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In 1459 certain lands were granted for the consideration that the grantee and his successors should maintain and repair certain causeways. This obligation was inserted in all subsequent investitures of the estate, and was implemented by subsequent proprietors. But in 1865 the then proprietor refused any longer to fulfil the obligation, on account of the change in the circumstances and in the subjects. The superior brought an action against the proprietor to compel implement of the obligation; and also against a Railway Company, which had considerably altered the roads, to compel it to maintain the portions so altered. The Court assoilzied the Railway Company; and, in regard to the proprietor, held, that although the obligation was not extinguished, it could not, under the altered circumstances, be enforced, but should be converted into a money equivalent.
This was an action at the instance of the Lord Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of Perth, against the Earl of Kinnoull and the Caledonian Railway Company, to compel the defenders to maintain and repair certain roads at Perth. The circumstances which led to the raising of the action were as follows:—
In 1459 the pursuers' predecessors, as representing the community of the burgh of Perth, made over to Robert Kinglassie, an ancestor of the defender Lord Kinnoull, lands called Gildherbar or Calsey Lands, of which they were the superiors. This grant was made upon certain conditions, specified in indentures entered into between the parties, and dated 8th May 1459. These indentures set forth that the honourable men, council, and community of Perth had set in fee and heritage to the said Robert Kinglassie their Gildherbar, with the pertinents, the boundaries of which were therein described,—the south boundary being the King's Calsey. There was reserved of the Gildherbar lands 4 ells in breadth, measuring from the north side of the said King's Calsey, and extending in length so far as the Gildherbar lay, so that the Gait and the King's Calsey might be made together for carts' load and common passage. The said Robert Kinglassie was also, as a condition of the grant to him, taken bound to uphold for ever, for passage for man and horse, the Calsey stretching from the Charterhouse gate to the burn of Craigie, now called St Leonard's Causeway, sufficiently as should effeir, with stone and sand; as also to uphold the Cow Calsey, now called Kinnoull Calsey, passing to Stirling, stretching to the strip and bridge lying at the calsey, for men, horse, and common passage; and to uphold in like manner the calsey passing to Methven, as it stretches from the east corner of St Paul's Chapel until it comes to the burn above Whitefriars, now called the Long Causeway. The indentures further stipulated and provided that these calseys should be upholden perpetually of the same breadth “as they now ar breader,” on the said Robert Kinglassie's cost. These various stipulations and conditions were fortified by a clause of irritancy, to the effect that if the said Robert Kinglassie, his heirs or successors, should fail in all or any of the points foresaid, it should be lawful to the said aldermen, council, and community to have regress to the said Gildherbar, with the pertinents, at their own hands without any process of law,—the said Robert Kinglassie or his heirs getting previous warning to repair the calseys, as mentioned in said indentures; and that not being done, it was provided that the said aldermen, council, and community were to have recourse to the Gildherbar, with the pertinents. It was also stipulated that the said Robert Kinglassie and his heirs should give yearly to St John the Baptist's light a pound of wax on the feast of his nativity. The said aldermen, council, and community also granted absolute warrandice to the said Robert and his heirs, he and they “keepand all conditionis foirspoken.” Robert Kinglassie thus acquired right to the lands of Gildherbar, which have now come to belong to the defender Lord Kinnoull; and the conditions contained in the foresaid indentures, upon which the lands were granted, have been regularly inserted in all the subsequent titles. Owing to change of circumstances, the causeways mentioned in the indentures gradually became totally changed in their character; and owing to railways being brought into Perth at that point, were also very materially altered, both in position and length; new roads being substituted for a great portion of the old causeways, and the new roads being five or six hundred yards longer than the old causeways. The predecessors of the defender, the
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Earl of Kinnoull, however, maintained and kept in repair the said three calseys, throughout their successive changes, down to the year 1865. In that year Lord Kinnoull, the father of the defender, gave notice to the pursuers of his intention to repudiate the obligation by a letter of date March 20, 1865, from his agent, Mr George Condie, writer in Perth, in the following terms:—“With reference to your late letters regarding the maintenance by Lord Kinnoull of certain calseys here, I am, by Lord Kinnoull's instructions, to communicate to you that, as the arrangement for the employment of a man upon these calseys will come to an end at Whitsunday first, it is not his Lordship's intention to renew it.” In consequence of the position thus taken up by Lord Kinnoull, the pursuers, in August 1866, raised an action against his son, the defender, who had succeeded to the estate in February 1866. This action sought to have the defender found liable to maintain and repair the Long Calsey, which is a continuation of the High Street of Perth. Then, in the month of September 1868, the pursuers brought another action against Lord Kinnoull in the Sheriff-court, asking that the defender should be decerned to put all the three causeways, viz., the Long Calsey, St Leonard's Calsey, and Kinnoull Calsey, in repair. These actions were conjoined, and a record was made up and closed in the conjoined actions. The Sheriff allowed a proof of certain averments in the record, and thereupon the defender the Earl of Kinnoull appealed the case to the First Division of the Court of Session, by whom it was remitted to the Lord Ordinary, who, on the 16th July 1870, pronounced an interlocutor allowing, before answer, the parties a proof of their averments; which proof was taken before his Lordship on the 18th and 19th of October 1870. The Lord Ordinary thereafter pronounced an interlocutor in the following terms:—“26 th December 1870.—The Lord Ordinary having heard parties' procurators, and considered the closed record in the conjoined actions, proof adduced, and whole process—sustains the appeal: Finds that the first and second of the common causeways mentioned in the titles and in the conclusions of the summons are situated within the extended police boundaries of the town of Perth; and that the third of the said causeways, with the exception of the portion to the west of Dovecotland, is also situated within the said police boundaries: Finds that the pursuers have failed to instruct that they have now any right or title to insist in the conclusions of the present actions, in so far as regards those portions of the said causeways which are situated within the said police boundaries: Therefore dismisses the actions, and decerns, reserving to the pursuers to establish in any competent process their claim to enforce against the defender the obligation in the indenture and other titles founded on by them to repair the portion of the causeway third above mentioned, and commonly called the Long Causeway, which is situated beyond the said police boundary, and between it and the burn crossing the high road near Cornhill; and to the defender his defences, as accords: Finds the defender entitled to expenses, of which appoints an account to be given in, and remits the same, when lodged, to the Auditor to tax and report.” The pursuers reclaimed against this interlocutor to the First Division of the Court, by whom the case was partially heard; then consideration of the cause was superceded, in order that farther information might be obtained; and it was suggested by the Court that some settlement might be arranged between the parties. The Magistrates of Perth, however, in 1871, brought an action of declarator in the Court of Session against the Earl of Kinnoull, and also against the Caledonian Railway Company.
The object of this action, and the relation it bears to the Sheriff-court actions, will be seen from the Lord Ordinary's note, and the opinion of the Lord President.
The Lord Ordinary ( Mure) pronounced this interlocutor:—
“11 th January 1872.—The Lord Ordinary, having heard parties' procurators, and considered the Closed Record and productions, reports the case to the First Division of the Court; and, with this view, appoints the pursuers to print and box this interlocutor and subjoined note.
Note.—This action has been instituted to obviate some of the objections taken by the defender Lord Kinnoull to an action which was raised against him some time ago by the pursuers, as Magistrates of the burgh of Perth, and is at present depending before the First Division of the Court.
That action was a petitory one, directed against Lord Kinnoull alone, and was originally brought before the Sheriff-court of Perthshire, in the name of the Lord Provost and Magistrates of Perth, as representing the community, in order to enforce an obligation contained in the titles under which parts of the Kinnoull estates were held of the town of Perth; and in respect of which it was alleged that Lord Kinnoull was bound to maintain the roads or common causeways described in those titles. The action was, however, met by the objection that the pursuers, as Magistrates of Perth, had no title to enforce the obligation; because, by the Police Statutes applicable to the town, the whole duty of maintaining the streets within the Police boundaries, including the causeways in question, which at one time lay upon the Magistrates, had been transferred to and imposed upon the Police Commissioners; and it rested with them, and not with the Magistrates of the burgh, to take proceedings against parties who might be bound to repair any portion of the streets, to the relief of the assessments levied for that purpose by the Commissioners. And it was further maintained on the part of the defender that, even if the obligation to uphold the old lines of causeway still existed, and was enforcible against him, he could in no view be liable to maintain those portions of the existing lines of causeway which consisted of new or substituted roads carried over the railways intersecting the town; and that, as regards those portions of the roadway, proceedings ought to have been taken against the Railway Companies, and not against the defender.
To the first of these objections the Lord Ordinary, upon considering the provisions of the Police Statutes, and the evidence adduced relative to the management of the streets, came to the conclusion that effect ought to be given to the extent of holding that it lay with the Police Commissioners, and not with the pursuers qua Magistrates of the burgh, to enforce obligations of the present description, and he accordingly dismissed that action, reserving to the pursuers to establish in any competent process their right to enforce the obligation in regard to those portions of the causeway which were situated beyond the police
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boundaries. And he at the same time intimated an opinion that it was against the Railway Companies, and not against the defender, that proceedings should have been taken to enforce the repair of those portions of the causeways which passed over the bridges built by the Railway Companies, with their immediate approaches. Against this interlocutor a reclaiming note was presented by the pursuers; and although no interlocutor appears to have been pronounced, the discussion was, as the Lord Ordinary understands, stopped by the Court, and the disposal of the case delayed, in order that parties might endeavour to affect an arrangement; or, if they failed in this, that an action of declarator might be brought to try the case, with all the parties interested in the question. No such settlement having been effected, the present action has been raised by the pursuers, not simply as Magistrates of the burgh of Perth, but as now reinvested, in respect of the Acts of Parliament and Provisional Orders founded upon in the Condescendence, with the whole duties and powers relative to the paving and management of the streets and roadways within the police boundaries of the town, which had been conferred upon the Commissioners by the Police Statutes; and they have called as defenders the Caledonian Railway Company as well as Lord Kinnoull, as now representing those Railway Companies by which the lines of the causeways were altered, and carried over the railways passing through the town.
The conclusions of the Summons are somewhat complicated; but the pursuers appear to the Lord Ordinary, in substance, to seek to have it declared—1st, That the defender Lord Kinnoull is bound to keep in repair the whole of the common causeways in question, including the new or substituted portions, except the bridges constructed by the Railway Companies, and the immediate approaches thereto; and that the Caledonian Railway Company is bound to keep in repair the said bridges and their immediate approaches; or otherwise, 2d, That the defender Lord Kinnoull is bound to keep in repair such portions as still exist of the original lines of causeway, as specified in the Summons; and that the defenders the Caledonian Railway are bound to keep in repair the substituted portions or deviations of these causeways made by the Railway Companies under Acts of Parliament, including the bridges and their immediate approaches. There are also declaratory conclusions to the effect that the defender Lord Kinnoull is bound to contribute three-fourths, or such other reasonable proportion as may be fixed by the Court, of the total expense of repairing the causeways, with the exception of the bridges and approaches; and the Summons contains petitory conclusions framed with the view to carry out the law which may be declared under the declaratory conclusions.”
The First Division heard counsel on the whole cause.
Fraser and Scott, for the pursuers, argued that, as regarded Lord Kinnoull, the obligation had never been extinguished, but was still existing. That, as it was the whole condition of the grant, the pursuers were entitled to demand implement, and the defender was bound to perform the obligation. That, if he did not do so, he had no right to keep the lands. That, as to the argument that the nature of the roads and expense of keeping them had increased enormously since the date of the grant, the answer was, that the value of the property had increased in a corresponding ratio. That, as regarded the Caledonian Railway Company, they were bound to keep up the new portions of the roads which they had substituted for the old, and the bridges with their immediate approaches.—(The Queen v. The Inhabitants of Ely, 19 L. J., 223, Magistrates Cases; North Staffordshire Railway Company v. Thomas Dale and Others, 27 L. J., 147, Magistrates Cases; Rex v. Inhabitants of Kent, 13 East., 220).
The Lord Advocate and Johnstone, for the Caledonian Railway Company, argued that all that could be asked from the Railway Company was that they should maintain the bridges and immediate approaches, and that they in fact had always done this. That, as to the substituted portions of the roads, there was no claim against the railway company to uphold them.
The Solicitor-General and Gloag, for Lord Kinnoull, argued that the obligation must be held to be extinguished, as it was now impossible to keep up the causeways in the manner specified in the indenture; to attempt to do so would be to destroy the road. That there could be no claim against Lord Kinnoull to keep up the roads of the present day under the obligation of 1459, on account of the changes in the characters of the roads, and the increase of expense, and that, besides there was hardly any part of the original causeway now in existence; and that, under the provisions of local statutes, the Magistrates were themselves bound to keep those roads in repair, being within the boundaries of the burgh.
At advising—
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When this case was brought here by reclaiming note the difficulty seemed very formidable; and, until it could be shown for how much the Railway Company was liable, Lord Kinnoull's obligation could not be ascertained. So we superseded consideration of the cause, and gave the Magistrates time to prepare information on these matters; at the same time suggesting that a settlement might be come to between the parties, and that it was a fitting case for arbitration. The Magistrates, however, did not adopt this suggestion, but brought a new action—an action of declarator; and to this action we must now turn our attention. Here they sue not only as Magistrates, but also as vested with all the powers and jurisdictions of police, paving, watching, lighting, and others granted to the Commissioners of Police of said burgh, under the Local Act, 2 Vict. c. 43, or any other Act, and also as vested with all the duties, rights, and liabilities with respect to roads and streets within the royalty and extended royalty of the burgh of Perth; and they call as defenders Lord Kinnoull, and also the Caledonian Railway Company, as standing in the place of all the separate railway companies who have made alterations on the said roads. The conclusions of the summons are as follows:—(1) There is, in the first place, a conclusion against Lord Kinnoull to maintain the Long Calsey, Leonard Calsey, and Kinnoull Calsey, excepting the bridges after specified constructed by said railway companies in the course of the foresaid alterations, and immediate approaches thereto. (2) Then, in the second place, there is an alternative to find Lord Kinnoull liable to maintain the portions of the calseys not affected by the alterations made by railway companies, and to find the Caledonian Railway Company liable to maintain the portions so altered. (3) In the third place, there is a second alternative, to have Lord Kinnoull ordained to pay three-fourths, or such other proportion as may be fixed by the Court, of the whole calseys, or of the original portions of them. (4) In the fourth place, there is a conclusion for decerniture for the sums expended by the pursuers in repairing and maintaining the causeways; and (5) in the fifth place, there is a third alternative that, in case of the pursuers not obtaining decree against Lord Kinnoull, they should be found entitled to have regress to the lands of Gildherbar, called Calsey Lands.
Now, it is desirable, in the first place, to dispose of the case as regards the Caledonian Railway Company. The defence of the Railway Company consists of three parts—first, that the Company is not liable to repair the substituted roads, as distinguished from the bridges and immediate approaches; second, that as regards the Glasgow Road Bridge, the Company is not liable to keep it up, as it did not make the bridge, and does not represent the Company which did; and third, that as regards the other two bridges, the Company has never disputed its liability to maintain them and the immediate approaches, and has, in point of fact, done so.
As regards the first of these points, I am clearly of opinion that under the Act of 1845 the Railway Company is not bound to repair the substituted portion of the roads, as distinguished from the bridges and immediate approaches. In the second place, it is not disputed that the averment of the Railway Company as to the Glasgow Road Bridge is true; and, in the third place, it is quite confirmed that the Company has all along admitted and fulfilled its liability in regard to the other two bridges. There is thus no case against the Caledonian Railway Company, and I am of opinion that, as regards the two bridges which the Company is bound to maintain, the action should be dismissed as unnecessary, and that quoad ultra the Caledonian Railway Company should be assoilzied.
Now, we come to the question between the Magistrates and Lord Kinnoull, and it is a question of considerable delicacy. The original obligation is contained in the indenture of 8th May 1459, by which the burgh of Perth set in fee and heritage “thair gildherbar” to Robert Kinglassie. Then in the indenture follows a reservation in the following terms:—“Reservand furth of the gildherbar four ellis of breid fra the northsyd of the Kingis calsay, and of lenth as the gildherbar lyis sua that the gait and the Kingis calsay may be maid to-geddir for cartslaid and common passage.” Then comes the consideration for which the conveyance is made—“And also the said Robert sall uphauld for ewir for passage for man and hors the calsay streikand fra the charter hous yet to the burne of Craigie sufficientlie as effeiris, with stane and sand, and als sall uphauld the Cow Calsay passand to Strewiling, streikand to the streip and brig now lieng at the calsay, and for men, hors, and commen passage, as is foresaid, and in sicklyke manner the said Robert sall uphauld the calsay passand to
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Now, as regards the appeal, I think the result of this opinion is that these Sheriff-court actions cannot be maintained, and the sooner they are got rid of the better, so I think that we should simplify the process before us by disposing of the case in so far as it concerns the Caledonian Railway Company by dismissing the Appeal, and by limiting consideration to the question how the conversion is to be made.
Then, as regards the obligation sought to be enforced against Lord Kinnoull, I am of opinion that the obligations made upon the vassal by the indenture of 1459 were and are binding upon him and his successors. The obligation to maintain the causeways was the whole consideration of the grant of the lands, and there is nothing in law or in practice to prevent that obligation from being enforced. So, if matters had been in the same position as they were at the time of the grant, there would have been no doubt but that the parties who made the grant would have been entitled to implement of the obligation. The difficulty arises from the change of circumstances, which has made the causeways different now from what they originally were, both as regards their construction and the expense of maintaining them. Then the roads themselves have been made five or six hundred yards longer than they were originally, and I suppose that little remnant of the original causeways exists. Again, the change which has been made as to the construction of the roads may be still further extended, as, for example, if it should be found necessary to lay the roads with asphalt, or to introduce tramways. So I agree with your Lordship that it would be somewhat extravagant to hold that this obligation is still to be enforced in its terms—if to maintain the roads of the present day could be called enforcing the obligation in its terms. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to enforce the obligation in its terms, and so the question arises, whether money, the universal solvent, should not be used here, and I have no doubt that it should. The difficulty—the only one in the case—is as to the principle upon which this conversion should be conducted. I do not know that we can take the obligation here as it originally was. There may be an increase in the reddendo by difference in circumstances. If a person was bound to pay some hundred of hens yearly, I doubt if it would be a good answer to a demand for payment to say that hens were ten times as dear as when the obligation was made. So we cannot affirm as a universal proposition that a reddendo cannot increase. But in the present case it is absurd to say that the increase of expense consequent upon the increase of traffic is not to be taken into consideration.
As to the Inferior Court actions, I agree with your Lordship that the sooner they are out of Court the better, and it is a sufficient reason that they are now at an end, and should be dismissed.
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Then, as regards the obligation of Lord Kinnoull, it is so clear on the whole defence, and so set into the titles of the estate, that it cannot be held to be extinguished. But the way in which the pursuers propose to enforce it is quite inconsistent with the original obligation, and also inconsistent with the proper keeping up of the roads. To enforce the obligation in its terms would be to destroy the roads, and to enforce it not in its terms would be unfair to Lord Kinnoull. So the only way is that proposed by your Lordship in the chair, viz., to convert the obligation into a money equivalent.
I have no doubt whatever as to the title to sue in this case, to which an objection has been taken. The Magistrates of Perth are seeking enforcement of a contract entered into by their predecessors with the predecessor of Lord Kinnoull. That the thing sought to be enforced is not a money payment, but repair of certain roads, seems to me to make no difference. It is not the less the stipulation of the contract, sued on by one of the contracting parties. Even if the party interested in the roads had not been the inhabitants of Perth, but some third party, the Magistrates would still have a legal title to sue on what is their own contract. It only makes the case clearer when it is the inhabitants of Perth in whose interest the Magistrates of Perth are pursuing.
I consider it equally clear that the obligation to repair the roads contained in the original contract of 1459 was a valid and effectual obligation ad factum prœstandum, enforceable at that time by actual and literal implement. There may be some difficulty as to the precise extent of the obligation. It seems tolerably clear that, as to two of the causeways, the Cow Causeway and St Leonard's Causeway, the obligation was only to maintain the roads for the passage of men and horses. I have more difficulty as to the Long Causeway, as to which there is some indication of its breadth being such as to provide for the passage of carts. But to whatever extent the obligation went, it was an obligation enforceable by actual fulfilment, both at the time and, I do not doubt, for long afterwards.
But the question is raised before us, whether actual fulfilment can now be insisted in to the effect of Lord Kinnoull being compelled to repair the roads in their existing condition, and for their existing purposes. I am of opinion that no such obligation lies on Lord Kinnoull. I consider the obligation in the contract to be incapable of being stretched so as to compel Lord Kinnoull to repair the roads as they now exist. Circumstances have so changed that an obligation to do this would, in my apprehension, be an obligation altogether different from that in the contract, and much more stringent and severe. The scanty traffic, chiefly, if not entirely, carried on by men and horses, in the year 1459, presents no image of the traffic carried on now by those passing to and from a large and thriving burgh, or communicating with a whole net-work of railways. I do not mean to say that the obligation was not compatible with a certain increase of traffic, making the slow and deliberate progress appropriate to the fifteenth century. But the present is not the increase appropriate to the time of the contract, and capable of being then fairly contemplated. The traffic now is essentially a different thing from that existing, or any which could be anticipated at the date of the contract; and to enforce on Lord Kinnoull the duty of making provision for such traffic would not be to enforce the obligation of the contract, but one wholly different.
There are other circumstances of change which cannot be left out of view. For more than half a century back there have been public boards entrusted with the entire maintenance and repair of the roads or streets within the burgh of Perth. It is no doubt open to be said that this general authority is not inconsistent with certain portions of these streets being repaired by Lord Kinnoull. But I think it cannot be held to have been intended by the statutes that any exception should be made from the generality of the obligation laid upon the statutory boards. It never could be intended that the streets generally should be repaired by the statutory board according to their own judgment and discretion, but that little bits of these streets should be repaired in some different way, and on some different design, by some one else. And if it be said that all must be done on one uniform plan, authorised by the statutory board (which is the only reasonable assumption), there at once arises the difficulty that Lord Kinnoull's obligation to repair under the contract 1459 was not one to be fulfilled at the dictate, or according to the plans, of any public board. He was entitled to repair at his own hand, according to the reasonable construction of an agreement of that date, which, whatever it may be held to be, is something wholly different from the modern plans of these statutory boards. The repairs of the causeways mentioned in the deed of 1459 were, according to the very words of the contract, to be made “with stane and sand.” How can this be made to enforce an obligation to pave and macadamise the streets according to the mode statutorily in use?
Another considerable change has arisen from the operation of certain railway companies, in diverting the roads in question, and substituting for certain portions of these, roads running in different lines, and of much greater length. Here, also, it may be said that the obligation may be judicially limited to what properly may belong to a road of the original line and length. But this again is an unsatisfactory view, and practically would be very difficult to carry out. It would not be an actual repair of existing roads, but a calculated repair of hypothetical roads, which is something very different from what was contemplated by the contract of 1459. A much more reasonable inference is to hold that these changes import (with the other circumstances) an impracticability of enforcing against Lord Kinnoull an obligation to repair the roads in their presently existing condition. Combining the whole circumstances together, I have come to the conclusion that such an obligation cannot be held to lie against Lord Kinnoull under the contract 1459.
It does not necessarily follow that Lord Kinnoull is to be absolved from all obligation under the contract 1459. This would be simply to give him the property without his paying any part of the price. The whole extent of what is proposed is, to absolve him from literal fulfilment in the altered circumstances. But he still must fulfil his obligation in the most approximate mode known to the law. What he is fairly bound to is to pay a pecuniary commutation proportioned to the true obligation.
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In regard to the Caledonian Railway Co., also called as defenders, I think they are entitled to get free of the action so far as directed against them. It is clear that, after forming and making over the substitute roads required by their operations, they are not liable in any part of the maintenance of these roads. They thereby restore matters, constructively, to their original position, and are no further liable. They are liable under the statutes for the maintenance of “the bridges and immediate approaches;” but this obligation they admit, and express their willingness to fulfil. In so far as there may arise any controversy as to the precise extent of road covered by the phrase “immediate approach,” or as to the apportionment of liability between the Caledonian Co. and some other railway company or individual, the present action is not suited for the determination of such a controversy. The proposed disposal of the action will leave all such questions open.
Solicitors: Agents for Pursuers— Hill, Reid, & Drummond, W.S.
Agents for Earl of Kinnoull— Mackenzie & Kermack, W.S.
Agents for Caledonian Railway— Hope & Mackay, W.S.