Page: 112↓
Subject_prescription — Ranking and Sale — Adjudication — Process.—
A party was infeft in lands in 1803, under a charter of sale granted in 1791, following on a decree of sale in 1787; the ranking and sale had been preceded by an adjudication in 1774; there was no ex facie nullity in these processes; in 1832 a reduction was raised of the decrees of adjudication and sale, and of the title made up under them:—Held, that although the defender's title was not fortified by the positive prescription, it was competent to him to plead the negative prescription as cutting off the right to challenge the decrees of adjudication and sale; that the right of challenge was cut off, there being no ex facie nullity in these processes; and that, as the defender's feudal title could not be invalidated except by reducing them, the defender must be assoilzied.—2. Circumstances in which the Court took into consideration a deed which, though in the Register House, had not been produced till after the record was closed; and intimated that it instructed a distinct ground of defence, by proving that the party was entirely divested, with whom alone the pursuer connected himself.
John Cubbison was proprietor of the lands of Banks and others, in Ayrshire. He had two sons, the eldest, David, and the second, John (2). He had contracted debts to a considerable amount, in which John (2) had become bound along with him, and on 16th March, 1765, he granted a disposition of the lands of Banks and others, to John (2), bearing in gremio to be granted in security and relief of these debts, and in security of a provision to John (2). The deed also declared that if David should, after the granter's death, “ratify these presents and also dispone all right of reversion in the said lands, competent to him as my heir,” to John (2) the latter should be bound to pay 2000 merks to David. On 12th April, 1705, John Cubbison (2) was infeft under this conveyance. On 17th May, 1766, John Cubbison (1) died. On 12th Jan, 1769, David Cubbison paid the debts, and the provision, in security of which, the disposition had been granted to John (2), and, on the same day John (2) granted a disposition of the lands to David, narrating that his father's deed had been granted in security only, and that David had paid the debts and provision. On 14th January David granted a heritable bond to William Aird, in Killochside, for £1500. On 22d January, David died, without having been infeft. He left one son, William Cubbison, and two daughters, Mary and Margaret. On 8th July, 1773, Aird obtained decree of constitution against William Cubbison, a minor, and his tutors and curators, if he any had, and on 4th December, 1773, he gave him a charge to enter heir in special to his father David, and his grandfather John (1), in the lands of Banks and others. Aird then raised a process of adjudication of these lands against William Cubbison, and on 25th March, 1774, he, in absence of the defender, obtained decree of adjudication of the lands against him and his tutors and curators, if he any had. In 1775, Aird obtained decree of maills and duties and entered into possession of the
lands. Aird afterwards raised a process of ranking and sale of the lands, in which, after he had obtained decreet of certification, William Cubbison made appearance, and raised a reduction-improbation of that decreet. In that process a curator ad litem was sisted to William Cubbison, who was a minor, and the process of ranking and sale was sisted till the issue of the reduction. Before raising the reduction, William Cubbison had expede a general service as heir of his grandfather John (1), and obtained a precept of clare constat from the superior of the lands of Banks, under which he was infeft as heir to his grandfather in April 1784. In the reduction, William Cubbison produced the disposition by his grandfather to his uncle John (2), and the disposition by John (2) to the pursuer's father David. Aird objected that William Cubbison had no title to insist as heir to his grandfather John (1), because his grandfather had been entirely divested in his own lifetime. A protracted discussion ensued, in the course of which various mutual minutes, memorials, and informations, and representations and answers were given in, hinc inde, and at length, the cause being reported to the Court, their Lordships on 20th June, 1786, “having advised mutual informations, found that the pursuer had produced no sufficient title to insist in the present process of reduction, and therefore assolzied the defender and decerned; and farther, found the pursuer liable in expenses.”
Prior to this, William Cubbison had died abroad, and Aird, on receiving that intelligence, had raised an action of transference against his sisters Mary and Margaret Cubbison and their tutors and curators, if they any had. On 25th January, 1786, Aird obtained decree of transference, the other parties failing to appear; but on 28th January all parties appeared, and were ordained to box informations to the Court. It was on the mutual informations then boxed, that the cause was decided by the interlocutor already quoted. The information for Mary and Margaret Cubbison was lodged in the name of William Cubbison, but it was in truth prepared and lodged for them. And when they put in a representation against the decree of absolvitor, of 20th June, 1736, they admitted that they had lodged their information “in the name of the said William Cubbison," as they alleged that they were not then certain of his death. That representation was objected to as incompetent, and was, on answers, refused. The interlocutor of the Court assoilzing Aird, was adhered to, and the Court “decerned and ordained the said Mary and Margaret Cubbison to make payment to the said defender of the expenses” of process as modified.
Thereafter Aird insisted in the ranking and sale of the lands of Banks and others, and decree of sale was pronounced in his favour as the highest offerer, on 8th March 1787. The lands had been valued at £1269, and were sold at £2490. A remit was then made to the Lord Ordinary in the
ranking, for making up a scheme of division. Aird gave in a state of the debt alleged to be due to him, after deducting his intromissions with the rents, under his process of maills and duties, and it was taken out to see, by the procurator for Mary and Margaret Cubbison, who lodged objections to it. In virtue of these objections, Aird was obliged to debit himself with a sum of £200, which had been omitted in his state; and another item, stated at £300, as the sum due for penalty, damages, and expenses, “by decreet of constitution, dated 8th July, 1773,” was restricted by the Court to “the actual expenses disbursed” as there specified. The judgment of the Court bore to proceed “after having considered the foresaid objections for Mary and Margaret Cubbison, with the answers thereto.” Upon correcting the state of Aird's debt, it appeared that a balance of £683 remained, after paying the debts ranked, and the procurator for Mary and Margaret Cubbison prayed the Court to approve of the report and state, exhibiting that balance; “to find that there arises a balance of the price of the lands purchased by William Aird, of £683, &c.; and decern him to make payment of that balance to Mary and Margaret Cubbison, daughters of the deceased David Cubbison.” Decree was pronounced as craved. They received payment of the balance of the price, and granted a discharge for it. Aird soon afterwards conveyed the lands to William Hyslop, and executed a disposition and assignation in his favour, of the lands, and of the decreet of sale, and of the various warrants thereof; in September, 1791, Hyslop obtained a charter of sale from the superior, and was infeft under it, in 1803. John Cubbison (2) lived till 1817. After his death, and when Mary Cubbison was also dead, Margaret Cubbison, having expede a general service as heir to her uncle John (2), raised an action of reduction-improbation against William Hyslop in 1832, The action struck at the decree of adjudication obtained by Aird in 1774, the decree of sale in Aird's favour in 1787, the conveyance by Aird to Hyslop, and the feudal title made up by Hyslop. It also struck at various earlier writs. The action also contained subordinate conclusions of removing from the lands, accounting for the rents, &c. In this summons the pursuer expressly admitted that she had received her share of the balance of the price of the lands, but alleged she had granted a discharge for it in ignorance of her rights.
In making up the record, the pursuer denied the existence of the disposition of 12th January, 1769, by which John (2) conveyed the lands to his elder brother, David. The defender produced an extract of the decree of absolvitor in the reduction 20th June, 1786, showing that in that process both parties admitted the existence of the deed, and pleaded on its import and effect.
After the record was closed, the Lord Ordinary sustained an objection to the pursuer's title, and dismissed the action.
The pursuer reclaimed.
The defender then stated to the Court that the disposition 12th January, 1769, which he had hitherto been unable to recover, was in the Register House, having been recorded in 1785, and he obtained warrant “before answer” to transmit it to the process. The Court afterwards held that the objection to the title was not competently on the record before them, and, therefore, recalled the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, and remitted to his Lordship to proceed. 1
At a subsequent stage of the cause, the Lord Ordinary assoilzied the defender, but intimated in a note that he did not rest his judgment upon the disposition 12th January, 1769, as the competency of doing so was denied, and there were sufficient grounds for the judgment independently of it.
The Court, on a reclaiming note, “remitted to the Lord Ordinary to take the deed of 12th January, 1769, into consideration, and all the title-deeds and documents connected therewith, and to grant warrant for letters of incident diligence against havers and witnesses for proving the actual delivery of the said deed or non-delivery, reserving all pleas and objections hinc inde.”
Under the diligence thus allowed, a fitted account was recovered between David and John (2), dated 12th January, 1769, striking the balance due to John (2) at £425; acknowledging the receipt of a payment of £300 in cash, and a bill at one day's date for the balance; and providing that the writs should in the meantime be in the hands of the agent of John (2) as a security till that balance was paid.
The pursuer thereafter pleaded, first, as to the effect of the disposition 12th January, 1769. It ought not to be looked at by the Court, not having been produced till after the record was closed. But, at all events, it was never delivered, and David died uninfeft, within ten days after it was subscribed, so that the rights of parties remained precisely on the same footing as if it had never been executed. Second; laying that disposition out of view, the pursuer must prevail in her reduction. For (1st) this was a proper competition of rights to land, the question being, which party had the best feudal title. The pursuer had connected herself, by service, with John (2), who was infeft under a disposition from John (1). The right of the defender was not clothed with infeftment till 1803, so that the positive prescription had not run in his favour; and no course of negative prescription, however long, could extinguish the infeftment of John (2), or prevent the pursuer, who connected herself with that infeftment, from prevailing in the competition, unless the defender was able to instruct a preferable right, independently of all aid
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1 Jan. 22, 1836 (ante, XIV. 327).
from the negative prescription. (2d) The competing right of the defender ultimately rested on his decree of sale in 1787, and his adjudication in 1774; and, throwing aside the operation of the negative prescription, as inapplicable, both of these decrees were irregular and inept. The decree of adjudication was inept, because it followed on a charge to William Cubbison, to enter heir in special to his father David, and his grandfather John (1), as last infeft in the lands of Banks; whereas David had never been infeft at all, and John (1) was divested by the disposition and infeftment in favour of John (2); it was also inept as being led in absence, against a minor; and as being led for a larger sum of debt than was due. Again, the decree of sale was invalid, for each of the following reasons:—The title of Aird, who pursued the sale, rested on the adjudication which was inept;—the action was directed against William Cubbison, who had no right or title to the lands, the full right thereto being still vested in John (2), who was then alive, and who was not made a party to the process;—William Cubbison was then a minor, and was abroad, and had granted no mandate to any party to appear for him, so that the whole proceeding, as against him, was irregular, any appearance made in his name being without a warrant;—the debts for which the lands were sold were, in great part, the debts of third parties, for which the estate could not be made liable;—and even assuming the debts to have been correctly stated, the estimated value of the lands, as the proven value, was greatly below their true worth, and the estate was not bankrupt. If the decree of adjudication and decree of sale were thus inept, the right conveyed by Aird to the defender, which was entirely founded thereon; and the title under the charter of sale made up by the defender, must fall to the ground.
In regard to the appearance made for the pursuer and her sister, in the reduction of the decreet of certification pronounced in the ranking and sale,—and in regard to their acceptance of the balance of the price of the lands,—the pursuer first alleged that she and her sister were minors at the time, and had acted in ignorance of their rights; and latterly denied the fact, but contended that, even if true, it could not restore validity to proceedings so irregular, or cut off the pursuer's right of challenge.
The defender answered, first, that the disposition 12th January, 1769, must be regarded by the Court, in deciding the cause, both because the last interlocutor remitting to the Lord Ordinary had expressly enjoined his Lordship to take it into consideration; and because it was essential to the justice of the case to do so. And the effect of that deed was to put an end to the pursuer's case. She libelled on a service to her uncle John (2). But as his right was held in security merely, and the pursuer's father David paid the debts secured by it, the right of John (2), became extinct even though he had never executed or delivered the disposition
But independently of the disposition 12th January, 1769, the pursuer's action was ill founded. For, although the negative proscription never could extinguish an infeftment, or a real right of property in heritage, it might be effectually pleaded against a right of action, and it cut off all real, as well as personal actions. It was no bar against pleading the negative prescription, that a party could not also plead the positive, provided that the negative prescription were only pleaded within its proper province. In the present instance, the defender was in possession of the lands under a complete feudal right, clothed with infeftment. And in order to cut that down, the pursuer had raised a reduction, inter alia, of the decree of sale, without which she could not succeed in voiding the defender's right. But this action, and all the pleas urged in support of it, were cut off by the negative prescription. 1 The procedure in that action was ex facie regular, and in foro. And as to the pleas alleged, viz. that William was a minor, and abroad, and had granted no authority to any party to appear for him; that the estate had been sold for debts, some of which were those of third parties; that the proven value was under-estimated, and the estate was not bankrupt, &c., these were, each and all, cut
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1Paul, Feb. 8, 1814 (F. C.); E of Dundonald, May 12, 1836 (ante, XIV. 737).
off by the negative prescription. The decree of sale was therefore unchallengeable; and as the pursuer could not shake the defender's feudal right, without setting it aside, the defender must be assoilzied.
The defender also pleaded, that, even if it were competent to go into the merits of the processes of ranking and sale and adjudication, these were regular and unexceptionable; and, separately, that the pursuer by her appearance in the reduction (20th June, 1786), and again in the ranking and sale, challenging the state of debts, and finally uplifting the balance of price, was barred, especially after so long acquiescence, from challenging a feudal right founded on the decree of sale.
It was separately pleaded by the pursuer, that, even if the decree of sale could not be reduced, her feudal right was radically preferable, in competition, to that of the defender; to which the defender answered, that, both in reference to the shape of the action, and the merits of the question, that plea was untenable.
The Lord Ordinary “having resumed the remit by the Court of date 9th July last, considered the deeds and documents, and the report of the diligence, and heard the counsel for the parties on the whole cause, sustained the defences as set forth in the pleas for the defender, assoilzied the defender, and decerned and found the pursuer liable in expenses, subject to modification.”
The pursuer reclaimed.
But besides this, the disposition by John Cubbison (1) to John Cubbison (2) was granted not in property, but merely in security of debt. The debt was paid, and consequently the right in security fell. In addition to this, John (2) granted a re-disposition to David Cubbison, the pursuer's father. Perhaps that deed was not necessary to effect the complete divestiture of John (2), but if it was necessary, it was granted, and it conferred a jus crediti on David, independently of any infeftment following on it. And that would be quite enough to sustain a decreet of sale, taken against David or his representatives. It is out of the question to allow any party to say that by his delaying to take infeftment on the deed, the decree of sale could be afterwards set aside.
There is a separate ground which I consider fatal to the pursuer if it had been necessary to go into it. She was herself a party to the process of reduction of the decree of certification pronounced in the ranking and sale. In that action of reduction a decree of absolvitor was pronounced, and the process of ranking and sale was subsequently followed out to a decree of sale, and a decree of division of the price. After the part which the pursuer herself had in these proceedings, she cannot now be allowed to reduce the sale.
Independently, therefore, of the plea of the negative prescription, I consider that the defences ought to be sustained; but, on the separate ground of that plea also, if it had stood alone, I would have sustained them.
There is no proposition better established than that the negative prescription cannot be pleaded directly against a right of heritable property.
If it was otherwise, possession alone, without infeftment, would complete the right, contrary to the statute 1617, which requires a title as well as possession.
I may possess a hundred years, but, if not infeft, any competitor who has neglected his right for that time, may competently establish it, if his right is better than mine. This is settled law, according to every authority, and a numerous train of decisions. What is the result? Not that the person who brings the challenge shall succeed because the negative prescription cannot be objected. But that both parties must produce their respective progresses, and compete upon them. They must trace back their respective rights to their common author, or to the crown; and he who has the best progress must be preferred. It is said, What is the use of the negative prescription in a question-regarding heritable property if it can e only pleaded when you have the positive? Does the law allow it only when it can be of no service? There is a great mistake here. The negative prescription is of use not in being objected directly against an heritable right of ownership, but in trying the validity of the competing progresses, and in getting rid of various objections which might otherwise have been competent. For example, A disposes to B, B to C, and so on. One of these dispositions is objected to on the ground of forgery, or because it was impetrated by force or fraud. Now, all these objections are cut off by the negative prescription. For although exceptions founded on ex facie nullities, for example, that the deed is not subscribed, or that it is tested by only one witness, and the like, are not barred, yet all objections not appearing ex facie on the deed, are effectually cut off by the negative prescription.
That distinction was admitted in the cases
Paul v. Reid, and Boyes' Trustees.
In this case I think the pursuer is not barred by the negative prescription from challenging the defender's right, although she has not brought her challenge for forty years. But the result is, that the merits of each, as in competition, must be tried.
On looking to the defender's progress, it will be found that his author having charged William Cubbison to enter heir to John, his grandfather, and to David, his father, led an adjudication against him, which was followed by a decree of ranking and sale, which came by assignation into the person of the defender Hyslop.
Then what is the pursuer's progress? It is a general service as heir to her uncle John, as the person last infeft in the lands. Now it comes to be a question which of these is the best progress? I think that there is conclusive evidence in process by the disposition 1769, that John's right was a right in security only. There is also evidence that the debt was paid, for John granted a discharge by a writing under his hand, which would of itself have extinguished his infeftment, and in addition to this he executed a reconveyance by the disposition 1769. Therefore, there was nothing which could be taken out of John's hæreditas jacens, by the service to him.
What are the objections stated by the pursuer? She says that the disposition 1769 cannot be taken into view, as it was not produced till after the record was closed. The Lord Ordinary gives weight to this objection; but I do not think it well founded. For though it may be incompetent for the parties to make farther production of deeds after the record is closed, the Court itself often orders a deed to be produced ad rimandam veritatem, and accordingly that was done here. The same thing was done, and is common in practice, in the cases of Hamilton, Nov. 15, 1828 (S. & D. VII. 21); Thomson, Feb. 21, 1828 (S. & D. VI. 571). I therefore think this deed of 1769 is now competently in process. It is evident that John's right was discharged, and that a service to him could carry nothing. I agree with the Lord Ordinary, therefore, that this of itself puts an end to the question.
But in the second place, independently of this deed, and assuming that it cannot be competently founded upon, there was a decree of sale at Aird's instance (March 8th, 1787), on which his titles were completed, and to that action the pursuer was a party, for she challenged the decree of certification, and her challenge was dismissed.
How do the facts stand as to that proceeding? It is objected, 1st, That William was in minority and abroad, and it was a decree in absence. But none of these objections can be stated in so far as William is concerned, as they are all cut off by the negative prescription, and the decree is good, notwithstanding the minority
It is next said that William died before the action was called; but it is proved that the action was executed before his death, and duly transferred against his representatives, and it has been decided that after execution, an action though not called, may be transferred against a representative. It was lately decided so in the case of Macandrew, which I reported to this Division. 1 Now here the action was transferred against Margaret Cubbison and her sister now dead.
The transference was in absence. A representation was presented and refused as incompetent. This representation, which most unaccountably was lodged in the name of William after his death, and the transference against his sisters, was held to be a pleading for them, and indeed they admitted expressly that it was so. None of these proceedings can now be challenged, as the negative prescription applies to them all,
I am of opinion therefore that although the disposition 1769 were to be laid out of view, yet as Margaret Cubbison was a party to the decree of sale which is now unchallengeable, the defender must be assoilzied from this reduction.
The Court accordingly adhered to the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, assoilzieing the defender with expenses.
Solicitors: R. Mackay, W.S.— A. Smith, W.S.—Agents.
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1 M'Intosh v. Macandrew, May 26, 1829 (ante, VII. 649).