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(1) A pursuer of an action having been allowed a proof, the diet of which was twice adjourned, and having failed to attend the adjourned diet, held that, under section 10 of the Sheriff Court Act, his action fell to be dismissed; and (2) a Sheriff-Substitute having fixed a new diet of proof after the original diet had fallen, held that this was an allowance of proof and that the interlocutor might be appealed to the Sheriff under section 19 of the Sheriff Court Act.
This is an advocation from the Sheriff Court of Galloway. The advocator had presented in that Court a petition against the respondent and another, in which he applied for interdict of an intended sale of some bark under a poinding. He alleged that the poinding had been carried out unwarrantably, because the bark was not the property of the poinder's debtor, but his. Interim interdict was granted, and a minute of defence was lodged to the effect (1) that the petition was vague and indefinite, and (2) that the bark was not the property of the petitioner. A variety of procedure occurred thereafter in the process, which is detailed in the annexed opinion of the Lord Justice-Clerk. The question before the Court arose out of a renewal of a diet of proof which the Sheriff-Substitute granted to the petitioner after a first diet had fallen. This interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute was appealed to the Sheriff (Hector), who recalled it. He also dismissed the petition, and found the petitioner liable in expenses. To-day the Court adhered to the judgment of the Sheriff.
The Lord Justice-Clerk said—This is a small case, but it belongs to a class of cases of great importance, because there is no way in which more mischief can be done than by applications for interdict, and especially for interim interdict. The petitioner's application was presented on the 24th of January, interim interdict was granted of that date, and all I will say upon that point is that if the application had been made to me I would have refused it. The defender appeared, and stated his defence to be an objection to the vagueness of the petition, and a denial that the bark in question was the property of the petitioner. Upon that the Sheriff-Substitute allowed the petitioner a proof of his averments. I shall not say whether the proof ought to have been
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The other judges concurred.
Counsel for the Advocator— Mr Mair. Agent— Mr W. Officer, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondent— Mr Pattison. Agent— Mr W. S. Stuart, S.S.C.