Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions

THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

 

 

CASE REF: 5232/18IT

 

 

CLAIMANT: Bernadette Gillespie

 

 

RESPONDENTS: Santander UK PLC

 

 

 

DECISION ON PRE-HEARING REVIEW

 

1.             The application for an extension of time for consideration of the unfair dismissal claim was withdrawn at the hearing.

 

2.             The tribunal finds that it would not be just and equitable to extend time for the consideration of the discrimination claims.

 

3.             In the circumstances, the tribunal dismisses each of the claims made against the respondent.

 

 

 

Constitution of Tribunal:

 

Employment Judge (sitting alone): Employment Judge Travers

 

 

Appearances:

 

The claimant was represented Ms L Gillen, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by John Fahy & Co. Solicitors.

 

The respondent was represented by Ms L Rankin, Solicitor, of Carson McDowell Solicitors.

 

 

REASONS

 

Issues

 

1.             By a claim form received by the tribunal on 20 February 2018, the claimant raised claims of unfair dismissal, age discrimination, and discrimination against her as a part-time worker.

 

2.             At the outset of the hearing the tribunal was informed that it is now agreed between the parties that:

 

(a) the effective date of termination of the claimant's employment was 3 September 2017, and

 

(b) the date from which time runs for the issue of the discrimination claims is also 3 September 2017.

 

3.             The respective effect of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 at article 145(2), the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 at regulation 48, and the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2000 at regulation 8, is that there was a 3 month time limit running from 3 September 2017 for the issue of each of the claims.

4.             It is agreed that the statutory time limit for the issue of the claims expired on
3 December 2017. When the claim form was lodged on 20 February 2018 each of the claims was just over 11 weeks out of time. Consequently this hearing was listed for the tribunal to determine whether it will consider the claims despite the fact that they have been lodged out of time.

 

5.             During the course of the hearing the tribunal was informed by counsel for the claimant that the claimant no longer invited the tribunal to consider her claim for unfair dismissal out of time. Consequently, the claim for unfair dismissal being lodged 11 weeks out of time, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider that claim.

 

6.             In respect of the discrimination claims which were lodged out of time, the issue under the relevant legislation is whether or not the tribunal considers that it would nonetheless, in all the circumstances of the case, be just and equitable to consider the claims.

 

7.             The tribunal was provided with a small bundle of relevant documents and heard evidence from the claimant.

 

Facts

 

8.             The claimant commenced employment with the respondent on 14 November 2005. The claimant was employed at the respondent's Derry branch.

 

9.             By letter dated 10 August 2017 the claimant resigned from her employment. Following a notice period, the claimant's employment terminated on 3  September 2017. Immediately prior to her resignation the claimant was working part-time hours.

 

10.          The claimant's resignation letter stated:

 

'This situation has arisen because of the change to my work pattern which is not suitable for me. As you informed me there was no alternative and it was not open for discussion. This left me no alternative but to seek opportunities elsewhere'.

 

11.          On 5 August 2017 the claimant had applied for a job with First Source Solutions. She was successful in that application and commenced employment on 18 September 2017. The claimant works longer hours in her new job than she did when employed by the respondent.

 

12.          The catalyst for the claimant's resignation was a meeting to which she was called when she was at work on 5 August 2017. Present at the meeting were Jonathan Head, who was the branch manager, and Sharon Doherty who was the claimant's line manager.

 

13.          At the meeting two subjects were discussed with the claimant. Three customer complaints which concerned the claimant were raised. The claimant does not believe that the complaints are soundly based. She feels strongly that they were raised only in order to intimidate her into accepting a change in her shift pattern which was the second subject discussed with her at the meeting.

 

14.          The claimant was informed by Mr Head that her shift pattern was to be changed. There had been no prior consultation about the issue. It is clear that the claimant was deeply upset about this. She feels that the effect of the change of shift pattern would have been to fundamentally alter the work/life balance offered by her existing part-time shift pattern. The claimant notes that other younger employees did not have this change in shift pattern forced upon them. She feels that she was singled out for differential treatment by reason of her age and her status as a part-time worker.

 

15.          It was against this background that the claimant sought alternative employment and subsequently resigned. The claimant's last day at work with the respondent was 3 September 2017. Her first day in her new employment was 18 September 2017.

 

16.          The claimant is a member of the Advance Union. She first contacted her union about the issues around her resignation on 29 September 2017.

 

17.          The claimant prepared a grievance letter concerning her treatment and on
12 November 2017 she sent a copy of the letter to her union representative Roberta Barbour. The grievance letter was submitted to the respondent on
12 November 2017. The letter began by stating that:

 

'I wish to lodge a grievance against Santander for constructive dismissal for the following reasons...'.

 

18.          The claimant says that she expected her union to advise her on the right procedure to get the dispute sorted out. The claimant says that she was not made aware by Ms Barbour that there was a time limit for tribunal claims.

 

19.          The claimant sent emails to Ms Barbour enquiring about progress on
1 December, 10 December and 18 December 2017.

 

20.          On 1 December 2017 Ms Barbour informed the claimant by email that there would be an internal investigation.

 

21.          On 10 December 2017 the claimant sent an email to Ms Barbour to let her know that she had yet to hear from the respondent about scheduling a meeting. The claimant expressed concern about how long an internal investigation might take and she asked Ms Barbour:

 

'Can you explain why you think an internal investigation, conducted by Santander Management, is the best course of action? Why is the Union not taking action? How can an internal investigation be fair and unbiased?'

 

22.          Ms Barbour did not reply to the queries set out in the 10 December 2017 email, so the claimant sent a chasing email to Ms Barbour on 18 December 2017. The claimant received no reply and so she sent a letter dated 19 December 2017 directly to the respondent's HR department.

 

23.          The claimant told the hearing that she also phoned the tribunal office on
19 December 2017 and spoke to someone in the office who told her that she should exhaust the internal procedures before making a claim. The employment judge highlighted that this would be an unusual occurrence, the staff in the tribunal office are neither legally qualified nor mandated to offer legal advice to litigants and/or potential litigants. The claimant was unable to assist the tribunal as to whom it was she spoke to in the tribunal office.

 

24.          The evidence of the claimant as to the conversation which she says that she had with a member of the tribunal office staff was too vague for the tribunal to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she was told by someone in the office to exhaust internal procedures before making a claim.

 

25.          The fact that the claimant contacted the tribunal office before Christmas 2017 plainly indicates that making a claim to the tribunal was at the forefront of her mind from that time, at the very latest. The reference to 'constructive dismissal' in the claimant's 12 November 2017 grievance letter suggests that the claimant was focussed on potential legal remedies from at least that earlier date. The claimant says that it was a colleague of hers, Orla Kelly, who caused the expression 'constructive dismissal' to be included in the letter.

 

26.          The respondent's HR department contacted the claimant by email dated
2 January 2018 to let her know who had been appointed to investigate her grievance.

 

27.          Following receipt of that email, on 3 January 2018 the claimant contacted
Ms Barbour by email to complain about what she thought was delay and lack of activity in the investigation. The claimant wrote (emphasis as in original):

 

' I am concerned because I have been made aware that there is a strict time limit in pursuing such claims.

 

Because I did not receive any response to the concerns raised in my emails, to you, of 10 and 18 December, I posted the attached letter to Santander on 19 December and I have made contact with the Office of Industrial Tribunals and the Fair Employment Tribunal in Belfast regarding this issue. I took this action because I had been made aware that there is a strict time limit in pursuing such claims and I felt I needed to protect myself because of the lack of feedback/information from either the Union or Santander.'

 

28.          The claimant told the tribunal that over Christmas/New Year holiday period her brother-in-law had told her that there are strict time limits for making a claim.

29.          The claimant emailed Ms Barbour on 5 January 2018 and again expressed concerns about the delay in the internal investigation. She wrote:

 

'I fully understand the logistics and the holidays however none of these issues will matter or help me if I run out of time. My concerns are:

 

•            Has the Union lodged a claim with the Office of Industrial Tribunal...on my behalf?

 

•            If not should I raise a claim on my own behalf?

 

•            The time limitations on raising such claims.

 

•            The reasons for the delay.

 

•            The lack of feedback from Santander or the Union.

 

•            Should I employ a legal representative or do the Union have such resources, if required.

 

I am relying on yourself and the Union to keep me right with regard to following the correct procedures in pursuing such issue. I only became aware of the time limits via a third party.'

 

30.          Given that the claimant had contacted the tribunal office before Christmas to make enquiries about issuing a claim, it is curious that the claimant should ask a question, 'Has the Union lodged a claim with the Office of Industrial Tribunal ... on my behalf?', to which she would appear to have already known the answer.

 

31.          The claimant received a reply to her 5 January 2018 email from another union representative, Ms Felgate, who also cc'd Ms Barbour into the reply. Ms Felgate told the claimant, amongst other things, that:

 

'...We are here to advise you and provide support and can be contacted on 01442891122 should you have any further questions regarding your situation ... I need to make you aware that if you wish to pursue your case to an Employment Tribunal, the Court will want assurances that you have fully exhausted the internal process before taking your case to the court. There are however very strict procedural timescales (three months from the last incident that resulted in the Grievance) which involve using ACAS and you will be are personally responsible for lodging a claim. You can find information on this course of action from various sources, including the internet ....'

 

32.          The claimant told the tribunal that she did not seek further advice by telephoning the 01442 number on Ms Felgate's email. She said that, 'It was my understanding that I had to wait. My understanding was that the reference to three months from the date of the last incident was that the grievance itself was part of the incident.'

 

33.          This was unfortunate. The tribunal finds that the wording of Ms Felgate's evidence was clear as to 'very strict procedural timescales'. Highlighted in bold, it is clearly stated that the time is three months from the last incident that resulted in the grievance.

 

34.          Given the anxiety about time limits which the claimant had expressed in her earlier correspondence, it is unfortunate that she neither telephoned the 01422 number nor apparently did she take up Ms Felgate's suggestion that she could find out information about issuing a claim from various sources, including the internet.

 

35.          In view of the dissatisfaction which the claimant had expressed with Ms Barbour prior to that date, it is surprising that the claimant did not take up the opportunity of having a discussion with a different union representative via the 01422 number. The claimant told the tribunal that she only contacted Ms Barbour and not Ms Felgate.

 

36.          A Formal Grievance Meeting took place on 12 January 2018. By letter dated
2 February 2018 the respondent informed the claimant of the outcome:

 

'... On the basis that no other colleague was presented with a similar shift pattern, further options could have been explored and the manner in which this was presented to you; I recommend that you are offered reinstatement to a similar position, within reasonable travel distance. The hours of work to be agreed, as per the contract terms and conditions.'

 

37.          The claimant declined the offer of reinstatement. She was unhappy about comments made by Mr Head in his feedback. The claimant was concerned about the ongoing behaviour of Mr Head and Mr Kelly towards her if she went back to the Derry branch. The claimant was offered a position in Strabane but Mr Head's sister would be her manager there and so the claimant didn't feel that she could work there. Positions in Omagh and Coleraine were thought by the claimant to be too far away.

 

38.          The claimant told the tribunal that she didn't lodge her claim until 20 February 2018 because she wanted to see if a solution to the problem could be found.

 

39.          Paragraph 6.11 of the Claim form invites a claimant to tick the relevant box to state what remedy is sought if they are successful. The claimant has completed it as follows:

 

'(a) To get your old job back and compensation (reinstatement) YES

 

(b) To get another job with the employer and compensation
(re-engagement) NO

 

(c) Compensation only NO'

 

In her claim form the claimant sought, in part, reinstatement, a remedy which she has expressly rejected. The claimant now seeks compensation only.

 

Law

 

40.          The parties have cited a number of authorities to the tribunal. The tribunal does not intend to recite details of them all in this decision, but it has considered the parts of any decided cases to which it was referred. Some of the cases are relevant only to the reasonable practicability test applicable to the extension of time for consideration of an unfair dismissal claim. This is now not an issue which the tribunal needs to consider.

 

41.          The burden is on the claimant to satisfy the tribunal that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would be just and equitable to extend time so that her claim may be considered fully by a tribunal.

 

42.          In considering this application the tribunal enjoys a broad discretion, it is a question of fact and judgment:

 

'... there is no principle of law which dictates how generously or sparingly the power to enlarge time is to be exercised. In certain fields (the lodging of notices of appeal to the EAT is a well-known example), policy has led to a consistently sparing use of the power. That has not happened, and ought not to happen, in relation to the power to enlarge the time for bringing ET proceedings, and Auld LJ is not to be read as having said in Robertson [v Bexley Community Centre [2003] EWCA Civ 576, [2003] IRLR 434] that it either had or should. He was drawing attention to the fact that limitation is not at large: there are statutory time limits which will shut out an otherwise valid claim unless the claimant can displace them'

 

[ Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston [2009] EWCA Civ 1298, [2010] IRLR 327 , per Sedley LJ at para 31]

 

43.          The tribunal must consider the prejudice which each party would suffer as the result of the decision to be made and also to have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular, inter alia, to:

 

(a)        The length of and reasons for the delay;

 

(b)        The extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be effected by the delay;

 

(c)        The extent to which the party sued had co-operated with requests for information;

 

(d)        The promptness with which the claimant acted once she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action;

 

(e)        The steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action.

 

[See British Coal Corp v Keeble and ors [1997] IRLR 336 at para 8]

 

44.          The claimant relies on the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Anigawu v London Borough of Hackney and Owens [1999] IRLR 303. Ms Gillen submits that the case is on 'all fours' with the current application. The tribunal disagrees.

 

45.          The tribunal application in Aniagwu concerned an allegation that an internal grievance procedure was itself tainted by racial discrimination. It was against that background that the EAT determined that it would be just and equitable to extend time. The claimant had waited to issue his tribunal claim until he received the outcome of his internal appeal against the rejection of his grievance. He was six days out of time. The respondent was found to have been guilty of substantial delay in the way that it dealt with the appeal. On the particular facts of the case the EAT found that it was just and equitable to permit the complaint to the tribunal even though it was out of time.

46.          The facts in Aniagwu are quite different from the instant case. The facts giving rise to the claimant's discrimination claims arose prior to, and are discrete from, the grievance procedure.

 

47.          Aniagwu is a case which very much turns on its own facts and it should not be taken to establish a rule of general application. The Court of Appeal in Apelogun-Gabriels v London Borough of Lambeth [2001] EWCA Civ 1853 is clear on this point:

 

'I regard the decision in  Robinson as being plainly correct. If one considers what was said in  Aniagwu, it may be that the headnote to the Industrial Relations Law Reports is not quite accurate in appearing to suggest that it was laying down some general principle to be followed in all cases by tribunals, as the tribunal with which we are concerned appears to have thought. Instead, as it seems to me, what was said in  Aniagwu was intended to be limited to the particular circumstances of that case, and on those facts the EAT was expressing the opinion that every industrial tribunal, unless there was some particular feature about the case or some particular prejudice which the employers could show, would take the view that to await the outcome of the grievance procedure was an appropriate course to take. To the extent that  Aniagwu goes any further than that and lays down some general principle that one should always await the outcome of internal grievance procedures before embarking on litigation, in my judgment  Aniagwu was plainly wrong. It has long been known to those practising in this field that the pursuit of domestic grievance or appeal procedures will normally not constitute a sufficient ground for delaying the presentation of an appeal.'

 

[per Gibson LJ at para 16]

48.          Gibson LJ in Apelogun-Gabriels at paragraph 10 cited with approval the judgement of Lindsay J sitting in the EAT in Robinson v Post Office [2000] IRLR 804 where he commented on Angiawu:

 

'That is not, and does not purport to be, a proposition of broad applicability such that, wherever and so long as there is an unexhausted internal procedure, then delay to await its outcome necessarily furnishes an acceptable reason for delaying the presentation of an IT1 such as would, of itself and without more, lead to relief under s.68(6) of the Race Relations Act or, by analogy, s.76(5) of the Sex Discrimination Act or, as we are concerned with, para. 3 of Schedule 3 of the Disability Discrimination Act.'

49.          Incorrect legal advice which has caused a delay in the lodging of a tribunal claim is potentially relevant to the exercise of the just and equitable discretion. The claimant relies on Hawkins v Ball and Barclays Bank [1996] IRLR 258, where at paragraph 28 Keene J sitting in the EAT expressed the view that:

 

'We cannot say that the obtaining of incorrect legal advice is irrelevant to a decision on what is just and equitable in all the circumstances. The obtaining of incorrect legal advice may well constitute a reason for a delay which has occurred and in those circumstances it is potentially relevant. We can see no reason to limit the width of the broad discretion given to an industrial tribunal by the statute in that particular respect. For the same reason, while we may not have come ourselves to the same exercise of discretion as the tribunal below on this particular matter, we find it impossible to say that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could find that it was just and equitable to extend time in these circumstances.'

 

Conclusion

 

50.       The tribunal is satisfied that if an extension of time were granted, the cogency of the evidence would not be substantially effected by the delay. An internal investigation was carried out, when all the potential relevant witnesses for the respondent will have been invited to cast their mind back to what occurred when events will have been reasonably clear in their memory. The tribunal is not satisfied that the respondent would suffer significant prejudice on this ground if the matter proceeded to trial. The tribunal does take into consideration the prejudice suffered by the respondent in permitting the claimant to proceed with a claim which has been made outside the statutory time limits.

 

51.       No significant issue has been raised by the claimant as to the extent to which the respondent has co-operated with requests for information.

 

52.       In submissions the case was put for the claimant on the basis that the claimant genuinely and honestly put her faith in the advance union, and she expected that they would advise her fully on the relevant procedure and any claim. The claimant argues that she wasn't aware of the time limit and that she was advised that she had to go through an internal procedure before making her claim. The outcome of the internal grievance is a focal factor. The claimant was first given no advice and then it is said given misleading advice by letter.

 

53.       Considering all the circumstances of the case, including the Keeble factors at paragraphs 43(a),(d) and (e), above, the tribunal has not been persuaded that it would be just and equitable to permit the claims to be heard out of time.

 

54.       The claimant sent her letter of resignation on 10 August 2017. She worked her notice period until 3 September 2017 (by agreement with the respondent this was a shorter notice period than she was contractually obliged to give). She made contact with the union on 29 September 2017. This was more than seven weeks after the unpleasant meeting with Mr Head on 5 August 2017. It was seven weeks exactly since the date of the claimant's letter of resignation which she wrote by reason of the alleged discriminatory behaviour of the respondent. It was more than three weeks after the time for lodging her claim had started running. No clear or cogent explanation has been given for this initial delay.

 

55.       It is striking that it was not until 5 January 2018, more than a month after the time limit for lodging a tribunal claim had expired, that the claimant raised the question with Ms Barbour as to whether or not the union had lodged a claim on her behalf, or whether she should lodge a claim herself. She received a response the same day from Ms Felgate to the effect that responsibility for issuing a claim rested with the claimant herself.

 

56.       The claimant is a plainly articulate and intelligent person. This was clear not only from her oral evidence but also from the grievance which she drafted and from her subsequent correspondence with her union representative. By 12 November 2017 at the latest, when she wrote in her grievance of 'constructive dismissal' at the suggestion of Orla Kelly, she was focussed on the legal issues which may arise from her treatment by the respondent. It is extraordinary that throughout this period of time, the claimant apparently did not clarify with her union whether or not the union would file a tribunal claim on her behalf or whether she would have to deal with it herself.

 

57.       Throughout the period from 3 September 2017 to 5 January 2018, the claimant believed that events had occurred which entitled her to a legal remedy against the respondent. Despite this, the claimant says by implication of her 5 January 2018 correspondence that it was not until then that she appreciated that the burden of lodging a tribunal claim rested with her. If this is correct, there is no reason demonstrated on the evidence as to why she did not clarify that simple enquiry at any time between her first contact with the union on 29 September 2017 and 5 January 2018.

 

58.       If in fact the claimant was aware prior to 5 January 2018 that she would personally be responsible for lodging a tribunal claim it would beg the question as to why she wrote an email on 5 January 2018 pretending ignorance of this important fact.

 

59.       When the claimant approached her union for assistance she was aware that she may have grounds for taking legal action against the respondent. It is simply not satisfactory that, on the claimant's case, she did not clarify such a fundamental issue as to whether or not it would be her responsibility or the union's responsibility to issue a claim if necessary.

 

60.       It is very unfortunate, given the complaints which the claimant was making about the tardiness of Ms Barbour's responses to the claimant, that when the claimant was offered the opportunity on 5 January 2018 in Ms Felgate's email to speak to someone else within the union she did not take up the opportunity. The claimant continued to utilise as her primary point of contact within the union, a person who she felt had let her down. Ms Barbour had apparently not responded to the claimant's emails of 10 and 18 December 2017.

 

61.       The claimant submits that she was misled into believing that she should exhaust internal processes prior to issuing a tribunal claim. The tribunal finds that
Ms Felgate's response to the claimant on 5 January 2018 should have put the claimant on notice to enquire as to whether this was correct. Unfortunately she did not make the telephone call to the union landline which doubtless would have clarified the issue definitively. Instead there was further delay between then and 20 February 2018 when the claim was finally lodged.

 

62.       It is submitted on the claimant's behalf that she relied on the advice of the union representative. It is clear however from the claimant's December 2017 email correspondence that this was not the case from at least that point in time. So dissatisfied was the claimant with the service which she was receiving from
Ms Barbour, that she herself contacted the Office of the Industrial Tribunals on 19 December 2017. By this point, at the absolute latest, it is clear that a potential claim to the tribunal was contemplated.

 

63.       In her email to Ms Barbour on 3 January 2018, the claimant explains her contact with the Office of the Industrial Tribunals by stating:

 

'I took this action because I had been made aware that there is a strict time limit in pursuing such claims and I felt I needed to protect myself because of the lack of feedback/information from either the Union or Santander.'

 

64.       Regardless of what advice the claimant may have been given by Ms Barbour prior to 19 December 2017, it is clear that from that date the issue of time limits for tribunal claims was in her mind. Nonetheless, it was not until 20 February 2018 that the claim was lodged.

 

65.       The tribunal is not satisfied that it was reasonable for the claimant to rely exclusively on advice given by Ms Barbour in circumstances where the claimant had failed at an early stage to explore with Ms Barbour the extent of the assistance which the union would give in respect of any potential tribunal claim.

 

66.       The tribunal is not, in any event, satisfied that the claimant did rely exclusively on the advice of Ms Barbour, at the very least from mid-December 2017 onwards.

 

67.       The claimant says that over the Christmas period she was made aware of strict time limits for the lodging of tribunal claims. She failed to act on them.

 

68.       It is not entirely clear from the documentary evidence the precise terms of the advice which Ms Barbour gave to the claimant. The tribunal did not have the benefit of hearing from Ms Barbour herself. The tribunal is satisfied however that from mid- December 2017 the claimant knew or ought to have known of the urgency of getting on with issuing a claim.

 

69.       The tribunal has not found on the evidence that the claimant was given advice over the telephone on 19 December 2017 by a member of the Office of Industrial Tribunals staff to the effect that internal procedures should be exhausted prior to a claim being made. It is however notable that on the claimant's account, the question of whether it was necessary to exhaust internal procedures before issuing a tribunal claim was a matter which she was considering by 19 December 2017 at the latest.

 

70.       The claimant managed to locate and contact the Office of Industrial Tribunals without the assistance or encouragement of Ms Barbour. It is clear that the claimant is a resourceful and intelligent person who was able to act independently of Ms Barbour.

 

71.       The tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant:

 

•          Took appropriate steps at an early stage to clarify the extent to which the union would assist her in progressing a tribunal claim.

 

•          Acted in a timely fashion to make enquiries of Ms Barbour or otherwise of the procedure applicable to making a claim.

 

•          Acted in a timely fashion, when put on notice by mid-December 2017 (at the latest) of the issues concerning time limits for tribunal claims and whether internal procedures had to be exhausted before such a claim.

 

•          Took appropriate steps to clarify the issues of time limits and the exhaustion of internal remedies when put on notice by Ms Felgate's letter of 5 January 2018.

 

•          Acted in a timely fashion to issue the tribunal claim after Ms Felgate's email of 5 January 2018 and/or the notification of the outcome of the internal grievance procedure by letter dated 2 February 2018.

 

72.       The tribunal is mindful of the broad discretion which it is may exercise in extending time on a just and equitable basis even when a claimant has failed to act in a timely manner. In all the circumstances of this case the tribunal deems that it would not be just and equitable to exercise that discretion.

 

73.       In reaching this decision the tribunal has considered all the information and evidence which has been presented to it.

 

74.       The tribunal has taken into account the potential merits of the claimant's case. It notes that the outcome of the internal process was to offer the claimant a form of reinstatement. This process concluded at a time when the claimant knew or ought to have known that any claim which she might make was out of time. The claimant rejected the offer of reinstatement but nonetheless requested on the face of her tribunal claim (made just weeks later) reinstatement as one aspect of the remedy she sought.

 

75.       The tribunal expresses its gratitude to both advocates for their assistance and skilful presentation of their respective cases.

 

Employment Judge:

 

 

Date and place of hearing: 22 August 2018, Belfast.

 

 

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: