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Subject_Slander Privileged.—
In an action of damages for slander by a bankrupt against certain of his creditors and their agent, on account of statements of fraudulent conduct on his part, made by the creditors in a letter to the agent, and by him, under their direction, circulated among the other creditors, as the reasons for their refusing to accept a proposed composition, and insisting on proceeding with a sequestration, and to induce the other creditors to concur with them—held that the pursuer was bound to take an issue, whether the statements were made and circulated “maliciously,” as well as “falsely and calumniously.”
Action of damages for alleged slander at the instance of Torrance, merchant in Glasgow, against Leaf, Coles, Son, and Company, merchants in London, and James Turnbull, accountant in Glasgow, rested
“
sir,—We are informed by your letter, dated the 10th instant, that the sequestration of William Torrance ii set aside by the Court in consequence of some informality in the proceedings of the law-agent. We regret that this circumstance has taken place, because unnecessary expense and delay must inevitably follow. We are given to understand that some arrangement is about to be proposed to wind up the concern without sequestration, but at present we are not favoured with the particulars. We consider the conduct of Torrance has been so exceedingly bad, that the creditors cannot with propriety come to any settlement short of sequestration. We think him a very proper person to be made an example of, and we do not see any other mode of punishing him than by making him a bankrupt, and keeping him without his certificate. From all that we heard of this transaction, we are of opinion that you have not been well used; and, in justice to your professional character, we feel ourselves called upon to state, that your proceedings in this affair of Torrance have our decided approbation; and, acting upon the general instructions we have always given you in matters of insolvency in Glasgow and the neighbourhood, we think that, on our account alone, you were perfectly justified in taking the prompt steps you did, for it is quite clear that, if Torance's system of selling his goods by auction had not been effectually stopped, a very small portion of the property would have been left for the creditors. We beg to assure you that our reliance on your integrity, skill, and activity, is the same now as it has ever been, and that no circumstance has occurred in the case of Torrance to diminish, in the slightest degree, the confidence we have placed in you, but, on the contrary, late events have confirmed it. We originally gave you our general instructions to act on our behalf to the best of your judgment in all cases of doubt, and we believe that your movements in the affair of Torrance's have been dictated solely by the consideration of what was best to be done, not only for our interest, but for the interest of the body
This letter, the pursuer averred, was by Turnbull, “under the direction of, or in concert with, the defenders, Leaf, Coles, Son, and Company—at all events, with their knowledge and approbation,” circulated among all the creditors of Torrance, a copy being appended to a circular from Turnbull, soliciting their support for the office of trustee, in the event of sequestration being again awarded, as contemplated by Leaf and Company. Thereafter, these parties were solicited by different creditors to concur in accepting the composition, but they declined; and, on the 27th March, they, and Turnbull as their mandatory, presented a petition, praying for sequestration. On the 28th, an application was transmitted to Leaf and Company by a considerable number of creditors, soliciting them not to proceed with the sequestration, but to accept the composition; and, at the same time, Henry Brooke and Son, also creditors of Torrance, had written them in these terms:—“We are creditors of W. Torrance of Glasgow as well as yourselves, and we regret to learn that you do not consent to his affairs being settled by composition, a way, we think, very desirable for the interest of all concerned; and we beg respectfully to urge this upon you, trusting you will give your support to the proposed plan.”
To this, Leaf and Company returned the following answer:—“
Gentlemen,—We are favoured with your letter, dated the 27th instant, and we are exceedingly sorry we cannot comply with your request of acceding to the proposed composition offered by William Torrance of Glasgow. In this, as in all cases of insolvency, we are guided entirely by the conduct of the party, and we presume you are not fully acquainted with the circumstances which occurred before the failure, or we think you would not willingly allow Torrance to escape punishment. In the month of October last, he came to London, for the purpose of purchasing goods. He bought nearly £500 of us, and also to a considerable extent of two or three other houses here; and, immediately on his arrival in Glasgow, he sent a large portion of these goods to the auction mart, and he disposed of them at any prices they would fetch. From an investigation of his affairs, it is pretty certain that, at the time he purchased these goods, he not only was well aware that he was insolvent, but that he never could pay for them. The system of selling goods by public auction appears to be gaining ground very much in Scotland, and we are determined, whenever we make a bad debt with a man who is guilty of such a practice, we
Copies of this letter were, it was alleged, sent by Leaf and Company to Turnbull, and also to Mr Edward Railton, agent in Glasgow, who had been appointed one of a committee alongst with Turnbull, by the meeting of the 20th February, to obtain the concurrence of the absent creditors to the composition then offered.
Thereafter the second petition for sequestration, and that of Leaf and Company, were conjoined, and sequestration awarded on the 5th April, and ultimately a composition was accepted by the creditors, including Leaf and Company, of 9s. 6d., and Torrance discharged.
The letters above recited were alleged in the summons, and on the record, to have been not only falsely and calumniously, but also “maliciously” written and circulated, or caused to be circulated by the defenders, who on their part averred, in justification, the truth of the statements therein contained, and further pleaded that they were acting in bona fide in the exercise of their rights and privileges as creditors.
In preparing issues, Torrance maintained that he was not bound to take an issue whether the letters had been written and circulated “maliciously,” but only whether they had been written and circulated “falsely and calumniously,” and that it lay with the defenders, in order to bring themselves within a case of privilege, to take a counter issue whether they had acted in discharge of their duty, or exercise of their privilege as creditors. The defenders, on the other hand, contended, that on the face of the pursuers' own statement, a case of privilege was raised, and that he must therefore take an issue requiring him to prove malice.
The issues, as prepared by the clerk, put it only whether the letters had been written “falsely and calumniously,” with a counter issue on the part of the defenders, whether they had acted in the discharge of their duty, or exercise of their privilege as creditors; but on their coming
The Court, after hearing counsel, delayed to consider the point.
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* “The Lord Ordinary thinks this a question of importance. The case is, that according to the most probable view of the cause, as it appears from the summons, the defenders being creditors under a depending process of sequestration, resisted a proposal of composition on the ground of what they held to be fraudulent practice in the bankrupts in the contraction of the debts, and the disposal of the goods furnished to them; and that they endeavoured to obtain the concurrence of other creditors in the opposition, by laying before them extrajudicially their views of such fraudulent practices. The question is, whether this is a relevant ground of an action or issue of damages, without a statement of malice as well as falsehood? Or at least, whether some form of issue is not necessary, which shall throw on the pursuer the onus of showing that what was done was not done in the ordinary exercise of the rights of a creditor in the discharge of a duty, or the exercise of a privilege. The issues as they stand, give to the pursuer a right to a verdict on simply proving that the things said were untrue (which would be inferred, unless the justification in the record were supported by evidence,) and injurious or calumnious in their own nature, and they give merely a converse issue to the defender to prove that the words were written in discharge of a duty, or exercise of a privilege. The defenders say that the onus should lie the other way, and the Lord Ordinary thinks the question very important. Fur he thinks that it would be a grievous state of things if, whenever an injured creditor, when required to concur in a composition contract (which is this case), refuses to do so under an impression of fraud, which he may not ultimately be able to establish, and under that impression endeavours by representations to obtain the concurrence of other creditors in his opposition, he must, without allegation of malice, or even of violation of duty, or departure from bona fide privilege, be made liable in an action of damages. The Lord Ordinary is strongly inclined to think, that if malice shall not be required (which may perhaps be inconvenient in interpretation in this country), some such form of issues as that adopted in the case of Coltart ( Grant v. Coltart, February 1, 1834) should in this case be resorted to. He cannot conceive a principle of greater hardship than to say, that because a man has opposed a composition on grounds which ultimately are found not to be proved, and has bona fide stated his views to other creditors for the legitimate purpose of obtaining their opinion, he must not only suffer by paying the expenses of the discussion, but be exposed to an action of damages at the instance of his bankrupt debtor. It requires very grave consideration, in his opinion, and he is inclined to believe, from any information he has, that in England, without a positive allegation of malice in the issue, or something equivalent, it could not be sent to a jury.
“The issues are clearly wrong as drawn in the first and second issues, because there is evidently no relevancy without combining them. A man cannot be liable in damages for the instructions he gives privately to his own mandatory or agent, and therefore the first issue, by itself, could never be allowed. The Lord Ordinary understands it to be admitted that this must be corrected.”
this rule to the present case, the question is, whether, as appearing on the face of the pursuers' allegations, the plea of privilege is raised? for if not, the onus will lie on the defenders. I cannot allow the pursuer to say that it is not in the summons or record that the defenders were creditors. There is a clear statement, both in the summons and condescendence, that the defenders were creditors, and there was no necessity therefore for a special averment to that effect on their part. Then it being sufficiently stated that they are creditors, we are to consider if there be any thing alleged to have been done by them beyond what they were entitled to do as such. No doubt the circulation of the letters was prior to the second sequestration; but suppose they had been personally present at a meeting after the first sequestration, at which there was a discussion as to the offer of composition, to which they were importuned to accede—if, in this situation, when they had determined to sequestrate, and reject the composition, they had at such meeting of creditors stated their reasons, they would have been privileged, and I do not see any difference that they state them to their agent, to be communicated to the other creditors, and they follow it up by sequestration; and, therefore, it appears to me, that they have prima facie the benefit of privilege. As to the second letter, I think the same principles apply, as there was an appeal to the defenders by a petition not to go on, and they were perfectly entitled in their answer to state their reason in reply. Taking this view, I cannot think it sufficient to prove that the statements were false and calumnious, but that the issue must be, whether they were malicious, as is alleged both in the summons and condescendence. There is, however, a distinction between Turnbull and the others; and if he were alleged to have been acting on his own authority, he might be in a different position; but I think it clear on the face of the averments that his acting was sanctioned and authorized by the other defenders, and, consequently, the same privilege applies to him as their agent; and on the whole, I am satisfied the pursuers must take an issue of malice, and I am not even inclined to go into the modification proposed by the Lord Ordinary.
The Court accordingly found that the pursuer must take an issue, whether the statements were made and circulated “maliciously,” as well as “falsely and calumniously,” and that the defenders were not required to take a counter issue on the point of privilege.
Solicitors: J. Cullen, W. S.— Campbell and Macdowall, S.S.C.—Agents.