Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions

THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

 

CASE REF: 2823/16IT

 

 

 

CLAIMANT: Alice Quinn

 

 

RESPONDENT: North City Business Centre Ltd

 

 

 

DECISION

The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant was not unfairly dismissed. Her claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety.

 

 

Constitution of Tribunal:

 

Employment Judge: Employment Judge Browne

Members: Mrs M O'Kane

Mr A White

 

 

Appearances:

 

The claimant was represented by Mr S Doherty, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by McCartan Turkington Breen, solicitors.

 

The respondents were represented by Ms R Best, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Jones Cassidy Brett, solicitors.

 

 

ISSUE

 

1. The tribunal was required to determine whether or not the claimant was unfairly dismissed.

 

EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT

 

2. The claimant was employed as Chief Executive of the respondent from 1 December 2006 until her dismissal on the ground of gross misconduct on 26 August 2016.

 

3. The respondent is a charitable limited company, run by a board of voluntary,
non-remunerated board members. Their other personal business commitments resulted in a much greater reliance upon the Chief Executive in the day-to-day running of the organisation. The claimant accepted in her evidence that she was the operational person on the ground, acting as the board's "eyes and ears".

 

4. It appeared to be common case that all of the voluntary board members were very experienced in business and finance.

 

5. The function of the board is overall responsibility for proper running of the company, with power to set policy and strategy. The Chief Executive's role is to implement such policy and strategy within the powers delegated by the board. In the current case, such structure was defined within the claimant's job description and a Scheme of Delegation introduced by the board on 21 April 2015.

 

6. A Scheme of Delegation is a formalising structure, setting out in detail the scope and parameters of a Chief Executive's responsibilities. In the current case, the board members, acting on behalf of the respondent, claimed that they felt compelled to introduce it because of mounting concerns within the board as to the claimant's conduct and capability.

 

7. The respondent's witnesses referred in their evidence to a number of issues of concern, which later formed the basis of disciplinary proceedings and, ultimately, the dismissal of the claimant.

 

8. These concerns at first included: issues around the claimant's apparent omission from the minutes she took at board meetings of decisions taken about aspects of the implementation of policy; and with her management of a redundancy programme between August 2014 and March 2015.

 

9. The respondent's case was that, having requested assistance from external HR consultants, the claimant had been specifically told not to use any, because the board members between them felt that they had sufficient expertise to manage the process. This was communicated to the claimant verbally, and in emails. It later transpired that the claimant had consulted with, and paid, a number of external consultants, without at any stage seeking approval from the board. The process implemented by the claimant, ended up costing much more than the board had anticipated, due to consultancy fees, and larger redundancy payments than projected by the board.

 

10. The board on 2 March 2015 met while the claimant was abroad on holiday. The issues around the redundancy process were discussed, and the board, giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt, concluded that her actions might have been due to a lack of clarity around specific authority levels. The board therefore decided that a Scheme of Delegation ("the Scheme") should be drafted, in order to define and clarify the boundaries of the Chief Executive's authority, with a cap of £100.00 on the claimant's authority on new transactions.

 

11. Whilst there appeared to the tribunal to be a growing feeling at that time within the board that the claimant's performance might include misconduct, the respondent's intended approach was stated during the tribunal hearing to be to encourage and assist the claimant to perform her job properly.

 

12. On 21 April 2015, Mr David Williamson, board member, met with the claimant to go through the finalised draft of the Scheme, which had never previously been discussed with her. She accepted in evidence that, at the time of its introduction, she had been told by Mr Williamson that the primary objective of the Scheme was to re-establish a level of trust and confidence. The claimant, whilst accepting in evidence that the board had a right to introduce a Scheme, she, on her case, did not know why she had been issued with it; nor did she know how to implement it.

 

13. After the introduction of the Scheme, the board continued to have concerns around the performance of the claimant and regarding her adherence to the terms of the Scheme.

 

14. In November 2015, these concerns led to disciplinary action against the claimant, following a board review of her adherence to the Scheme. In the invitation letter to her on 17 November 2015, David Williamson explained that its purpose was to "review examples of apparently poor performance" and, in effect, to address them and to find a way forward.

 

15. He attached to that letter a list of issues raised by the board at their meeting on
2 November 2015. Whilst it did not include specific examples, it appeared to the tribunal to make clear to anyone reading it that there were concerns around the claimant's apparent failure to deliver satisfactory outcomes on tasks within her remit, along with allegations that she in effect withheld or misrepresented important details from the board; and that she acted outside her permitted authority, both generally and as delineated by the Scheme.

 

16. Without a rehearsal of the details of the meeting with the claimant on
20 November 2015, conducted by Mr David Williamson and Mr Frank Murtagh from the respondent's board, it was clear from the minutes that it was fractious. Mr Murtagh in particular did little to conceal his dissatisfaction with the claimant's performance at work or with her responses during the meeting. It was asserted by the two board members from the outset, and repeatedly throughout the meeting, that there was a confidence issue, and that their stated intention was to get the claimant "back on track".

 

17. It was apparent to the tribunal from the minutes of that meeting that the claimant was resentful of having her capability challenged and her authority formally circumscribed by the Scheme. On the one hand, that is a not an unnatural reaction, not least because of Mr Murtagh's attitude. On the other hand, however, the nature of its recurrence, and its escalation by the claimant, throughout the rest of the process, are worthy of note.

 

18. It also is worthy of note that the claimant at that first meeting stated "the board have lost confidence in me...", which stands in contrast to the case put by her to the tribunal that she was unaware throughout the process that the loss of trust and confidence in her was a key element in her eventual dismissal.

 

19. At the conclusion of the meeting, the claimant and the board members agreed that she should produce a written action plan, and arranged to meet again on
27 November 2015. On 26 November 2015, the claimant emailed to Mr Williamson and Mr Murtagh her action plan, which set out the board's complaints and her proposed means of addressing and resolving them. In her email, she stated: "I don't accept that there are any performance issues as alleged".

 

20. Yet again, the meeting did not go well. The atmosphere can be gauged from the minutes, recording the increasingly ill-tempered exchanges between the claimant and the two board members. The claimant accepted in her evidence that the way she spoke to the two board members could be interpreted as being inappropriate, confrontational and disrespectful.

 

21. The tribunal considered that a major source of friction can readily be ascribed to the growing gulf between the two sides, as demonstrated by the claimant's attitude in her email; and her action plan points, along with the board members' written responses to them. Those responses, prepared by the two board members for the remainder of the board, reflect a developing, unfavourable view of the claimant's capability, attitude and truthfulness.

 

22. The contents of the claimant's action plan, responding point by point to the issues, appeared to the tribunal to reflect an intention by her to adopt a reactive style of carrying out her functions as CEO.

 

23. That approach however ran contrary to the expectation of the board that the claimant, as CEO, would relieve it of the need to be involved in giving specific direction in the day-to-day running of the organisation. The board's view of the claimant's action plan would appear to have been that she was blaming the board for any shortcomings, and that she accepted no blame whatsoever.

 

24. The day after the meeting on 27 November 2015, the claimant went off on sick leave, eventually returning in January 2016. In the meantime, on 16 December, the claimant submitted a number of grievances, on the basis that by that date, she felt that the previous disciplinary process had not been resolved.

 

25. Her grievances included reference to the Scheme, claiming that, at the time of being given it, she had "protested that it was unacceptable and a totally unworkable document". It is of note that the claimant at the tribunal conceded that this assertion in her grievance was not only factually incorrect, but that it was also a lie.

 

26. The claimant also asserted in her grievance letter (without providing examples or sources) that the introduction of the Scheme was a significant change to her contract of employment, and that it bypassed all governance and laws of employment.

 

27. The claimant in fact did not formally complain to the board about the Scheme until her grievance letter of 16 December 2015, some eight months after its introduction.

 

28. The board decided to deal with the remainder of the claimant's disciplinary process at the same time as considering her grievance, on the basis that it felt the issues overlapped.

 

29. The letter of invitation to the claimant of 19 January again stated that the purpose of the disciplinary process was to resolve matters, and to work with the clamant to resolve any performance issues "to the satisfaction of all concerned". To that end, it was made clear that a low level sanction, such as a verbal or first written warning, might be appropriate, although that "may not be the case".

 

30. The letter of invitation acceded to the claimant's grievance about Frank Murtagh's conduct during the disciplinary hearings to the extent that he was replaced by
Tony Haren, also a board member. The claimant then also objected to
David Williamson continuing to be on the panel, on the basis that the majority of her grievance complaints related to him "as Chairman and the overbearing management I have been subjected to for a prolonged period by some members of the board".

 

31. The respondent had already explained that the makeup of the panel was to a high degree dictated by the small membership of this voluntary board.

 

32. After the grievance/disciplinary meeting on 27 January 2016, two separate, comprehensive written reports were produced by the board members who heard them. The overall conclusions of the panel were that the claimant "consistently denied any wrongdoing and refused to accept any of the allegations". The panel also felt that she challenged the quality of the Board's decision making, reluctantly accepting its right to introduce the Scheme, while simultaneously challenging it.

 

33. The panel also found that the claimant claimed to be acting in the best interests of the organisation, despite the fact that the panel concluded that, on the issues which at that time formed the focus of its enquiries, she was working contrary to Board instruction, strategy and policies.

 

34. The tribunal noted that, in imposing a written warning for twelve months, the panel also made it clear that failure by the claimant to address her performance in accordance with its Action Plan, drawn up specifically for her, might result in "further disciplinary action up to and including a final written warning or dismissal".

 

35. One of the claimant's grievance issues was her complaint about the introduction of the Scheme, which the panel clearly considered to be working, and not in contravention of any of the areas identified by the claimant.

 

36. Despite such finding by the panel, the claimant, as part of her case to the tribunal, asserted that, during her appeal process against the findings of the panel on the disciplinary matters and her grievance, she was not bound by the terms of the Scheme.

 

37. Whilst the claimant was fully entitled to pursue her appeals, her attitude regarding any obligation on her to comply with the Scheme appeared to the tribunal not to countenance the possibility that her grievance appeal might be dismissed.

 

38. Her views as to the Scheme might also be found in her email to Tony Haren on
24 March 2016,between lodging her appeal and having it determined, in which she stated "... as I have advised repeatedly over the last eleven months, I do not accept the [Scheme]".

 

39. The claimant's appeals against the respondent's disciplinary and grievance findings were dealt with on 8 March 2016 by Norah Whittaker, an HR Consultant. She interviewed all of the panel members and the claimant individually and separately. Her independent services, to conduct by way of review the disciplinary and grievance appeals, were paid for by the respondent. Mrs Whittaker's independence and competence or her conclusions during the appeal procedure were not challenged by the claimant at any time.

 

40. Mrs Whittaker's conclusions were set out in a detailed written report dated 5 April 2016, at the conclusion of which she declared herself satisfied as to the propriety of the disciplinary and grievance procedures and findings. In doing so, she also concluded that the sanction of a written warning was "entirely appropriate".

 

41. Mrs Whittaker also disputed the assertions to her by the claimant as to when she had first challenged the validity or efficacy of the Scheme. That issue reappeared as a feature of the claimant's case at the tribunal hearing. Only under cross examination did the claimant concede that her assertion in the grievance letter of 16 December 2015 was not only incorrect, but that it was in fact a lie.

 

42. She therefore had lodged her grievance, already knowing that there was an existing lack of confidence in her, but nevertheless made in it a claim which the members of the Board who received it knew to be a lie.

 

43. In the context of the claimant's later assertions around her awareness during the disciplinary and dismissal process of the issue of trust and confidence, the report by Mrs Whittaker also referred to that issue. During her interview with Mrs Whittaker, the claimant stated that lack of confidence had been raised with her on a couple of occasions, and she was aware since around September 2014 that certain members of the Board had been lacking confidence in her.

 

44. When the Board received and considered Mrs Whittaker's report, it accepted her findings, and the claimant was duly informed.

 

45. In the meantime, a number of issues not included in the disciplinary process were emerging as causes for concern.

 

46. These included the claimant's apparent failure to follow David Williamson's instruction to return around £60000 from a government source, because it was uncertain as to whether it ought to have been sent to the respondent in the first place. The claimant did not return the amount, and it was alleged against her that, by failing to do as instructed, she consequently misreported to the Board the state of the financial accounts.

 

47. Also under question was the claimant's failure to obtain insurance quotes in a timely manner, or to use the procedure directed by the Board; her submission of unsighted invoices for Board approval of external auditing services, which she later admitted she knew were substantially higher than the figure the supplier had originally quoted; her failure to follow direct Board instructions as to putting in place Board policies, and her unilateral amendment and implementation of policies, outside her remit and without seeking Board approval; and her failure to recognise the efficacy and validity of, or properly implement, the Scheme.

 

48. As a result of the Board's concerns about these issues, the claimant was suspended from work by a letter of 8 April 2016, pending disciplinary investigation. The letter included detail of allegations against the claimant, including her attitude to operating the Scheme.

 

49. The letter made it clear to the claimant that the allegations "if proven...may amount to behaviour or negligence ... that irrevocably destroys the trust and confidence necessary to continue the employment relationship and amounts to gross misconduct".

 

50. Against that background, Garry McCaul, an independent HR consultant, conducted a wide-ranging enquiry in to the allegations, in the course of which he interviewed each of the Board members; all of those meetings were minuted, albeit that the notes did not purport to be verbatim.

 

51. Having gathered all of the available evidence, Mr McCaul then arranged to interview the claimant. She attended the investigation meeting on 13 May 2016, accompanied, as was her right, by her trade union representative, Tommy Brownlee.

 

52. At the very outset of the meeting, Mr Brownlee stated that he and the claimant were adopting the stance that they were disputing the lawful constitution of the Board, and, consequently, its legal right to institute the disciplinary proceedings.

 

53. Mr Brownlee, with the consent of the claimant, then made it clear that they would not be participating in the disciplinary investigation, as they were hoping to raise further grievances because they had no trust or confidence in the Board. He also stated that they were seeking legal advice as to the Board's constitution.

 

54. Mr McCaul tried to persuade the claimant to co-operate with his investigation, but, after a break to allow her to speak to Mr Brownlee, she stated that, until she was satisfied as to the legitimacy of the Board's constitution, she would not participate, despite being told by Mr McCaul that he would still proceed with his investigation and recommendations.

 

55. At the conclusion of Mr McCaul's investigations, he produced his detailed report on 10 June 2016.

 

56. Mr McCaul found all seven allegations to be established, and concluded that all fell within the respondent's disciplinary procedure in the handbook, which had been co-authored by the claimant. The handbook, whilst not purporting to provide an exhaustive list, stated that "any behaviour or negligence resulting in a fundamental breach of contractual terms that irrevocably destroys the trust and confidence necessary to continue the employment relationship will constitute gross misconduct".

 

57. He categorised the proven allegations to fall within the categories of: refusal to carry out a reasonable work instruction; careless work and poor effort at work; performance of duties below an acceptable standard; insubordination; and undermining the Board.

 

58. Mr McCaul then suggested that the Board might wish to consider if their trust and confidence in the claimant's ability to continue to be employed by the respondent as chief executive might have broken down.

 

59. The Board, upon considering Mr McCaul's report, convened a disciplinary hearing with the claimant on 5 July 2016. It was made clear in the letter of invitation that the hearing was for gross misconduct, and set out the seven upheld complaints in
Mr McCaul's report, which had already been supplied to her.

 

60. In response to a letter from the claimant dated 30 June 2016, the disciplinary hearing took place on 21 July 2016, conducted by Mr Ashley Stewart, an independent HR consultant. In her letter of 30 June 2016, the claimant asserted that "this entire process is a farce and was choreographed by the Board. This continues to show further clear evidence of sex discrimination, bullying, harassment and victimisation against me which has been ongoing for the past 18 months".

 

61. At the disciplinary hearing on 21 July, the claimant was accompanied by her union representative, Kevin McCabe. Mr McCabe challenged at the outset the propriety of Mr Stewart being appointed by the Board to carry out the hearing, because he alleged close professional links between Mr Stewart and the HR consultant who had conducted the investigation. This objection was not pursued at the tribunal, but there was nothing to suggest that the original objection was made without the consent of the claimant.

 

62. The claimant denied that she had refused to participate in the investigation by
Mr McCaul, stating that she had merely asked for the process to be suspended pending enquiries in to her concerns.

 

63. Mr Stewart made it clear to the claimant that, following his consideration of the evidence, including anything the claimant wished to say, he would make recommendations for the Board's consideration. If he felt that the allegations against the claimant were established, he told her that he would set out possible sanctions, up to and possibly including summary dismissal for gross misconduct.

 

64. Mr Stewart gave the claimant her chance to put her side of events, and she submitted a six-page letter for his consideration. He also interviewed a number of witnesses for clarification of issues, and he considered a number of additional documents.

 

65. Mr Stewart produced his extensive final report on 22 August 2016. In it, he found that two of the seven allegations found by Mr McCaul to be proven were not supported by the evidence. He did however find that, of the remaining five, there was "sufficient and substantial evidence" to support them.

 

66. The latter category of allegations included the failure to return the cheque; the behaviour around the implementation of policies; the conduct around insurance quotes; the submission for approval of invoices she knew to be incorrect; and her refusal to accept or properly implement the Scheme.

 

67. In his conclusions, Mr Stewart made it clear that he regarded the allegations found to be proved were serious, and, in consideration of their cumulative effect, he advised a finding of gross misconduct. He went on to make the recommendation that an appropriate sanction would be dismissal on the grounds of gross misconduct. Indeed, he went further and stated: "Any sanction short of termination of employment is unlikely to be effective in this case".

 

68. Having considered Mr Stewart's report on 24 August 2016, the Board agreed unanimously that no action other than dismissal was possible. The claimant was informed of this outcome by letter of 29 August 2016, and of her right to appeal it. The claimant appealed by letter of 9 September 2016 against her dismissal. In her letter, she cited the grounds of appeal to include the respondent's failure to properly analyse and assess the evidence; failure to properly review and assess the procedural issues raised by the claimant over a long period of time; failure to take into account claims by her of sex discrimination, bullying and harassment; abuse of power by the trustees, and their failures in fiduciary duties and good governance; and the disproportionate sanction of dismissal.

 

69. As requested by the claimant, the respondent appointed Diane Allen, an independent HR consultant, to conduct the appeal. Her brief was to conduct the appeal by way of review, not investigation, specifically excluding the previous disciplinary or grievance process, as it had already been the subject of an independent external appeal.

 

70. The claimant was informed of Ms Allen's remit by letter of 29 September 2016, which included telling her of her right to be accompanied by a colleague or union representative. The claimant chose to be represented again by her union representative, Mr Brownlee.

 

71. On 30 September 2016, Mr Brownlee emailed Ms Allen, and repeated the claimant's previous assertion that the Board lacked the legal authority to instigate or adjudicate any disciplinary proceedings against the claimant. He also repeated the claimant's previous claim that the entire process had been motivated by sex discrimination.

 

72. At the appeal hearing on 5 October 2016, Mr Brownlee, on behalf of the claimant, stated that he queried the independence of the process, in that it was conducted by members of the Board. He also repeated on behalf of the claimant queries about the Board's legitimacy. The claimant herself stated that the Board was dealing with public money but were accountable to no one; it was stated by Mr Brownlee that it was their intention to raise their concerns with the Charity Commission when the disciplinary process was completed.

 

73. Mr Brownlee stated on behalf of the claimant as regards her sex discrimination allegation that, amongst other things, the Board members had used their position to degrade her; that they had identified a male colleague to replace her; and that the Scheme had only been introduced to set her up to fail.

 

74. As regards the procedural aspect of the appeal, the claimant stated that the Board had been "judge, jury and executioner"; she also made reference to what she felt was the unfairness of the first disciplinary process in November 2015.

 

75. Ms Allen proceeded to conduct the appeal, having reference to the evidence bundle, comprising some 440 pages; the claimant's job description and contract of employment; the respondent's memorandum of association; a statement from Sarah Smith (re the cheque issue), whom Ms Allen also interviewed; Board meeting minutes of 24 August 2016; a written statement submitted on behalf of the claimant, which included allegations of a "witch hunt", and the use by the panel of factually incorrect material, designed to mislead the Board; and the respondent's employee handbook (co-authored by the claimant).

 

76. Ms Allen produced her written report on 25 October 2016, in which she addressed all of the claimant's appeal points in considerable detail, concluding on each one that there was no evidence to substantiate any of them.

 

77. Ms Allen recommended that the original decision to dismiss should be upheld. The claimant was informed on 8 November 2016 by letter from the respondent that the Board, having considered Ms Allen's report, accepted its recommendation, and her dismissal was confirmed.

 

 

 

 

LAW AND CONCLUSIONS

 

78. Part of the claimant's case to the tribunal was that the statutory dismissal procedure had not been followed, in that the issue of trust and confidence had not been referred to in the Step 1 letter, yet its alleged breakdown was clearly a key element in the decision to dismiss the claimant.

 

79. It was raised by Mr Stewart as a matter for consideration by the Board when weighing its response to his individual findings of guilt on the substantive issues in his investigation, therefore, on the claimant's case, it ought to have been spelt out to the claimant in advance of the disciplinary hearing.

 

80. The tribunal concludes however that the need for trust and confidence in any relationship does not need to be spelt out; it is the oxygen without which no relationship can survive.

 

81. Article 126 of The Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 states:

 

"The right

 

126.-”(1) An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer.

 

(2) Paragraph (1) has effect subject to the following provisions of this Part (in particular Articles 140 to 144)."

 

Article 130 states:

 

"General

 

130.-”(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show-”

 

(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and

 

(b) that it is either a reason falling within paragraph (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.

 

(2) A reason falls within this paragraph if it-”

 

(a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

 

(b) relates to the conduct of the employee ..."

 

82. The claimant in this case was the respondent's most senior employee, and it must have been abundantly clear to her that her alleged actions were not only individual breaches of direct instructions or reasonable expectations, but collectively capable of amounting to an unacceptable pattern of behaviour on her part. Such breaches, individually or cumulatively, on any interpretation, were clearly capable of going to the heart of the relationship between employer and employee, with the potential pollution of the trust and confidence as a natural consequence. Of course, the degree of pollution, and its enduring effect, must be proportionate to the conduct of the offending party.

 

83. In any event, the claimant told Ms Whittaker she was well aware that trust and confidence in her performance had been in diminishing supply with the Board for some time before any disciplinary process was commenced. The tribunal considered that it must also have been clear to the claimant from the tenor and contents of the correspondence that, whilst the Board's confidence in her was in issue, the focus of the respondent's introduction of the Scheme, and the initial disciplinary proceedings, was to work together to address and resolve it.

 

84. As such, the Scheme provided the claimant with a clear framework within which to operate. The claimant later untruthfully claimed that she from the outset had objected to it as unworkable and a breach of her contractual rights and duties. The Board clearly had a right as her employer to introduce it, but there was also a clear need for it, to rein in the claimant's wayward behaviour in her attitude to the Board's authority.

 

85. One result of her later repeated challenge to the Board's constitution was not confined to refusing to engage in Mr McCaul's investigation, but was repeated in Ms Allen's dismissal appeal hearing.

 

86. The claimant also threw unsubstantiated allegations of bullying, harassment and sex discrimination in to the mix. Whilst she did not pursue such claims at the tribunal hearing, she did, in terms, repeat her allegation of sex discrimination.

 

87. The tribunal formed the clear view that the claimant had little but contempt for the Board. Even without the all-pervading issue of trust and confidence, the tribunal concludes that the claimant repeatedly and knowingly ignored clear and reasonable instructions from her employer, any one of which it properly viewed as gross misconduct. The case advanced by her that no harm befell the respondent is not in the view of the tribunal relevant or sustainable.

 

88. For example, her actions in the return of the cheque, as specifically instructed, was not simply an oversight. It was a clear and deliberate breach of a reasonable instruction, which also resulted in the misrepresentation by the claimant to the Board of its true financial situation. In consequence, the Board's authority was undermined, and it was thereby misled, to the point that it could not properly discharge its duties in the proper management of the respondent's business because of the claimant's actions.

 

89. The tribunal concluded that the test in BHS -v- Burchell was clearly met, in that the respondent was genuinely and reasonably satisfied as to the guilt of the claimant after a reasonable enquiry. The tribunal formed the view that, upon running out of Board members who could properly investigate and adjudicate, it properly sought outside professional assistance, at considerable expense. Those investigations were thoroughly and professionally conducted, despite the obstructive and unreasonable obstacles put up by the claimant. The tribunal is of the view that the Board reasonably followed the findings and conclusions.

 

90. The tribunal concluded that, whilst the claimant had every right to challenge and appeal, she did not produce any credible evidence to substantiate her assertions. The reasons for her dismissal were clearly made out by the reasonable findings of gross misconduct. The tribunal concludes that, by carrying on regardless of what she was instructed to do, she clearly demonstrated not only a defiance of the Board's authority on those individual issues, but also a deep-seated contempt for its authority. Such repeated behaviour, knowing she was under close observation, was reasonably viewed by the Board as rendering the relationship between employer and employee as irretrievably broken down due to the claimant's behaviour, causing the destruction of any trust and confidence in her willingness to comply with her responsibilities.

 

91. As such, the tribunal is unanimously of the view that the sanction of dismissal was reasonable, and the claimant's case is dismissed in its entirety.

 

 

 

Employment Judge:

 

 

Date and place of hearing: 19 - 23 February and 12 March 2018, Belfast.

 

 

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: