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Process — Special Case — Competency.
A testator directed his trustees to pay to his wife during her lifetime “the free rents, interests, and profits arising from my means and estate, heritable and moveable, or from the proceeds thereof,” and after her death to divide his “means and estate, heritable and moveable, or the proceeds thereof,” into three equal parts, and to hold one share for behoof of each of his three children in liferent and his or her children in fee.
The testator was survived by his wife and three children, and left, inter alia, engineering works and other heritable property. There was no direction in the trust-deed to the trustees to carry on the engineering business.
Held that the trustees had power under the trust-deed to sell the heritable property, including the engineering works.
Observations as to nature of controversy which may be made the subject of a special case.
David Thomson, engineer, Johnstone, died on 26th September 1895 leaving a trust-disposition and settlement, dated 24th September, in which he conveyed his whole estate, heritable and moveable, to trustees for the following purposes— In the first place, Payment of his debts, sick-bed and funeral charges, and trust expenses: “ In the second place. In the event of my wife Mary Anne Hamilton or Thomson surviving me, that my trustees shall pay to her during her lifetime the free rents, interests, and profits arising from my means and estate, heritable and moveable, or from the proceeds thereof: In the third place, That my trustees shall, upon the decease of the longer liver of my said wife and me, divide my means and estate, heritable and moveable, or the proceeds thereof, into three equal parts or shares, and shall hold one of said equal parts or shares for behoof of my daughter Ann Crawford Thomson or M'Kenzie in liferent for her liferent use allenarly, and of her children in fee; they shall hold another of said equal parts or shares for behoof of my son David Thomson in liferent for his liferent use allenarly and of his children in fee, and they shall hold the remaining said equal part or share for behoof of my daughter Mary Stevenson Thomson or Stewart, in liferent for her liferent use allenarly and of her children in fee.”
The truster was survived by his wife and three children. At the date of his death his estate included, inter alia, the engineering works at Johnstone in which he carried on his business of an engineer, and certain leasehold subjects at Kilchattan Bay, consisting of three houses erected on ground held on a ninety-nine years' lease from Whitsunday 1880 to Whitsunday 1979.
The trustees resolved, if it was competent, to sell the engineering works and the leasehold subjects by public roup or private bargain, or, failing sale of the former, to let them on lease for ten years or less; but questions arose between them and the beneficiaries as to their power to do so.
For the decision of the point a Special Case was presented to the Court by (1) the trustees and (2) the beneficiaries under the trust-deed.
The questions at law were—“(1) Have the parties of the first part power under the trust-disposition and settlement to sell the engineering works and fixed plant and tools therein by public roupor by private bargain? (2) Have they power to let the said engineering works and fixed plant and tools on lease for say ten years or under? (3) Have they power, under the said trust-disposition and settlement, to sell the said leasehold subjects at Kilchattan Bay by public roup or by private bargain?”
Argued for first parties—A sale was competent, as the trust-deed directed them to pay to the widow the free rents, interests, and profits arising from his means and
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estate, heritable or moveable, “or from the proceeds thereof,” and on her death “to divide said means and estate, heritable and moveable, or the proceeds thereof.” This necessarily implied a power of sale.— Parker v. Tootal (1865), 11 H. L. Oases, opinion of Lord Westbury, p. 161; Affleck v. James (1849), 17 Simon's Reports, 121; Allan v. Glasgow's Trustees, September 1, 1835, 2 S. & M., opinion of Lord Brougham, p. 352. Argued for the second parties—It was incompetent for the trustees to sell or let on long lease any part of the heritable estate, including the engineering works, because the trust-deed contained no express powers to that effect and no sufficient ground for implying such power.
The plain reading of the will shows that it was the intention of the testator that the trustees should have power to convert any part of the estate, heritable or moveable, into money if they thought fit to do so. I do not think the word “proceeds” can be used as applicable to the moveable portion of the estate only. The sequence shows that the word applies to the whole of the truster's means and estate, both heritable and moveable. A case was quoted in which Lord Westbury expressed his opinion that implication may arise from the form of expression in a deed which involves something else as contemplated by the person using the expression. Here I think the form of the direction to the trustees necessarily involves a power of sale.
On the question submitted to us I have no doubt. In the second purpose of the trust the testator authorises the trustees to give the liferent of the estate to his wife by paying her the free rents, interests, and profits arising either from his means and estate or the proceeds thereof. This implies that they may either keep the estate as it is or convert the estate and give her the interest of the proceeds. If this is right as regards the second purpose, the same reasoning is applicable to the third. A power is implied in that also to convert the estate. This view acquires additional force from two circumstances. The testator has given no direction that the trustees should carry on the business. It may therefore be inferred that he did not intend them to do so. In the second place, upon the death of the testator and his wife the trustees are directed to hold the estate for behoof of the children of the truster in liferent and their children in fee. It is impossible to think that the truster meant the trustees to carry on this business, not only during the lifetime of his widow, but also after her death during the lifetime of his children, and to hand it over intact to his children's children.
As regards the competency of the special case, I think it may be regarded as competent, in respect that the first parties might have proceeded to sell the business at their own hand, in which case the beneficiary might have objected on the ground that no power of sale is contained in the trust-deed, and they might have applied for interdict on that ground. I think that this case is an economical and convenient mode of settling that question.
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Dundas — With reference to what has fallen from your Lordships on the question of the competency of this special case, I think it right to say that the point was carefully considered by the parties, and if your Lordships had expressed a desire for argument upon the point I would have cited authority which would have satisfied your Lordships that the case was competent.
The Court pronounced the following interlocutor— *
“Answer the first and second questions therein stated by declaring that the parties of the first part have power under the trust—disposition and settlement of the deceased David Thomson, according to their discretion, to sell by public roup or by private bargain, or let, the engineering works and fixed plant and tools therein: Answer the third question therein stated in the affirmative: Find and declare accordingly, and decern.”
Counsel for First Parties— Dundas, Q.C.— Salvesen. Agent— F. J. Martin, W.S.
Counsel for Second Parties— Jameson, Q.C.— Sym. Agent— F. J. Martin, W.S.