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[Court of Exchequer.
Held that a person who was tenant of a farm under one lease, and lessee of the landlord's shooting rights over the farm under another lease, was liable to be assessed under Schedule B of the Income-tax Acts on the aggregate amount of the shooting and agricultural rents payable under the two leases.
At a meeting of the General Commissioners of Income-tax for the county of Sutherland held at Dornoch on 20th November 1894, Mr Tom Scott, farmer, Rhifail, appealed against an assessment of £1042, 17s. 6d. made on him under Schedule B of the Income-tax Acts for the year ended 5th April 1895, in respect of the occupation of Rhifail sheep-farm and shootings.
The Commissioners were of opinion that the assessment under Schedule B ought not to include the appellant's shooting rental, and that appellant was only liable to be assessed under said schedule on his rent as grazing tenant, and they reduced the assessment to £672, 17s. 6d. accordingly.
The present case was stated for the opinion of the Court at the request of the Surveyor of Taxes.
The case contained the following statements:—“Mr Scott is tenant under the Duke of Sutherland of Rhifail sheep-farm, in virtue of a fourteen years' lease as from Whitsunday 1889, and he is also the lessee under another lease, applicable to the same period, of the landlord's shooting rights over said farm, and also of his angling rights over one heat of the river Naver. According to such leases he pays yearly the following separate rents, viz., £670 in respect of the occupancy and grazing of the farm, £370 for the shootings, including a furnished lodge-keeper's house and offices, and £100 for the angling, together with a further sum of £2, 17s. 6d. yearly of fire insurance, payable on the farm and other buildings rented by him. Mr Scott is in the actual occupation of Rhifail farm and resides upon the same all the year round. No assessment under Schedule B has been made in previous years upon Mr Scott in respect of the shootings and angling until the year 1893–94, when the Schedule B assessment, so far as it included the shooting rental, was discharged after a hearing before the Commissioners.
The appellant contended (and his contention was admitted by the Surveyor) that if the shooting of Rhifail during his occupancy of the grazing right had been let by the proprietor to another person, the shooting tenant would not have been liable to income-tax under Schedule B in respect of the shooting rent; and that no distinction can be drawn between his position and that of a shooting tenant who pays a separate rent for the shootings. … This is the first occasion in the county of Sutherland, since the passing of the Income-Tax Act 1862, that the occupancy of shootings over and above the primary and beneficial occupation of the land as a sheep grazing farm (apart from deer forests) has been made the subject of assessment in respect of income-tax under Schedule B. …
It was contended on behalf of the Crown that the Schedule B assessment of £1042, 17s. 6d., being the annual value of the farm and shootings thereon in the occupancy of the appellant (less the sum of £70 allocated to the shooting lodges), was rightly made according to No. vii., Schedule B, section 63 of the Income-Tax Act of 1845 (5 and 6 Vict. cap. 35).” …
Argued for the Surveyor of Taxes—The appellant was undoubtedly an occupier of land by his possession under his shooting lease just as much as in virtue of his agricultural lease. The case of Middleton v. Lord Advocate, March 16, 1876, 3 R. 599 was directly in point. There, as here, the tenant had the exclusive use or occupation of the land, and the rent paid by him was its agreed-on actual value, in that case as a deer forest, in this for farming and shooting combined. Rule vii., Schedule B, section 63, of the Act of 1842 provided for the duty under Schedule B being charged in addition to the duty under Schedule A, according to the general provision in rule 1, Schedule A,
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section 60, on the full amount of the annual value of the lands. That rule extended to all lands “for whatever purpose occupied or enjoyed,” and the annual value was in this case the full rent paid, on which accordingly the appellant must be assessed— Menzies v. Solicitor of Inland Revenue, January 18, 1878, 5 R. 531— 15 S.L.R. 285; Stewart v. Bulloch, January 14, 1881, 8 R. 381, where the shooting rent was reckoned in calculating the amount of a composition — Paterson v. Johnston, November 12, 1879, 7 R. 12, at pp. 24–7. Argued for appellant—(1) Only one rent was contemplated by Schedule B, and that was for the “occupation” of the land in the statutory sense, which did not embrace shooting purposes. It was merely a fiction of law to hold that the right of a game tenant was “occupation.” (2) All the rules contemplated only the assessment of profits, but the tenant of a shooting could not be said to make a profit out of his shooting rights. This constituted the differences between assessment under the Property and Income Tax Acts and that under the Poor Law Act, where a game tenant had been held to be in the occupation of land and so assessable. The terms and objects of the Acts were different — Stirling Crawfurd v. Stewart, June 6, 1861, 23 D. 965. The headings of the Income Tax Acts showed that they were intended to exact duties on “profits,” and thus an agricultural tenant was exempted if he did not make profits—14 Vict. c. 12, sec. 3; 16 and 17 Vict. c. 34, sec. 46; 43 and 44 Vict. c. 20, sec. 52; 53 and 54 Vict. c. 8, sec. 23. Schedule B of the 1853 Act (16 and 17 Vict.) was subordinate to Schedule A, and unless the ownership was assessable the occupancy could not be. But shooting rents were not assessed qua ownership, under Schedule A but under Schedule D; therefore they were not assessed under Schedule B qua occupancy. Under the 1842 Act this contention would be equally valued.
At advising—
Lord President—This is an important case and requires consideration, but the facts lead me to the conclusion that the decision of the Commissioners is wrong.
That Mr Scott is in occupation of these lands in virtue of his agricultural lease is admitted. That by his possession under his shooting lease he is also in the sense of law in occupation of the lands can hardly be regarded as disputable in view of the decisions. I may refer to the case of Middleton (cited in the case), where the previous decisions are noted, and to Lord Mure's opinion in Paterson v. Johnston, 7 R. 17, where they are carefully examined.
If Mr Scott, then, be in occupation of the lands under both leases, he comes under Schedule B, and the next question is, what, to use the phraseology of the statute, shall the annual value of the lands be understood to be? The 63rd section says that the duties under Schedule B shall be charged, according to the general rule in No. 1. Schedule A, on the full amount of the annual value. This leads us to the 60th section, which gives the rule referred to, and there we find that the annual value of lands is understood to be the rent by the year at which the same are let at rack-rent, if the amount of such rents shall have been fixed by agreement. This rule is to apply to all lands and heritages capable of actual occupation, of whatever nature and for whatever purposes occupied or enjoyed.
If Mr Scott is occupant of the lands under both his leases, then the rent he pays under both is rent for the occupation of these lands, and the fact that one of his rights of occupancy is for one purpose, and the other for another, is nothing against the assessment, and shows merely that the annual value of these lands arises from their being suitable for two modes of occupation which are diverse but compatible. The aggregate of the two rents fixed by agreement is, in the sense of the statute, the rent at which these lands are let. The fact that there are two leases and two rents, and not one rent stipulated in one lease, seems to me to make no more than a superficial difference.
My opinion is that the decision of the Commissioners should be reversed.
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The Court reversed the determination of the Commissioners.
Counsel for the Surveyor of Taxes— A. J. Young. Agent—The Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
Counsel for the Appellant— A. Jameson— Macphail. Agents— Macpherson & Mackay, S.S.C.