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A truster directed his trustees, inter alia, to hold the residue of his estate for his children in liferent and their issue in fee, declaring that the grandchildren's shares should not vest till they respectively attained majority, and that such vesting should take place subject to the liferent of their parent. He further conferred on the trustees full power to advance to the fiars a portion not exceeding one-half of their respective shares.
The trustees having presented a petition for authority to resign and for the appointment of a judicial factor on the trust-estate, on the ground that certain other trust purposes were unworkable, the curator ad litem to the minor grandchildren called the attention of the Court to the power to make advances, and raised the question whether the Court would confer the same power upon a judicial factor.
The Court granted the petition, holding that the trustees had an absolute right to resign under the Trust Acts 1861 and 1867, and that that right could not be defeated by the possibility of the administration of the estate being more limited in the hands of a judicial factor than under the trust-deed.
Alexander Kirkwood Brown and others, testamentary trustees of the late Robert M'Connell, bleacher, Glasgow, presented a petition for authority to resign the office of
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trustee, and for the appointment of a judicial factor on the trust-estate. By the fourth purpose of his trust-disposition and settlement the testator, who died on 7th April 1897, recommended and empowered the trustees to carry on his bleach-works, with full discretion, if they saw fit, to wind it up or dispose of it as a going concern. By the sixth purpose he directed his trustees to erect tenements of dwelling-houses on certain specified steadings of ground. He lastly directed them to hold the residue of his estate for his children equally among them in liferent and their issue in fee, it being declared that the shares of grandchildren should vest at twenty-one in the case of males, and at twenty-one or marriage in that of females, and “that such vesting shall take place subject to the life interest of their parent if then alive, and the right given to such parent as after mentioned to confer a similar life interest on his or her surviving spouse.” The truster at the same time conferred on the trustees “the full power in their own absolute discretion to pay even before the said period of vesting, to or for behoof of any grandchild, such portion as they may think fit, not exceeding one-half thereof, of the capital of its prospective or presumptive share, and that for any purpose, and under any conditions they may consider proper, declaring that, notwithstanding what is hereinbefore written, each of my sons shall have full power to confer upon his surviving wife … and each of my daughters upon their surviving husbands … a liferent of the whole or any portion of the share of residue hereby directed to be held in liferent for such son or daughter.”
The petitioners set forth that they desired to sell the buildings and steadings which formed one block of ground, and to dispose of the business as a going concern; but that they were advised that they could not safely disregard the imperative direction of the truster in the sixth purpose to build tenements. Yet, to carry out this direction, they averred, would necessitate their embarking the whole of the trustestate in a hazardous building speculation, and borrowing money for at least an equal amount; and thus the trust had become unworkable, all the fiars being in minority, and it being therefore impossible to arrive at an agreement authorising the petitioners to take any particular course.
The application was presented under the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1861, and the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1867. The former (24 and 25 Vict. cap. 84), section 1, empowers all gratuitous trustees under any deed to resign; the latter (30 and 31 Vict. cap. 97), section 10, makes provision for the appointment of new trustees or a judicial factor by the Court, if any trustee entitled to resign, and desirous of so doing, is at the time sole trustee.
Mr Blackburn, advocate, who was appointed curator ad litem, to the fiars, lodged a minute in which, while expressing his belief that the trust-estate would be more efficiently administered by a judicial factor than by trustees, he called the attention of the Court to the clause of the settlement with respect to advances to the fiar quoted above, and proceeded thus—“This is a very peculiar power, and very different from the power frequently met with where trustees are authorised to make an advance of capital to an individual who is enjoying the liferent of that capital. Here the trustees are actually empowered to deprive the liferenters of a portion of their beneficiary interest in the estate, and to bestow that portion on an individual who has no present beneficiary interest in the estate, and may even not have any vested interest in the estate.
“The trust-deed contains a power to assume new trustees, so the truster must be held to have indicated no delectus personœ as to the carrying out of this power, and in such cases the Court has, on an application by a judicial factor, frequently extended to him the special powers contained in the original trust-deed. But the special power above referred to is of such a peculiar nature, and implies such a power of selection as to the individuals on whom the beneficiary interest of the estate is to be conferred, that the curator has grave doubts as to whether the Court would allow a judicial factor to exercise the power. If this doubt is justified, then the interests of his ward would be adversely affected by the granting of the prayer of the petition in its present form, and he considers it right to draw the attention of the Court to this fact at the present stage of the proceedings.”
The Lord Ordinary ( Stormonth Darling) reported the petition to the First Division.
The petitioners argued that under the statutes they had an absolute right to resign, pointed out that the discretion conferred on the trustees could only be exercised after the death of the liferenter, and referred to Maxwell's Trustees v. Maxwell, November 4, 1874, 2 R. 71; Simson, &c., January 27, 1883, 10 R. 540; Robbie's Judicial Factor v. Macrae, February 4, 1893, 20 R. 358; Howden v. Simson, November 16, 1895, 23 R. 113,
At the same time it appears to me that the case admits of a distinct solution upon this ground, that these trustees have a right to have the prayer of their petition granted, and accordingly that any doubt or difficulty which may arise in the sequel in consequence of the different powers of a judicial factor does not present a legitimate answer to the prayer of the petition.
But as this latter subject has been mooted, it is in accordance with what Lord Stormonth Darling has said, that the Court cannot in anticipation determine whether the application of a judicial factor for authority to exercise the powers conferred
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As to our giving any particular power to the judicial factor, that is not possible at this stage. If after the factor is appointed the question should arise, he can come to the Court and state the whole circumstances. We shall then be in a position to decide whether or not power should be given to him to exercise the discretion.
I also agree with what has been said as to the future administration. Whenever a judicial factor is appointed the Court becomes the trustee, and I think that the parties may be satisfied that the interests of the beneficiaries will be safe in the hands of the Court whatever emergencies may arise.
I agree also that it is impossible for the Court at present to say what special power they might think fit to grant to a judicial factor in circumstances which cannot be anticipated. Any application for special powers must be considered upon its own merits at the time when it is made. For a somewhat similar reason I confess it appears to me that the other persons interested in the estate could not be required to the themselves down in anticipation to the position they are to take up in circumstances which they cannot possibly foresee.
Therefore I think we must appoint a judicial factor, having for my own part no doubt that the administration of the estate will be safe in his hands, subject to the control and superintendence of the Court.
The Court granted the prayer of the petition.
Counsel for the Petitioners— Fleming. Agents— Forrester & Davidson, W.S.