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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Magistrates of Inverkeithing v. Ross [1874] ScotLR 12_21 (30 October 1874)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1874/12SLR0021.html
Cite as: [1874] SLR 12_21, [1874] ScotLR 12_21
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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session
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Court of Session Inner House First Division.
[
v.
Facts:
In a charter of confirmation, and novodamus the clause of confirmation set forth that the lands were conveyed to A and “his heirs and assignees (excluding assignees before infeftment).” The clause of novodamus was expressed in similar terms. The reddendo stipulated that the vassal's “heirs and assignees” should pay double feu duty the first year of their entry. By no former charter had the entry of singular successors been taxed. Held that the superior's right to composition for the entry of singular successors was intact.
This was an action of declarator of non-entry, brought by the Magistrates of Inverkeithing against Alexander Ross. The subjects were described in the summons in the following terms:—“First, All and Whole these eight sixteenth parts of Crooks or Cruicks Easter, excepting and reserving a piece of ground of said lands on which a tomb was built, consisting of one acre and one eighth part of an acre Scots: Second, All and Whole one sixteenth part of the lands of Crooks or Cruicks Wester, called Foul Briggs, as sometime possessed by John Davie: Third, All and Whole that piece of ground at the old toll, consisting of twenty falls and one-half Scots measure: Fourth, All and Whole these five sixteenth parts of land lying in Easter Cruicks, sometime possessed by John Lindsay, tenant thereof, excepting therefrom a piece of ground at West Ness, consisting of
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three-fourth parts of an acre Scots, and also that piece of ground adjoining, feued by John Forrest to the Commissioners of Customs,-All which several lands and others lie within the parish of Inverkeithing and county of Fife, as particularly described in the instrument of sasine in favour of the deceased Alexander Wilson, contractor, sometime residing at Granton, recorded in the general register of sasines at Edinburgh the 25th day of June 1858, but always with and under the exceptions and reservations specified in the said instrument of sasine recorded as aforesaid.” At this stage of the case there was no dispute in reference to the third subject. The pursuers were superiors of the subjects. The defender had acquired the dominium utile of the subjects in May 1873 from William Wilson, who was the disponee of James Wilson, who was the last entered vassal. The disposition to William Wilson was dated 13th August 1868, and James Wilson after granting that disposition died in 1872. William Wilson, disponee of the last entered vassal, was willing to enter with the superiors, but he maintained, and the defender as his disponee maintained, that he (William Wilson) was entitled to an entry on payment of the duplicand of feu duty, which he contended was the composition at which the entry of the disponee or singular successor was taxed by a charter of confirmation and novodamus of 2d June 1858, granted by the pursuers to Alexander Wilson, father of the said James Wilson. This charter, and other charters founded on by the parties, are quoted, in so far as bearing upon the question, in the opinion of the Lord President.
The pursuers pleaded—“The lands and others described in the summons being in non-entry, the pursuers, as superiors thereof, are entitled to decree of declarator and payment against the defender, in terms of the conclusions of the summons, with expenses.”
The defender pleaded—“(1) The defender should be assoilzied, in respect of the offer made on the part of William Wilson, the successor of the last entered vassal, to enter as vassal in the subjects libelled. Separately, and in any view, in respect of said offer, the pursuers are not entitled to non-entry duties prior to the date of any decree which they may obtain in this action. (2) The entry of singular successors in the subjects first, second, and fourth described in the conclusions of the summons, being taxed at a double of the feuduty, the pursuers are not entitled to demand a year's rent as a condition of their granting an entry.”
The Lord Ordinary (
Young ) pronounced this interlocutor:—“The Lord Ordinary having heard counsel for the parties, and made avizandum with the debate and whole process-Finds that the pursuers are bound to grant an entry to William Wilson, contractor, Granton Villa, as vassal in the lands comprehended in the charter of confirmation and novodamus of date 2d June 1858, referred to in the record, being the lands first, second, and fourth specified in the summons, on payment of a duplicand of the feu duties exigible for said subjects, the said William Wilson being ready and willing to take such entry; and appoints the case to be put to the roll. Grants leave to the pursuers to reclaim, if so advised.“ Note.—The discussion was confined to the lands to which the preceding interlocutor refers, the parties being, as I understood, agreed with respect to the lands third and fifth specified in the summons and specially referred to in articles 1 and 4 of the defender's statement.
With respect to the lands first, second, and fourth specified, and which are comprehended in the charter of novodamus of 2d June 1858, the question between the parties turns on the construction of the word ‘assignees’ as used in the reddendo in that charter. The pursuers maintain that it means only those to whom the personal right before infeftment is transferred, assignation being in that case only the proper form of conveyance. The defender, on the other hand, while conceding that the terms ‘assignation’ and ‘assignee,’ when used with technical accuracy are only applicable, the one to the transference, and the other to the transferee, of the personal right, maintains that the term ‘assignee’ is sufficiently flexible to admit of another construction which will comprehend a disponee of the complete feudal right, when that clearly appears to be in accordance with the meaning and intention of the party using it, which he contends is the case here, and relies on the case of Hamilton v. Dunn, 15 D. 925.
I agree with the defender, 1st, that the term ‘assignees’ is flexible, and may mean disponees of the feudal Subject: and 2d, that this is the sense in which it is used in the charter of 2d June 1858. The exclusion of ‘assignees before infeftment’ shows clearly that the term is not used in the sense of assignees before infeftment, and disponees is the only other meaning that it admits of. That it does admit of this meaning is settled by the case of Hamilton v. Dunn.
The pursuers further maintain that it appears from the negotiations and correspondence which resulted in the charter of June 1858, that the novodamus was for the purpose of settling some controversies about mineral rights, and that it was not in the view of the parties to make any change upon the reddendo with respect to the casualties or otherwise. But first, I think it is not allowable to refer to negotiations or correspondence in order to construe the charter; and second, the original charters of the lands embraced in the novodamus have not been produced, and I understand are not now obtainable. Farther, the previous charters by progress produced are not clear in the pursuers' favour for an untaxed entry of singular successors, and it is a legitimate purpose of a novodamus to make the reddendo, including the taxation of casualties, certain.”
The pursuer reclaimed, and argued—In none of the earlier charters is there any limitation of the superior's right to claim composition upon the entry of a singular successor, and so, if there is such limitation, it must be found in the charter of confirmation and novodamus. In that charter there occurs in the confirmation clause and clause of novodamus the expression “excluding assignees before infeftment,” while in the reddendo the usual expression “heirs and assignees” is used. The question is, does the expression in the two former clauses limit and explain that in the latter clause? It does not have any such effect, for the plain reason that the insertion of the expression was to benefit the superior, and not for the purpose of limiting or abandoning a right which he formerly had. The purpose was to make it clear that the disponee and his heirs alone could take infeftment, and to prevent him assigning the charter with open
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precept. It was not intended to make any change in the holding. The defender argued—Assignee was a word of the widest signification, meaning a person to whom a right was conveyed in one way or another from the original vassal. Here the meaning which parties intended to put upon the word was clear, from the use of the words “excluding assignees before infeftment” in the dispositive clause. When in one clause of a charter a distinct meaning was impressed upon a word, a different meaning would not be given to the word in another clause except upon the strongest grounds and the clearest indication that such different meaning was to be used. But there was no indication of any qualification of the word assignee in the roddendo clause, and it must be there read as excluding assignees before infeftment-that was, as meaning disponees or singular successors.
When there was a new grant in gremio of a deed it was not competent to go back to former grants. In all cases in which the Court held that they were bound and entitled to go back to the old infeftments, the novodamus expressly stipulated that such should be the case. But if the Court did go back they would find one change of great importance, for in the charter of novodamus the words “as use is of feu-ferme” which appeared in the older infeftments, were omitted-and the use in feu farm was to enter singular successors upon payment of composition.
Authorities— Magistrates of Inverness v. Duff, M. 15,059; Thomson, May 22, 1810, F.C.; M'Lachlan v. Tait, Dec. 6, 1822, 2 S. 69; Boyd v. The Vassals of the Estate of Linlithgow, Elchies, voce Superior and Vassal, No. 13; Bell's Illustrations, p. 34.
At advising—
The
The second parcel of land consists of one-sixteenth part of the lands of Crooks Wester, and the earliest charter we have is a charter of resignation of 23d February of 1826. The reddendo is there set forth as follows:—“For payment to us and our successors in office, or our treasurer for the time, for the use and behoof of the community of the said burgh for the said one-sixteenth part of Crooks or Cruicks Wester of the sum of four pounds six shillings and six pennies Scots, at the term of Lammas yearly, in name of feu-farm, beginning the first year's payment at Lammas next to come, with the double of the said feu at the entry of every heir or assignee to the said lands, and that for all burden,, secular service, question or demand, which can be exacted or required forth thereof.”
The fourth parcel of land consists of one-fourth of the lands of Easter Cruicks, together with one-sixteenth part of the same lands, the whole being described in the summons as five-sixteenths of land lying in Easter Cruicks. The original charter of the one-fourth part is dated 24th March 1603. In that charter the reddendo is thus expressed:—“Reddendo inde annuatim predicti Thomas Mitchell et Isobella Broun ejus spousa heredesque eorum et assignati ut supra nobis et successoribus nostris seu Thesaurariis pro tempore pro diotis terris cum pertinentiis ejusdem summam triginta solidorum saulis monete regni Scotie tanquam firm am antiquam seu annuum redditum de predictiis terris solvi solitum, nec non summam duodecem librarum monete predicts in augmentationem rentalis extendendo in toto ad summam tredecem librarum et decem solidorum monete prescripts, annuatim solvendarum ad duos anni terminos consuetos festa viz. Pentecostes et Sancti Martini in hieme per equales medias portiones nomine feudifirme Duplicando dictam feudifirmam seu annuum redditum in introitu cujuslibet eorum heredis vel assignati tantum ad dictas terras cum pertinentiis jacentis ut supra prout usus est feudifirme tantum pro omni alio onere seruicio seculari questione seu demanda que de predictis terris cum pertinentiis prefato burgo spectantibus per quoscumque juste exigi poterint quomodolibet vel requiri.”
Then, of date 20th September 1664, we have a charter of confirmation of the whole five-sixteenths of Easter Cruicks, in which the reddendo is expressed in terms substantially the same as in the original charter of the one-fourth part. The clause proceeds thus:—“Paying therefor yearly the said John Hodge and his foresaids furth of the foresaid five-sixtene pairts Cruicks with the pertinents to us and our successors, or the treasurer for the time, the sum of twenty-ane pund eleven shillings and three pennies, at twa terms in the year, Whitsunday and Mertinmas in, be equal portions, in name of feu-ferme, doubling the said feu-ferme at the entrie of any of their heir or heirs or assignees to the said lands, with the pertents whatsomever as use is of feu-ferme.”
Now, the right of the superior to composition is a clear legal right belonging to him, which is not
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But the defender's case rests on the charter of confirmation and novodamus, and, undoubtedly, the very expression novodamus suggests that it contains something not in the ordinary charter by progress, and it is competent and necessary to enquire what the superior meant to alter or change by the charter of novodamus.
The charter of confirmation and novodamus is dated the 2d June 1856, and sets forth a distinct reason of the cause of granting in the following terms:—“Considering that the conditions and reservations under which some of the lands aftermentioned are held as expressed in the recent charters thereof are not conform to the conditions contained in the original and more ancient charters of these lands, and that questions have arisen between us and Alexander Wilson, contractor, residing at Granton, the vassal, as to the clauses and conditions which are obligatory upon him, and we have agreed to compromise and transact all such questions by the said Alexander Wilson paying to the Town Council of said burgh the sum of three hundred pounds sterling upon our granting him a charter of confirmation and novodamus in the terms and manner afterwritten.”
This charter contains inter alia the whole three parcels of land in question. The object of granting the novodamus is to reconcile the ancient and recent charters as to certain conditions, and it is necessary to examine the charters in order to see what the discrepancies are. We find that in the older charters there is a reservation of minerals, with the qualification that they are “for the use of the superior,” while in the more modern charters the reservation is absolute. Here we have a very substantial discrepancy, and as far as I can see there is no other discrepancies between the ancient and more recent charters. Certainly, before 1858 there were no discrepancies as to the terms of entry of singular successors, and so there was nothing to reconcile in reference to that point. It is, however, a very sufficient reason for granting the charter of novodamus that the qualification upon the reservation of minerals is restored. But it is said that being a charter of confirmation and novodamus it is expressed in such terms as necessarily to imply a peculiar entry for, heirs and also for singular successors. That may be so if it is distinctly so set forth in the deed, and in that case it must be given effect to. But a charter of novodamus is not by mere implication to be extended beyond what is warranted by express words. Now, the confirmation clause is in the following terms:—“We, the said provost, bailies, treasurer, and councillors, for ourselves and our foresaids, and representing as aforesaid, do hereby confirm for ever to and in favour of the said Alexander Wilson, and his heirs and assignees whomsoever (but excluding assignees before infeftment).”
Then the clause of novodamus is in the following terms:—“And we, the said provost, bailies, and treasurer, and councillors of said burgh of Inverkeithing, for ourselves and our successors in office, and representing as aforesaid, do hereby of new sell, alienate, and in feu-farm dispone to and in favour of the said Alexander Wilson, his heirs and assignees whomsoever, but excluding assignees before infeftment, and declaring that these presents shall not be a valid warrant for sasine after the term of Martinmas next.”
Now, in connection with these clauses the defender points out that the reddendo clause is thus expressed:—“The said Alexander Wilson and his foresaids paying yearly to us and our successors in office, or to our treasurer for the time being, for the several lands as follows, viz., For the said eight-sixteenth parts of Crooks Easter, the sum of thirty-four pounds ten shillings Scots money; for the said one-sixteenth part of Crooks Wester, the sum of four pounds six shillings and sixpence Scots money; and for the said five-sixteenth parts of Crooks Easter, the sum of twenty-one pounds eleven shillings and threepence Scots money; amounting together the said several sums to the sum of sixty pounds seventeen shillings and ninepence Scots money, or five pounds and sevenpence and nine-twelfths of a penny sterling, and that in name of feu-farm yearly, beginning the first year's payment at the term of Martinmas eighteen hundred and fifty-eight for the year preceding, doubling the said feu-duties at the entry of every heir or assignee to the said several lands.”
The argument is that assignees before infeftment being excluded, the word assignees in the charter cannot be read as meaning assignees before infeftment, but must mean singular successors or disponees. In the reddendo clause the persons spoken of are Alexander Wilson and his foresaids, which can only mean Alexander Wilson and his heirs and disponees or singular successors.
This argument is plausible, but when we examine the clauses more minutely, and look at the circumstances of granting, the argument is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the right of the superior to composition.
The object for which the peculiar restriction (excluding assignees before infeftment) is introduced, is plain. The restriction occurs in the confirmation clause, but it also occurs in the clause of novodamus, with the declaration that “these presents shall not be a valid warrant for sasine after the term of Martinmas next.” This provision shows that the right was meant to be immediately feudalised in the person of the vassal. This was of importance, for the charter did make a difference in the feu, and it was desirable that it should be at
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So I am of opinion that the superior's right to composition for the entry of singular successors is intact.
The pursuers are superiors of the subjects. The defender, Mr Ross, acquired the dominium utile of the subjects in May 1873 from William Wilson, who was the disponee of James Wilson the last entered vassal. The disposition to William Wilson is dated 13th August 1868, and was followed by Sasine on 14th August 1868. James Wilson after granting that disposition died in 1872.
William Wilson, disponee of the last entered vassal, is willing to enter with the superiors. But he maintains, and the defender Mr Ross as his disponee maintains, that he (William Wilson) is entitled to an entry on payment of the duplicand of feu-duty, which he contends is the composition at which the entry of a disponee or singular successor is taxed by the charter of confirmation and novodamus granted in June 1858. The pursuers deny that William Wilson is entitled to enter on payment of a taxed composition, and they demand payment of a year's rent.
The question depends, as I think, on the ascertainment of the true meaning of the charter of novodamus, read of course in connection with the older titles. The language of the novodamus is most unusual; the meaning is by no means clear; and the question of construction is, in my view, attended with extreme difficulty.
We must look, in the first place, at the original charter of 24th March 1603. The construction of that charter is not quite free from doubt; but reading it by the light derived from the authorities, both institutional and judicial, I concur in the opinion expressed by your Lordships, that the entry of a disponee or singular successor is not by that charter taxed to a duplicand of the feu-duty. The words “ cujue-libet eorum heredie vel aeeignati” are qualified by the words “ prout usus est feu-deferme;” and these qualifying words are considered by all our authorities as most important. At the date of this charter, in 1603, there can be no doubt what was the feudal usage of Scotland on the subject of the entry of vassals. Therefore, giving effect to the reference and to the usage as referred to, I arrive at the same conclusion as your Lordships in regard to this charter. I come to the same conclusion in regard to the construction of the charter of 1690; and also, though not without some difficulty, in regard to the construction of the charter of 1826.
But the real difficulty arises on the construction of the charter of confirmation and novodamus in 1858.
This charter proceeds on the consideration “that the conditions and reservations under which some of the lands after-mentioned are held, as expressed in the recent charters thereof, are not conform to the original and more ancient charters of these lands, and that questions have arisen between us and Alexander Wilson, the vassal, as to the clauses and conditions which are obligatory on him.” This introduction to the charter is important, as explaining the meaning of the charter. The cause and consideration of granting is disconformity between the conditions of recent charters and the conditions of the original and more ancient charters. In construing the grant of novodamus we must bear in mind that this disconformity in previous charters was the occasion and consideration of the grant. The charter then proceeds to narrate that “we (the superior and the vassal) have agreed to compromise all such questions.” By these words I understand all questions which had arisen, or such as had arisen, between the superior and vassal out of the disconformity which I have explained between the old and the recent charters. No other questions appear to have arisen. The mode of effecting the compromise and transaction of such questions which had been agreed on is then stated. The vassal pays £300, and the superiors grant a charter of confirmation and novodamus in the terms now before us. It is rightly maintained for the vassal that the terms of the charter, and especially of the novodamus as expressed, form the counter-part of the payment which he made; and that he is entitled to enforce it according to its true meaning. On the other hand, it is rightly contended for the superiors that the cause or consideration of granting the novodamus was the discovery of disconformity between the old and recent charters, and that the questions which had arisen related to the clauses and conditions in these conflicting charters, and that the agreement to compromise and transact embraced only all such questions as arose out of such disconformity.
The ascertainment of the true meaning of this introductory part of the charter is of great importance, and I shall have occasion for a moment to return to it. In the meantime, I proceed to consider the terms of the clause of confirmation and the terms of the clause of novodamus.
By this charter the superiors do confirm the subjects, which are fully described “to and in favour of the said Alexander Wilson and his heirs and assignees whomsoever (but excluding assignees before infeftment).” Then the superiors proceed “of new to sell, alienate, and in feu-farm dispone to and in favour of the said Alexander Wilson, his heirs and assignees whomsoever, but excluding assignees before infeftment, and declaring that these presents shall not be a valid warrant for
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Now, the question before us turns on the construction of the word “assignees,” as used in the reddendo in this charter of novodamus. I am of opinion that a charter of novodamus, in so far as it is a novodamus, has the character of an original grant. It is a grant de novo. In the words of Lord Stair, “the clause ‘ de novodamus’ doth dispone the fee as by an original right.” Whatever is within a clause of novodamus by a subject superior is held to be validly granted, if the superior had the power to grant it. A variation from the original grant, if in favour of the superior, is unfavourably viewed by the law. He cannot augment his own rights and impair his vassal's rights in a charter of novodamus, unless by transaction with the vassal. Where the words require construction, an intention to withdraw or to restrict the rights of the vassal cannot be presumed in a charter of novodamus. The clause must, in dubio, be construed against such withdrawal or restriction of right. But where there is in the novodamus a concession of right by the superior, and where the right of the vassal is extended or amended, there is no such adverse presumption or unfavourable canon of construction. In such a case the power to make the concession being beyond question, the words of the grant must receive a fair, and as regards the vassal, a not unfavourable construction, and their true meaning must be ascertained.
Now, what is the true meaning of the reddendo in this clause of novodamus, read in connection with the other clauses in the charter.
In approaching this question of construction I am disposed to go very much along with the argument for the vassal. The words must be fairly construed as they stand. There is no presumption against the vassal's claim. For my part, I must say that I think the claim is not in itself unreasonable. The superior's right to demand a year's rent from the vassal on his entry may surely be surrendered by the superior on substitution of a duplicand of feu-duty. There is no presumption to exclude it; and looking to the relative rights of superior and vassal as now recognised, and as affected by equities which have arisen in the progress of society, I am disposed to think that the law would not look unfavourably on a construction in support of such a substitution.
I think it right also to add, that the date of this charter of novodamus is, in the question of construction, of some importance. This charter was granted in 1858, and I am not aware of any case in which a decision unfavourable to the vassal on such a question has been pronounced where the charter of novodamus was of recent date.
According to our older law, a feu was inalienable without consent of the superior. While such was the relation between the superior and the vassal, it was to be expected that the clauses of a charter would be read in favour of the superior's rights which the law then fully supported, and against the rights claimed by the vassal, which the law then refused to recognise. Therefore, charters dated during that early period of our law seem to have been construed in dubio in favour of the superior. But, when we look at the progress in the course of legislation on the subject—to the Act 1469, c. 37, an Act anent apprisers for debt—to the statute 1669, c. 18, anent adjudications—to the statute 1681, c. 17—and above all to the statute 20 George II, c. 50,—it seems impossible to doubt that the unfavourable presumptions, and the severe rules of construction enforced in the construction of old charters, have now lost much of their appropriate force, and are no longer applicable.
In the case of Hamilton v. Dunn, July 16, 1853, the charters were of date 1643 and 1659, a period when the vassal's right to alienate the feu had not been fully recognised, and yet, even in that case, and in regard to such a charter, the opinion of a majority of the Court was in favour of the vassal. In the case of the Magistrates of Inverness, and several of the other cases quoted, the charters were of old date, and suitable rules of construction were applied. In no case has a charter granted since the 20th of George II. been construed on a presumtion so unfavourable to the vassal. If I understand aright the opinion of Lord Curriehill, whose opinion in the case of Hamilton v. Dunn was in favour of the superior, he would have taken a different view if he had been construing a modern charter. Therefore, up to the point of entering on the ascertainment of the meaning of this particular clause, my view of this case is favourable to the vassal.
But notwithstanding this, and setting aside as inapplicable all unfavourable presumptions or rules of construction adverse to the vassal's claim, I have come to the conclusion that, reading the words of the charter before us fairly, and endeavouring to ascertain their true meaning, it was not intended to alter the former holding—to change the customary entry—or to substitute a duplicand of feu-duty for payment of a year's rent. The charter was granted as the result of a compromise and transaction, and that was limited to disputes arising out of the disconformity of charters. There is no indication or suggestion of any question having arisen in regard to the conditions of entry before the date of this novodamus; there is no disconformity on that subject between the more recent and the more ancient charters; and there was, so far as we can see, no necessity, no occasion, and no desire, for compromise or transaction in regard to entry. The omission of the words “as use is,” is, I admit, not without importance, for the introduction
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Then I do not think that the use of the word “assignees” is of itself sufficient to support the defender's plea. A fixed and inflexible meaning is not attached to the word, and it does not necessarily and exclusively express assignees to the personal right and before infeftment. But it may do so, and it has frequently done so, and in this case, when Iconsider the introduction to the charter—the whole structure of the charter,—the obligation to infeft “Alexander Wilson and his foresaids,” which would be inapplicable if it meant his disponees,—and the fact of the existence of other questions regarding minerals really turning on disconformity between the old and the recent charters—I feel unable to resist the conclusion at which your Lordships have arrived, that taxation of this entry by substitution of a duplicand feu-duty for a year's rent was not intended by the parties in 1858—not demanded by the vassal, and not conceded by the superior. I have considered this case with great anxiety. The views which I entertain in regard to the change in the relations between superior and vassal, and in regard to the presumptions and canons of construction in application to modern charters of novodamus, tended to dispose me to concur, if I could, with the Lord Ordinary's judgment. But notwithstanding these views, and not rejecting or overlooking the equitable considerations to which I have adverted, I have been unable to read the words of this charter before us otherwise than as your Lordships have done.
The Court pronounced this Interlocutor:—
“The Lords having heard counsel on the reclaiming-note for the Magistrates of Inverkeithing against Lord Young's interlocutor of 25th June 1874, Recal the said interlocutor, Find that the entry of original successors to the lands first, second, and fourth mentioned in the conclusions of the summons is not taxed; find the pursuers entitled to expenses since the date of the interlocutor reclaimed against, and remit to the Auditor to tax the account of the said expenses, and report to the Lord Ordinary, reserving all other questions of expenses; and remit to the Lord Ordinary to proceed with the cause, and with power to decern for the expenses now found due.”
Counsel for Pursuers— Dean of Faculty (Clark) and Orr Paterson. Agents— J. & A. Peddie, W.S.
Counsel for Defenders— Marshall and M'Laren. Agents— Lindsay, Paterson, & Hall, W.S.