Page: 457↓
Sheriff of Dumfries.
Where one party to an action produces an unstamped document and founds on it, paying the stamp duty and the penalty, he is not entitled to recover half of that expense from the opposite party, although the document be a mutual contract, the Court having held it to be of no effect, and the opposite party not having founded on it.
This was an action raised for payment of a sum of £127, 6s. 8d. by Hislop, a draper in Thornhill, against Thomson, who had formerly been a draper there. Hislop had been for some time a tenant of Thomson, and had while tenant made certain additions to the premises, the cost of which, by an agreement of parties drawn up and signed at the beginning of the lease, Thomson was to repay to him at the termination of the lease. After the termination of the lease Thomson became bankrupt, and Hislop bought the premises. The question between them raised in this action was whether the claim for the cost of the addition made by Hislop while tenant had been discharged or not by the terms of the bargain made at the sale of the premises. To support his claim Hislop produced the agreement drawn up by the parties; the Court ordered it to be stamped at his expense. In their judgment on the merits the Court sustained the contention of the defender, that the stipulations of that agreement had been passed from by both parties at the time of the sale, and held that the agreement was no longer of any effect.
The pursuer asked that the defender should be found liable in one half of the stamp and penalty, in respect that if the deed had been stamped originally he would have paid half, and referred to the rule laid down in the cases of Neil v. Leslie, March 19, 1867, 5 Macph. 634, and M'Donall v. Caird, July 19, 1870, 8 Macph. 1012.
The defender answered that this agreement was no part of his case, and that it was only where both parties founded on a deed that they could both be liable for the expense of stamping it.
Their Lordships consulted the Judges of the Second Division.
At advising—
The point is quite settled that where the document is one on which both parties require to found, and the party leading it in evidence is made to pay the duty and the penalty, he will be entitled to recover half of that from the opposite party. But I am not satisfied that where an obligation of this kind is founded on by one only of the parties, and found to be worth nothing, then that party should be entitled to recover half the duty and half the penalty from the other party—the other party is quite entitled to say, “You should never have founded on this. I did not do so. You see the consequences of having done so, and you must bear them.” Now, by our judgment this agreement is found to be a worthless piece of paper, and I do not see how that answer is to be met.
There is one case certainly whose principle I have had a little difficulty in reconciling with our present decision. In the cases of Neil v. Leslie and M'Douall v. Caird the common rule is applied; but there is another case where the principle is not so clear. I mean the case of Logan v. Ellice, Mar. 6, 1850, 12 D. 841. That was a case laid upon a mutual contract in which the pursuer concluded for £692; the defender tendered £205 as the sum due under the contract; the pursuer got a verdict, but only for £181, being £24 under the tender; the consequence was that the defender was found entitled to expenses after the date of the tender. The difficulty that arose was as to the cost of stamping the contract; that had not been done till the trial, long after the tender was made, and therefore the defender contended that he could not be held liable for any part of the expense of stamping it.
The Court, however, proceeded there on the footing that that was a writing on which both parties founded in the course of the case, and the Lord President says—“There is nothing to prevent our following the fair and reasonable rule, that where a mutual instrument is founded on by both parties, they should divide the expense of stamping it.” That being the ground of the judgment in that case, it cannot be held to apply to this.
I should add that this judgment is given in accordance with the opinions of the Judges of the Second Division, whom we have consulted.
Counsel for Pursuer— Gloag. Agents— Ronald & Ritchie, S.S.C.
Counsel for Defender— Johnstone Agent— John Galletly, S.S.C.