Page: 1063↓
Subject_Process—Proof—Writ.—
In an action of reduction of certain deeds notarially executed, on the ground of their not having been subscribed by the party's own hand, circumstances in which held that the case ought to be tried by Jury, but that the general issue was not the proper issue to try the question, and a remit made to have an issue prepared relative to the special facts in dispute between the parties.
In 1822, the late John Reid, of Glasgow, executed a trust-disposition and settlement, in favour of Isaac Baxter and Others, the defenders. In 1825, and 1830, he executed two several codicils, altering some of the provisions of the previous deed. The trust-disposition was not subscribed by Reid himself, but bore to be executed by notaries, in the following manner:—“At the special request of the within-designed John Reid, who, from a defect of sight, or dimness of vision, cannot see to read write clearly, as he asserts, and being desirous to execute the foregoing deed in a valid form, so as to exclude challenges on the head of blindness or defect of sight, therefore we, John Drysdale and James M'Hardy, notaries-public, and co-notaries in the premises, subscribe the same for him, he
The codicil of 1825 bore to be executed in the same way, and the codicil of 1830 as follows:—“At the special request of the within-designed John Reid, who, from a defect of sight, or dimness of vision, cannot see to read write, as he asserts; therefore we, Donald Macintyre and James M'Hardy, notaries-public,” &c., as above.
Upon the death of Mr Reid, the pursuer, his eldest son and heir-at-law, raised an action of reduction of the trust-settlement, and subsequent codicils, on the ground, inter alia, that Reid was, at the time of executing the writings in question, “perfectly able to subscribe the same with his own hand, and did, in point of fact, both prior and subsequent to the said dates, and each of them, so subscribe a variety of writings of different descriptions, and was in the practice of so doing; and, accordingly, the notarial docquets above quoted do not bear that the said John Reid was unable to subscribe with his own hand, but merely that he was unable to read writing, or to read the same clearly, from a certain dimness of sight; and, therefore, the said deeds or writings ought, in order to give them legal validity, to have been subscribed by the hand of the said John Reid himself; and the said deeds or writings, not having been so subscribed, are null and void, and can make no faith,” both at common law, and under the statutes 1540, c. 117, and 1579, c. 80.
The trustees pleaded in defence—
That the deeds were duly executed, and admitting, in point of fact, that Reid was occasionally in the practice of subscribing documents of minor importance, when guided by others to the part of the paper where his name was to be written, they averred that “at each and all of the dates above condescended on, he was in such a state of blindness as to be totally unable to read either print or writing. When he executed the original trust-deed he was little more than able to distinguish between light and darkness. His sight became afterwards gradually more and more impaired, and, at the date of the two codicils, he was incapable of distinguishing between one object and another.”
This averment was denied by the pursuer, who further maintained, in point of law, that the notarial docquets must be held as probatio probata of the state of the deceased's powers of vision; and that, under the statutes, even supposing parties absolutely blind, “gif they can subscribe,” they are bound to do so, and not have recourse to notaries. 1
A motion having been made by the defenders for a remit to the Jury Roll, the pursuer objected to a trial on the ground, that it was more consistent
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1 Lord Fife's case (1 Shaw's Appeals, 498).
The defenders answered, that it was expedient to have the facts previously ascertained, as, according to the state of the averments in regard to Reid's powers of sight, the pursuer asked for judgment on a hypothetical case; and that it was not necessary that the question, “deed or no deed,” should go to the jury; but it might be a question of simple fact, to which, when ascertained, the Court would apply the law.
The Lord Ordinary reported the case, issuing the note subjoined, *
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* “The Lord Ordinary reports this matter, because a remit to the Jury roll might prevent the parties from obtaining the opinion of the Court by a note in the usual way, and because it is important for them to get it settled as soon as possible what course the case is to take.
“If the Lord Ordinary had disposed of the case, he was inclined to have sent the whole matter to a jury, on a general issue, whether the deed was, or was not, the deed of the deceased, leaving the facts to be settled either by a general or a special verdict, and the necessary law to be laid down, or to be reserved, at the trial; or, at least, upon an issue or issues framed, so as to determine special facts.
“The pursuer, however, objects to any trial of fact, and, holding the defenders to have admitted (chiefly in their answers to article 15 of the condescendence), that the deceased could sign, he insists that the cage shall be determined upon his legal plea, viz. That mere capacity of signing makes subscription by notaries an inept mode of execution. But, it will be observed, that he never takes this ground purely and exclusively, but combines it with the averment, that the deceased not only could sign, but was in the practice of doing so, and that he was enabled to do so partly by his eye-sight, which is said to have been good. (Condescendence 14 and 15.) These averments are denied (answers to article 15 of condescendence, and statement for defenders, article 2).
“Now, in this state of the record, there are two objections to the course which the pursuer insists for. In the first place, if the fact shall be, as averred by him, viz. That at the date of this deed the pursuer saw, and could sign quite well, then the whole case is disposed of, and the legal discussion, if gone into, may turn out to have been useless and hypothetical. In the second place, the capacity or incapacity of seeing may form a material element, in deciding whether a person can write; for, in the statutory sense, this, to a certain degree, may be a legal question. The law may relieve, by notaries, a person, who, though not, perhaps, utterly and absolutely incapable, cannot sign his name without a straining of nature, or who believes that he is not safe, in writing feebly, or what he cannot see; and it may withhold this relief from one for whom it is plainly totally useless. To meet such possible views, it would apparently be very convenient to have the facts settled before discussing the law; whereas the pursuer, though he expressly refuses to restrict himself merely to his general legal proposition, insists that the precise condition of the man shall remain unascertained till that proposition be disposed of; and that failing this, he shall then be at liberty to proceed next to his case on the facts.”
Their Lordships accordingly pronounced this interlocutor:—“In respect that the Court is of opinion, that this case is not in a proper state for trial by a jury under a general issue, remit to the Lord Ordinary to remit the process to the roll of Jury causes, with instructions that the clerks do prepare the draft of an issue or issues relative to the special facts in dispute between the parties, and to proceed farther thereanent as to his Lordship may seem proper.”
Solicitors: William Grierson, W.S.— Inglis and Macdonald, W.S.—Agents.