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Held that the words “I will put you in prison,” used by a head clerk in a company to one of the clerks under him, were not actionable, and would not support the innuendo that the person to whom they were addressed had been guilty of such criminal misconduct as would warrant his being apprehended on a criminal charge and thereafter imprisoned.
This was an action by William Russell Cockburn against Thomas Reekie for £500 as damages for alleged slander.
The pursuer was a clerk in the employment of the London and Edinburgh Shipping Company, Leith, from October 1877 down to 18th November 1889, and the defender was cashier and managing clerk in the same company.
The pursuer averred that for some time past the defender had entertained feelings of hostility and malevolence toward him, and had done everything in his power to injure him in his reputation and prospects. In particular he averred—“(Cond. 5) On 18th November 1889, the pursuer, finding the work of his department rather heavy for him to undertake efficiently, wrote to the defender a most courteous and respectful letter, suggesting that some assistance should be given him to enable him satisfactorily to overtake the said work. The defender, on receipt of said letter, on the date above mentioned sent for pursuer, and in the head office of the said Shipping Company, in Commercial Street, Leith, asked him, ‘What the hell do you mean by sending me this letter?’ and attacked the pursuer in most violent and abusive language. Towards evening of the same day the defender came up to the pursuer's desk in the clerks' room, in the said Shipping Company's office, and after some abusive language, said that ‘he had a d—d presumption,’ and charged him with being incompetent for the duties of his office. Defender then called on pursuer to resign his post at once, and pursuer said he was willing to do this. Thereafter the defender, in the presence of Mr Seater and Mr White, both clerks in the said shipping office, and in their hearing, also stated to the pursuer, ‘I will put you in prison,’ thereby meaning it to be understood that the pursuer had been guilty of such criminal misconduct as would warrant his being apprehended on a criminal charge, and thereafter imprisoned. The said charge is false and calumnious, and the words were used by defender maliciously and without probable cause. No provocation was given by the pursuer.”
On 4th February 1890 the Lord Ordinary ( Wellwood) fixed the following issue for trial of the cause:—“Whether on the 18th day of November 1889, within the head office of the London and Edinburgh Shipping Company, in Commercial Street, Leith, in presence and hearing of Seater and William White, both clerks in the employment of the said Shipping Company, the defender said to the pursuer, ‘I will put you (meaning the pursuer) in prison,” and whether he thereby falsely and calumniously represented that the pursuer had been guilty of such criminal misconduct as would warrant his being apprehended on a criminal charge and thereafter imprisoned, to the loss, injury, and damage of the pursuer.”
The defender reclaimed, and argued—There was nothing in the circumstances in which they were used to attach to the words ‘I will put you in prison’ a libellous meaning, which they would not otherwise bear. The construction attempted to be put upon them by the proposed innuendo was forced and unreasonable— Fraser v. Morris, February 24, 1888, 15 R. 454; Stewart v. Moss, December 5, 1885, 13 R. 299; Brydone v. Brechin, May 17, 1881, 8 R. 697.
The pursuer and respondent argued—Looking to the fact that the words used were unqualified, they naturally bore the innuendo put upon them— Webb v. Beavan, May 30, 1883, L.R., 11 QBD 609; Blasquez v. Lothians Racing Club, June 29, 1889, 16 R. 893.
At advising—
The circumstances of the particular occurrence in question as stated by the pursuer on record are, that finding his work to heavy for him he wrote to the defender a courteous and respectful letter suggesting that some assistance should be given him, and that the defender on receiving this letter sent for the pursuer and in rude terms asked what he meant by sending it, and that in the evening of the same day the defender came to his desk and said that “he had a damned presumption,” and charged him with being incompetent for the duties of his office. Now, there is nothing slanderous in that, and no issue is proposed with regard to these words. It is quite plain, however, from the statement read that both parties were angry and were quarrelling with one another.
Then comes a statement that the defender called upon the pursuer to resign his post at once, which the pursuer said he was willing to do, and that thereafter, in the presence of two clerks in the office, the defender
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That is the whole statement made by the pursuer, and the innuendo sought to be put upon it is that the defender meant “that the pursuer had been guilty of such criminal misconduct as would warrant his being apprehended on a criminal charge, and thereafter imprisoned.” It appears to me that these words which were admittedly used, or something like them, will not bear the construction sought to be put upon them. I think it a most unreasonable and forced construction, because the only imputation made against the pursuer by the defender was one of incompetence and neglect of duty, which as cashier and managing clerk of the company the defender had a perfect right to make if he thought himself justified. That was the only subject of quarrel. It is no doubt ludicrous to say that because of negligence the defender had the power to put the pursuer in prison, but either from anger or from some other reason the defender seems to have had the notion that in a contract of the kind between the pursuer and the company he had the power to enforce fulfilment by imprisonment, but it is important to observe that no criminal charge was made against the pursuer. The way the innuendo puts it is that the defender meant “that the pursuer had been guilty of such criminal misconduct as would warrant his being apprehended on a criminal charge, and thereafter imprisoned.” It is not suggested what kind of criminal misconduct is intended, and I think even if it were otherwise intelligible, the innuendo is not sufficiently precise. Some kind of criminal charge must be alleged. Apart from that, however, it is perfectly plain that no kind of imputation of a criminal offence could be intended. The details of the interview and misunderstanding between the parties show that the only question between them was a question of the performance or non-performance by the pursuer of his duties as clerk. I think, therefore, the case falls under the category of such cases as Broomfield v. Greig, March 10, 1868, 6 Macph. 563, 40 Scot. Jus. 568, where the Court held that an innuendo of a forced and unreasonable character could not be allowed to be put upon words not in themselves slanderous.
It may seem hard to the pursuer that he should have no remedy for coarse abuse levelled at him, but he always has the power to repay the person who has so attacked him in his own coin, and in such cases the right is generally taken advantage of to the fullest extent.
The Court recalled the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, sustained the defences, and assoilzied the defender.
Counsel for the Pursuer— Baxter. Agent— J. H. Dixson, W.S.
Counsel for the Defender— C. S. Dickson— Salvesen. Agents— Beveridge, Sutherland, & Smith, S.S.C.