THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REF: 2879/11
CLAIMANT: Jemma Higginson
RESPONDENT: David & Christine Ramsey t/a Body Trust Beauty Salon
DECISION
The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant was unfairly dismissed by the respondents and the tribunal orders the respondents to pay to the claimant the sum of £1,064.00 in compensation for unfair dismissal.
Constitution of Tribunal:
Chairman: Mr J V Leonard
Members: Mr A Burnside
Mr B McAnoy
Appearances:
The claimant was represented by Ms Suzanne Keenan, Solicitor, of Higgins, Hollywood, Deazley, Solicitors.
The respondents appeared in person and were not represented.
REASONS
1. The tribunal heard oral evidence from the claimant and from Mrs Barbara McCone, the claimant’s mother, and oral evidence from the respondents, Mr David Ramsey and Mrs Christine Ramsey. The tribunal also received in evidence an agreed bundle of documents and additional documents where placed before the tribunal, by agreement, in the course of the hearing. Upon conclusion of the evidence, the claimant’s representative and the respondents made oral submissions to the tribunal.
THE ISSUE
2. In her claim to the tribunal dated 24 November 2011 the claimant claimed unfair dismissal. In the respondents’ response to that claim dated 17 December 2011 the respondents conceded that the claimant had been employed and dismissed by them and contended that the dismissal was on grounds of redundancy. In the course of the hearing, the respondents made the concession that there had been inadequate warning and consultation in the stated redundancy process and further conceded that the dismissal was conducted in breach of the applicable statutory procedures (which are mentioned further below). The tribunal accordingly had to determine the reason for the dismissal and whether or not the claimant was dismissed on grounds of redundancy. In view of the concession that the dismissal had been procedurally unfair and also unfair in terms of the statutory procedures applicable, the tribunal had to determine the appropriate amount of compensation (as no other remedy was applicable) in respect of the concession that there had been an unfair dismissal. The issues following from that included the issue raised by the respondents as to whether or not the claimant had properly mitigated any loss that might have resulted from the dismissal and whether the claimant would have been dismissed in any event if fair procedure had been followed.
THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDINGS OF FACT
3. In consequence of the oral and documentary evidence adduced before it, the tribunal on the balance of probabilities determined the following material facts:-
3.1 The respondents, David Ramsey and Christine Ramsey, traded in partnership as “Body Trust Beauty Salon” from premises at 245 Carnmoney Road, Glengormley, Newtownabbey BT36 6JR. The claimant commenced employment with the respondents as a hairdresser on or about 13 November 2007. The claimant was the only hairdresser employed by the business at the material time. Another employee, together with Mrs Ramsey, was responsible for beauty treatments conducted from the same premises. The claimant was contracted to work on a flexible basis, six days per week excluding Sundays, for 33 hours per week, in accordance with the written terms of contract which were signed by the claimant on 5 August 2008, as inspected by the tribunal. These contracted hours were then reduced by mutual agreement in writing dated 26 August 2010 to 27 hours per week, with the claimant being paid at a rate of £6.80 per hour and her normal nett (take home) pay each week being £170.25.
3.2 In regard to the practical management of the business, Mr Ramsey concerned himself with the financial and managerial aspects of the business which he carried on in conjunction with a parallel beauty products business owned by the respondents (which latter business did not employ the claimant). Mr Ramsey accordingly was responsible for financial records and for monitoring the general performance of the business. Mrs Ramsey concerned herself more with direct conduct of the business and with interactions with customers and staff.
3.3 Mr Ramsey gave credible evidence to the tribunal, consistent with business records, concerning what he stated to be a material decline in the financial performance of the business. The tribunal inspected the documentary evidence produced by the respondents which was contended by Mr Ramsey to demonstrate that business trading figures were substantially reduced at the material time. It is not necessary to mention in detail the specific trading figures and quarter to quarter reductions over a period of two years prior to the dismissal of the claimant save to say that there was evidenced a substantial reduction in the trading figures. The respondents’ evidence given by both Mr and Mrs Ramsey was that the specific business figures for the hairdressing function of the business were particularly reduced and were very problematical. There were many days, according to the records, when the hairdressing function had either no clients or had very few clients. That produced a corresponding reduction in the need to employ a hairdresser, the function performed by the claimant.
3.4 The evidence of the respondents was that the beauty therapist function in the business required what was called a “Level 3” beauty therapist qualification, which could only be gained after a period of training lasting either three years part-time, or at least two years full-time. The claimant did not possess any other technical qualifications entitling her to engage in anything other than some peripheral functions to assist in beauty therapies and clearly her function was primarily as a hairdresser. The respondents’ evidence was that a genuine redundancy situation thus arose in respect of the post occupied by the claimant as a hairdresser and it would have been not possible to have redeployed the claimant as a beauty therapist without formal training and in the absence of the claimant gaining specific technical qualifications.
3.5 The effect of the trading conditions upon the business and the issue of whether there was a genuine redundancy affecting the claimant's post of employment was challenged both in evidence and also in submissions on behalf of the claimant. The tribunal however noted the weight of the oral and documentary evidence and in particular the business records produced. This evidence does certainly indicate a material reduction in the trading performance of the business in the period leading up to the dismissal of the claimant. The business reduced opening hours in order to save costs. Special promotions were offered to the public. Endeavours were made by the respondents to encourage staff, including the claimant, to engage in these various business promotions and to use any personal or other contacts in an attempt to increase the level of business. However these efforts do not appear to have been particularly successful. The tribunal had little doubt that the claimant would have been alert to the reduction in volume of hairdressing business conducted. The claimant would, very probably, have harboured concerns. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case, as was indeed candidly conceded by the respondents, that there was no formal process of warning and of consultation with the claimant engaged in by them at the time redundancy in regard to the claimant’s post was contemplated.
3.6 The respondents’ evidence was that they were intending to “break the news” to the claimant that she was to be made redundant on Tuesday 13 September 2011 (the claimant did not work on Mondays) having reached a decision the previous weekend that the claimant’s post was to be made redundant. The tribunal is not entirely sure why the claimant did not attend work on Tuesday 13 September, but contact was made by Mrs Ramsey with her by telephone on the morning of Wednesday 14 September and the claimant agreed to attend work at 10.30 am on that day.
3.7 Apparently, on her way to work on that Wednesday the claimant suffered a panic attack. This unfortunate event occurred in a local Tesco store. Contact was made by Tesco staff with the claimant’s mother, Mrs McCone, who called to collect her daughter from the store.
3.8 There was regrettably a significant conflict in the evidence given to the tribunal as between Mrs McCone and Mrs Ramsey concerning whether or not Mrs McCone did visit the respondent's business premises on the morning of 14 September. Mrs Ramsey maintained in her evidence to the tribunal that Mrs McCone did visit the business premises that morning and was taken to one side by Mrs Ramsey and was informed by her that the claimant was going to be made redundant. Mrs Ramsey indicated that the claimant’s mother, Mrs McCone, requested Mrs Ramsey to defer making this announcement to the claimant for a period of some two weeks, for the reason that the claimant was stated to be going through a rather difficult period, personally.
3.9 Mrs McCone, for her part, vehemently denied that any such conversation had taken place that morning. Mrs McCone contended that the first conversation she had with Mrs Ramsey was when she had called to the business premises much later that day with a medical certificate from the claimant’s doctor certifying the claimant to be unfit to work for a period of two weeks. Mrs Ramsey did state that Mrs McCone called again later that day, after about 3.00 pm, to deliver a medical certificate on behalf of the claimant. Assessing this conflicting evidence, the tribunal preferred the evidence of Mrs Ramsey and finds that events occurred as Mrs Ramsey has described, with Mrs McCone making two visits, the second of these in the afternoon when she delivered the medical certificate. Having said that, this conflict of evidence in reality is not of great significance to the tribunal’s ultimate decision in the matter, for the reason that there has been a forthright concession on the part of the respondents (as mentioned above and in the next paragraph). Thus, that is all the tribunal needs to say about the matter.
3.10 By letter dated 15 September 2011 Mrs Ramsey wrote to the claimant confirming that on 11 September the respondents had made a decision to close down the hair service at the respondent's business due to a lack of clients wanting hair treatments. The letter indicated that the business no longer required the services of a hairdresser and therefore the claimant's employment was being terminated. The letter enclosed a payment in respect of outstanding wages being the sum of £301.50 representing two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice and some holiday pay due. It is noted that the written contract terms provided for five working days’ contractual notice of termination of employment on the part of the employer (statutory provisions of course can provide a greater entitlement). In effect, this letter constituted a summary termination of employment, with pay in lieu of notice being afforded to the claimant. As has been conceded by the respondents, there was no adequate process of warning and consultation such as is normally required in a redundancy situation, nor was any proper endeavour made to follow the statutory dismissal procedures applicable. At the time of dismissal the claimant was aged 25 years and she had been employed by the respondents for three complete years at the effective date of termination of employment.
3.11 There were two further payments made by the respondents to the claimant. On 10 October 2011 the respondents paid to the claimant the sum of £550.80 which (although the respondents did not provide a breakdown of this amount in the accompanying letter) represents the equivalent of three weeks’ gross pay and is assumed to constitute payment of statutory redundancy pay and, further, on 13 October 2011 the respondents paid to the claimant the sum of £367.20 which is the equivalent of two weeks’ gross pay. That latter, the respondents explained in the accompanying letter, concluded the balance of four weeks’ notice pay which they felt the claimant was entitled to receive, the first two weeks’ notice pay having been paid at the time of termination. The total paid upon termination of employment by the respondents therefore amounts to £ £1,219.50.
3.12 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Article 118 of the 1996 Order provides for a minimum period of statutory notice dependant upon length of service which in this case, taking the length of service as being three complete years, provided that pay in lieu of notice should properly have been the equivalent of three weeks’ net pay, not four weeks’, as appears to have been the understanding of the respondents. Therefore there appears to have been an overpayment.
3.13 After dismissal, the claimant made endeavours to conduct business in her own right as a self-employed hairdresser, working from home. The tribunal saw and inspected some handwritten business records maintained by the claimant in respect of that activity. The claimant did not sign on for Jobseekers Allowance. The claimant was inactive and was not working for a period two weeks after the dismissal and then she commenced this self-employment from home with effect from 27 September 2011.
3.14
One difficulty experienced by the
tribunal in this matter was in dealing with the somewhat inadequate nature and
quality of the evidence adduced concerning the claimant’s income post-dismissal
such as was earned from this self-employment following the dismissal. The
hearing of the matter, indeed, was adjourned for a period of time in order to
permit the claimant to provide to the tribunal some clarification concerning
particular documentary evidence relating to tax credits claims which appeared
to show a greater sum earned from self-employment than the claimant's written
records of her business disclosed. The HM Revenue & Customs amended tax
credits award documentation provided in evidence for the period 30 September
2011 to 5 April 2012 showed income for the year 6 April 2011 to 5 April 2012,
based upon an estimate provided by the claimant, of earnings as an employee
being £10,346.00 (which indeed tallied with the claimant's earnings from employment
with the respondents for that year) but also of income from
self-employment being £9,000 to 5 April 2012. Notwithstanding that, the
claimant’s self employment income figures produced by her in evidence showed a
total of only £1,240.00 earned in self-employment as a hairdresser in the
period from 27 September 2011 to 5 April 2012. The substantial
disparity between the estimate of £9,000 provided by the claimant to the tax
authorities and the recorded earnings merited an explanation. This issue was
resolved, to a degree and not without some difficulty, when the hearing of the
matter reconvened. The claimant's mother, Mrs McCone, was recalled to
provide evidence and she stated in evidence that she had filled in the figures
on behalf of the claimant in the tax credits documentation and that, in
essence, she had substantially over estimated the claimant’s income from
self-employment in the period. The tribunal was nonetheless troubled by the
size of the disparity and the small amount of the recorded earnings in the
relevant period. The respondents contended in submissions that the claimant
had other sources of income undeclared, but the claimant denied that to be the
case and there was no proof of any other source of income save in respect of
this
self-employment as a hairdresser during the relevant period.
3.15 There was little persuasive evidence
that the claimant endeavoured to obtain employment, notwithstanding the low
level of earnings stated in regard to the
self-employment. There was no documentary evidence produced of any
applications for employment and the claimant’s oral evidence was that she had
applied for only two jobs, one in Ballyclare and one in Carrickfergus. She
also contended that she made about six calls to salons listed in Yellow Pages,
but the tribunal found the latter evidence to be somewhat vague and imprecise.
The claimant appeared to be content to work in a self-employed capacity as a
hairdresser, insofar as she could. The tribunal wishes to make the observation
that apart from the two weeks of medically certified unfitness to work
mentioned above, certified (according to the oral evidence given) by the
claimant's doctor on 14 September 2011, there was no medical evidence
adduced that the claimant was, at any time following the dismissal, unfit to
work on grounds of illness.
3.16 The tribunal did not need to determine any further findings of fact for the purposes of its determination in this case.
THE APPLICABLE LAW
4. In respect of the law in
regard to unfair dismissal, the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order
1996 (“the 1996 Order”) provides at Article 126 of the 1996 Order that an
employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer. Article
130 of the 1996 Order provides for the test of fairness concerning the
dismissal by an employer. It is for the employer to show the reason (or, if
more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and that it is either a
specified reason as set out in Article 130 or some other substantial reason of
a kind such as to justify the dismissal. Such potentially fair reasons include
redundancy. If a tribunal makes a finding of unfair dismissal, and an order
for re-engagement or
re-instatement is inapplicable, a tribunal may make an order for compensation
including both a basic award and a compensatory award. Under Article 153 of
the 1996 Order the basic award is calculated with reference to the effective
date of termination of employment. For the compensatory award under Article
157 of the 1996 Order, the award is such amount as the tribunal considers just
and equitable having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in
consequence of the dismissal, insofar as that loss is attributable to action
taken by the employer.
The Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 ("the 2003 Order") amends the 2006 Order and
includes provisions, respectively, under Article 17(1) to (4), in relation to
non-completion of statutory procedure: adjustment of awards by industrial
tribunals and under Article 23, in relation to procedural fairness in unfair
dismissal. Article 130A (1) of the 1996 Order (as amended by the 2003 Order)
provides that an employee who is dismissed, whether or not his dismissal is
unfair or regarded as unfair for any other reason, is to be regarded as being unfairly
dismissed if a statutory dismissal procedure (as set out in the 2003 Order)
applies in relation to the dismissal, the procedure has not been completed, and
the
non-completion of the procedure is wholly or mainly attributable to failure by
the employer to comply with its requirements. Schedule 1 to the 2003 Order
sets out statutory procedures. Part 1 of Schedule 1 provides for standard and modified dismissal procedures. Article 17
(3) of the 2003 Order provides for an adjustment of compensation as follows:- “
If, ..... it appears to the industrial tribunal that— the claim to which the
proceedings relate concerns a matter to which one of the statutory procedures
applies, the statutory procedure was not completed before the proceedings were
begun, and the non-completion of the statutory procedure was wholly or mainly
attributable to failure by the employer to comply with a requirement of the
procedure, it shall…. increase any award which it makes to the employee by 10
per cent and may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the
circumstances to do so, increase it by a further amount, but not so as to make
a total increase of more than 50 per cent”. The jurisdictions to
which that adjustment applies are set forth in Schedule 2 to the 2003 Order and
these include the claims of unfair dismissal, redundancy payments and breach of
employment contract and termination.
The Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2004 (“the 2004 Regulations”), at Regulation 3 provide for the application of the standard dismissal (and the modified dismissal) procedures, the former being when the employer contemplates dismissing the employee (and the latter post-dismissal). Regulation 4 provides for situations where these statutory procedures do not apply and Regulation 5 provides for situations where the parties are to be treated as complying with these statutory procedures.
Article 154(1A) of the 1996 Order provides that the basic award in any automatically unfair dismissal pursuant to Article 130A (1) must amount to at least four week’s pay unless that would be unjust to the employer.
In regard to redundancy, Article 170 of the 1996 Order provides that an employer shall pay a redundancy payment to any employee in the event that the employee is dismissed by the employer by reason of redundancy. Circumstances in which an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy are set forth in Article 174 of the 1996 Order. This provides as follows: “For the purposes of this Order an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to (a) the fact that his employer has ceased or intends to cease (i) to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or (ii) to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business— (i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or (ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.” Article 197 of the 1996 Order sets out how the amount of the redundancy payment should be calculated with reference to length of service and age of the employee.
Article 118 of the 1996 Order provides for a minimum period of statutory notice dependant upon length of service. In the case of length of service of the three complete years’ duration, that is three weeks in accordance with Article 118 (1) (b).
THE TRIBUNAL’S DETERMINATION
5. In view of the concession made by the respondents that the claimant was dismissed, the stated reason being redundancy, the tribunal had to determine if redundancy was the reason for dismissal, this being a potentially fair reason for dismissal. That contention was challenged on behalf of the claimant and it has been contended that this was not a genuine redundancy situation. The claimant's representative has endeavoured in submissions to link the respondents' decision to dismiss the claimant with the claimant submitting (via the claimant's mother) a medical certificate of unfitness to work for a period of two weeks on 14 September 2011. Considering the totality of the evidence in the case and the matters of fact to be derived therefrom, the tribunal determines that there was a genuine redundancy situation in accordance with Article 174 of the 1996 Order, arising on account of a very substantial reduction in the need for the business to engage as an employee, a hairdresser. Upon the facts, the dismissal was wholly or mainly attributable to the fact that the requirements of the respondents’ business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, that is to say hairdressing, or for employees to carry out work of that kind in the place where the employee was employed by the respondents, had ceased or diminished or were expected to cease or diminish. The tribunal accepts the evidence that the claimant was otherwise unqualified in beauty therapies and could not readily have been deployed by the business into other areas of work without substantial training and without the gaining of additional technical qualifications, which process would have taken a number of years to complete.
6.
The decision to dismiss the
claimant was taken at the weekend preceding the week in which the dismissal was
communicated to the claimant, some three days or so in advance. Redundancy was
the reason for the dismissal. However, there was no proper process of warning
and of consultation and on that basis the dismissal was unfair, procedurally.
Furthermore, there was no endeavour to adhere to the statutory dismissal
procedures, as prescribed. The dismissal was therefore also automatically
unfair on that basis in accordance with Article 130 (A) (1) of the 1996 Order.
The only issues for the tribunal to resolve, accordingly, relate to a proper
award of compensation and such include issues of mitigation of loss, and the
so-called "would have made no difference" argument which has been
raised by the respondents in submissions.
7. The tribunal has noted that the claimant did not in any proper sense endeavour to obtain any employment but rather concentrated on self-employment, working from home as a hairdresser. As mentioned, the tribunal had considerable difficulty in generally assessing loss in this case as there was a disparity between the figures contained in the tax credits documentation in respect that the claimant’s earnings and those earnings as recorded by her and placed before the tribunal in evidence. The tribunal is obliged, accordingly, having afforded a reasonable opportunity to the claimant to adduce all material evidence in the case going to the matter of loss arising from the dismissal, to proceed in the basis of all of the evidence before the tribunal.
8. The tribunal also examined the issue of appropriate statutory uplift in the case for failure to follow the statutory dismissal procedures (see Article 17 (3) of the 2003 Order). The tribunal determines that an appropriate statutory uplift figure is 15%, upon the facts of the case.
9. On behalf of the respondents it has been submitted that there should be a substantial “Polkey” reduction for the reason that the claimant would have been dismissed in any event if fair procedure had been followed in the matter. Whilst, clearly (and this has been forthrightly conceded by the respondents) the established and well-settled fair procedures connected with redundancies were not followed, in view of the facts of the matter and the circumstances surrounding the business and the potential redundancy of the post, the tribunal determines that there was a very substantial possibility, indeed something very close to a certainty, of the claimant being dismissed in any event.
10. In this matter the tribunal is obliged to afford such compensation as is just and equitable, given all of the relevant facts and circumstances, in respect of the loss sustained by the claimant in consequence of the dismissal, insofar as that loss is attributable to action taken by the respondents. There exists a series of authorities in such cases as Abbotts and Standley –v- Wesson-Glynwed Steels Ltd [1982] IRLR 51 EAT and Mining Supplies (Longwall) Ltd –v- Baker [1988] IRLR 417 which support the proposition that, in circumstances where the tribunal determines that, notwithstanding the deficiencies in taking the appropriate procedural steps, the employee would have been dismissed in any event, it is appropriate to consider the likely outcome had that been done which ought to have been done. In that specific context it is deemed permissible to assess how long any proper process of warning and consultation would have taken in a redundancy matter. In this case the tribunal has concluded that the appropriate procedural steps, if taken, would not have avoided the claimant’s dismissal on grounds of redundancy but merely deferred the dismissal. That goes to the essential issue of just and equitable compensation. The issues were clearly analysed in Elkouil –v- Coney Island Ltd [2002] IRLR 174 EAT and the general principles therein were clarified and approved by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in England. In Elkouil there was a delay in the commencement of the consultation process from a time when the employer first determined that the employee was to be made redundant. However, on the facts of this matter that situation does not apply, for the reason that the respondents made the decision some very few days only before that decision was communicated to the claimant. Accordingly, (unlike Elkouil ) the claimant was not disadvantaged in seeking another job on account of any material delay on the part of the respondents. The tribunal, accordingly, is permitted to examine the time period commencing at the point when the respondents first determined that there was to be a redundancy and extending to the time when a fair process of warning and consultation would inevitably have concluded.
11. In this case, the process, in the tribunal’s determination, would have inevitably concluded with the dismissal of the claimant. In considering these matters, the tribunal also takes into account the parallel process required to be undertaken by the respondents (which they did not undertake) in the following of the statutory dismissal procedures. The appropriate time period for the pursuit and conclusion of the forgoing is assessed by the tribunal as being a period of four weeks. Accordingly that period of four weeks is the period of loss to be compensated in the circumstances of this case, the tribunal bearing in mind that the loss must be sustained by the claimant in consequence of the dismissal, insofar as that loss is attributable to action taken by the respondents. Beyond that period of four weeks, the claimant would have stood as dismissed.
12. It is therefore just and equitable to award compensation for this period of loss of four weeks’ duration and this is reflected in the tribunal’s award of compensation in the matter as set forth below. It would not be appropriate to reduce that on account of any submitted failure to mitigate loss, in view of the brief period of loss in question. The tribunal therefore determines the applicable compensation in the case to be as follows:-
THE AWARD OF COMPENSATION
Unfair Dismissal - Basic Award
The claimant was employed for 3 years and she was aged 25 at the effective date of termination. However Article 154(1A) of the 1996 Order provides that the basic award in any automatically unfair dismissal, such as in this case, pursuant to Article 130A (1) must amount to at least four week’s pay unless that would be unjust to the employer. The tribunal does not determine that there would be any injustice to the respondents in making such an award in this case. (This may not be reduced by any excess payment for pay in lieu of notice, for this requires a statutory basis).
4 x £183.60 = £734.40
Less money paid in regard to redundancy = £550.80
Unfair Dismissal – Compensatory Award
(i) Loss from effective date of termination to end of appropriate period, confined to a period of four weeks from dismissal to accord with the period of time that a proper warning and redundancy consultation process would of taken = 4 weeks x £170.25 = £681.00.
(ii) Less monies earned by the claimant in self-employment in the relevant period of loss (4 weeks) after dismissal by claimant = £55.00.
(iii) Less excess money paid in regard to notice pay to be credited in favour of respondent = £183.60
(v) The award for loss of statutory rights = £300.00
(vi) Total compensatory award = £742.40
Total Award (before statutory uplift)
(vii) The total award (basic and compensatory) is £926.00 (before statutory uplift).
Unfair Dismissal – uplift in Award (Article 17(3) of the 2003 Order)
(viii) £926.00 x 15% = £138.90
Total award of the tribunal = £1,064.90
Recoupment of Benefits
There is no recoupment under the relevant statutory provisions, as the claimant did not claim any relevant state benefits.
13. This is a relevant decision for the purposes of the Industrial Tribunals (Interest) Order (Northern Ireland) 1990.
Chairman:
Date and place of hearing: 2 May and 20 June 2012, Belfast.
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: