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Sale of Land — Shooting Rent — Division of Rent between Seller and Purchaser.
A disposition of lands provided that the purchaser should have entry at Martinmas 1886, and that he should have right to the rents “due and payable from and after the said term of entry.” Held that the purchaser was not entitled to a rent which was payable at Whitsunday 1887, but was for a period of possession prior to the term of entry.
The shootings upon an estate were let for the season from 1st August 1886 to 31st March 1887. The lands were sold, the purchaser's entry being at Martinmas 1886. Held that the shooting rent fell to be divided, one portion from 1st August to 11th November going to the seller, while the remaining portion went to the purchaser.
By trust conveyance, dated 5th June 1885, the Earl of Glasgow conveyed his whole estates to George Auldjo Jamieson and others as trustees for certain purposes.
On 24th August 1886 the trustees exposed for sale by public roup the lands of Thirdpart and others belonging to Lord Glasgow. The articles of roup provided—“ Tertio, The entry of the purchaser to the said lands and others shall be at the term of Martinmas 1886, and the purchaser shall have right to the rents to become due for the possession from and after that term, the exposers having right to the rents due for the possession prior to that term, notwithstanding the dates at which the same may be conventionally payable; and the price shall be payable to the exposers by the person preferred to the purchase at the said term of Martinmas 1886, and shall bear interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum from and after the said term during the not-payment.” The lands were purchased at the sale by John Clark, Largs, at the price of £12,500.
By the disposition which followed upon the sale the term of entry was Martinmas 1886. It contained this clause of assignation of rents—“And we, as trustees foresaid … assign the rents, feu-duties, and casualties of superiority due and payable from and after the said term of entry.”
The lands consisted of two farms, both arable. At Whitsunday 1887 £122, 10s. was due and payable as rent for one of them, and £72, 10s. for the other—in all £195. These rents were payable for the possession prior to Martinmas 1886. Clark claimed these rents, and obtained payment thereof from the tenants.
Lord Glasgow's trustees raised the present action against Clark to obtain repayment of the £195, pleading “(2) the rents of the said farms due and paid at Whitsunday 1887 being for the
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possession of the said farms prior to the defender's entry, he has no right thereto.” The defender pleaded—“(1) The rents in question having become due and payable subsequent to the term of the defender's entry, he was entitled to uplift the same. (2) In respect that by the terms of the conveyance in his favour, the said rents belonged to the defender, he is entitled to absolvitor, with expenses.”
On 4th July 1888 the Lord Ordinary ( Trayner) sustained the defences and assoilzied the defenders.
“ Opinion.—The defender bought the lands of Thirdpart from the pursuers, and he is now infeft therein. By the disposition in favour of the defender the term of entry was declared to be Martinmas 1886, and the clause assigning the rents was expressed thus:—‘And we, as trustees foresaid … assign the rents, feu-duties, and casualties of superiority due and payable from and after the said term of entry.’
The rents uplifted by the defender, and which the pursuers seek by this action to recover from him, were due and payable after Martinmas 1886, and therefore, prima facie, were assigned to the defender by the conveyance in his favour. But the pursuers maintain that the said rents nevertheless belong to them, because by the articles of roup under which the defender purchased it was stipulated that the purchaser should have right to the rents to become due for the possession from and after the term of entry, and the rents in question, although due and payable after Martinmas 1886, were for the possession prior to that date.
If the rights of parties were to be held as fixed by the articles of roup I should find for the pursuers. But I am of opinion that the rights of parties are to be determined by the terms of the disposition granted by the pursuers to the defender, that being the ultimate expression of their contract, which cannot be modified or altered by previous writings, negotiations, or conditions of sale.
Further, by the Statute 31 and 32 Vict. cap. 101, section 8, it is provided that an assignation of rents, in the form there given, shall, ‘unless specially qualified, be held to import an assignation to the rents to become due for the possession following the term of entry.’ The pursuers, therefore, by using the statutory form, ‘We assign the rents,’ would have limited the defender's right to that which was expressed in the articles of roup. Instead of doing so, however, the pursuers ‘specially qualified’ the assignation of rents by adding ‘due and payable from and after the said term of entry.’ I must suppose that this qualification was intended to have some meaning and effect, otherwise it would not have been expressed, and the only meaning I can give to the qualification is its natural and ordinary meaning as contended for by the defender.”
The pursuers reclaimed.
A separate question arose as to the shootings upon the estate. The shootings were let by Lord Glasgow's trustees, at a rent of £100, to a tenant from 1st August 1886 to 31st March 1887. On 21st February 1887 Lord Glasgow's trustees uplifted this rent from the tenants. Clark, as proprietor of the lands, sued Lord Glasgow's trustees for payment of the £100 rent thus uplifted. He maintained that the term of entry to the lands being Martinmas 1886, he had right under the clause of assignation of rents above quoted to the shooting rent because it was payable after his entry. The defenders averred that the shooting rent fell to be apportioned between them and the pursuer, the portion from 1st August to 11th November 1886 effeiring to them, and the remainder to the pursuer.
The defenders pleaded—“(1) The pursuer is only entitled to the portion of the said rents due for the possession of the said lands from and after the term of Martinmas 1886. (2) In terms of the contract between the parties and the provisions of the Apportionment Act 1870 (33 and 34 Vict. c. 35), the said rents fall to be apportioned between the pursuer and the defenders, and the latter are entitled to the proportion thereof effeiring to the period from 1st August to 11th November 1886.”
On 4th July 1888 the Lord Ordinary ( Trayner) decerned against the defenders in terms of the conclusions of the action.
“ Opinion.—The rents in question, which were for shootings over a portion of the lands of Thirdpart, were due and payable at 31st March 1887. I think they belonged to pursuer, being assigned to him by the conveyance granted in his favour by the defenders. I refer to the opinion expressed by me to-day in deciding the case Lord Glasgow's Trustees v. Clark.
The Apportionment Act referred to by the defenders has no bearing upon this case, which is one of contract.”
The defenders reclaimed, and argued—The Lord Ordinary had entirely misconstrued the meaning of the clause of assignation of rents. It had the same meaning as the short claim introduced by the Act of 1868, “I assign the rents.” This short form was not imperative and it did not follow, as the Lord Ordinary seemed to think, that because the exact language of that short claim was not adopted the parties must have intended thereby to give effect to some other arrangement. The purchaser was only entitled to the rents payable for possession after his entry, and what the disposition carried was an assignation to rents “due and payable from and after the said term of entry,” so by common law as well as by the disposition the purchaser could have no right to any rent, whatever might be the stipulated terms of payment, for possession prior to his entry at Martinmas 1886.— Penman v. Campbell, June 10, 1828, 6 S. 940. The important word was “due,” because though the rent might be “due” it might not be “payable” until a conventional term. The construction of this claim now contended for was a reasonable one and was borne out by the following cases— Stevenson v. Moncreiff, February 12, 1845, 7 D. 418; Sinclair v. Sinclair, December 1, 1847, 10 D. 190; Shand's Trustees v. Mackie, February 15, 1850, 12 D. 739; Murray's Trustees v. Jardine, May 31, 1865, 3 Macph. 845. As regarded the rents of the shootings it was payable on 31st March after the purchaser had obtained possession, but a portion of the £100 was rent due before the purchaser obtained possession and fell to Lord Glasgow's trustees. There ought to be apportionment—Apportionment Act 1870 (33 and 34 Vict., cap. 35), sec. 2; Maxwell's Trustees v. Scott, November 5, 1873, 1 R. 122.
Argued for Clark—The rents claimed belonged
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to the purchaser. The sellers had not availed themselves of the short form introduced by the Act of 1868, which if it had been adopted would have expressed the same meaning as that contained in the articles of roup. In construing the clause of assignation of rents it was not competent to look at the language of the articles of roup or to refer to the communings of parties. The rents in question were “payable” after the purchaser obtained possession, and by the terms of the disposition they fell to him. That was the intention of parties and was so expressed. The authorities cited by the other side were not applicable as they were all prior to the Act of 1868. With regard to the rent of the shootings, the legal term of payment and the term at which the rent was due were the same. The Apportionment Act was not applicable to a case like the present; the whole rent was due to the purchaser. At advising—
The purchaser is entitled to rent for the possession which follows after the term of his entry while the rents for possession prior to that period goes to the seller. No doubt this rule may, in the option of parties, be varied by paction, and it has been urged that that is what has taken place here, but in the construction of this clause of assignation of rents it is to be kept in mind that we are dealing with terms which have a definite meaning attached to them by a long series of decisions. I do not consider it at all necessary to go back to the clause in the articles of roup, because it only expresses the common law upon this subject.
But it has been said that the disposition which followed upon these articles of roup abrogated the ordinary rule, and the words which are relied upon as supporting this view are, “and we assign the rents … due and payable from and after the said term of entry.” Now, these words are substantially the same as those which are to be found in the articles of roup, and that being so it is not necessary for us to decide whether it is competent to go back to the articles of roup in order to construe the clause in the disposition. Rents due or becoming due clearly mean rents becoming due at the legal term. I do not know any other meaning which can be put upon these words except that expressed in the pursuer's condescendence, and I am not upon that account going to alter the law of Scotland. I think that the case of Penman to which we were referred is on all fours with the present case. There the rents became due according to a legal term, though they were payable at a conventional term; here the assignation is to the rents becoming due and payable after the term of entry; therefore whatever portion of the rent became due before that period effeired to the seller, and what became due thereafter belonged to the purchaser.
But it has been said that there was an intention here to depart from the ordinary rule, because the short form of the clause of assignation of rents introduced by the Act of 1868 was adopted. Now, I do not quite follow this. Suppose that this short form had not been adopted, then the claim in the disposition must just have stood or fallen according to the meaning of the terms used. All that the parties have done here is to adopt the short form introduced by the Act, at the same time using certain words to express their meaning, and they have thrown aside the statutory forms. This can in no way alter the rights of parties.
As to the other case in which Mr Clark is pursuer, it is to be decided upon somewhat different principles. The question relates to a rent of certain shootings, and the period covered by it was from August 1886 to March 1887.
The right which the tenant enjoyed was the privilege of entering on and using the lands for a certain definite purpose, namely, for sport. There was no actual or annual profit derivable from the lands as in the case of an agricultural lease, but only the exercise of a personal function. It is a possession which can be measured by time, and accordingly when rents are assigned under a clause of assignation of rents in a disposition that portion of the rent which corresponds with the period of occupation by the tenant after the term of entry belongs to the purchaser, while the portion corresponding with the tenant's occupation prior to the term of entry belongs to the seller. In such a case no question of apportionment arises. Prior to Martinmas the shooting tenant possessed under the seller, but subsequent to that date he possessed under the purchaser. I therefore differ from the view which the Lord Ordinary has taken, and think that the rent in question falls not to be apportioned but divided. This may require some adjustment, but as the total rent is £100 counsel can have little difficulty in settling the exact amount due to each party upon the principle which I have stated.
It is not necessary to consider what would have been the effect of the use in the disposition of the short clause of assignation of rents, for the simple reason that the parties have not chosen to avail themselves of it.
As regards the other case, I also concur. Shootings are not in the same position as an agricultural lease. The crop is reaped from day to day, and the rent ought to be divided between the seller and the purchaser just in the proportion that the game tenant holds under each.
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In the case in which Lord Glasgow's trustees were pursuers the Court recalled the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor, repelled the defender's pleas-in-law, and decerned.
In the case in which Mr Clark was pursuer the Court sustained the first plea-in-law for the defenders, and found the pursuers entitled to £57, 12s. 3d., and decerned.
Counsel for Lord Glasgow's Trustees— Low. Agents— J. & F. Anderson, W.S.
Counsel for Clark— Balfour, Q.C.— Ure. Agents— Mackenzie, Innes, & Logan, W. S.