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Expenses
A raised an action for divorce against bis wife, and thereafter reclaimed; before the case came on for hearing he raised a second action, alleging acts of adultery committed since the first was raised. Held that the two actions must be conjoined in pronouncing decree of divorce, the Court being satisfied with the proof of adultery in both.
Held, (1) That the defender, qua-wife, is entitled to recover her expenses from her husband in an action for divorce although adultery has been proved; (2) That under the Conjugal Rights Act 1861, § 7, the co-defender may be decerned against both for the pursuer's expenses and for those thus paid by the pursuer to his wife.
These two actions were both for divorce on grounds of adultery. In the first action a reclaiming note was presented by the pursuer, Aug. 20, 1872, against the interlocutor of Lord Jerviswoode, and the second action was reported to the Inner House by Lord Shand on January 21, 1873. The interlocutor pronounced was as follows:—“The Lord Ordinary, having considered the cause, for the reasons stated in the subjoined note reports the cause to the Lords of the Second Division of the Court: Appoints the pursuer to print and box the record, proof, and documents; and grants warrant to enrol in the Inner House rolls.” And thereafter in his note the Lord Ordinary, on the point of the two actions, adds—“The present case is the sequel of a previous action of divorce between the same parties, which has not yet been finally disposed of. In that action the pursuer maintains that he has proved acts of adultery between the defender and co-defender during a period prior to that embraced in the present action, and although he has failed to establish this to the satisfaction of the Lord Ordinary before whom the case was heard, their Lordships of the Second Division of the Court have made avizandum with the debate, and have not yet pronounced judgment. It appears to the Lord Ordinary, in these circumstances, that while on the one hand he ought not to delay the proceedings in the present action till the issue of the other case, on the other hand he ought not to pronounce a decree of divorce, seeing that the Court have at present under consideration the question whether a decree of divorce ought to be granted in the action before them, which was instituted before the present. As both cases are now ripe for judgment, it appears to the Lord Ordinary that they should be disposed of at the same time; and, indeed, it will be for the consideration of the Court whether they ought not to be conjoined,”
At the same time the Court heard counsel on the reclaiming note in the first action.
At advising—
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The counsel for the pursuer thereupon asked the Court to decern against the co-respondent for the whole expenses of process. He rested his demand on the seventh section of the Conjugal Rights Act, 1861, which is as follows:—“In every action of divorce for adultery at the instance of the husband, it shall be competent to cite, either at the commencement or during the dependence thereof, as co-defender along with the wife, the person with whom she is alleged to have committed adultery; and it shall be lawful for the Court, in such action, to decern against the person with whom the wife is proved to have committed adultery for the payment of the whole or any part of the expenses of process, provided he has been cited as aforesaid, and the same shall be taxed as between agent and client.” It was admitted that husband was formally liable for the wife's expenses, but in terms of the section quoted it was argued that decree should be given against the co-defender, not merely for the pursuer's expenses, but also for the expenses incurred by his wife in defending the action.
For the defender it was maintained that she was entitled to decree for her expenses against her husband (as being his wife until the decree was pronounced), and that she had no interest in the matter as to who might be ultimately liable therefor.
The co-defender asked in the first place for modification of the expenses, on the ground that the pursuer had failed to prove some of his averments in the first action; and, in the next place, that the section above quoted had reference only to his expenses, and those of the pursuer as against him, and therefore that decree should not be given against him for the expenses of the wife, which did not properly fall under the Act.
After considering the matter, the Court pronounced the following interlocutors—
“7 th February 1873.—… In the first action recal the interlocutor reclaimed against: Find it established by the proof in that case that the defender and the co-defender committed adultery on the occasions libelled in the third and fourth sub-divisions of the 12th article of the condescendence. In the second action, Find that it is established by the proof that the defender and co-defender Committed adultery, first, in the co-defender's house in Glasgow, secondly, in Mrs Wishart's house in Millport, and, thirdly, in the house No. 4 Soho Street, Glasgow, at the times libelled: therefore in the conjoined actions, Find the defender guilty of adultery accordingly: therefore de—vorce and separate the defender, Elizabeth Peacock or Andrews, from the pursuer, Robert Andrews, his society, fellowship, and company, in all time coming: further, Find and declare that the defender has forfeited all the rights and privileges of a lawful wife, and that the said pursuer is entitled to live single, or to marry any free woman, as if he had never been married to the defender, or as if she had been naturally dead: Find the co-defender liable to the pursuer in expenses, as well of those incurred by the pursuer himself as of those for which the pursuer may be liable in respect of the expenses of the defender: further, Find that the pursuer is liable to pay the expenses incurred by the defender; and remit to the auditor to tax the expenses now found due as between agent and client, and to report, and decern.
22 d February 1873.—… Approve of the Auditor's report upon the defender Mrs Elizabeth Peacock or Andrews' account of expenses; and decern for payment to her by the pursuer of £253, 6s. 2d., under deduction of £120, 4s. 9d. paid to account, leaving a balance now payable to her of £133, 1s. 5d; and allow this decreet to go out and be extracted in name of Messrs Campbell & Smith, S.S.C., the agents disbursers.
22d February 1873.—… Approve of the Auditor's report upon the account of expenses; and decern for payment by the co-defender Joseph Stirling to the pursuer of the whole expenses incurred by him, amounting to £809, 17s. 9d.”
Counsel for Pursuer— Scott and Rhind. Agent— A. Kelly Morrison, S.S.C.
Counsel for Defender— Trayner. Agents— Campbell & Smith, S.S.C.
Counsel for Co-Defender— Maclean. Agent— T. J. Gordon, W.S.