Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[1996] NISSCSC C67/96(DLA) (25 October 1996)

 


Decision No: C67/96(DLA)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 DISABILITY LIVING ALLOWANCE
Application by the claimant for leave to appeal and appeal to the Social Security Commissioner on a question of law from the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal dated 12 March 1996
DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
1. In this case the claimant seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal sitting at Lisburn; whereby it was held that she was not entitled to either the care or the mobility component of disability living allowance from 20 February 1994. I grant leave to appeal and, with the consent of the parties, treat the application as the appeal.
2. The grounds relied upon by the claimant in her application for leave to appeal raise the question of the adequacy of the Appeal Tribunal's recorded reasons for decision. It is further submitted that the Tribunal erred in law in recording that the decision of the Adjudication Officer dated 24 August 1994 could not be reviewed.
3. The background facts are somewhat involved. Immediately prior to February 1994 the claimant was in receipt of the lowest rate of the care component of disability living allowance and the higher rate of the mobility component. She submitted a renewal claim in September 1993 and by decision dated 18 March 1994 the Adjudication Officer disallowed both components from 20 February 1994. Within 3 months of the notification of that decision the claimant requested a review which was duly carried out on 24 August 1994. It was this decision - a review under section 28(1) of the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 - which was the subject of the claimant's appeal to the Disability Appeal Tribunal. The full hearing of that appeal did not take place until 12 March 1996. The reasons for the interval were two-fold. The time allowed for appealing had been extended, and the first hearing on 25 July 1995 had been adjourned to enable further medical evidence to be obtained. In the meantime an Adjudication Officer had, on 25 November 1994, made a further review decision under the provisions of section 28(2) of the 1992 Administration Act, and had decided that there were no grounds to revise the decision of 24 August 1994.
4. As there was no written submission to the Tribunal and the hearing was not attended by the Adjudication Officer, it is scarcely surprising that the correct issue was not identified. The Tribunal was dealing with an appeal by the claimant against the Adjudication Officer's decision of 24 August 1994. That was a refusal to review the decision of the Adjudication Officer on the renewal claim which had been submitted by the claimant in September 1993, and in reaching it, the Adjudication Officer on 24 August 1994 had explained that he could review the earlier decision on any ground. The Appeal Tribunal correctly identified the appeal as being against the decision of 24 August 1994; but wrongly assumed that the claimant could not succeed unless grounds of appeal as set out in section 28(2) of the 1992 Administration Act were established. There was no such restriction. The decision of 24 August 1994 was an "any ground" review, and the Appeal Tribunal accordingly had full power to reconsider the question of the claimant's entitlement under her renewal claim submitted in September 1993.
5. In response to an invitation to comment upon this application for leave to appeal to the Commissioner, Mr G L Shaw, the Adjudication Officer now concerned with the case has, by letter dated 2 September 1996, explained in clear terms how the Appeal Tribunal came to err in law. He has also raised a number of further points arising from the fact that, at the time of the submission of her renewal claim, the claimant was in receipt of the higher rate of the mobility component and the lowest rate of the care component. I agree that in these circumstances one would expect some explanation to be given for a complete cessation of entitlement. Clearly this case will require to be reheard, and I would request that steps be taken to ensure that a new Tribunal have the benefit of a written submission from and the attendance of an Adjudication Officer.
6. For the reasons given in paragraph 4 above I am satisfied that the decision of the Appeal Tribunal was erroneous in point of law. I accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal. As indicated, I refer the case for determination by another Tribunal, who should have regard to the views expressed in this decision and to such guidance as they may receive from the Adjudication Officer.

(Signed): R R Chambers

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

25 October 1996