Facts:
The Judicature Act 1825, sec. 28, provided
inter alia, that all actions for damages on account of breach of promise of marriage or on account of seduction should be held as causes appropriated to jury trial. The Court of Session Act 1850, sec. 49, limited the class of cases appropriated to jury trial to actions for libel, or for nuisance, or properly
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in substance actions of damages. The Evidence (Scotland) Act 1866, sec. 4, provides that if both parties consent, or if special cause be shown, it shall be competent to the Lord Ordinary to take proof by evidence led before himself in any cause in dependence before him notwithstanding the provision of the Judicature Act 1825 and the Evidence (Scotland) Act 1866.
In an action of damages for breach of promise of marriage and seduction and aliment, the Lord Ordinary allowed the parties a proof of their averments, and to the pursuer a conjunct probation; but the Court (
diss. Lord Shand) in respect that the pursuer did not consent to this mode of proof, and that no special cause was shown, remitted the cause to the Lord Ordinary for jury trial.
Headnote:
Jane Trotter, daughter of William Trotter, Greenlaw, Berwickshire, raised an action of damages for breach of promise of marriage and seduction against George Happer, tailor there, concluding for payment of £300. The summons also contained a conclusion for aliment at the rate of £8 sterling per annum for a period of thirteen years. The defender denied that he ever made any promise of marriage to the pursuer; he admitted that he had connection with her, and he offered to aliment her child at the rate and for the period allowed in the Sheriff Court of Berwickshire.
The Lord Ordinary (
Fraser) on 18th October 1888 allowed the parties a proof of their averments and to the pursuer a conjunct probation.
The pursuer reclaimed, and argued that by the Evidence (Scotland) Act 1866, sec. 4, she was, in the absence of any consent to a proof, or of any special cause being shown, entitled to have the case sent to a jury.
The defender argued that owing to the rank of life of the parties neither was able to afford a jury trial, and that that was a sufficient special cause; besides, there was in such cases less likelihood of a miscarriage of justice if the case was tried by proof before the Lord Ordinary.
At advising—
Judgment:
Lord President—I am afraid that we have no alternative open to us but to follow the Act of Parliament. The Judicature Act 1825 appointed this class of case to jury trial, and so for a long period it was impossible that they could be tried in any other way. The Act of 1850 first made some slight relaxation of this rule with regard to certain enumerated cases; and now we have the Act of 1866. It relaxes the rule still further, and provides that if both parties consent, or if special cause is shown, it shall be competent to the Lord Ordinary to take the proof in the manner provided by the first section of the statute. But the condition of the competency of a proof before the Lord Ordinary in such cases is (1) consent of both parties, or (2) special cause shown. Now, the only special cause shown here is, what was suggested by the respondent, that this class of case was not suited to jury trial, but that to my mind is a general and not a special cause. A special cause would be one which was peculiar to the case before us, and nothing of that nature was even attempted to be shown. I think therefore that we are bound by the statute, and that this interlocutor should be recalled and the case sent back to the Lord Ordinary for jury trial.
Lord Mure—Until 1866 such a case as this could not have been tried otherwise than by a jury, but with the Evidence Act of that year a change was made in the law; and with the consent of parties, or upon special cause shown, the case might be tried by a proof before the Lord Ordinary. In the present case there is no consent of parties, and I agree with your Lordship that no special cause has been shown, so that we have no alternative but to remit the cause to the Lord Ordinary to be tried by a jury.
Lord Shand—I have great difficulty in differing in this case from the Lord Ordinary. The statute says that upon special cause shown the case may be tried otherwise than by a jury, and the specialty here is, that besides this being an action of damages for seduction there is also a conclusion for aliment. If the rule be adopted that such cases are only to be tried by a jury we shall be flooded with cases of this kind which should undoubtedly be disposed of in the Sheriff Court. Looking to the rank in life of these parties as set out on record, I should be disposed to hold that quite a sufficient cause has been shown for trying this question by means of a proof before the Lord Ordinary. I am therefore for adhering to this interlocutor.
Lord Adam—If this question was open I should be prepared to send the case to be tried by proof before the Lord Ordinary, but I fear we are not free in the matter, but are tied down by the statute. The pursuer is entitled to have her case tried by a jury unless special cause can be shown to the contrary. It has been urged that the eloquence of counsel appealing to the feelings of a jury often results in a miscarriage of justice. But the result of such an argument, if given effect to, is, that no cases of this kind should ever go before a jury. But the statute says exactly the opposite. It was further urged that the position in life of these parties rendered such a mode of trial undesirable, but I can see nothing in this record to exclude the pursuer from the right which the statute gives her.
The Court recalled the interlocutor and remitted to the Lord Ordinary to proceed with the adjustment of issues and the trial of the cause by jury.