Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[1995] NISSCSC A33/95(IS) (3 November 1995)

 


A33/95(IS)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 INCOME SUPPORT Application by the above-named claimant for leave to appeal to the Social Security Commissioner on a question of law from the decision of Limavady Social Security Appeal Tribunal dated 19 October 1994 DETERMINATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
1. This is an application by the claimant for leave to appeal to the Social Security Commissioner against the decision of Limavady Social Security Appeal Tribunal, confirming the decision on review of the Adjudication Officer that she was not entitled to housing costs in respect of mortgage payments on the dwelling house in which she lived.
2. This is the second occasion upon which I have had to consider the question of the claimant's possible entitlement to housing costs. By decision No. C1/94(IS) I allowed the claimant's appeal against the Appeal Tribunal's decision that she was entitled to housing costs in respect of mortgage interest payments from 21 October 1992, which was the date of the request for a review of her income support. The claimant maintained that her entitlement should have run from 1986, but my decision to allow the appeal was not based upon any acceptance of that assertion. The Adjudication Officer then concerned with the case conceded that the Tribunal had failed to record adequate findings of fact and reasons for their decision, as required by regulation 25(2)(b) of the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1987, (the Adjudication Regulations). I agreed with that submission and referred the case to another Tribunal with directions for its determination. I pointed out, however, that there was to be a complete rehearing of the case, and I warned that there could be no guarantee of a successful outcome.
3. It is in my view clear from the record of their proceedings that, when the case came before the new Tribunal, they took care to investigate and consider in detail all the evidence made available to them. Comprehensive findings of fact and reasons for decision were recorded, which in my opinion covered all the matters referred to in my decision No. C1/94(IS).
4. The claimant now seeks leave to appeal on the grounds that new documentary evidence establishes that certain of the Tribunal's findings of fact were incorrect. In particular, it is said that they were wrong to find that a mortgage arranged in July 1986 was taken out to pay off her deceased husband's debts.
5. At my request the Adjudication Officer now concerned with the case has, by letter dated 19 July 1995, submitted his comments on the application for leave to appeal. The claimant has been sent a copy of that letter and has responded to an invitation to express her further views upon the points raised. Briefly, the Adjudication Officer submits that the Appeal Tribunal dealt fully with all relevant issues, gave due consideration to the evidence which was before them, and complied fully with the provisions of regulation 25 of the Adjudication Regulations which required them to record their reasons for decision and material findings of fact.
6. Before going any further, I must first explain the limits of the Commissioner's jurisdiction in cases of this nature. A right of appeal lies only on questions or matters of law. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, those are to be determined by the Tribunal on the evidence placed before them. Where a finding of fact has been reached, the Commissioner has no power to intervene unless it can be said that the finding was perverse in the sense that it was one which, on the available evidence, no reasonable Tribunal could have reached. In this instance I understand and sympathise fully with the claimant's conviction that the Tribunal were wrong to find that the money raised by the mortgage taken out in July 1986 was used to repay her deceased husband's debts. I accept, moreover, that the documentary evidence which she has now obtained supports in full her contention that her husband's debts were paid out of the proceeds of an insurance policy. It is regrettable that this new evidence was not available at the time of the appeal hearing; but the fact remains that it was not before the Tribunal, and they obviously cannot be faulted for having failed to have regard to it. The Tribunal made their findings of fact in relation to the mortgage of July 1986 on the evidence at their disposal, and the conclusion which I have reached is that there is nothing to suggest that they erred in law in so doing. I would find it quite impossible to say that their findings were unreasonable or perverse. I may say that, in any event, it would not assist the claimant to have it established that the mortgage in question was not taken out to pay off her husband's debts. That would only be the first hurdle which would have to be cleared. Even if she succeeded in proving that the mortgage interest was "eligible interest", and that might be difficult enough, she would in my opinion be quite unable to overcome the obstacle presented by regulation 69(1) of the Adjudication Regulations, which would preclude payment of benefit for any period more than 12 months prior to the date on which the review was requested. That would effectively prevent the claimant from securing an award in respect of any part of the period from 6 August 1986 to 13 February 1989, when the house became the property of her son Brendan, and the Appeal Tribunal made it clear in their "reasons for decision" that this was one of the grounds upon which they relied. So far as the period thereafter is concerned, the Tribunal found as a fact that the claimant was a tenant of her son and again I consider that that was a finding which, on the evidence, they were fully entitled to make. Altogether I have reached the conclusion that there are no grounds upon which the decision of the Appeal Tribunal might be held to have been erroneous in point of law and, as I have sought to explain, even if they were misled by the evidence into making inaccurate findings of fact, I am of the opinion that these would not have affected the outcome of the case. I have accordingly decided that leave to appeal against the Tribunal's decision should be refused, and I so determine.
7. The claimant requested an oral hearing of this application; but having considered the circumstances of the case and the reasons put forward for the request, I am satisfied that a hearing is not required. The request has therefore been refused.

(Signed): R R Chambers

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

3 November 1995