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[Sheriff of Lanarkshire.
A tenant sued his landlord for damages caused by the landlord's alleged illegal interference with the roof of his house. Upon appeal for jury trial under section 40 of the Judicature Act, the Court remitted the case to the Sheriff for proof, restricted to the averments in certain specified articles of the condescendence, the other averments being held irrelevant.
Andrew Nicol, miner, sued his sometime landlord, John Picken, for £500 damages.
The pursuer was the defender's tenant from Whitsunday 1891 to Whitsunday 1892. In articles 13, 14, and 15 of the condescendence he averred that in April 1892 the defender removed the roof of a room in the pursuer's house, so that the rain came through the ceiling of the room and destroyed his furniture, and made the house uninhabitable; that although the defender knew that the pursuer's wife was lying seriously ill, he nevertheless caused certain building operations to be carried on upon the premises, so as to materially aggravate her illness and accelerate her death; that in consequence of all these illegal operations the pursuer was obliged to take another house at an increased rent, and that his wife died there, her end being accelerated by the defender's operations. The previous articles of the condescendence contained a long account of alleged proceedings on the part of the defender before the licensing authorities, which terminated in the defender's transferring his business premises from subjects rented by him to his own property, in part of which the pursuer was tenant, the result of which was the interference complained
The Sheriff allowed a proof before answer.
The pursuer appealed to the Court of Session and lodged an issue.
He argued—This case was competently brought to the Court. It was a serious case of damage. The pursuer averred that the defender's illegal operations had not only caused material damage to his furniture, but had also hastened the death of his wife. This was a case which, if it had begun in the Court of Session, must necessarily have been sent to trial by jury if the pursuer desired it, and that being so, it was incompetent to send it back to the Sheriff Court for proof— Crabb v. Fraser, March 8, 1892, 19 R. 581.
The respondent argued—It had been decided that the Court could deal with a case appealed for jury trial in the way which it thought best for the parties, and either send it to jury trial, order proof before a Lord Ordinary, or remit back to the Sheriff for proof. This was really a very small case. If proof was necessary at all, it should be before the Sheriff, in whose jurisdiction the parties were resident, rather than by a jury trial or a proof in the Court of Session— Cochrane v. Ewing, July 20, 1883, 10 R. 1279; Bethune, &c. v. Denham, March 20, 1886, 13 R. 882.
At advising—
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We have considered this competent appeal, and in our opinion it is not a fit case for jury trial, but should be sent for proof before the Sheriff-Substitute. The appeal is brought under the 40th section of the Judicature Act, and it would be an unfortunate thing if the language of the statute had been such as to prevent us doing what in our opinion was best in the interests of the parties, but that point has been considered and decided, and I am of opinion that the result arrived at is both a sound and expedient one. I think we should follow the course pointed out by the former decisions in this case.
I merely make this explanation to show that in my opinion when an appeal is brought competently before us, it is open to us to consider, in view of the whole facts of the case, what is the best course to follow in the interests of the parties.
The Court remitted to the Sheriff to take the proof, restricted to matters contained in articles 13, 14, and 15 of the condescendence.
Counsel for the Appellant— G. Smith— Able. Agents— Gill & Pringle, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondent— Clyde. Agents— Drummond & Reid, S.S.C.