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[Sheriff Substitute of the Lothians.
Process — Action by Undischarged Bankrupt — Caution for Expenses.
A person brought against the law-agent of a person who had presented a petition for cessio against him an action of damages, alleging that the defender had in the Sheriff Court, and in the Sheriff's absence, falsely, maliciously, and injuriously, and in the hearing of certain persons, used words concerning him, representing that he had been guilty of an offence under the Debtors Act 1880. He denied these averments, and stated that he had only asked questions pertinent to the cause and to his duty, but did not set forth on record that at the time the words complained of were used the pursuer was under examination in the cessio process, and that the question was asked by him in the course of the action. The Court allowed the pursuer an issue, and refused to allow a counter issue of privilege, but observed that if circumstances showing a case of privilege appeared at the trial the Judge would direct the jury accordingly.
In an action of reparation for slander by a person against whom decree of cessio bonorum had been pronounced, and who had not obtained his discharge, the Court refused to order him to find caution for expenses.
Patrick Turnbull, Liquidator of the Money Order Bank, Limited, presented a petition for cessio bonorum in the Sheriff Court of Edinburgh, against James Gibson Scott.. Under an order of the Sheriff-Substitute, pronounced in the process on him to do so, Scott in December 1883 lodged a state of his affairs.
At the diet held for Scott's examination on 24th December 1881 he was examined by Robert Fleming Johnston, W.S., of the firm of Richardson & Johnston, W.S., law-agents for the liquidator.
Scott thereafter raised against Johnston the present action of damages for slander. He averred that the defender on the date above mentioned, in the Sheriff Court Buildings, Edinburgh, in the presence of several persons, and in particular of David Walker, 1 Bellevue Terrace, Edinburgh, and others whose names can be ascertained, “falsely, maliciously, and injuriously used,” with reference to the state of affairs, the following words, or others of like meaning, of and concerning him, pursuer—“Are you aware of the consequences under the statute of lodging a state of affairs such as you have done?”
To this averment the defender answered—“The deposition is referred to; and it is explained that defender asked no questions except such as were pertinent to the cause and in the line of his duty.”
Walker was the shorthand writer who bad been present to take down the examination.
The pursuer's further averments and the defender's answers were as follows—“(Cond.3) The said words used by the defender were so used when no Court was present, and in the absence of any Sheriff, Sheriff-Substitute, Commissioner, or other Judge, or of any official of Court of any kind; and said words so used, falsely, maliciously, and injuriously represented, and were intended to represent, that the pursuer in lodging said state of affairs had been guilty of a crime and offence under the provisions of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880, and the Acts therein referred to, or one or other of them. (Ans. 3) The proceedings are referred to. Quoad ultra denied. (Cond. 4) The import of said words was reported in the Scotsman and other newspapers of the 25th December 1883; and from the defender using said words, and from said reports thereof, and otherwise, the pursuer has suffered great annoyance, loss of character and credit, and has been greatly damaged in his business and reputation, and has been hurt in his feelings. (Ans. 4) Denied.”
The pursuer pleaded that the words libelled having been used falsely, maliciously, and injuriously regarding him, he was entitled to damages.
The defender pleaded—“(1) The pursuer's statements being irrelevant, the defender ought to be assoilzied with expenses. (2) The statement complained of having been made in the course of judicial proceedings, the defender was privileged in making the same, and is not liable in damages.”
The Sheriff-Substitute ( Rutherfurd), on the ground that the pursuer offered to prove that the state lodged by him was an honest and full disclosure of his affairs, and that the defender acted maliciously, in the legal sense of the term, by putting the question recklessly and in total disregard of the consequences which the insinuation conveyed might entail on the pursuer, repelled the defender's first plea-in-law and allowed a proof.
The pursuer appealed to the Court of Session for jury trial, and argued his case in person.
He lodged the following issue—“Whether, on or about the 24th day of December 1883, and within the Sheriff Court Buildings, Edinburgh, the defender did, in the presence and hearing of Mr David Walker, Bellevue Terrace, Edinburgh, and others, and one or more of them, say to, of and concerning the pursuer,—‘Are you aware of the consequences under the statute of lodging a state of affairs such as you have done?’—referring to a state of affairs dated 18th December 1883, lodged by the pursuer in the hands of the Clerk of Court in compliance with an order of
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Sheriff-Substitute Hamilton dated 30th November 1883, in a petition for cessio against the pursuer at the instance of Patrick Turnbull, liquidator of the Money Order Bank, Limited; said words, so used, falsely, maliciously, and injuriously represented, and were intended to represent, that the pursuer in lodging said state of affairs had been guilty of a crime and offence under the provisions of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880, and the Acts therein referred to, or one or other of them; or did falsely, maliciously, and calumniously use and utter words to that effect, to the loss, injury, and damage of the pursuer? Damages laid at £500 sterling.” The defender objected to the relevancy of the action, and argued—It was no doubt the case that when the question was put the Sheriff-Substitute had temporarily left the Court-room, but the examination was going on judicially when the question was put. He was willing to amend the record in order to make a statement to that effect. In such circumstances it was not enough merely to use the word “maliciously.” There was here privilege, and pursuer must make averments of facts and circumstances from which it could be inferred that the question was put maliciously— Scott v. Turnbull, June 28, 1884, 11 R. 1131. But even should the action be found relevant, the defender being an undischarged bankrupt should be ordered to find caution for expenses as a condition of going on with the case— Clarke v. Muller, January 16, 1884, 11 R. 418. He (defender) was, if the action were allowed to proceed, also in that case entitled to a counter issue of privilege, though no doubt such a counter issue was not essential— Ramsay v. Nairn, July 25, 1833, 11 S. 1031; Donald v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, June 12, 1875, 2 R. 813.
At advising—
I understand it to be the opinion of the Court that this extraordinary case cannot be explicated except by sending it to trial in the usual way, and if it is to go to trial the less said at present the better.
On the question of caution my opinion is that we ought not in this case to order the pursuer to find caution. I have not been able to examine the authorities,— but I agree with the Lord President in the case to which we were referred that the question whether or not a bankrupt pursuer should be ordained to find caution for expenses is always one for the discretion of the Court. I should not, however, have been prepared to say that the general rule is to order the bankrupt to find caution, but rather that in an action of damages for defamation of character or bodily injury the Court in its discretion may or may not order the pursuer when he is bankrupt to find caution. The ground on which I should have thought it not according to the ordinary rule to exercise that discretion by ordering caution is that a claim of damages for slander or bodily injury is not part of the estate which passes to the trustee on the sequestrated estate of the slandered or injured person. We had the general question as to the finding of caution by a person who is without funds raised in the case of Macdonald v. Simpson in 1882, 9 R. 696, where there was no sequestration—that is to say, no divestiture of her estate by the pursuer of the action, she having no estate of which to be divested. She was a widow who was in receipt of parochial relief, and she brought an action for solatium and damages on account of her husband's death against his employers. That case therefore was not within any exceptional rule on the ground of its being an action of damages for injury to the pursuer's character, or for his or her bodily injury, but I think it is all the stronger on that account. The ground on which the Court were asked to ordain the pursuer to find caution was simply that she was a pauper, and that it would be a denial of justice to the defenders to allow her to litigate without finding caution. But I see that in that case I made these observations in expressing my concurrence with the Lord Justice-Clerk—“In a sense it is always in the discretion of the Court to order a party to find caution, whether defender or pursuer; and that discretion will be exercised whenever it may appear that justice requires it. This, however, will only occur in exceptional circumstances. It is the practice to apply this discretion where a party seeks to raise an action who has been divested of his property, the reason being that he is usually seeking to recover something for himself which is included in his conveyance to another. I remember the late Lord Mackenzie pointing out, however, that absolute impecuniosity will never be taken as the sole ground for making a party find caution. I certainly entertained some hesitation at one time of the debate as to whether by receiving 1s. 6d. a-week there was not an implied assignation to the parochial board. But I dismiss this, because after all the allowance must be a casual one, and the pursuer is probably under no obligation to repay even if he should succeed in the present action. It may perhaps be a hard thing for one party to have to litigate with another who has no funds, but after all there are innumerable instances of it, and I repeat, it is no ground to order the pursuer here to find caution.” Then, with reference to the case of Hunter v. Clark, which my brother Lord Rutherfurd Clark thought hard to distinguish from the case we were then dealing with, I observed that we must “hold that the Court were there in possession of certain circumstances which led them to exercise their discretion in the way they did.” Lord Craighill thought that the case was distinguishable from Hunter v. Clark, and Lord Rutherfurd Clark was of an
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The
The Court approved the issue for the pursuer (as the same was amended at the bar), and remitted the cause to Lord Lee (Ordinary) to proceed.
Counsel for Defender (Respondent)— Nevay— M'Kechnie. Agents— Richardson & Johnston, W.S.