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Held that a petition presented under sections 100 and 138 of the Companies Act 1862, by the liquidator of a company which was being voluntarily wound-up, craving the court to ordain the secretary of the company to deliver up its minute-book, was competent.
Subject_Retention — Company — Minute-Book.
Held that the secretary of a company has no right of lien over its minute-book.
At a meeting of the shareholders of the Scottish West Australian Land and Exploration Syndicate, Limited, held in March 1896, it was resolved to wind up the company voluntarily, and Mr Andrew Gladstone was appointed liquidator.
A petition was presented by the liquidator against Mr William M'Callum, secretary of the company, craving the Court to ordain the respondent “to deliver forthwith to the petitioner as liquidator foresaid the minute-book” of the company, “with-out prejudice to any lien competent to him.” The application was presented under secs. 100 and 138 of the Companies Act 1862. Sec. 100 provides, inter alia—“The Court may at any time after making an order for winding up a company require any … agent or officer of the company to deliver forthwith, or within any such time as the Court directs, into the hands of the official
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liquidator, any sum or balance, books, papers, estate, or effects which happen to be in his hands for the time being, and to which the company is prima facie entitled.” Sec. 138 empowers the liquidator or contributories of a company which is being voluntarily wound up to apply to the Court “to determine any question arising in the matter of such winding up, or to exercise as respects the enforcing of calls, or in respect of any other matter, all or any of the powers which the Court might exercise if the company were being wound up by the Court; and the Court, if satisfied that the determination of such question or the required exercise of power will be just and beneficial, may accede wholly or partially to such application on such terms and subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit.” The respondent lodged answers in which he averred that he had acted as secretary to the company till the date of the petitioner's appointment; and that for the services rendered by him to the company there remained due to him the sum of £17, 11s. He offered to give up the minute-book on receiving payment of this debt from the liquidator, and maintained that he was entitled to retain the book till he received payment.
Argued for petitioner—(1) He was entitled to make this application in terms of the two sections of the Companies Act quoted above. These sections, as interpreted by the cases, showed that the Court might interfere for such a purpose as this in voluntary as well as in other windings-up— Rance's case, 1870, 6 Ch. App. 104. (2) The minute-book of a company could not be the subject of a lien. A solicitor had been required to give up the minute-book of a company which had employed him— In re Capital Fire Assurance Company, 1883, 24 Ch. Div. 408. There were similar decisions in the cases of in re South Essex Reclamation Company, 1869, L.R. 4 Chanc. App. 215, and Engel v. South Metropolitan Brewing Company, 1892, L.R. Chanc. i., 442.
Argued for respondent—(1) The petition was not warranted by the sections of the Companies Act founded upon by the petitioner. Sec. 138 did not give the Court jurisdiction, in a merely voluntary liquidation in which creditors were unrepresented, to interpose between the company and the common law right of creditors to enforce payment of their debts— Sherrard v. Gardner, March 10, 1876, 3 R. 577; British Canadian Lumber Company, December 3, 1886, 14 R. 160. Sec. 100 only related to books or papers to which the company was prima facie entitled, and did not extend to a case like the present, where the respondent was prima facie entitled to retain the minute-book. In any view, the Court must be satisfied that it would be equitable to grant the application, and should only grant it subject to the rights of the respondent. (2) The minute-book had come into his hands lawfully in the course of his employment and he was entitled to retain it until his counter obligation under the contract of employment was fulfilled— Meikle & Wilson v. Pollard, November 6, 1880, 8 R. 69; Robertson v. Ross, November 17, 1887, 15 R. 67.
Lord President—I do not see any objection to the liquidator of this company proceeding under section 138 of the Companies Act 1862, but he is met by the pretension of the respondent that he had a lien over the minute-book of the company.
Now, the validity of the claim prima facie is to be judged by the statement of the respondent in the answers to the petition; and I do not discover more in his averments than that he was the secretary of the company and performed the duties of the secretary until the liquidation.
Now, has any law been shown in support of the proposition that the secretary of a company who has been employed to write up the minutes has a right of lien over the minute-books? There are well-known and well-recognised liens applicable to a different relationship of the parties, and to a different possession of the articles in dispute, from what we find here; and we could not give judgment for the respondent unless we were to affirm—what has not as yet been decided—that every man who has been employed to write in the books in his master's office has a right of lien over the books until he has been paid for his services.
I therefore think that we must grant the prayer of the petition.
Retention, as I understand it, is the right of an owner of property to withhold delivery of it under an unexecuted contract of sale or agreement of a similar nature until the price due to him has been paid or the counter obligation fulfilled. Lien again is the right of a person who is not the owner of property, but is in possession of it on a lawful title, and whose right of lien, if it is not a general one—of which class of liens there are not many examples—is a right to retain the property until he has been compensated for something which he has done to it. In this case there is no right of retention because the books belong to the company, and there is no right of lien because they are not in the possession of the respondent but of the company. Accordingly this case is in a different category from that of a claim by a writer who is lawfully in possession of his client's papers under a contract of agency.
The Court granted the prayer of the petition.
Counsel for Petitioner— Gunn. Agent— John Scott, Solicitor.
Counsel for Respondent- Christie. Agents— Simpson & Marwick, W.S.