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Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wilson (Surveyor of Taxes) v. Fasson [1883] ScotLR 20_583 (19 May 1883)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1883/20SLR0583.html
Cite as: [1883] SLR 20_583, [1883] ScotLR 20_583
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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session
Page: 583↓
Court of Session Inner House First Division.
[Exchequer Cause.
v.
Facts:
The Act 48 Geo. III., c. 55, exempts from assessment for inhabited—house-duty, inter alia, “any hospital.”
Held that the dwelling-house of the medical superintendent of an infirmary situated within the infirmary grounds, was exempt from inhabited-house-duty, because it was a necessary part of the infirmary.
In this case Charles H. Fasson, Deputy Surgeon—General, Superintendent of the Royal Infirmary, Edinburgh, appealed to the Commissioners for the county of Edinburgh against an assessment of £2, 5s. as inhabited-house-duty, at the rate of 9d. per pound on £60, the annual value of a dwelling-house occupied by him within the precincts of the Royal Infirmary grounds.
The house, which was self-contained, and occupied by Mr Fasson and his family, was a part of the Infirmary buildings, but separate and distinct from the Infirmary itself, being distant about 30 yards from the nearest point of it. There was an entrance to the house by the principal gate of the Infirmary in Lauriston Place, but there was also a private entrance for the superintendent and his family from the Meadow Walk, a public thoroughfare, though for foot-passengers only.
There was nothing in the constitution of the Royal Infirmary which required the superintendent to reside within the precincts of the Infirmary, and for a time the appellant had lived in a house provided for him by the managers in another part of the city, but on 16th October 1876 the Building, House, and Finance Committees of the managers adopted a joint report in which they came to the “unanimous conclusion that the superintendent should be required to live within the Infirmary grounds, and that a suitable residence should be provided for him there.” They came to this conclusion on, inter alia, the following grounds.—“The experience of the last four years seems to the committee to have proved that the duties of superintendent cannot be efficiently and in their entireness carried out unless he resides at the Infirmary. He cannot, living at a distance,
Page: 584↓
exercise constant supervision and control over the large staff of a great establishment such as the new Infirmary; he cannot be at all times easily accessible to those who may have occasion to apply to him for advice or assistance; he cannot conveniently, especially at night, visit from time to time the wards to see that matters are properly conducted; he cannot take effectual cognisance of the stores; nor, in short, can he keep himself continuously acquainted with the whole working of the institution, for which he is answerable to the managers.” The managers by their minute of 30th October 1876 adopted this report, and instructed the Building Committee to provide a suitable house for the superintendent, which was accordingly done.
The Commissioners sustained the appeal and granted relief from the assessment for inhabited—house-duty. With this decision the surveyor declared his dissatisfaction, and in terms of section 59 of 43 and 44 Vict. cap. 19 (The Taxes Management Act 1880) craved a Case for the opinion of the Court of Exchequer.
It was therein set forth that “the appellant (Fasson) had contended that the house occupied by him being part of the Infirmary buildings, and occupied by him in his official capacity as superintendent of the Royal Infirmary, fell under Case 4 of the exemptions, Schedule B, of the Act 48 Geo. III. cap. 55, which exempts from inhabited-house-duty ‘any hospital, charity school, or house provided for the reception or relief of poor persons,’ and which exemption is still continued in force by the Act 14 and 15 Vict. cap. 36.” And further, “That his case was ruled by the decision of the judges in the Exchequer (England) case, Jepson v. Gribble, L.R., 1 Ex. D. 151, Exchequer Cases, Income Tax and Inhabited House Duties, part 5, No 16, in which the resident medical superintendent of a lunatic asylum was held not to be liable for inhabited—house-duty in respect of the house provided for him, separate and detached from, but within the grounds of the asylum.”
The Case further stated that for the surveyor of taxes it had been contended “that but for the exemption relied upon by the appellant the whole of the Infirmary buildings would, under the Act 14 and 15 Vict, cap. 36, be chargeable; that the exemption was meant to prevent such a result; but that it was straining it to hold it as applicable to the family dwelling-house of the superintendent, in which patients are neither received nor treated. The fact of the house being situated within the grounds of the Infirmary might affect its annual value (which is not objected to), but could not constitute a right to exemption. The surveyor further contended that a material difference existed between this case and that of Jepson v. Gribble, inasmuch as in that case it was provided by statute (16 and 17 Vict. cap. 97) that the medical superintendent shall be resident in the asylum, whereas in this case no such obligation exists either under a statute or the constitution of the Royal Infirmary.”
At the discussion the following additional authority was cited for the surveyor of taxes— Congreve & Brushfield v. Overseers of Upton, Jan. 23, 1864, 33L.J., Mag. Cases, 83.
At advising—
Now apart from authority altogether, I think this is a case about which there can be little doubt. This hospital is a very large establishment. I am not aware how many beds it contains, but it is one of the largest in the kingdom, and prima facie it would appear absolutely necessary that a medical superintendent should reside within the walls. Accordingly we find that the managers of the Infirmary when they removed from the old building and got possession of the new, by a minute of 16th October 1876, following on a report, “came to the unanimous conclusion that the superintendent should be required to live within the Infirmary grounds, and that a suitable residence should be provided for him there.” They came to this conclusion on the following grounds— [reads as above]. It is not said, nor was it suggested in argument, that the managers were wrong in coming to this conclusion, that it was not a step which was absolutely necessary for the working of the institution. If it was necessary—and I think there is no doubt of that—for the superintendent to visit the Infirmary at night, and throughout the night, it follows that it was necessary for him to reside within the building; and I think it impossible, if the statement of the managers is consistent with fact, to doubt that such an arrangement was necessary for the wellbeing of the institution.
If it was necessary that there should be a resident superintendent at the hospital, what did it matter whether the rooms he occupied were connected by a covered passage, or whether he inhabited a separate house. In either case his dwelling was still within the grounds and walls of the hospital.
I do not think this is a technical question at all; it is a single question of fact, and I quite agree with Chief-Baron Kelly that it is to be looked at with the eye of common sense; and so regarded, I think this house was a necessary part of the establishment, and that the hospital could not be administrated without a resident medical superintendent. We were told that his residence within the building was not a statutory necessity, and while I admit that, I do not see the relevancy of it, for the statute would not make this house more a part of the Infirmary than the absolute exigencies of the institution. I think that the requirements of the case make it just as much part of the Infirmary as if it had been made part by the statute. The cases of Jepson and Congreve are strong authorities to this effect, but I desire to give my opinion on the broad question, without reference to authority at all; and on the merits of the case I have no doubt that this house is exempt.
Page: 585↓
It was argued that if the house of the medical superintendent was part of the hospital, so is that of the chaplain. I do not think that follows at all. The duties of the two may be equally important, but they are not equally connected with the establishment, for the duties of the chaplain relate to the next world while those of the medical superintendent relate to this; the duties of the one are more immediate than those of the other. Therefore there is no use in arguing that if the one is part of the hospital the other must be also. It is of no consequence whether the necessity arises from a statutory condition or not; the question is one of fact, and on the facts I hold that this house is not only a part but a necessary part of the hospital. Even if there had been no authority, I should be of opinion that on a mere statement of the case this house was part of it. The managers have so found, but I do not go upon that, for it is not necessary. Apart from the conclusion of the managers, I am clearly of the same opinion as your Lordship.
The Court affirmed the determination of the Commissioners.
Counsel for the Inland Revenue—Solicitor—General ( Asher, Q.C.)— Lorimer. Agent— D. Crole, Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
Counsel for Fasson— Pearson. Agents— Hope, Mann, & Kirk, W.S.