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The parties to an action in the Scotch Courts agreed as a compromise of the action that certain property in Rangoon belonging to the first party should be sold and the proceeds handed to the agent of the second parties in satisfaction pro tunic of a sum of £4250, and that any deficiency should be paid by the first party. The property was sold and the price paid in rupees. In an action for payment of a deficiency the defenders pleaded that the amount of the deficiency must be calculated on the footing of the value of the rupee in Rangoon. Held that the pursuer was entitled to payment at the fall equivalent of the sum in English currency, and that the sum realised in rupees must be estimated according to the current rate of exchange.
Opinions per Lord President and Lord Mure that Scotland was the locus solutionis of the contract.
Opinions contra per Lord Deas and Lord Shand.
The pursuer of this action was John Dodds Ainslie, who at one time carried on business at
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Rangoon under the firm of Murray, Ainslie, & Co., and was now a partner of the firm of Ainslie, Warren, & Co., Rangoon, but resident in Glasgow. The defender James Murray was proprietor of Caliendo, in the county of Peebles, and resided there, and John Mackie Murray was his son, who was at one time in business at Rangoon, but now resided in Edinburgh. In an action raised in the Court of Session in 1878 by the pursuer's firm against the defenders this agreement of compromise was entered into upon the narration that certain claims had been made upon both sides against the other—“(First) The second parties [the defenders] shall grant a power or powers of attorney to each and either of Messrs Ainslie, Warren, & Company of Rangoon, and Alexander Dixon Warren, merchant there, partner of that firm, to realise by public sale or otherwise, to the best advantage, the whole properties in Rangoon belonging to the second parties or either of them: (Second) The proceeds of sale of the said properties, to the extent of Four thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, are to be paid to and retained by the said Ainslie, Warren, & Company on behalf of the first parties [the pursuers] in satisfaction and discharge of their claims; any surplus above that sum is to be accounted for and paid to the said James Murray; and in the event of the said properties not realising the said sum of Four thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, then the deficiency shall be made up and paid by the second parties, jointly and severally, to the first parties: (Third) Failing payment being made to the said first parties of the said sum of Four thousand two hundred and fifty pounds within one year from the date hereof, any right which the first parties may have to payment of the whole sums sued for and interest will in their option revive, and if this option is exercised, then the second parties' objections thereto will also revive: (Fourth) All claims on the first parties at the instance of the second parties are hereby discharged, subject, however, to the declaration that if the first parties proceed with the said action then this discharge shall not be effectual, and the said claims shall revive: The rents of the said properties in Rangoon down to this date shall belong to the first parties, and shall be paid to or retained by Messrs Ainslie, Warren, & Company on their behalf, over and above the said sum of Four thousand two hundred and fifty pounds: From and after this date the said rents shall belong to the said James Murray: (Fifth) Upon payment to the first parties of the said sum of Four thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, … their whole claims will be discharged.”
A power of attorney was executed in terms of the agreement, and the property was realised by Ainslie, Warren, & Co. The amount of sales and of rents collected, as stated in the accounts which were rendered, was Rs. 32,099, 15s. 6d. At ls. 8d. per rupee, which was the value at the current rate of exchange in this country, that sum amounted to £2675 sterling. The defenders contended that the value of each rupee recovered under the power of attorney fell to be taken at 2s., its value in Rangoon.
This action was brought for payment of the balance of the £4250 due to the pursuers, the defenders pleading in answer that—“(1) The minute of agreement betwixt the parties having stipulated that the price of the properties sold under the power of attorney should be paid to or retained by the pursuer's firm of Ainslie, Warren, & Company, merchants in Rangoon, the defenders are entitled to have the value of each rupee so recovered estimated as at the value of 2s., its value in Rangoon.”
The Lord Ordinary decerned against the defenders, who reclaimed.
Argued for them—The agreement dealt with real property situated in Rangoon. There was nothing said about sending the money to England. The locus solutionis was Rangoon— Campbell v. Hannay, Feb. 15, 1809, F.C.; Scott v. Bevan, 1831, 2 Barn. and Adolph. 78; Chittey on Contracts, 93; Story's Conflict of Laws, secs. 271a, 272; Savigny's Conflict of Laws (Guthrie's ed.), sec. 374, p. 245; Bar's Private International Law, sec. 70, p. 253; Thomson on Bills (Wilson's ed.), 439; Cary v. Courtenay, 1869, 4 American Reps. 559; Parsons on Bills, i., 664; Don v. Lippman, May 26, 1837 (II. of L.) 2 Shaw and Maclean, 682; Valery v. Scott, July 4, 1876, 3 R. 965.
Argued for pursuers—They had bargained to be paid in English money, and were entitled to get it. This was a Scotch debt being sued for in a Scotch Court. It was not the same case as that of a bill being granted payable in India— Wallis v. Brightwell, 1722, 2 Peere Williams, 88; Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 1820, 2 Bligh's (H. of L.) Reps. 60.
At advising—
It is stated that a power of attorney having been sent out to Rangoon the property was brought to sale, and the amount of the sales and the amount of rents realised the sum of Rs.32,099: 15: 6. “This sum,” the pursuers state, “at ls. 8d. per rupee—which is the current rate of exchange—amounts to £2675 sterling.”
The defenders' explanation is that they have always been willing to settle with the pursuers upon the footing of the rupee being estimated as of the value of 2s., which is its value in Rangoon. The ground upon which the defenders maintain that contention is, that under the contract the locus solutionis was India. I do not think it rests upon any other basis than that. So that a question is raised upon the construction and effect of the contract between the parties, what is the locus solutionis? If it be not India the defenders are wrong.
Although at first sight I had an impression that as regards the proCeeds of the sale at Rangoon the contract was one which fell to be performed in India, I am now satisfied upon a review of the clauses of the contract that Scotland is the place of performance. The contract is a settlement of a compromise of an action in this Court, and the subject-matter of it is that for a discharge of their liabilities the defenders shall pay a sum of £4250. If that sum be not paid within a year, it is stipulated that the former claims shall revive, and may be again insisted in; but if it be paid within a year, then the defenders are to be entitled to a discharge, and all imputations made against them upon record are to be withdrawn. There is a further point which I think is ancillary or subsidiary. It consists in the stipulation that the defenders shall give a power of attorney to the pursuers' agents in Rangoon to bring certain properties to sale, to realise these, and impute them pro tanto in payment of the sum in question. It is contemplated that the properties may sell for a sum large enough to meet the whole debt, but that it may also fall short of it. But in either event the condition is that the sum in question is to be paid within a year from the date of the agreement.
The settlement of the account under that agreement must be in Scotland, and consequently Scotland is the locus solutionis.
I may say that the case of Glyn v. Johnston, June 8, 1830, 8 S. 889, was considered to raise a question of what belonged to the law regulating the nature of the debt itself and what to that regulating the remedy. The Court held that the kind of evidence admissible fell to be determined by the law of England. That judgment followed upon a hearing in presence. Lord Craigie dissented from the judgment, but from the remarks made upon that case by Lord Brougham in deciding Don v. Lippman it appeared that Lord Craigie had been right in the view which he had taken.
The Court adhered.
Counsel for Pursuer— Gloag— M'Kechnie. Agents— J. & R. A. Robertson, S.S.C.
Counsel for Defenders— J. Burnet— R. V. Campbell. Agents— Cairns, M'Intosh, & Morton, W.S.