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(Ante, vol. x, p. 249.)
Interest.
A contribution having been annually made for forty years by the landlord of a Bleach-work to upper heritors on a stream in respect of certain dams maintained by them, and this contribution having been continued by the tenant during the last five years of his lease without any express permission or prohibition by the landlord; held, ( reversing Lord Gifford, diss. Lord Neaves), that the tenant was entitled to deduct the same from his rent, because the landlord was bound by implication and usage under the lease to make the payment, or had led the tenant to believe in bona fide that the contribution was a debt.
Interest at 4 per cent. allowed on balances of rent unpaid by the tenant, although he had termly tendered payment of his rent on receiving certain deductions to which he was ultimately found entitled by the Court.
This was a reclaiming note against the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary in an action previously reported, and which was an action at the instance of “the Rev. Peter Sawers, now designating himself Peter Russell Sawers, Free Church minister, Gargunnock,” as sole surviving trustee of the late Peter Sawers, bleacher, Nether Kirkton, against Messrs John & Hugh M'Connell, bleachers, Nether Kirkton, and Hugh M'Connell, the sole surviving partner of the firm, for payment of a balance of £281, 7s. 1d., with periodical interest amounting to £30, 8s. 7d., and with interest until payment, in name of overdue rents. Payment of £50 of the sum sued for was resisted on the ground—(1) of no title to sue, the pursuer not being entitled to
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sue with his co-trustee; (2) that the property taxes and water-rents being proper charges against the landlords, the defenders were entitled to deduction thereof; (3) that the pursuer's claim for interest was unwarranted; and (4) that the defenders not having been in mora, but having been always ready and willing punctually to pay their rents on receiving the proper deductions, and having consigned the full sum due (£199, 10s. 8d.), were not chargeable with interest, and were entitled to absolvitor over and above that sum, with expenses. The Lord Ordinary pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“ Edinburgh, 18 th November 1873.—The Lord Ordinary having heard parties' procurators, and having considered the closed record, proof adduced, and whole process, Finds that the balance of rents due and resting-owing by the defenders to the pursuer as at 27th January 1873, after deducting property tax, was £249, 10s. 8d. sterling: Finds that the defenders have failed to instruct that the sum of £50 paid by the defenders to Messrs Cochran & Hay, per receipts produced, was paid either by authority of the pursuer, or that the same was a debt due by the pursuer, and which he is bound to repay to the defenders, or to allow the defenders deduction or credit therefor: Finds that the pursuer has received payment of the consigned sum of £199, 10s. 8d. under warrant of the Lord Ordinary, dated 18th March last: Therefore decerns and ordains the defenders to pay to the pursuer the sum of £50 sterling, in full of the sums concluded for in the present action, reserving entire all questions as to who is ultimately liable for the said sum of £50, and all claims of relief or repayment thereof: Finds in the circumstances no expenses due to or by either party, and decerns.
Note.—The question in this case came ultimately to be a very simple one, namely, whether the defenders were entitled to credit from the pursuer for a sum of £50, being five years' water-rent paid by the defenders to Messrs Cochran & Hay, upper heritors, in respect of certain dams and water-works, of which the bleachfield belonging to the pursuer, and occupied by the defenders, got the benefit.
There is no doubt whatever that the defenders paid this water-rent, being £10 a-year, in perfect bona fide, believing that it was justly due by the pursuer, their landlord, and that they would get deduction for it in settling their rent with him, or his agent or factor; and it seems also to be the case that the defenders believed that if they did not pay this water-rent they would or might be deprived of the benefit of the dams; and as their lease gave them right to the existing water power which the dams were necessary to maintain, they not unnaturally thought they were justified in continuing to pay the water-rent to Messrs Cochran & Hay. The Lord Ordinary, therefore, has felt considerable sympathy for the defenders, and he cannot help thinking that the course taken by the pursuer in repudiating the long usage of his predecessors and authors is, to say the least of it, somewhat illiberal, and that it was not unjustly characterised by the defenders' counsel as narrow and shabby.
Still, the Lord Ordinary is bound the decide the case on strict legal principles, and he has felt himself compelled to come to the conclusion that the defenders have failed to instruct either—(1) that they paid the so-called water-rent with the pursuer's authority; or (2) that the rent was legally due by and exigible from the pursuer, and that the defenders, as implied assignees of the creditors, are entitled to relief therefrom.
It appears that, in order to equalise the flow of water in Kirkton Burn, so as to make it efficient as a water power both in summer and in winter, it has been found necessary to construct at the higher parts of the burn large artificial reservoirs, for the purpose of storing the flood water and the excess available in winter and in wet weather, so as to give a constant supply in summer and in dry weather. It has also been proved that the bleachfield belonging to the pursuer has been benefitted by these operations, and that it was natural and equitable that the pursuer should contribute thereto. It is fully proved that for a period of upwards of forty years the late Mr Sawers and his trustees contributed £5 annually, and that since 1849, when the second dam was formed, they contributed an additional £5 per annum. At the date when the defenders' lease was granted the late Mr Sawers, the truster, was actually paying £10 a-year for the ‘existing water power,’ and he and his trustees, after letting that existing ‘water power’ to the defenders, continued to make this annual payment till 1864. About that year, however, Mr Sawers' trustees, with consent of Henry Sawers, the then liferenter, gave the defenders a deduction from their rent of £80 a-year, on condition that the defenders should pay the water-rent, (£10 a-year) which the landlord had hitherto paid. This arrangement was acted upon, and thus the defenders, the tenants of the bleachfield, came to pay the water rent instead of the proprietors or liferenter. The deduction of rent, however, having been only granted during pleasure, the present pursuer, when he succeeded to the liferent, refused to continue the deduction, and it is not disputed that he was entitled so to do, and the defenders have always been ready to pay their rent without the abatement. There never was any settlement of rents, however, till the present action was raised, the defenders merely making payments to account; and the defenders, who, under the arrangement of 1864 had been paying the water-rent direct to Messrs Cochran, continued to do so, supposing that it was a just debt due by the proprietors to the upper heritors.
But, then, the Lord Ordinary thinks that the defenders took the risk of so doing. In strictness, when the arrangement for abatement of rent was cancelled, matters should have reverted to their former position, and the defenders should have referred Messrs Cochran to the pursuer or his agents for payment of the water rent.
There are, indeed, strong grounds for holding that the water-rent was justly, or at least equitably, due by the pursuer. As to £5, or one-half of it, it seems to have been paid by the pursuer's authors, by whose acts he is bound, for a period of more than forty years, and as to the remaining £5, this sum has been paid ever since the second dam was constructed. But then it is possible that these payments were of the nature of voluntary contributions. No deed of agreement has been produced, and no obligation under which the payments were made. Indeed, this question as to whether the water rent is a legally exigible debt or not cannot well be tried in the present action, at least it cannot be conclusively tried, because the creditors in the supposed obligation are not parties to the present action, and are not hound
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by anything done or found therein; and this is just the misfortune of the defenders, who paid without authority, and without making sure that deduction would be allowed. The Lord Ordinary, however, reserves the question of right entire, for it may very well be that in an action at the instance of the true creditors the pursuer may be found liable for the water rent. As to this the Lord Ordinary can give no opinion. All that he has found in the present action is, that the defenders have failed to instruct a legal right to retain the water rents from the rent of the bleachfield due by them. The Lord Ordinary also leaves untouched any claim of repayment which the defenders may have against anybody other than the present pursuer. In the whole circumstances, the Lord Ordinary thinks justice is done by awarding expenses to neither party. To a very large extent the pursuer himself is to blame for the dispute which has arisen, and for the present litigation. He seems to have appointed a factor, Mr Matthew Anderson, but he did not give this factor authority to settle questions with the present defenders, and Mr Anderson very naively depones that he is not sure whether he is the pursuer's agent or not. In Mr Anderson's cross-examination it appears that he got no instructions or information from the pursuer at all, and it is proved that it was at his request that the defenders went on simply making payments to account, without coming to half-yearly or termly settlements. Then, neither the pursuer nor Mr Anderson ever intimated, either in writing or verbally, to the defenders, that there was no water rent due to the upper heritors, or undertook that the ‘existing water power’ should be maintained, though the water rent for the dams was not paid. The pursuer himself knew the long usage of payment, and never intimated either to the defenders or to the creditors that the usage was to be inverted. This may not prevent the pursuer from now maintaining his strict legal rights, whatever these are, but it seems an equitable and sufficient ground for refusing him the expenses of an action of which he has himself been the cause.”
The defenders reclaimed.
At advising—
Had the question been whether the pursuer, as landlord, had become bound by the series of payments made to the upper heritors to continue their payment in all time coming, I should not have differed from the Lord Ordinary. I think he was not so bound. If he was prepared to sacrifice the benefit which his works were receiving in return for this annual contribution, he was, I think, entitled to withdraw it. Therefore it is clear that, as one of the upper heritors, the defenders could have no claim.
But there is another ground of judgment, which compels me to come to a different conclusion from the Lord Ordinary. I look on the missives of lease of these subjects, and not on the obligation of the pursuers to the upper heritors, as the foundation of the defenders' case, and hold that under the warrandice of the lease the pursuer is bound to relieve the defenders of this payment.
The water power was given as it then existed. It was essential to the full enjoyment of the existing water power that the water rent which had been paid to the upper heritors for forty years and more should continue to be paid. And as the landlord was bound to give the water, he was bound to make the payment.
Having made these observations, I next notice that the Lord Ordinary, toward the end of his note, “reserves the question of right entire, for it may very well be that in an action at the instance of the true creditors the pursuer may be found liable for the water rent.” Now, if we look at the state of matters existing when the action was raised, we shall see that for four years the defenders, as tenants, had been making this payment, and that it was utterly impossible that the upper heritors should ever raise action against any one for these years' payment. The reservation of the Lord Ordinary is therefore unmeaning and ineffectual. But it shows also most clearly that the ground of the Lord Ordinary's judgment altogether overlooks the obligation that the pursuer was under, not to the upper heritors, but to the defenders. So far as the upper heritors were concerned the pursuer might do as he liked. But he was not entitled to say to his own tenants—I did not during all these years choose to expose myself to any discussion on the subject with you, but I now say you took on yourselves a risk for which you are answerable, and if you cannot make out that I am liable to the upper heritors you will get nothing from me.
Let us now look at the lease.—[ Reads lease.] Now it appears to me that it was impossible for the landlord to maintain the high rent of his bleachfield unless he maintained at the same time the supply of water. It is clear that that has been the opinion of the proprietors for the last forty years. It was the opinion of old Mr Sawers, who worked the bleachfield himself. It was the opinion of Henry Sawers, the first liferenter. He continued for some years the payment previously made by his predecessor to the upper heritors, and then, when a short time before his death an arrangement was made between him and his tenants to the effect
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In the evidence of the defender Hugh M'Connell it is clear how anxious he and his partner were to come to an understanding with Mr Sawers on the subject of the payment of this £10—foreseeing that difficulties might be afterwards raised. It is also clear how anxious Mr Sawers was to avoid any personal communication with them on the subject. In these circumstances, no doubt the tenants in making this payment of £10 a year for the last five years of the lease took on them a certain risk. But what was that risk? Not the risk that Mr Sawers might be found under no obligation to make this payment to the upper heritors, but the risk that Mr Sawers might be found under no obligation to them under the warrandice in their lease to make this payment in order to secure the water supply, which was essential to the carrying on of their works. That was a risk they were quite entitled to run. It was evident that the bleach work could not be carried on without the supply of water. If they did not pay it was evident they would not get the water; and as prudent men, and acting in bona fide, they were entitled to say, Our landlord is not dealing openly in this matter, and will not come to a settlement of any one year's rent which would bring the thing to a point; we cannot carry on without the water, and rather than run the risk of ruining our trade we will pay this water rent and recover it from him. Had they both done so it would have been much worse for the pursuer, for their claims against him could then have taken a very different form. I am therefore of opinion that the deduction of £50 claimed by the defenders should be allowed.
In the next place, the finding holds that the defenders have failed to instruct “that the same was a debt due by the pursuer.” It has not been proved that this was a legal debt due by Peter Sawers, that Messrs Cochran and Hay could have had any ground of action upon it, and I agree in this with the view taken by the Lord Ordinary. The view taken by Lord Benholme is to this effect—You are liable to me under the obligation of warrandice under the lease, and therefore I was entitled to make these payments for you, and to deduct the amount from the rent which I had to pay you. I confess I cannot coincide with the law as laid down by Lord Benholme on this point. Certainly there was an obligation, but I am unable to see that any breach of warrandice ever actually took place. All that the defenders, in such a view, could maintain would be, that as the warrandice would have been broken we paid this money to avoid your failure to implement your obligations under the lease. Now, this is a serious matter. I do not think it is a tenant's business to implement his landlord's obligations. Let him wait, let the landlord break the warrandice and fail to fulfil his obligation, and then there would be a measure of damage incurred thereby. To have acted in the way in which the Messrs M'Connell have done appears to me to be unjustifiable in so far as regards a claim for reimbursement. Putting the question entirely on the legal ground, I am not able to say that I think a tenant entitled to go and fulfil his landlord's warrandice in this way.
In all these transactions no one can approve of Mr Sawers' conduct in shuffling and avoiding any settlement of the question, and I must concur in what the Lord Ordinary has said of this in his note. Were I called upon to pronounce an eulogium on Mr Sawers' conduct I could not do it.
(1.) This payment was made in respect of, and as the counter part of, certain rights and privileges which the landlord was bound by his lease to communicate to the tenant, and form part of the consideration for which the rent stipulated in the lease was paid. I think we must hold that this annual contribution represented a corresponding annual
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(2.) It is to my mind quite immaterial that the obligation to furnish and pay for these privileges was not permanently binding on either Sawers or Cochran in a question between them, and might have been terminated by either. They were binding on the landlord in a question with his tenant whatever might be the rights of Sawers or Cochran in the matter. But it must be remembered that this was an annual payment for an annual benefit, paid after the benefit had been supplied, and, yet further, one which had continued for many years. Although it was not a permanent payment it could not be terminated without notice; and each year which was allowed to terminate without notice might vest a right to the payment for that year, seeing the consideration was furnished and accepted for that year. In this case no notice that he means to discontinue this payment has ever yet been given to Cochran by Sawers, and in this view the prior arrangement between them did continue to subsist for each of the five years as each year expired, and therefore it may be reasonably maintained that for each of these five years the payment became due and was a debt between Cochran and Sawers. But that is not the question here. The rights and powers of Cochran against Sawers cannot come into question, for Cochran received all he could claim, and Sawers obtained all the advantage paid for. The real question is whether Sawers can retain the advantage and leave the burden on the shoulders of the tenant.
(3.) Mr Sawers maintained that it was enough for this action that, whether the sum was due by him or not, this payment was made without and against authority, and therefore that the tenant was not entitled to credit for it or to retain his rent in respect of it. Now, even if the pursuer had taken his ground plainly and openly, had told his tenant that he was going to terminate this agreement, and to discontinue the payment to Cochran, and had warned the tenant not to pay, this would not absolutely have settled the question, as the tenant might still contend that the landlord could not withhold the payment so far as necessary to secure the stipulated privileges under the lease. But the element in this case which has chiefly weighed with me, (admitting Lord Neaves' observation on the law as to payment made by a tenant of his own hand), is that the pursuer has never made any such intimation—he has evaded all opportunity of settling the question—as to intimation he does not say anything either on the record or in his evidence. All he did was to intimate that he would not allow the abatement given by Henry Sawers; he would recognise no deduction, and would demand his full rent. His full rent has been paid as far as the former deductions were concerned; but this was not a deduction. It was no favour or advantage to the tenant; it was a burden on him. Prom the evidence it is quite clear that the pursuer evaded all attempts to extract from him a statement of what ground he took. He never liberated the tenant in express terms, at least from his customary payment; he knew of these payments year by year, but he never told Cochran they were not paid on his account. It was an arrangement for the landlord's convenience in Henry Sawers' time that the tenant should pay the water-rent—certainly it was not made to suit the tenants. Mr Sawers knew, and his agent knew, that the receipts were taken in the name of the landlord, but he did nothing. He never faced the question whether he could under the lease stop this contribution, and he took care to prevent such a question arising. He never spoke of this rent to his agent, and would not speak of it to his tenant, but left him in uncertainty whether that part of his arrangement with Henry Sawers remained, although the deduction were disallowed; and, now, waiting till all the payments have been safely made, and no question can now arise to his prejudice, he tries to avoid payment. This I think he cannot successfully do.
The Court pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“Recal the interlocutor complained of; assoilzie the defenders from the whole conclusions of the summons, and decern, except as regards the periodical interest arising on the rents due by the defenders while unpaid: find that the said interest amounts to £22, 19s. 8d., and decern against the defenders therefor; find the defenders entitled to expenses, and remit to the Auditor to tax the same and to report.”
Counsel for Pursuer—Lord-Advocate (Young) Q.C., and Scott. Agent— D. Milne, S.S.C.
Counsel for Defender—Solicitor-General ( Clark), Q.C., and R. V. Campbell. Agent— A. K. Mackie, S.S.C.