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Held that the following provision in the 7th section of the Law Agents Act 1873, viz.—“A single judge shall be entitled to act as the Court with reference to all petitions for admission as a law agent under this Act,” does not render a reclaiming note against his judgment incompetent.
Observed by the Lord President that the power of review by the Inner House of all interlocutors pronounced by the Lord Ordinary cannot be taken away by implication. This was a petition presented in terms of the 10th section of the Law Agents Act (36 and 37 Vict. cap. 63). The Lord Ordinary pronounced the usual interlocutor, quoted in the Lord President's opinion. The petitioner, believing that he was entitled to be admitted without examination, on the ground that at the date of the passing of the Act he was entitled to be admitted a procurator under the Procurators Act of 1865, asked leave to reclaim against this interlocutor, which the Lord Ordinary granted, reserving all questions of competency.
On the question of competency it was argued for him—The expression “Lord Ordinary” used in; the 7th clause of the Act indicates the intention of the Act to allow the review of any interlocutors pronounced under the powers conferred by it. Under section 8th of the Judicature Act of 1825 review is declared competent unless expressly excluded— Otis v. Kidston, 24 Dunlop 419, Lord Justice Clerk's remarks, p. 426.
At advising—
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The Court, after hearing further argument on the merits, pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“The Lords having heard counsel for the reclaimer on the reclaiming note for John Robertson, writer, Edinburgh, against Lord Young's interlocutor of 29th June 1876, Sustain the competency of the reclaiming note, but refuse the same on the merits, and adhere to the interlocutor reclaimed against.”
Counsel for Petitioner— Begg. Agent— Party.