Page: 369↓
Subject_Proof—Reference to Oath.—
1. Terms of an oath on reference which held to prove a debt to be resting-owing, although the party, in conclusion, deponed generally, that it was not resting-owing—he having assigned as the reason, that the creditor was satisfied that the money had been accounted for, whereas the preceding part of the oath was inconsistent with this statement. 2. How far competent to refer to documents in taking an oath on reference.
The pursuer, Hunter, as trust-assignee of Charles Macdonald, late agent at Huntly, for the Aberdeen Banking Company, raised an action against the defender, Geddes, for payment of £300 alleged to have been advanced to him by Macdonald, and referred the whole cause to the oath of Geddes. A commission was granted to take the oath at Aberdeen, when the following procedure took place:—
“Whereupon appeared the said George Geddes, who being solemnly sworn and interrogated, depones, That he is a farmer at Haddoch: That in 1829 he resided at Haddoch, which is about three miles and a half from Huntly. Depones, That he knows Mr Charles Macdonald, late bank agent in Huntly. Depones, That he knows Cornhill of Park: That there are several markets held there in the year: That there is one about the middle of May: That the deponent is in use to go to the markets held in that place: That he thinks he was there in the month of May, 1829: That he thinks, but is not sure, that the market-day in that month that year was on the 14th day of the month. Depones, That he took money with him to that market; and he thinks the amount was
“Whereupon the pursuer appealed to the Lord Ordinary.
“Interrogated whether, and when, if ever, the deponent again saw the said Charles Macdonald, relative to this matter? Depones, That he frequently saw Macdonald subsequent to the said market, but he does not recollect how long after the market it was when he next saw Macdonald. Interrogated, What passed between him and Macdonald subsequently relative to this transaction? Depones, That at one of the said meetings with Macdonald, he told the deponent that his father had not so much money in the bank as the £300: That Macdonald said, that the deponent's father had about £112, 10s. in the bank: That at the time of this meeting the deponent's father was dead, having died in December, 1828, and previous to the time the deponent received the said money from Macdonald: That Macdonald said at said meeting, that to save the deponent the expense of confirmation, he (Macdonald) would make the deponent's father debtor to the bank, in the difference between
“The Commissioner was requested to put the general question, Whether the deponent is resting-owing the debt sued for? The pursuer objects to this question being put by the Commissioner.—All which is truth, as the deponent shall answer to God.”
This deposition having been reported to the Lord Ordinary, his Lordship, “In respect that the Commissioner has sustained several objections to the course of examination proposed by the pursuer, which ought to have been repelled—that the oath itself is in several parts ambiguous or
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* “The Lord Ordinary is fully aware of the danger and inexpediency of granting re-examinations, after an oath has been reported; but this is plainly a case of a very suspicious character, and in which it would be particularly unadvisable to narrow the undoubted privilege of a party referring to refresh the memory, and probe the conscience of his opponent, as well as to test his veracity, by all competent interrogatories, however minute and detailed. In the Lord Ordinary's opinion, the former Commissioner has unduly abridged this privilege, and that in several important particulars; especially—1st, By refusing to put the interrogatory, as to the terms of the acknowledgment given, or to allow the acknowledgment itself to be exhibited to the deponent; 2d, By refusing to put the interrogatory, whether he is willing to produce the account he says he received from the Bank, and which he had sworn, corresponded with what Macdonald had previously said as to the state of that account; and 3d, By refusing to order production of the documents relative to his final settlement of that account, the existence of which he, to a certain extent, admitted.
“As to the first of these points, the Lord Ordinary is clearly of opinion that it was quite competent to ask in what terms the acknowledgment was expressed, or more particularly, whether it contained a promise to repay the money to Macdonald.
“If there had been no writing on the subject, it seems scarcely doubtful that the deponent might have been asked, whether at the time he promised to pay back the money to Macdonald; and the question of competency plainly cannot be affected by the circumstance of the acknowledgment being in writing. As to the fitness of showing that writing to the deponent, the Lord Ordinary thinks there is as little doubt; not certainly for the purpose of rearing it up as a ground of obligation, or in any way evading the stamp acts, but merely for the purpose of refreshing his memory, and perhaps stimulating his conscience as to his having actually made such a promise—to which, if it had been verbal, it is thought he could not have refused to speak. By allowing such exhibition, it appears to the Lord Ordinary that there would not have been the least approach to any recognition of the writing as of any force or validity, either as an obligation or as evidence; and after such exhibition, as well as before, it must have been by the oath, and the oath alone, that the case would still be decided. If he swore that he never subscribed it, or that he subscribed it without reading it, there would be an end in this cause of all enquiry into the existence or effect of that acknowledgment; while, if he swore that he signed it knowingly, the oath would merely import, and ought perhaps merely to express, that having seen that writing, he is now certain that at receiving the money, he did promise to pay it back to Macdonald, whenever he might demand it; a fact which seems obviously material to the issue, especially if followed up by the questions, how he came to make that promise, and whether or why he broke it, &c.
“Upon the second point, as to producing the bank account, the matter seems still clearer. He not only refers to that account in his oath, but swears that it corresponded with a certain previous statement of Macdonald. Its tenor, in this respect, therefore, is truly a part of his oath, and being in his own possession, it seems to the Lord Ordinary, that it ought clearly to have been exhibited. It is material even to himself, that if his memory deceived him in this respect, the error should be corrected. It is still more material that the other party should not suffer by his falsehood or rashness, if by means of a farther or more sifting examination, the oath may be made consistent with truth. Accordingly, upon a similar ground, a re-examination was ordered in the case of Fraser, 27th June, 1809, Fac. Col., and very recently in that of Young and Pollock, 25th May, 1832 ( 10. Shaw, 570). The case of Cooper against Hamilton, which is most fully stated in Wilson and Shaw's Appeal Cases, Vol. II. p. 59, is still more decisive as to the right of a party, even without a re-examination, to see and to found on the tenor of all writings referred to in an oath of reference, though not produced to the deponent at his examination. The same observations apply to the third article above mentioned. If there be any such documents, the deponent is bound to refer to them to correct any misrecollection which may have been produced by the lapse of years; and the pursuer is entitled to see them, either to aid in clearing up such misrecollections, or to force the deponent out of a false statement. The Lord Ordinary has said, that the oath is in some respects ambiguous or contradictory. He alludes, in part, to the statement made peremptorily in the early part of the deposition, that the money was got from Macdonald on his (the deponent's) father's account, when it appears from the sequel, that the father had been dead for six months; and that the money, in so far as it was an advance, must therefore have been obtained on the deponent's own account only, but chiefly to the plain and unconditional admission near the close of the original examination, that he never afterwards gave Macdonald any money with reference to this transaction, and never paid back any part of the sum received from Macdonald before deponed to. Upon this statement the deposition is apparently closed, without objection or offer of explanation. And it is only upon reading it over, before signing, that, upon his attention being called to this admission by his own counsel, the deponent makes the statement as to a repayment to Macpherson, a succeeding bank-agent—as to which the account and documents already mentioned as withheld are referred to, and required to be seen by the pursuer. The way in which the statement proposed to be thus tested is made, seems to furnish a strong additional reason for allowing the test to be unsparingly applied.
“Reference was made at the debate to certain extracts from the bank books, by which the falsehood of the deponent's statement, as to the accounts furnished at the settlement made by him with that body, seem strongly established. The Lord Ordinary, however, is of opinion, that those cannot be founded on in this process to invalidate the oath. But as a re-examination is granted, he thinks their tenor should be previously communicated to the deponent and that, after this is done, he may be interrogated as to the way he reconciles them with his former statement. If he declines looking at them, or answering in regard to them, the oath must be taken as he makes it. But the consequences may be serious in relation to proceedings of a different description. The Lord Ordinary has required the defender to come to Edinburgh for examination, because the case is now so serious as to require the assistance of counsel, and his attendance here must be less burdensome than their journey to such a distance.
“The Lord Ordinary observes, that in some early cases, sifting questions are rejected, and re-examination refused ob metum perjuri, that is, as he understands, lest the party, when reluctantly driven to answer by the force of truth, shall contradict a false statement originally made, either from rashness or dishonesty; but he has no idea that any countenance can be given to so strange a scruple at the present day. The party referring has, at all events, a right to get all the truth that, by any legal method, he can extract from his opponent; and even as to him, he is plainly in far less danger of the pains of perjury if he is driven, whether by skilful interrogation, or exhibition of documents, to retract a false statement, originally hazarded, while still under examination in the civil suit, than if left to vindicate that false statement, after it has been made the instrument of scandalous injustice in a criminal action.”
The following examination thereafter took place:—
“Compeared George Geddes, farmer at Haddoch, who being solemnly sworn, and his former deposition having been read over to him, and interrogated,
On advising the two depositions, the Lord Ordinary pronounced this interlocutor, adding the note below: * “Having resumed consideration
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* “The Lord Ordinary is perfectly aware that he has nothing to do with the credit due to an oath of reference, and must give effect to it, if at all intelligible, however palpably and disgracefully false it may appear. But, in order to give effect to it, its true tenor and import must, at all events, be ascertained; and, where it is made up of a series of flat contradictions and glaring inconsistencies, this is not so easy. He supposes, however, that he must take the deponent's last statements, when positive, as entirely superseding the first; and reconcile minor incongruities, so as, if possible, to support his substantive averments. The oath is the pursuer's evidence, and it is for him to show, that resting-owing is sufficiently proved by its tenor. If it were entirely unintelligible, the defender would be entitled to be assoilzied. Now, the oath, in this case, certainly is not very intelligible in all its parts. But the Lord Ordinary is of opinion, that resting-owing is sufficiently proved by its tenor.
“He thinks the constitution of the debt, as a debt due to Macdonald, clearly enough established. The advance of the £300 by that person, on 13th May, 1829, is fully admitted; and though something is said of its being advanced out of the balance due on the father's account with the bank; yet, the true tenor of the oath is, not that it was actually so advanced—all that is said is, that the state of that account was not then known, but that an account would be afterwards rendered, from which it would appear. The nature of the debt was therefore in pendente (or at least unknown) at the time of the advance. If there was £800 at the father's credit, then it was a transaction with the bank. But if there wan nothing at his credit, it was necessarily an advance by Macdonald, for it is not pretended that the son ever had any account with the bank. Now, passing over the disgraceful contradictions as to what Macdonald said on the state of the father's account, and by payment of what sums that account was ultimately settled—there are two things very clearly proved by the oath. 1st, That a state of the father's account was furnished, with which the deponent was satisfied, and in terms of which he actually settled, by payment of the precise balance then specified. And, 2d, That he never paid, either to Macdonald or to the bank, any other sums than those composing that balance, subsequent to the advance in May 1829. Now, the account thus described, adopted, and settled by the deponent is at last produced by him, and its tenor is truly a part of his deposition; and taken along with the rest of that deposition, it clearly establishes these three things. 1st, That at the father's death, and in May 1829, there was nothing due to him by the bank; but, on the contrary, that he was indebted to it in the sum of £245, 10s. 2d, That the advance of £300 in May 1829 to the deponent is no where entered or noticed in that account, or at all recognised as a bank transaction. And, 3d, That the only payments he ever made were two sums (in April and in September, 1830), making together the precise balance of £245, 10s. due at the father's death, by the extinction of which, at the last of these dates, the account was finally closed, and the bond given up to the cautioners.
“The Lord Ordinary holds it, therefore, to be completely proved, by the oath, and relative productions made by the deponent himself, that the £300 was advanced by Macdonald personally to the defender; that it never was credited to the bank, or due to it;—and finally, that no part of it was ever repaid, either to the bank, or to Macdonald,—and that the whole is consequently still resting-owing to the person by whom it was advanced.
“If this be the true result of the facts established by the oath, it is supposed to be plain enough that the defender could not alter, or at all effect, that result, by swearing, that, in his opinion, the debt was not resting-owing. That is a conclusion in law over which he has no control. But, in truth, he has qualified his opinion in such a way, as to remove all difficulty. For all that he says in answer to that general question is, ‘that Macdonald was satisfied that the money was accounted for; and therefore, and for that reason alone, he thinks the debt is not resting-owing. Now, the Lord Ordinary conceives this to be clearly an extrinsic quality in the oath, if it be not something still more irrelevant;—for 1st, It is an averment, not as to any fact known to the deponent, but as to the state of another person's mind, from whom he does not say he ever received any statement of his satisfaction; who is, in fact, through his trustee, the pursuer of this action; and whom he represents, indeed, in another part of his deposition, as having professed to bave no recollection on the subject;—and 2dly, Unless the whole of the rest of the oath is supposed to be retracted, Macdonald's being satisfied was palpably no ground whatever for inferring that the debt was not resting-owing. The whole scope of the defence is, that it was the bank, and not Macdonald, to whom it was due. If it was ever accounted for at all, therefore, it must have been by the defender's subsequent payments to the bank,—the last and largest of which (if not both) he swears to have been made to Macdonald's successor in the agency, and long after the period of his removal. The only ground assigned for the legal inference (for it is no more), that the debt is not resting-owing, is therefore manifestly irrelevant to support that conclusion, even if it were a fact capable of being proved by the oath of the defender, instead of a most improbable and rash conjecture as to the sentiments of another person.’
of the debate, with the two several depositions of the defender, and whole process, finds, that by the tenor of the said depositions, the constitution of the debt pursued for is sufficiently established, and no facts deponed to, which import that it was ever paid, or in any other way satisfied, discharged,
Geddes reclaimed.
The Court accordingly adhered.
Solicitors: John Hunter, W. S.— M'Millan and Grant, W.S.—Agents.