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Held ( diss. Lord Deas) that there is a distinction in the case of conjunct and confident persons as to what constitute sufficient vouchers to entitle a creditor to vote in a sequestration.
In a sequestration awarded in November 1880 there was lodged in January 1882 a claim by two brothers of the bankrupt, founded on promissory-notes bearing to be for value and to be dated in March 1876, and to be payable in March 1877. They had never been discounted, and had lain in the claimants' hands from their date till they were lodged with their claim. Held that the claim was insufficiently vouched, and that the claimants were not entitled to vote in the sequestration.
There was also produced a claim by the bankrupt's law-agents for the amount of a promissory-note given them in payment of their business account. The account itself was not produced. Held that the proper voucher was the account itself, and that the claim was therefore insufficiently vouched to entitle the claimant to vote.
This was an appeal under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1856 at the instance of James Tytler, chartered accountant, Aberdeen, trustee on the sequestrated estates of John Walker, Polwarth Terrace, Edinburgh, against a resolution adopted by a majority of the creditors of the bankrupt at a meeting held in Aberdeen on 15th July 1882, “that James Tytler, chartered accountant, Aberdeen, be now removed from the office of trustee in the sequestration.”
The estates of John Walker were sequestrated by the Lord Ordinary officiating on the Bills on 3d November 1880, and the appellant was confirmed trustee in the sequestration on 18th November 1880. John Walker had previously, on 28th August 1880, granted in favour of the appellant a trust-disposition for behoof of his creditors.
The total amount of the claims of the creditors who supported the motion for the appellant's removal declared to be carried at the meeting on 15th July 1882 was £20,755, 1s., while the total amount of claims against the resolution was £10,244, 14s. 10d., and the only question raised in this case was whether the votes of the majority in favour of the resolution were legal or not.
The appellant in his condescendence objected to eleven votes tendered in support of the resolution, amounting to £19,427, 10s. 7d.
The Lord Ordinary ( Kinnear) sustained the objections to two votes only, amounting to £4810 (being Nos. 7 and 8 of the votes objected to), and therefore found that the resolution complained of was carried by a majority of the creditors entitled to vote, and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant then reclaimed, and in the Inner House the case turned upon the validity of two
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votes, Nos. 4 and 6, amounting to £6195. No. 4 was vouched by two promissory-notes in favour of Messrs Alexander & James Walker, brothers of the bankrupt, which were thus described in the statement of debt referred to in the affidavit:—“Promissory-note, dated 7th March 1876, granted by John Walker, No. 1 Polwarth Terrace, Edinburgh, of said date, to Messrs Alexander & James Walker, merchants, 52 Union Street, Aberdeen, payable twelve months after date, and indorsed by them to their firm of William Walker & Sons, merchants, of which firm the said Alexander Walker and James Walker are the sole partners, and held by said firm for value in Sandlodge, £2000; interest thereon from 10th March 1877 to 3d November 1880, date of the sequestration of the estates of the said John Walker, £365, 4s. 1d.—£2365, 4s. 1d.” The other note was in the very same terms, and the claim No. 4 thus amounted to £4730, 8s. 2d. The affidavit and claim for this sum were made by Alexander Walker on 7th January 1882. The Lord Ordinary in his note observed on this claim—“4. The vouchers are promissory-notes by the bankrupt in favour of the claimants, dated in 1876. It may be quite proper that the trustee should require explanation as to circumstances in which they were granted, but in the meantime, and in the absence of any ground of suspicion, they appear to me sufficient vouchers to support the vote.”
(6) Vote for Messrs Dunn & Clark, advocates, Aberdeen, for £1465, 12s. 6d. William Dunn, the senior partner of the firm, was the bankrupt's brother-in-law, and the firm his law-agents. The affidavit and claim by Peter Clark, the other partner, referring to the note produced, was in these terms—“That John Walker, of No. 1 Polwarth Terrace, Edinburgh, was at the date of the sequestration of his estates, and still is, justly indebted and resting-owing to the deponent's said firm the sum of £1458, 15s. 6d. sterling, contained in a promissory-note granted by the bankrupt to deponent's said firm, dated 28th August 1880, and payable one month after date. Item, £6, 17s. of interest, at 5 per cent. from the date said promissory-note fell due till the date of sequestration, being together £1465, 12s. 6d.”
The Lord Ordinary in his note observed on this claim—“It is possible that further explanation may be required before admitting the claimants to rank, but the promissory-note seems to be sufficient prima facie evidence to entitle them to vote.”
This promissory-note was thus dated on the same day on which the voluntary trust-deed for creditors was granted. The affidavit in this case also was dated 7th January 1882.
The reclaimer (appellant) argued—These documents having been granted in suspicious circumstances, and to conjunct and confident persons, were not per se vouchers sufficient to sustain a vote — Anderson v. Guild, June 13, 1852, 14 D. 866; Cullen v. M'Farlane, July 16, 1842, 4 D. 1522; Laidlaw v. Wilson, January 27, 1844, 6 D. 530; Aitken v. Stock, February 14, 1846, 8 D. 509; Dyce v. Paterson, May 28, 1847, 9 D. 1141; Gascoyne v. Manford, December 10, 1847, 10 D. 231; Brown v. Kerr, June 14, 1809, Hume's Decisions, p. 62.
Respondent's authorities—Bell's Comm. ii. (5th ed.), 310–314, and cases there cited.
At advising—
As to the first of these two objections, I have to observe at the outset that in dealing with questions of this kind the Court must take the votes in exactly the same form as that in which they were given and received at the meeting of creditors. The Court in reviewing is not entitled to do anything else. The question therefore comes to be, whether the vote was properly rejected or received at the meeting looking to the evidence which was there adduced in support of it? Now, this fourth objection relates to the vote of William Walker & Sons, which is supported by an affidavit by Alexander Walker, a partner of that firm, dated 7th January 1882, and the debt claimed is £4730, conform to statement annexed. The statement annexed sets out in the first place —[ quotes terms of promissory-note given above]. And the other item in the statement is another promissory-note of the same date, between the same parties, and in all other respects in precisely the same terms. Both notes are produced, and they bear to be granted for “value in Sandlodge,” and to be payable on the 10th March 1877. No markings of any kind are to be found on them, and therefore it is clear that they were not discounted. They have no appearance of having been lodged in any bank, nor are they indorsed to anyone except to William Walker & Sons. They have, in short, lain in the hands of these two gentlemen from 7th March 1876 to 7th January 1882 without anything following on them as far as we can see. Now, when we consider that the payees are the brothers of the bankrupt, and that the notes were produced under such peculiar circumstances, it seems to me impossible to sustain this claim to vote. It is quite true that there might have been a sufficient explanation, but without such an explanation, and with no statement as to the cause for which the promissory-notes were granted except that they were for “value in Sandlodge,” I am clearly of opinion that there are no sufficient vouchers for this claim, and that the objection must be sustained.
The sixth objection seems to me to be clearer still. It relates to the vote for Dunn & Clark, of whom William Dunn, the senior partner, is the brother-in-law of the bankrupt, and the firm are his law-agents. The affidavit and claim is by Peter Clark, the other partner, and sets out that the bankrupt is indebted to the firm to the extent of £1458, contained in a promissory-note in favour of the firm dated 28th August 1880, which, as we know, is the day on which the bankrupt executed his trust-deed. Now, I do not say that there is anything wrong in the bankrupt granting this promissory-note provided the debt is really
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The case of Anderson v. Guild, reported in 14 D. 866, was a case in which a competition for the office of trustee turned upon the vote of the bankrupt's mother-in-law, who produced a promissory-note dated eighteen months prior to the sequestration, and payable sixty days after sight, which bore a noting dated within three days of the sequestration. The affidavit gave no explanations of the debt nor of the noting, but merely said that the debt was due, and the vote was rejected. In the opinion of Lord Colonsay the following passage occurs:—“The principle seems to be that a conjunct and confident creditor who holds the bankrupt's acknowledgment of debt must produce along with such document, before he can be allowed to vote, some corroborative vouchers such as detailed account, excerpts from books, or other writings, or failing them must explain in his oath the nature and history of the transactions between him and the bankrupt which led to the granting of the acknowledgment founded on.” Now, this clearly applies to the promissory-note for £2000 referred to in the objections to the fourth vote. The objections urged against the sixth vote are still clearer; the statutory provisions have not been complied with, and the vote cannot be allowed.
In the case of a creditor asking a ranking for a claim the law and practice requires that the proof should be of a very rigorous kind. I think that some relaxation has been admitted, and that a somewhat less strict rule has prevailed where a claim to vote was preferred and not a claim to rank. I think also that by a series of decisions a distinction has been drawn as to the nature of the vouchers required in cases of conjunct and confident persons, and of strangers, and I feel obliged to express my dissent from the view just explained by Lord Deas. I think a very clear statement of the law is to be found in a very careful note by Sheriff Glassford Bell in the case of Anderson v. Guild. If merchants in the course of their transactions have bills passing, and one should be drawn six weeks before sequestration, such a bill would be a perfectly good voucher. But it would be a very different matter if such a bill was drawn by a father upon his son. I think that by a long series of cases it is clear that a claim so vouched would be insufficient whether for voting or for ranking, and the reason is that in the one case the claim is by a conjunct and confident person, and the other is not.
The two claims we have here to deal with are by conjunct and confident persons—brothers and law-agents. Such claims must be very narrowly examined. They may no doubt be good, but to guard against fabricated documents concocted for the purpose of controlling the sequestration, some satisfactory explanation is required of the debt and some adminicle of evidence along with it—as, for example, a reference to a book, or the counterfoil of a cheque-book, the markings on a bill showing it has been in the circle—anything, indeed, supplying some independent evidence to sustain the vote. In the case of No. 4 here the only documents produced are these passing between the bankrupt and his brother. The same remarks apply to the objections stated to vote No. 6. A little care might perhaps have made both this vote and the one previously objected to good; but in the latter case a promissory-note granted on the same day as a deed executed in favour of creditors, and with no satisfactory vouchers, cannot be sustained.
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The Court recalled the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary and found that the resolution complained of in the appeal was not carried by a majority of the creditors entitled to vote; therefore sustained the appeal and declared the said resolution to be invalid.
Counsel for Appellant— Trayner— Dickson. Agent— R. C. Gray, S.S.C.
Counsel for Respondents— Keir— G. Burnet. Agent— George Andrew, S.S.C.