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A testatrix directed her trustees to realise and convert her whole estate into money, and to divide the residue equally among, inter alios, the children of J, “of whom there are ten, and in the event of any of the said children dying before payment without leaving issue, the division shall be made as if they had not been born among the survivors jointly with the issue of any who may have died leaving children, such issue always succeeding equally
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to the share which their parent would have received if alive: … With power to my trustees to make such advances as they may deem suitable before the period of distribution (being the complete realisation and scheme of division of my whole estate, which shall be the period of vesting when not otherwise provided) to any of the said children, or to their father or mother respectively for behoof of all the members of a family, jointly, if not stated in the receipt to be for any one in particular.” One of the beneficiaries died on 24th April 1890. The estate was not finally realised until after that date.
Held (1) that a share of the residue did not vest in him; (2) that the words “of whom there are ten” did not exclude three children of J who were born after the date of the settlement, and before the death of the testatrix.
Mrs Mary Rattray or Millar died on 16th May 1889, leaving personal estate to the amount of £1300, and heritable estate to the value of about £470.
By a trust-disposition and settlement she directed her trustees (12th) “To realise and convert my whole estate into money, and divide the free residue equally among the children of my late brother Andrew Rattray, whose widow continues his farm at Porter-size, County Kildare, Ireland, of whom there are nine; the children of my said brother John Rattray, of whom there are ten; and the children of my said brother James Rattray, of whom there are seven, who may survive me; and in the event of any of them dying leaving issue, such issue shall be entitled equally among them to the share which their parent would have received if alive; and in the event of any of the said children dying before payment without leaving issue, the division shall be made as if they had not been born among the survivors jointly with the issue of any who may have died leaving children, such issue always succeeding equally to the share which their parent would have received if alive, the original division to be in as many equal shares as there are children alive, or dead but leaving husband or wife or family, such husband or wife likewise representing the deceased member either in their own right or for their children, and counting as one in the division: With power to my trustees to make such advances as they may deem suitable before the period of distribution (being the complete realisation and scheme of division of my whole estate, which shall be the period of vesting when not otherwise provided) to any of the said children, or to their father or mother respectively for behoof of all the members of a family, jointly, if not stated in the receipt to be for any one in particular, such advances to bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, so as to make all equal; but such advances to any one who may die without leaving husband, wife, or family shall be held as vested at the time of payment and be regarded as special legacies, but the share of any one who may be a minor shall be payable on attaining majority, or in the case of females on being married, whichever event shall first happen.”
The truster was survived by the nine children of Andrew Rattray mentioned in the settlement. One of these children, Peter Millar Rattray, died within a year of the testator, viz., on 24th April 1890, unmarried but testate. At the date of his death the trust-estate had been realised with the exception of certain heritable subjects in Dunkeld, and a debenture by a foreign land company which did not mature until 1893. The heritable subjects were sold on 4th April 1890, and the price was received on 15th May 1890.
The truster was also survived by the ten children of John Rattray mentioned in the settlement. Subsequent to the date of the settlement and prior to the date of the truster's death three other children of the same marriage of John Rattray were born, who at the date of the present case were in pupillarity.
The truster was also survived by the seven children of James Rattray referred to in the settlement.
Questions having arisen (1) as to whether Peter Millar Rattray having died upon the complete realisation and division of the whole estate, any share of the residue vested in him, and (2) whether the three children of John Rattray who were born subsequent to the date of the trust-deed were entitled along with their brothers and sisters to share in the residue, the present special case was presented, and the following questions were submitted for the opinion of the Court:—“(1) Did a share of residue vest in the deceased Peter Millar Rattray? (2) Are the said William Rattray, Jane Ann Rattray, and Richard Rattray entitled to participate in the division of residue?
Argued for the beneficiaries of the deceased Peter Millar Rattray—This was an estate easy of realisation, and six months was ample time for the trustees to have realised and divided it among the beneficiaries. This was a case in which the Court upon equitable grounds would presume that to have been done which ought to have been done. The heritage was actually sold before Peter's death, and, though the price was not paid until May, yet it was fixed, and could have been entered in any scheme of division— Maclean's Trustees v. Maclean, July 19, 1889, 16 R. 1095. In the circumstances upon equitable grounds the Court would hold that Peter's share had vested. On the second question — As the children were born prior to the death of the testatrix, if she had desired the three youngest to participate, she could easily have said so, and in the absence of any such direction the share of residue must be restricted to the ten— Shearer, 4 Brown's Chan. Rep. 54; Theobald on Wills, 228; Bryce's Trustees, March 2, 1878, 5 R. 722.
Argued for the children of John Rattray — Looking to the nature of the estate, there was no undue delay in the realisation of the property. The period of vesting was
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clearly indicated by the testatrix, and could not be anticipated; the case was ruled by Howat's Trustees v. Howat, Dec. 17, 1869, 8 Macph. 337, and Macdougall v. Macfarlane's Trustees, May 16, 1890, 17 R. 761. On the second question—The words “of whom there are ten” were demonstrative, not taxative. The bequest was to the children of John, and the power of making advances to the parents showed that the bequest was to the whole children— Bogle, Hume, 274; Wood v. Wood, January 18, 1861, 23 D. 338; Ross v. Dunlcp, May 31, 1878, 5 R. 833. At advising—
The facts which raise these two questions are very simple, and may be very shortly stated. Peter Millar Rattray was a son of Andrew Rattray, who was a brother of the testatrix. Now, this Peter Millar Rattray died unmarried on 24th April 1890, and the testatrix had died eleven months before. He left a settlement by which he conveyed to certain parties therein named his share of Mrs Millar's estate. If his share of this estate had vested in him, then of course it was carried by his settlement; if, on the other hand, it had not vested, then it was not so carried.
The first question then which has to be determined is the period of vesting; or, in other words, when did the shares of Mrs Millar's estate vest in the various beneficiaries? Now, the testatrix has expressed in so many words the time at which she desires that vesting shall take place. No doubt it is contained in a parenthesis, but the expression of her intention on the matter is not the less clear upon that account; it is in these terms—“being the complete realisation and scheme of division of my whole estate, which shall be the period of vesting when not otherwise provided.” It is not suggested that there is any other provision as regards the share of Peter Millar Rattray, and therefore the period of vesting of this share must be the period of the complete realisation and division of the testatrix's whole estate. If, then, Peter Millar Rattray died before his share of Mrs Millar's estate had vested in him, then the following clause of the deed applied to him—“and in the event of any of the said children dying before payment without leaving issue, the division shall be made as if they had not been born, among the survivors jointly with the issue of any who may have died leaving children, such issue always succeeding equally to the share which their parents would have received if alive.” …
Now, this is the event which has happened, for Peter Millar Rattray died before the period of payment had arrived, and his share therefore goes to the surviving children of Andrew Rattray.
It was urged that though realisation had not actually taken place, this had arisen from undue delay; and that we therefore should hold that to be done which ought to have been done. But I do not see any room for such a suggestion when we consider the date at which the testatrix died. She left personal property worth about £1300, and heritable property worth about £470. This property would take some time to realise advantageously, and I cannot say, looking to the nature of this estate, that there has been here any undue delay. When the testatrix has fixed a time for vesting, whether we think it a judicious arrangement or not, all that we can do is to give effect to it.
I am therefore for answering the 1st question in the negative.
As regards the 2nd question, the three children referred to in it are children of John Rattray, and their position is that they were not born at the date of the Settlement, but prior to the testatrix's death. The question therefore is, whether or not they are included in the gift to the children of John? Now, the testatrix by the 12th purpose of her settlement directs her trustees to divide the free residue of her estate among the children of her brothers, and among others between “the children of my brother James Rattray of whom there are ten.” Are these words, “of whom there are ten” to be held as limiting the number of those who are to share in this bequest? I do not think that this was the intention of the testator, and I reach this result on a construction of one of the clauses in this 12th purpose, which is in these terms—“With power to my trustees to make such advances as they may deem suitable before the period of distribution … to any of the said children or to their father or mother respectively for behoof of all the members of a family jointly if not stated in the receipt to be for anyone in particular.”. … I think that the language of this clause shows that the testatrix intended her gift to be shared in by all the children of her brother John.
I am therefore for answering the second question in the affirmative.
The law upon this subject is well determined. A legacy to the children of A confers upon all the children who may be born a right to participate in the bequest, whereas a bequest to the N children of A limits it to the children who happen at the time to be in existence, and the reason of this is, that you could not admit post-nati to share in the bequest without doing violence to the testator's language. Whenever the language of the deed permits the admission of post-nati to share in a bequest, then they ought to be admitted; and in the present case I consider the words used
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With regard to the term of payment, a difficulty sometimes arises in ascertaining the testator's intention on this matter, but any such difficulty is awanting in the present case, as the term of payment is clearly expressed in this 12th purpose as is also the period of vesting. The power of the trustees to make advances also shows that a wide discretion was given to them by the testatrix. Still I think that we must construe this deed in such a way as to carry out what we understand to be her intentions. As regards the second question the testatrix gives the residue of her estate to the children of her three brothers, not to the individuals who compose these three families, but to the families themselves. If a legacy is given in general terms to a class, the inference arising from such a gift must not be narrowed, unless there is a clear expression or implication of an opposite intention. In the present case the testatrix's intention is made clear by the terms of the 12th purpose.
The
The Court answered the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative.
Counsel for the Second Parties— Graham Stewart. Agents— Lyle & Wallace, Solicitors.
Counsel for First and Third Parties— Gillespie. Agents— W. & J. Burness, W.S.