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[Sheriff of Lanarkshire.
A horse was lent to a farmer on the footing that its work was to pay for its keep, and it died shortly after from the effects of an injury. Held (1) that the onus lay upon the farmer to show the cause of injury, and that in the absence of evidence to another effect he must be held responsible.
Circumstances in which such an onus was held not discharged.
Archibald Wilson, postmaster, Glasgow, brought this action against Robert Orr, farmer, Gartferrie Mains, Lanarkshire, for delivery of a horse lent to the latter, or failing delivery for payment of £54 as its value. Orr had agreed to take the horse in question on the footing that its work was to pay for its keep, and that it was to be returned whenever Wilson required it. It was sent to Orr on Friday 20th April 1877, and it died while in his possession on 8th May following from the effects of an injury on the shoulder and a supervening swelling. The defender stated that the death arose from natural causes, and that consequently he was not liable.
He pleaded—(1) The horse having died from natural causes while in the defender's possession, and through no fault of his, he cannot return the horse to the pursuer, nor can he be held liable in its price. (2) The defender having used the horse for the specified purpose agreed on, and having come under no obligation to return it in any special condition, he is not liable for damages nor for the total loss of the subject, the same not having been occasioned by his fault, according to the rule res perit suo domino.
The Sheriff-Substitute (Guthrie) after proof gave decree for £45, finding that it was the duty of the defender to discharge the onus by proving an injury existing when he got the horse, or else pure accident. He added this note to his interlocutor:—
“ Note.—This is plainly a case of location, in which the rule as to the risk is that the subject lent perishes to the owner provided that the lessee proves that its loss is due to a pure accident or to some cause for which he is not liable—Bell's Com. i. 454; Bell's Pr. 145, and cases of Robertson v. Ogle, Pyper, and Pullars there cited. This is undoubtedly a narrow case for the application of the rule. The defender has brought witnesses to show that ordinary good care was taken of the animal; and the case seems
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to turn on the medical evidence as to the injury causing the swelling and gangrene of which the animal died. The balance of that evidence is to the effect that the injury must have been received while the horse was with the defender. Had there been a previous wound or bruise it does not appear to me that the defender would have had much difficulty in proving it. He had the use of his own eyes and skill when he took possession of the horse; and he might have been able to prove it by the grooms of the pursuer, or of Mrs Townsend, who had the horse on hire for some time before he got it. At all events, it was his business to prove it, and he has not done so. On the whole I come to the conclusion that the horse must have got some bruise while the defender had it, and the presumption is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that it was caused by ill-usage. It does not seem probable that the horse could have hurt itself in the stable.” The Sheriff ( Clark) adhered in respect of no appearance for the defender.
The defender appealed to the Court of Session, and argued—There was no obligation on him to show the actual cause of injury, which was what the decision of the Sheriff-Substitute came to.
Authorities— Robertson v. Ogle, June 23, 1809, F.C.; Pyper v. Thomson, Feb. 4, 1843, 5 D. 498; Smith v. Melvin, Dec. 9, 1845, 8 D. 264; Pullars v. Walker, July 13, 1858, 20 D. 1238; Moes, Moliere, & Tromp v. Leith & Amsterdam Shipping Coy., July 5, 1867, 20 Macph. 988; Bell's Comm. i. 454; Bell's Pr. sec. 145.
At advising—
In the case of Robertson v. Ogle ( 15 F.C. 348) a person hiring a serviceable horse and returning him useless was found liable for his value, and it was held that the proprietor of the horse was not obliged to prove actual maltreatment when out of his possession. It was however stated that this did not affect the ordinary rule res perit domino. This case then laid down that although the risk remained with the owner, it fell upon the hirer (1) to prove the cause of the injury, and (2) to adduce at least prima facie evidence that all due care was taken. The opinion of Lord Cowan in the case of Pullars, 20 D. p. 1245, puts the matter beyond question—“Fortunately the parties are here at one as regards the degree of diligence which applies to this case. It is that degree of diligence which applies to the hirer in the case of a contract of location. I think that a reasonable view. In this case therefore, as in all such cases, the hirer must show the cause of death, and that he is blameless. Now, has this onus been fully satisfied? Have the pursuers shown that the cause of death was not one for which they were responsible? They have proved the disease of which the horse died, but they have not shown that for the probable cause of the disease they are not responsible. The principle which ruled the early case of Binny (M. 10,079) and the recent case of Robertson v. Ogle makes it incumbent on the pursuers to establish satisfactorily that they are blameless as regards the death. The question in this view is to be determined on the inference to be deduced from the whole circumstances in evidence, and a very little may turn the scale.”
I therefore assume that the hirer here was bound (1) to show the cause of injury from which the horse died, and (2) that it was a cause for which he was not responsible. I am of opinion that he has not done so, and I think therefore that upon the hirer must fall the loss, and that the Sheriff was right.
The defender alone was custodier of the animal. It was under his entire control during the day and in his stables at night. It lay upon him or his servants to feed it and to attend to it in every way. The pursuer was not near it, had no charge of it, and had no means of tracing or observing its treatment. In these circumstances I think it lay upon the defender to do a great deal more than merely to say—I cannot tell how the injury was received, but it was not owing to any fault in me or in my servants. The animal may have injured itself in the stable—I cannot tell how—but there are my servants, everyone of whom exoners himself of blame.
So standing the case, I think that the Sheriffs have taken the right view in holding that the defender in the absence of other evidence must be held responsible. He has not sufficiently discharged himself of the duty and onus which lay upon him, and which lies upon all parties who under a contract of hiring or of any other kind get the entire use, custody, and control of another person's property. If the property is found broken or destroyed, the custodier cannot content himself without explanation by a mere plea that he was not to blame.
If a conjecture is to be hazarded, I think that of the pursuer's counsel is as likely as any—that the animal got loose in the defender's stable on the Saturday before its death; that sometime on the Saturday night it had been kicked on the shoulder by some of the other horses in the stable; and that it was found so injured, as the defender himself tells us, at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning; he then saw the shoulder swelled. But if this happened, there must have been fault on the part of the defender or his servants as to the tying up of the horses, and the evidence is a blank as to this. It is remarkable that the defender himself does not say that he found the horses, including this one, all properly tied up when he went in at 4 o'clock on the Sunday morning. I should have liked to know what took him to the stable so early long before it was light.
On the whole I am satisfied with the judgment of the Sheriffs.
The Court adhered.
Counsel for Pursuer (Respondent)— Guthrie Smith. Agent— J. Gill, Solicitor.
Counsel for Defender (Appellant)— Goudie. Agent— R. Starke, Solicitor.