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Dean of Guild Court, North Berwick.
(Before the Election Judges.)
Held ( per Election Judges) that a petition against the return of a Member for Parliament was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that charges of bribery, &c., and of corrupt practices, were defective through want of specification.
This was a petition against the return of Provost Grieve as member for Greenock at the late Parliamentary election. The petition was at the instance of Mr Christie, the defeated candidate, and was in the following terms:—
“(1) Your petitioner was a candidate at the above election.
“(2) And your petitioner says that the nomination of the above election took place on the 16th day of November last, and that two candidates were duly nominated, viz., James Johnstone Grieve, then the Provost of the burgh, and your petitioner, and that on a show of hands the Sheriff declared your petitioner elected by a large majority; whereupon James Johnstone Grieve demanded a poll, and the polling took place on the next following day, the 17th of November; and on the morning of the next day, the 18th, the Sheriff declared the result of the polling to he 2962 votes for James Johnstone Grieve, and 2090 votes for your petitioner; and the Sheriff declared James Johnstone Grieve to have been elected member for the burgh, and he made a return accordingly to the Clerk of the Crown at Westminster, despatching it from Paisley of the 20th of November, and the Clerk of the Crown received the said return on the 21st November.
“(3) And your petitioner says that the election of James Johnstone Grieve was brought about and effected by an extensive and elaborate organisation of undue influence and large expenditure.
“(4) And your petitioner says that bribery, treating, and undue influence were practised by James Johnstone Grieve and his agents, and by others on his behalf, and that corrupt practices extensively prevailed.
“(5) Your petitoner further complains that the returning officer, the Sheriff of Renfrewshire, acted illegally in appointing a number of distantly separated polling places in some of the wards or polling districts, with assignment thereto by an alphabetical division of different portions of the duly published lists of voters for the said wards or polling districts, disregarding a protest of your petitioner duly and in good time delivered to him, and that he further acted illegally in disregarding and neglecting to comply with a requisition for the appointment of specified numbers of booths, compartments, halls, rooms, or other places, for polling at the duly appointed polling places, of the first, fourth, and fifth wards, according to the provisions of the Act 16th Victoria, chap. 28, sec. 4, which your petitioner made to him at the same time with the aforesaid protest.
“(6) Your petitioner says that the arrangement made by the returning officer as to polling places was prejudicial to his interests, and that in the carrying out of the said arrangement the returning officer employed or acted with the Town-Clerk of Greenock, and tjjat as soon as your petitioner became aware of the intervention of the Town-Clerk in the matter, he warned the returning officer, that as between the then Provost of Greenock and any other candidate, it was next to impossible to expect impartiality from the Town-Clerk.
“Wherefore your petitioner prays that justice
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may be done, and all rightful relief given hint in the premises, and that it may he determined that James Johnstone Grieve was not duly elected or returned member for Greenock, and that the election was void. “ In respect whereof,&c.
“W. D. Christie.”
After the petition was presented, the following note was lodged by Mr Grieve:—
“To the Honourable
Lord Cowan , and the HonourableLord Jerviswoode , the Judges for the trial of Election Petitions for the time being, pursuant to ‘The Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868.’“ My Lords,—
“The respondent makes the present application in writing to your Lordships, in accordance with section 24 of the rules of procedure made by your Lordships of date 27th November 1868; and he prays your Lordships to dismiss the petition, in respect that it does not, in terms of section 2 of said rules, ‘set forth articulately,’ ‘according to the rules and practice of the Court of Session in ordinary proceedings,’ the ‘facts Telied on in support of the prayer of the petition.’”
Clark, for the respondent Mr Grieve, M,P., addressed the Court in support of the respondent's application. He said that the ground upon which the motion was rested might be thus generally stated, that the petition contained a mere general statement, and was expressed in the most general way without attempting to give any particulars whatever of the charge which was made against Mr Grieve. In connection with this matter, and to show its importance, it was right to notice that the petition was not laid simply on the ground that agents or persons active in the interest of Mr Grieve had been guilty of bribery, so that his election was null; but that the statement wa3 that he himself, by himself as well as by his agents, was guilty of corrupt practices. He need not mention that to him that accusation raised a very important issue, for their Lordships would see, in the 43d, 44th, and 47th sections of the Bribery Act, what enormous sanctions followed upon the commission of such an offence. In this petition their Lordships had merely a statement in the most general terms asserting that the respondent brought about his election by the use of undue influence, by large expenditure—or, in other words, as stated in article 4, “by bribing, treating, and using undue influence”—but there was no specification of the time, place, or person. Now, the question was whether .this petition was framed in accordance with the rules issued by their Lordships under the Corrupt Practices Act of 1868, in which it was provided that “an election petition shall set forth articulately, in the form of a condescendence, according to the rules and practice of the Court of Session in ordinary proceedings, the facts relied on in support of the prayer of the petition. Mr Clark proceeded to maintain that the injunction in the rule which he had quoted had not been complied with in this petition, because it contained nothing except the most general statement th^t the respondent had been guilty of using undue influence and bribery, and other corrupt practices. The substance of the objection to the petition was that the petitioner proposed to go to trial on the case without giving any specification whatever of the time, or place, or person. The forms and practice of the Court of Session in ordinary proceedings required that there should be specification of the offence charged in the condescendence; and he submitted that it was perfectly out of the question to suppose that this petition had been prepared according to the forms and practice of the Court of Session; it was prepared indirect disregard of these forms and practice, because the Court required in all papers specification of the charges made. He concluded by submitting that this was not an objection to the mere form of the petition, but to its substance, and that the petition ought to be dismissed in respect that nothing was charged which, according to the forms of the Court of Session, could be sent to proof.
Alexander Moncrieff, for the petitioner, submitted. that his friend Mr Clark had presented no argument in support of his statement that the objection made to this petition was one of substance, and not merely of form; the objection, he maintained, was truly one of form, and of nothing else than form. The rules issued by their Lordships had apparently been issued very much with the view of separating the various articles mentioned in the condescendence; and the articles had, in accordance with these rules, been separately mentioned in the petition in the order prescribed in the rules. The petition stated distinctly what was meant by “corrupt practices;” for it stated, in the fourth article, that bribery, treating, and undue influence were practised by Mr Grieve and his agents, and that corrupt practices extensively prevailed. The “corrupt practices” were broken down in the petition into these three separate and distinct things, bribery, treating, and undue influence. The only thing alleged was that the petition did not say with regard to what persons, or upon what dates these various things, bribery, treating, and undue influence, which constitute the corrupt practices of which he complained, were respectively practised. Mr Moncrieff proceeded to argue that the objection to the petition was one merely of form, which, if they were in a summons of the Court of Session, could have been easily cured by adding some details; and that it would be unfair, and would not tend to justice, if petitioners were compelled to state at the beginning of their case the names of all the parties bribed, who might in that case be interfered with. He submitted that the practice in England corresponded with that adopted in this petition, and referred to two English cases reported in the Scotsman of Friday in support of his position. He concluded that there were no grounds for granting the prayer of the application that the petition should be dismissed.
Solicitor-General, for the respondent, submitted that the Act provided that the petition “shall be in such form and state such matters as may be prescribed.” Their Lordships had prescribed that “all election petitions shall set forth, according to the rules and practice of the Court of Session in ordinary proceedings, the facts relied on in support of the prayer of the petition.” This election petition, he maintained, was not in accordance with the rules and practice of the Court of Session, and it failed to set forth the matters prescribed by their Lordships. That was not an objection to the form, but to the substance of the petition. The Solicitor-General proceeded to comment upon the language of the petition, maintaining that it did not even say on which side the corrupt practices prevailed, and that the grammatical construction led to the inference that the
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corrupt practices had prevailed on the side of the petitioner. He referred to a jocular remark made by an old Judge, to the effect that indictments should be so simple as to consist simply of such a statement as “ You are a thief, and you will be hanged;” and remarked that such an indictment would be no more in accordance with the rules and practice of the Court of Justiciary than the petition in this case was in accordance with the rules and practice of the Court of Session. There were many species of bribery and treating, and it was impossible for any one to defend himself against so general a charge as that in this petition. The use of the word “ bribery ” no more gave information to the party accused than the use of the word “ debt ” would give information to a defender in the Court of Session, or the use of the words “ assault ” or “ fraud ” would give information to parties accused in the Justiciary Court. He concluded by submitting that the petition could not be amended, because it did not set forth the facts which it ought to have done, and there was therefore in reality no petition to be amended. Moncrieff, in reply, said that the radical fallacy of the argument on the other side was that it assumed that a failure to comply with the rules of procedure involved a nullity.
Lord Cowan —What do you propose to do? Is it your proposal that you should go to trial with the petition as it stands?Moncrieff—I do not wish to go to trial with the petition as it stands. If your Lordships say that the petition, which is validly brought, is deficient in such specification as might give fair notice, I am quite prepared that I should be ready to add such specification at the time your Lordships think necessary; but I submit that the proper time would be six days before the trial.
Moncrieff—I am not prepared to do that. I am not prepared to admit that the petition needs amendment. I am perfectly willing to give notice of particulars a certain number of days before the trial; but it is against the whole spirit of the Act and the previous practice to open one's hands in this matter until within a certain number of days of the trial.
Solicitor-General—The objection here is that there is no specification at all; but in the most analogous case which can occur in the Court of Session of deficient specification nothing is more common than for the Court, before pronouncing judgment, to have that found fatal, and to dismiss the action, and to require the party whose statement it is to specify any amendment or addition which he proposes to make; and I maintain that your Lordships, with a view to consider whether our present motion is or is not well founded, may offer that opportunity to the present petitioner. He may decline to take advantage of that opportunity, of course, if he please; but your Lordships will then consider the application in this light, that the petitioner declines to be more specific, and I apprehend that if your Lordships sustain this petition as you would do by refusing our motion, the petitioner would be under no obligation to be more specific. He has given in within twenty-one days wbat, under that hypothesis, must be a sufficient petition under the Act of Parliament, setting forth the matters on which he relied according to the forms and practice of the Court of Session, and if he has done that, I should myself find it difficult to maintain more. If he has not done that, there is no petition here; if he has done that, I cannot possibly ask more.
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Moncrieff—I do not in the least refuse to state particulars before the trial.
At advising—
By the 20th section of the Act the petition is to be in “such form”and to “state suchmatters” as may be prescribed. The rule referred to was made to carry out this enactment. It prescribes that the petition shall set forth articulately, in the form of a condescendence, the matters stated in the three heads of which the 2d rule consists. This has been here strictly observed as regards the 1st and 2d heads, but as regards the 3d head, whichrequires “the facts relied on in support of the prayer of the petition” to be stated, the petitioner merely says, in art. 3, that “the election” was brought about “by undue influence and by large expenditure and in article 4, “that bribery, treating, and undue influence were practised by the respondent, and his agents, and by others on his behalf. On the facts thus stated, the petitioner relies to support his prayer, which is to the effect that the respondent “was not duly elected,” and that “the election was void.” And general as is the statement in art. 4 as to bribing, treating, and undue influence, it is not doubtful that on these corrupt practices, as alleged, being established by evidence as matter of fact, the prayer of the petition will have been supported. It might have been more in accordance with the prescribed rule, that each of the three heads should have been separately set forth as practised by the respondent, his agents, and others on his behalf, and that some more information of a general kind should have been given, but the fact relied on of bribery, &c. being practised, is alleged, and as the statement is not alternative in any of its branches, it is not so open to this objection as it might otherwise have been. On full consideration of the argument, therefore, I cannot entertain the objection-to the effect of dismissing the petition. It is in truth an objection, in this view of it, to the form rather than to the substance of the petition, and falls within the 35th rule.
I have arrived at this conclusion the more readily, as it appears to me, that the hardship to which the respondent may be exposed from the generality of the statement in the petition, may be obviated by ordaining the petitioner to lodge with the clerk, and to furnish the respondent with a written statement of the particular matters in support of the several charges of bribery, treating, and undue influence, to which his evidence at the trial is to be directed. Such an order has accordingly been embodied in the deliverance on this application. The number of days before the trial for lodging this written statement has been the subject of deliberate consideration. According to the practice in election petitions hitherto, it is understood that information as to the facts to be proved was only given at the opening of the proceedings before the committee. But while this might obviate the danger to the petitioner of premature disclosure of his case, it has been considered by the Judges in England, acting under the Election Act, and we concur with them in their views on this subject, that notice of particulars, at least three days before the day fixed for the trial, should be given to the respondent, that he may not be taken by surprise, and may have time for preparation. There are difficulties as regards this matter, and the interests of both parties have to be consulted; but the order now pronounced will substantially meet the justice of the case. If this is found not to be fully realized, it will be in the power of either party, under the Act and relative rules, to make such farther application to the Court, or to the Judges, as may be thought expedient.
Besides the specific charges of bribery and others, there are general statements in the petition which cannot be allowed to stand with a view to the trial without amendment, if under those general terms any other illegal and corrupt practice is intended to be charged. The concluding part of the deliverance now pronounced, deals with the matter and is sufficiently explicit. Should an amendment be made to the effect of adding to the charges of bribery, treating, and undue influence, any other illegal or corrupt practice, the same particulars must be furnished as in reference to bribery and other charges, and within the same time before the trial.
The following interlocutor was pronounced:—
“Having considered the note for the respondent, and heard counsel for the parties,—Refuse the prayer for the dismissal of the petition, in so far as regards the averment in article 4 of bribery, treating, and undue influence: Under the declaration that not less than three days before the day fixed for the trial, the petitioner shall lodge with the principal clerk, and serve upon the respondent, a written statement, setting forth articulately the names -and designations of the person or persons alleged to have been bribed, treated, and unduly influenced by the respondent and his agents, and by others on his behalf, with such particulars as to the said alleged acts as shall afford to the respondent fair information in relation thereto; and that no evidence shall be received at the trial except as to matters within said written statement, and tending to support the same, without the leave of the Court or the Judge; and upon such condition as to postponement of the trial, payment of costs, and otherwise, as may be ordered; And inasmuch as art. 4 of the petition, and also art. 3, contain allegations in general terms of ‘corrupt practices’ having ‘extensively prevailed,’ and of an extensive and elaborate organisation of undue influence and large expenditure,—appoints the petitioner to state,
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“John Cowan,
“One of the Judges on the Rota for Election Petitions.”
Agents for Petitioner— Graham & Johnston, W.S.
Agents for Respondent— Duncan, Dewar, & Black, W.S.