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Subject_Executor—Trust.—
1. Executors not entitled, as against a claim by a special legatee for his legacy, to take credit for payments made to the residuary legatees. 2. Question how far executors, declared to be liable each for his own actual intromissions only, are responsible for misappropriation, by one of their number, of money which had been uplifted by them from a bank, and left in his hands for the purpose of being invested on security, but which had not been so invested.
The late Adam Amoss, by his latter will, appointed his agent, Alexander Greig, W.S., and three other friends, to be his executors and administrators, it being specially declared that they should not be liable for omissions, nor singuli in solidum, but each for his own actual intromissions only. He bequeathed various legacies to the extent of upwards of £5000, including £50 to each of the executors. Some of the legacies were to minors, and these were declared not to be payable till the legatees
On the other hand, Grieve maintained:—
“1. That the defenders, as executors and intromitters with the estate, were liable, in terms of the deed of settlement, to make payment to him of the principal sum of £400 sterling, with interest thereon from Martinmas, 1832, till paid,
“2. That in accounting with him, the defenders were not entitled to take credit for any sums paid by them to Mr Amoss's residuary legatees, whose right to draw any thing under his settlement was necessarily postponed to that of his special legatees.
“And, 3. That the defenders having, according to their own statement, without any necessity or any plausible pretext, uplifted a sum of money deposited by the defunot with the branch of the Bank of Scotland at Dumfries,
The Lord Ordinary pronounced the following interlocutor, adding the subjoined note:
*—“Decerns against the defender, Alexander
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* “The Lord Ordinary has no doubt that the defenders are all liable as actual intromitters, since, after being made aware that there was no immediate means of applying the £1500 in question, they all go personally to Dumfries, and there indorse the deposit receipt, and draw out the money; and this being all that the pursuer had any occasion to know, or to look to, when his legacy became payable, he was perfectly justified in bringing his action in the way he has done. Being liable in the first instance as actual intromitters, it was no doubt competent (and even necessary) for the defenders to meet the action, by showing that they had afterwards discharged themselves, either by payment of preferable claims, or, at all events, by such a prudent or reasonable application of the money as might bring them under the protection to which they were entitled by their character of executors, or by the special terms, of the settlement under which, they acted. This accordingly they have attempted to do; and, in the discussion of their defence, the question has no doubt come to be, whether they have not conducted themselves with such palpable and active imprudence as to be personally liable to the pursuer in spite of such protection. They say now, that this question and ground of liability ought to have been raised in the summons, and that the form of action is therefore incompetent; but the Lord Ordinary is of opinion that there is no ground for this objection, in as much as they were primarily liable as intromitters, and properly convened as such accordingly; and that the subsequent discussion has arisen altogether on their defences, and as to the sufficiency of their discharge, of which, the pursuer had no occasion to be previously cognizant.
“On the merits, the Lord Ordinary has proceeded altogether on the terms of the minute of 23d March, 1832, and the voluntary and deliberate act of drawing out the money, and placing it without security in Greig's hands, the very day after. From the minute it appears, that they were then perfectly informed that there was £1500 more in the bank than was then wanted, and they (very properly) instructed Greig to look out for a safe investment, in which it might yield more than bank interest. All this was not only within their power, but according to their duty. But what imaginable apology can be made for their not letting this sum remain in the bank till such investment was obtained? Their needlessly drawing it out, and placing it for an indefinite time in the hands of one of their number, was not an omission, but an act and intromission of the most unaccountable, and, it appears to the Lord Ordinary, the most indefensible character; and it is for this accordingly that he has found them liable. Their long subsequent neglect to ascertain whether it bad ever been invested, might perhaps be covered by their exemption from the consequence of omissions; and accordingly the Lord Ordinary does not rest his judgment upon it, farther than as showing, that in trusting the pursuer's money with Greig, they were utterly careless of the interests which had been confided to them.
“There is a near resemblance in many points between this case and that of Moffat and Robertson, 31st January, 1834 (12 Shaw, 369). That was a stronger case against the trustee in one respect, as the deed directed security to be taken for all funds lent out. But it was greatly weaker in another, viz. that there was in fact no new lending out or change of investment whatever, but a mere continuance of that which the truster himself had made, and allowed for years to continue. The neglect of the trustees to alter or strengthen it, was therefore very plausibly represented as a mere omission, for which they were declared not to be answerable by a clause identical with what occurs in this case. Here the ground of liability, as already explained, was a positive act, changing a most safe and unquestionable investment, not only without necessity, but without any assignable pretext, for one which is now admitted to have been most ineligible.”
The executors having reclaimed, the Court ordered minutes of debate, wherein was chiefly argued the question of responsibility disposed of in the findings of the Lord Ordinary, but to which it is unnecessary particularly to advert, as the Court proceeded exclusively on the second plea, as to the executors not being entitled, in a question with a special legatee, to take credit for payments to the residuary legatees. Their Lordships accordingly, holding it unnecessary to pronounce any judgment on the plea decided by the Lord Ordinary,
Recalled the findings in his Lordship's interlocutor, as unnecessary to be decided; and, in respect of the second plea, adhered in so far as it decerned against the executors.
Solicitors: Brodies and Kennedy, W.S.— Walter Horsburgh, W.S.—Agents.