Scottish Court of Session Decisions

Lord Justice-Clerk—In this case the Sheriffs have come to one conclusion. The grounds on which they have done so may be summed up very shortly. The pursuer and the defender had ample opportunities of meeting. The defender's case is that he never was on familiar terms with the pursuer. I think the answer to this case depends upon the answer to the question, “Did the defender write the letter produced in process?” as it is a letter which could not have been written to any woman by a man who was not on familiar terms with her.

I have looked at the letter, and compared it with the specimen of the defender's handwriting taken in Court on the day of the trial, and I think no one, except for the purposes of pleading, would say that both documents were not written by the same person. The occurrence in both of similar characteristics is remarkable, such as the way in which the letters were formed, and I think it is palpably evident that the same person wrote both.

I hold, therefore, that the defender wrote this letter. But the letter indicates familiarity on his part in the plainest manner, and destroys his case. It also sufficiently corroborates the pursuer's case, and justifies the conclusion at which the Sheriffs have arrived.

Lord Young—I am of the same opinion. As regards the evidence in cases of this nature I would like to make the following observations. I do not think that falsehood on the part of either party to the case is ever altogether unimportant; it may be of more or less importance according to circumstances. I do not think it would make out the pursuer's case that the defender admitted that he had once or twice or more frequently been convicted of perjury. The proof of any number of falsehoods on the part of the defender unconnected with the case would not support the case of the pursuer; it would only discredit the testimony of the defender. But where the falsehood is on matters connected with the case, it may be of great importance, and indeed may be conclusive, taken in connection with other evidence which would not have been sufficient without it. Thus it would not support the pursuer's case to have evidence that the defender had frequently called at her house and written to her letters which have nothing in them that would suggest the idea of familiarity. Such evidence would be no corroboration of her testimony. But if he denied having called or having written the letters or denied all knowledge of the defender; if he averred that the letters had been written by some-one else in imitation of his handwriting, and that he knew nothing of the woman, that falsehood would be conclusive in support of the pursuer's case, because it suggests the question “Why does the defender falsely deny having written to or called on or known the woman.” It thus leads to the conclusion that the defender's connection with the pursuer was of such a character that he wanted to conceal it. It thus forms some corroboration of the pursuer's testimony, and if the pursuer's testimony is believed by the Court to be trustworthy, it may entitle the Court to find for the pursuer.

Lord Rutherfurd Clark—I think the Sheriffs have come to a right conclusion.

Lord Trayner—I think this is a very narrow case, and should have been prepared to hold that the pursuer had failed to prove her case had it not been for theletter written by the defender to her which she had produced. That letter, however, affords such corroboration of the pursuer's testimony as enables one to agree with your Lordship in holding that the pursuer has established her right to decree against the defender.

As Lord Young's remarks upon the evidence necessary in such cases as the present were occasioned by an observation made by me in the course of the debate, I wish to say, that in making that observation I was not alluding to anything his Lordship had said in previous cases. The observation had reference to an opinion expressed by one of the learned Judges who decided the case of M'Bayne v. Davidson ( 22 D. 740), to the effect that the defender's “false account of the matter” afforded corroboration to the pursuer's case. I have heard the same view expressed more recently. I dissent from that view entirely. If a defender in his evidence denies the pursuer's statement, that cannot, in any view of it, be regarded as a corroboration of the pursuer. For if the defender's denial is true, it is a contradiction of the pursuer; if it is false, or is believed to be false, it is not evidence to any effect—it is simply discarded as false. A false statement cannot afford any corroboration; it is not believed.