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Held (1) that a person had a right of servitude over a road; (2) that he was entitled to perform operations on the road for the purpose of repairing it, but not so as substantially to alter its nature or level to the prejudice of his neighbour; (3) that he was not entitled at his own hand to dig trenches in the road for gaspipes, but that this having been done, he could not be ordained at the instance of an adjoining proprietor to remove the pipes; (4) that he was entitled to make openings in a wall running along the side of the road for the purposes of access to his own property, with or without gates, but that he was not entitled to make such openings in a part of the wall separating his property from that of his neighbour, so as to give access to his neighbour's property; (5) that he was entitled to take down any portion of the said wall for the purpose of enabling him to erect offices on his own ground; (6) that he was entitled to insist that a hedge on the side of the road should not be allowed to protrude so as to interfere with his full use of the road, but was not entitled at his own hand to cut down the hedge to any greater extent; and (7) that a party having a servitude over a road was not entitled without consent to erect a gate on the road at its junction with a parish road.
This is an action of declarator and interdict at the instance of Mr Stevenson, the minister of Dalry, and Captain Blair of Blair, with consent of Mr M'Cosh of Merksworth, writer in Dalry, against Mr Thomas Biggart, woollen manufacturer, Dalry. The questions betwixt the parties were of a very trifling nature, although they had given rise to considerable litigation. They had reference to an alleged interference on the part of the defender with a road, a wall, a hedge, and a ditch in the neighbourhood of the glebe of Dalry parish, and of the property of the defender. The Lord Ordinary (Kinloch) pronounced, after a long proof, an interlocutor in which he “Finds and declares that the defender, Thomas Biggart, has a right of servitude over the road libelled for its whole extent, from the parish road from Dalry to Blair westward to the point A on the plan referred to in the summons, to the effect of obtaining access thereby to his property, lying to the southward of the same: Finds and declares that the said defender was and is entitled to make openings in the wall running along the said road on the northward of his said property, for the purpose of obtaining access to his said property, with or without gates: Further, finds and declares that the said defender was and is entitled to take down the said wall to such an extent as to enable him to erect offices or other buildings on his own property, on the line of the said wall: Finds and declares that the wall to the southward of the defender's property, so far as it does not run along the said road, being that part of it running from the point A westward to the point B on the foresaid plan, is a march fence between the defender's property and the manse ground to the northward, and that the defender is not entitled, at his own hand, to make an opening in or otherwise affect this portion of the said wall: Finds and declares that the defender was not and is not entitled, without consent of the road trustees, to open any part of the parish road from Dalry to Blair, for the purpose of laying pipes or otherwise; but finds no sufficient ground on which to ordain him, at the instance of the present pursuers, to take up and remove any gaspipe laid by him: Finds and declares that the defender was not and is not entitled to lay slag or other materials on the said servitude road, to the effect of substantially altering the nature or level of the road; but finds no sufficient ground for ordaining him, at the instance of the present pursuers, to take up and remove the materials laid by him on the road: Finds and declares that the defender was not and is not entitled, at his own hand, and without the consent of the pursuer, the Reverend Robert Stevenson, to cut the hedge lying on the northward of the said servitude road: Finds and
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declares that the pursuers are not entitled, without the consent of the defender, to erect a gate across the said servitude road: Reserves to all concerned their right to apply to the Judge Ordinary of the bounds, to obtain his authority for mending the said road, or cutting the said hedge, or performing any necessary operations thereon, as to which they may not be agreed: And to any further effect than may be comprehended in the before-written findings dismisses the action, and decerns: Finds the defender entitled to expenses, subject to modification; allows an account thereof to be lodged; and remits to the auditor to tax the same, and to report.” In reference to the reservation, the Lord Ordinary said in his note that “he trusts that, after the sedative administered by the present process, this reservation may be practically inoperative.” The pursuers reclaimed.
Fraser and Watson were heard for them.
Young and Marshall for the defender.
At advising,
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But the first matter of contention is in regard to this wall, and two things are put before us to be dealt with in regard to it—First, to have it declared that it is a mutual wall or common wall between the parties; and secondly, that it is a wall which Mr Biggart has interfered with improperly by making openings into his own fields. The conclusion is, that it is either a mutual wall between Mr Biggart and the minister, or between Mr Biggart and Captain Blair, as owner of the solum of the road. Now, I think it is quite clear that the road is no part of the benefice. There may be a tolerance of going over the road, but certainly it is no part of the benefice. But in regard to the mutuality of the wall, I don't think there are grounds for the declarator claimed by the pursuer. I think this wall is built within what is the boundary of Mr Biggart's property as described in his title; the boundary of his property was the road, as I have stated, not the hedge; and there was a permission to straighten the wall, whereby the road still continued to be the boundary of his property. It is said that this wall was built on the line of the old hedge—that is, subject to the straightening; but the old hedge, I think, was within the description in the feu, and therefore I think there is no ground for regarding it as a mutual wall. I don't see any reason for complaining of Mr Biggart making accesses from that road to his ground; indeed, if he had no access from that road to his ground, I don't see what was the use of acquiring the servitude over the road. It was for the very purpose of the convenience of access to him and for the benefit of his feu. And as to saying that it increases the servitude, I cannot understand that, because he goes in at one gate or the other gate; and I should think that, if there are more gates than one, it would do less damage to the land at one particular point than if there was only one gate. I don't think there is any ground of complaint there, and I think the Lord Ordinary has arrived at a right conclusion in regard to that part of it. There is a particular portion of the wall which stands in a different predicament from the rest. Part of it was built by the heritors, and part of what was built by the heritors is not along the road. It is at a place where the ground was given off by Mr Biggart by the transaction of 1845, and it is built upon that ground which was part of Mr Biggart's fell originally, and where he gave off a portion to the heritors by that transaction. Part of what the heritors built is between Mr Biggart and the road straighting his line, and there is a stipulation to continue it up that length. Now, I think there is great difference in the evidence as to whether that wall was upon the part given off or was truly within the ground reserved by Mr Biggart. It is certainly on ground that belonged to him, but I don't think that it is very necessary to dispose of that matter here. I think it is very clear that, whether it be upon the one or the other, Mr Biggart is not entitled to make the openings through that part of the wall, so as to lay open accesses to ground which he has given off for the use of the benefice, and to that extent I think the Lord Ordinary is right; but we have not the heritors here, and we have not materials, I think, very well for determining as to this being a mutual wall, I am not prepared to say that it is a mutual wall between the parties, and I don't think it necessary to say anything to that effect in this judgment. But I think we should find that there is no right to make openings there, just as we find that there is a right to make openings in the other part of the wall.
The next matter of complaint is in reference to the cutting trenches for laying gaspipes. Now, it does not appear that Mr Biggart is correct in stating that he obtained the authority of the Road Trustees to make these trenches. I think Mr Patrick, the gentleman from whom he seems to have thought he got such authority, did not give it, for he says expressly that he did not, and would not in the circumstances give such authority. But he was aware that the operation was going to be made, and it was not made secretly, and there was no remonstrance at the time, though I suppose it was a very short proceeding, and the pipes were laid. But other things made that an item in the bill of complaint against Mr Biggart, and the question comes to be whether we should order these pipes to be taken up. Now, it is one thing to prevent operations to be made on a parish road, or other servitude road, and it is another thing whether, after these operations have been performed, which plainly do no harm to the road, and which were not challenged as soon as they were known, we are to order them to be removed. I think that that distinction was pointed out in the House of Lords in the case of Galbraith v. Armour, and I think it is applicable to this case, so that I think we ought not to desire these pipes to be removed. The only other matter connected with the road is the gate. It is said that in consequence of operations made by Mr Biggart upon the manse fence, on the south side of the manse ground, the ground is more open to stray cattle than it was before, and that this gate should be erected on the servitude road on the south side of the manse grounds. Now, the demand in this summons is not that there shall be a temporary
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And then as to the hedge, I think Mr Biggart appears to have proceeded rather too far in the exercise of any power that belonged to him in dealing with this hedge, and these trees. In the first place, I think that a party having an interest in a servitude road, such as Mr Biggart has, and obviously the main interest, is entitled to require that the hedge on the south side of the manse grounds shall not encroach upon the road, and that the trees there shall not encroach upon the road so as to interfere with the free and beneficial use of it. I think he is entitled to require that. I think he was entitled to call, as he did call, on the minister, or the parties interested, either to dress that side of the hedge, or to assist him in dressing it, for I think it was more of a mutual operation; and if that was not done, I could not say that there was any fault in the mere trimming of the hedge, in the ordinary mode of trimming hedges, so as to remove the obstruction, or having given notice as to the trees protruding, the mere taking away the branches, so as to allow the use of the road; but I think there has been more done here than that. I think there has been a cutting of these branches apparently, or at all events a cutting of the hedge, to an extent that made it practically very little of a hedge on that side for a considerable time to come, till it grew up. I think that was going too far. I don't think Mr Biggart was right there, and I think the heritors and the minister had a cause of complaint there, and that it is a thing that could not be allowed to be repeated. The Lord Ordinary seems to think he had no right to meddle with the hedge at all without the consent of the heritors. I am not prepared to say so, if he merely trimmed the hedge in a business-like way, not doing it any harm, for the purpose of preventing it from encroaching on the road. I don't think he could be at all found fault with if he did that, but they might differ materially as to what extent it might go to. I think the reservation of the Lord Ordinary as to going to the Sheriff in regard to matters on which they differed about the hedge should apply also to the road. Now, I think these are all the points which have arisen in this case, and I think that with some verbal alterations, and with the qualifications I have alluded to, the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor is substantially very near the judgment that ought to be given. We shall therefore pronounce an interlocutor in the same sense, but with the qualifications to which I have alluded.
The following interlocutor was pronounced:—
“ Edinburgh, 26 th January 1867.—The Lords having advised the reclaiming note for the pursuers, No. 120 of process, and the reclaiming note for the defender, No. 124 of process, and heard counsel for the parties, recal the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary submitted to review, and in place thereof find and declare that the defender,
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“Dun. M'Neill, I.P.D.”
Solicitors: Agent for Pursuers— John Henry, S.S.C.
Agents for Defender— Duncan & Dewar, W.S.