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A testatrix by her settlement directed her trustees to divide the residue of her estate equally between her two daughters, “and to their respective heirs and assignees, but declaring that the provision hereby made … is an alimentary provision for their own separate use and behoof, and shall not be subject to the jus mariti or right of administration or management of their husbands, … but my trustees shall be bound to see to the investment of the said residue for my said daughters in such way and manner as shall to them appear best to secure and give effect to the foresaid declarations and conditions.”
Held that the daughters were fiars, and were entitled to have the residue paid over to them upon their own receipts, but, following the case of Allan v. Allan's Trustees, December 12, 1872, 11 Macph. 216, that the receipts should bear exclusion of the jus mariti and right of administration.
Mrs Jane Lesslie, widow of the late James Lesslie, shipowner, North Shields, died at Bonny toun, Linlithgow, on 9th January 1881, leaving a trust-disposition and settlement, and codicil thereto, whereby she assigned to certain trustees her whole estate.
The third purpose of the settlement was as follows—“I direct my trustees, at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas six months after my death, or as soon after such term as my trustees shall be able to realise my estate, to divide the whole rest and residue of my said estates and effects equally between my two daughters Mrs Agnes Lesslie or Jamieson, wife of William Henry Jamieson, farmer, residing at Mayshade aforesaid, and Mrs Jane Lesslie or Dawson, wife of Adam Dawson, residing at Bonnytoun, Linlithgow, share and share alike, and to their respective heirs and assignees; but declaring that the provision hereby made to my said two daughters is an alimentary provision for their own separate use and behoof, and shall not be subject to the jus mariti or right of administration or management of their present husbands, or any future husbands they may marry, nor shall the same be assignable by them or by their said husbands, nor be liable to the deeds or subject to the legal diligence of the creditors, either of themselves or of their said husbands, for payment or in security of debts contracted by them; but my trustees shall be bound to see to the investment of the said residue for my said daughters in such way and manner as shall to them appear best to secure and give effect to the foresaid declarations and conditions, with power to my trustees, notwithstanding what is hereinbefore written, and provided they be required so to do by my said daughters, or either of them, to pay to my said daughters, or either of them, the whole or such part of their respective provisions foresaid as they may request so to be paid to them, leaving my said daughters themselves to see to the application, use, or investment thereof, and without my trustees incurring any responsibility therefor; and I declare that the receipts and all other writings with reference to the said provision, or to the interest or produce thereof, to be granted by my said daughters, shall be granted by themselves alone, and shall be good, valid, and sufficient to the receivers thereof, though the consent of their husband be not given thereto.” By codicil Jane Lesslie revoked that part of the third purpose of the settlement which is printed above in italics.
The trust-estate was realised by the trustees, and the primary purposes of the trust implemented. Mrs Agnes Lesslie or Jamieson and Mrs Jane Lesslie or Dawson, the residuary legatees under the settlement, both had children, who were all in minority.
Questions having arisen as to the rights and interest of the residuary legatees in the residue under the third purpose of the trust-disposition and codicil, a special case was presented by (1) Mrs Jamieson and Mrs Dawson, and (2) the trustees of the late Mrs Lesslie, submitting the following questions of law—“(1) Whether the fee of the residue of the said estate is vested in the said Mrs Agnes Lesslie or Jamieson and Mrs Jane Lesslie or Dawson? (2) Whether they are entitled to have the capital of the said residue conveyed and made over to them, or any, and if so, what part thereof? Or (3) whether the trustees are bound to retain the capital invested in their own names during the lifetime of the said legatees?”
Argued for the first parties—A right in the fee of the residue vested in them as at the date of the death of the testatrix, and they were now entitled to have the same conveyed and made over to them in such a way as to give effect to the declaration and condition of its being for separate use and behoof. They were willing to grant a receipt to the trustees in similar terms to that suggested by the Court in the case of Allan's Trustees v. Allan and Others, December 12, 1872, 11 Macph. 216, which ruled the present case.
Argued for the second parties—They were willing to pay over the residue to the first parties, who probably had the fee, if they could do so with safety, but there was here no direction to pay as in Allan's case, and the conditional power “to pay” had been cancelled by the codicil. In order “to divide” and “to see to the investment” of the residue, so as to protect it for the first parties as the testatrix desired it to be protected, it was necessary to keep up the trust during their lifetime, and only pay to “their respective heirs and assignees”— Balderston v. Fulton, January 23, 1857, 19 D. 293; Lady Massy v. Scott's Trustees, December 5, 1872, 11 Macph. 173; Whyte's Trustees v. Whyte, June 1, 1877, 4 R. 786.
At advising—
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I am therefore of opinion that the questions put to us must be answered, the first and second in the affirmative generally, and the third in the negative. As regards the testatrix's exclusion of the husbands' jus mariti and right of administration, it appears to me that the precedent set by the decision in the case of Allan should be followed, and that the receipts for the shares of the ladies who take the fee should bear that the jus mariti and right of administration of their husbands are excluded.
There is no question now about the fee. The only question is, whether payment is to be postponed, whether in fact the trust is to be kept up.
The peculiarity of this case is that there is no ulterior destination beyond the two ladies. There is therefore nothing to be protected by keeping up the trust. The direction is that the money is to be divided between the daughters of the testatrix. In these circumstances Balderston v. Fulton cannot be founded upon as an authority for keeping up the trust. The cases of Smith v. Campbell, May 30, 1873, 11 Macph. 639, and Rennie v. Ritchie, April 25, 1845, 4 Bell's App. 221, are quite distinct and distinguishable, because they are cases of annuity. I therefore concur with your Lordship's opinion.
The Court answered the first and second questions in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
Counsel for the First Parties— Strachan. Agent— J. Logan Mack, S.S, C.
Counsel for the Second Parties (Trustees)— Adam. Agents— Mack & Grant, S. S. C.