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[Sheriff of the Lothians.
The secretary of a building society registered under the Building Societies Act 1874 was required by the society to deliver over his books and papers to a person named by the society, and he having failed to do so a petition was presented to the Sheriff setting forth that he had been dismissed from office, and craving to have him ordained to deliver over the books and papers. He maintained that he had not been legally dismissed, and refused to give them up, and the Sheriff having allowed a proof in the petition, he appealed to the Court of Session. Held that the appeal was incompetent, because the society was entitled, whether he was dismissed
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or not, to demand his books and papers, and in an application to enforce that right the Sheriff had privative jurisdiction under the Act.
Section 24 of the Building Societies Act 1874 provides that every officer of a society registered under the Act “shall, upon demand made, or notice in writing given or left at his last or usual place of residence, give in his account as may be required by the board of directors or committee of management of the society, to be examined and allowed or disallowed by them, and shall, on the like demand or notice, pay over all the monies remaining in his hands, and deliver all securities, and effects, books papers, and property of the society in his hands or custody to such person as the society appoint; and in case of any neglect or refusal to deliver such account or to pay over such monies, or to deliver such securities, and effects, books, papers, and property in manner aforesaid, the society may sue upon the bond, or may apply to the Court, who may proceed thereupon in a summary way, and make such order thereon as to the Court in its discretion shall seem just, which order shall be final and conclusive.”
The First Edinburgh and Leith 415th Starr-Bowkett Building Society raised an action in the Sheriff Court at Edinburgh against their secretary, Alexander Munro, accountant, East London Street, Edinburgh, to have him ordained to give in an account of his intromissions as secretary with the society's funds, and pay over the balance thereon, and deliver up all the titles, books, and documents in his possession as secretary to a person named. The condescendence set forth that the defender having refused to obey the directions of the society had been removed from his office, but refused to give up an account or deliver the society's documents. The pursuers pleaded that the defender having been appointed secretary, and having been legally removed from office, they were entitled to decree as prayed for. The defender denied that he had been legally dismissed, and pleaded, inter alia, that being still secretary he was “entitled to have and hold possession of all the books, documents, and other effects of the society, in terms of the rules of the society.” The Sheriff on 25th June 1883, on appeal from the Sheriff-Substitute, pronounced an interlocutor allowing to both parties a proof of their respective averments, and a diet of proof was fixed.
The defender appealed to the Court of Session, and upon the motion that the case be sent to the roll the respondents objected to the competency of the appeal, and argued that under sec. 24 of the Building Societies Act of 1874 the interlocutor of the Sheriff was final.
The appellant argued that this was not a dispute of the kind contemplated by the Act, from which there could be no appeal, and that the only reason alleged for demanding the books was his alleged dismissal, which, if it had happened, took the case out of sec. 24.
Authorities—37 and 38 Vict. cap. 42, secs. 4, 24, and 36; Davie v. Colinton Friendly Society, November 10, 1870, 9 Macph. 96; Hamilton v. Hamilton, March 20, 1877, 4 R. 688; Rain v. Gill, May 19, 1877, 4 R. 732.
At advising—
It seems to me that the averment that the appellant has been dismissed is irrelevant to the present action. The society desired that its books and papers should be delivered up, and the present petition has been presented in consequence of the appellant's refusal to deliver up the documents demanded. The Sheriff has acted summarily in the matter, and in my opinion within his jurisdiction.
The words “final and conclusive” in this section of the statute have the same meaning as the words “final to all intents and purposes without any appeal” in the Friendly Societies Act of 1855. We had occasion to construe these words in the case of Davie v. The Colinton Friendly Society, and we there held that the jurisdiction of this Court was excluded by sec. 41 of that Act, by which a privative jurisdiction in such cases was conferred upon the Sheriff.
I am therefore of opinion that the present appeal is incompetent.
The Court refused the appeal as incompetent.
Counsel for Pursuer — Brand. Agent— R. Ainslie Brown, S.S.C.
Counsel for Defender— Rhind. Agent— Robert Menzies, S.S.C.