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Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions >> Bonner v J & K Coaches Jim Quinn Kevin Quinn [2012] NIIT 02086_11IT (19 January 0 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIIT/2012/2086_11IT.html
Cite as: [2012] NIIT 02086_11IT, [2012] NIIT 2086_11IT
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THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REF: 2086/11
CLAIMANT: Nuala Kelly Bonner
RESPONDENTS: 1. J & K Coaches
2. Jim Quinn
3. Kevin Quinn
Certificate of Correction
The decision issued on 19 October 2012 contained the following errors;
1. It stated two case reference numbers, 2086/11 and 1183/12, the decision only relates to case reference number 2086/11.
2. Jennifer McKeever should not have been named as a respondent.
3. In paragraph 3 it is stated “Ms Jennifer McKeever, formerly of Airporter”. Ms Jennifer McKeever is still a director of Airporter.
Vice President: __________________________________________
Date: __________________________________________
THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REFS: 2086/11
1183/12
CLAIMANT: Nuala Kelly Bonner
RESPONDENTS: 1. J&K Coaches
2. Jim Quinn
3. Kevin Quinn
4. Jennifer McKeever
DECISION
The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claims of unlawful discrimination and unlawful victimisation are dismissed.
Constitution of Tribunal:
Vice President: Mr N Kelly
Members: Ms D Adams
Mr J Hughes
Appearances:
The claimant was represented by Mr White, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Equality Commission for Northern Ireland.
The respondents were represented by Mr Ferrity, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Macauley & Ritchie, Solicitors.
Issues
1. The issues to be determined by the tribunal, which were more closely identified as evidence and submissions progressed, were:-
(i) Was the claimant interviewed on 27 April 2011 and was she offered a job as a coach driver with a start date in June 2011, as alleged by the claimant?
(ii) If that is the case, was that job offer withdrawn by Mr Kevin Quinn on or about 15 June 2011?
(iii) If that is the case, was the job offer withdrawn because of the claimant’s gender and/or because of the claimant’s previous history of lodging tribunal proceedings, or of making complaints, in relation to the Order?
Hearing
2. The evidence was heard on 1 and 2 October 2012. The hearing resumed on 5 October 2012 to hear submissions. On the afternoon of 5 October 2012 the panel met to consider those submissions and the evidence.
3. The claimant gave evidence on her own behalf and called no other witnesses on her behalf. On behalf of the respondents, the following witnesses gave evidence : the two named respondents, Ms Malisa Conway, a female driver employed by the respondent company, Ms Jennifer McKeever, formerly of Airporter, against whom the claimant had lodged a tribunal claim for unlawful sex discrimination and Mrs Isobel Dunn, who attended on foot of a Witness Attendance Order.
4. Apart from Mrs Dunn, who gave her evidence-in-chief orally, the witnesses gave their evidence-in-chief in the form of written witness statements which had been exchanged before the hearing in accordance with directions of the tribunal.
Background
5. The two named respondents owned and ran the first-named respondent, a bus and taxi company.
The claimant alleged that she had been offered an interview for the job of coach driver on 20 April 2011 and that that interview had been cancelled at the last minute by the respondents. She further alleged that it had been re-arranged for 27 April 2011 and that she had, at the end of the interview, been offered a job with an indeterminate start date in June 2011. She alleged that when, in mid-June 2011, she telephoned to ask about the job, she had been told by Mr Kevin Quinn that she could not have the job because female bus drivers required stewards on certain runs. A male driver, Mr Skuce, had been hired. She alleged that the job offer had been withdrawn because of her gender and because she had previously made sex discrimination claims against two other bus companies.
The respondents denied that an interview had either been arranged, on either the 20 or 27 April 2011, or had taken place. They alleged that they required the completion of a job application form before an interview could take place and that no such application form had been completed by the claimant. No job offer had been made and this alleged telephone conversation in mid-June 2011 between her and Mr Kevin Quinn had not taken place. They stated that they had had no knowledge of the claimant’s previous sex discrimination complaints until after June 2011.
6. This is a claim in which the claimant and the respondents put forward two starkly different views of events. There is no possibility of an innocent explanation or of an innocent misunderstanding giving rise to the conflict in evidence. One side or the other must be deliberately misrepresenting the facts.
The evidence-in-chief of both the claimant and of the respondents, together with the evidence-in-chief of their witnesses, apart from that of Mrs Dunn, was given by written witness statement prepared and exchanged in advance of the hearing.
As often happens in litigation, cross-examination of witnesses produced additions to or explanation of what had been contained, often in brief terms, in written witness statements. That can often happen even with oral evidence-in-chief.
The tribunal has to be cognisant of the fact that written witness statements are prepared by the witnesses themselves, ie by non-lawyers, and that they are prepared and exchanged before the hearing. They may well, on occasion, be shorter and less complete than the tribunal would like. Issues may emerge, or other issues may take on more importance during cross-examination. The important issue is that the tribunal is alert to the possibility of additions or omissions of significance and that it does not automatically disbelieve any addition to or explanation of what appears in written witness statements, particularly where there is a clear explanation and where that explanation is supported by other evidence.
Relevant law
7. Under Article 3 of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 (‘the Order’) a person unlawfully discriminates against a woman if he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a man.
8. Under Article 6 of the Order, a person unlawfully victimises another if he treats that person less favourably than he treats or would treat another on the ground that that other person has brought proceedings or made a complaint under the Order.
9. This is a claim of direct sex discrimination. As the EAT pointed out in Islington Borough Council v Ladele [2009] ICR 387:-
“The concept of direct discrimination is fundamentally a simple one. A claimant suffers some form of detriment (using that term very broadly) and the reason for that detrimental treatment is the prohibited ground.”
10. In essence, direct discrimination is less favourable treatment ‘on grounds of’ gender. Gender does not need to be the main reason for the detriment; it would be sufficient that it had a significant influence on the detriment.
11. Direct evidence of discrimination, including victimisation for a protected act, is rare and tribunals frequently have to infer discrimination from all the material facts. For that reason the legislation provides for a shifting burden of proof. If the claimant proves facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that there has been unlawful discrimination, the burden of proof moves to the respondents. It is then up to the respondents to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment of the claimant was in no sense whatsoever on the ground of gender or of the protected act.
In Madarassy v Nomura International PLC [2007] EWCA Civ 33, the GB Court of Appeal stated:-
“The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal ‘could conclude’ that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination”.
In Curley v the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2009] NICA, Coghlin LJ stated:-
“However this Court would wish to emphasise the need for a tribunal engaged in determining this type of case to keep firmly in mind the fact that the claim was founded on an allegation of religious discrimination. The need to retain such a focus is particularly important when considering the potential application of the [relevant provisions].”
Relevant findings of fact
Notice of Vacancy
Claimant’s version
12. The claimant alleged that she had first heard of the proposed vacancy for coach driver with the respondent company when she saw the Mid Ulster Mail dated 31 March 2011 where the respondent company had placed an advertisement for a vacancy. She later became aware of a posting in the local Job Centre.
Respondents’ version
13. Mr Kevin Quinn alleged that the claimant had asked one of his drivers, in a chip shop in Clogher on or about 13 April 2011, about the post and that that driver had given her a contact number at this stage which she had written down.
Finding
14. It does not seem to matter, other than as an issue which relates to credibility, how the claimant actually became aware of the possible vacancy for a coach driver with the respondent company. In relation to credibility, the tribunal notes with some concern that the claimant does not refer anywhere in her witness statement to being in the chip shop in Clogher or to meeting that driver. In her evidence during cross-examination, she did accept that the meeting had taken place but that the meeting had taken place after she had seen the newspaper advertisement. The claimant accepted in cross-examination that she had been in the chip shop, had been on the business side of the counter and that she had served food to the driver. She stated that she had been receiving Jobseeker’s Allowance at this point. She further stated that the chip shop had been owned by her cousin. She claimed to have received no payment for this incident and confirmed that she had not reported it to the Social Security Agency when she had claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance. She did not dispute that she had been obliged to report all unpaid, as well as paid, work to the Social Security Agency. This incident does tend to reflect adversely on the claimant’s credibility.
The tribunal will return later to the claimant’s credibility; particularly in relation to her allegations about Mrs Dunn.
Alleged interview on 20 April 2011
Claimant’s version
15. The claimant alleged that she had telephoned the respondent company on or about 18 April 2011 and that she had had spoken to Mr Kevin Quinn. He had invited her to an interview on 20 April 2011 in relation to the relevant post. That interview was to take place at ‘around 6.30 pm’. Prior to leaving home on 20 April 2011, she telephoned the respondent company to ask directions and was told by Mr Kevin Quinn not to come to the interview as Mr Jim Quinn would not be present. She alleged that Mr Jim Quinn and Mr Kevin Quinn did interviews together.
Respondents’ version
16. Mr Kevin Quinn said he had taken a call from the claimant and that he had told her to feel free to call in for an application form for the relevant post. He did not ask any other questions and did not ask her to bring a driving licence to the respondent company’s premises. It was his evidence that Mr Jim Quinn arranged interviews and signed all letters inviting candidates for interviews. An application form was required before interviews. No interview had been arranged for 20 April 2011 by him or by anyone else. No call had been received by him on 20 April 2011.
Decision
17. The tribunal was referred to the claimant’s mobile telephone records. They did not refer to any call on 18 April 2011 but did refer to a call on 19 April 2011. They also referred to a call to the respondents’ business mobile number on 20 April 2011 at 17.48 pm. That business mobile was ordinarily diverted to the office landline during business hours but after those business hours, Mr Kevin Quinn or Mr Jim Quinn would ordinarily have had access to that mobile. The number of the mobile was a 24 hour access number which was advertised widely including on the respondents’ vehicles.
18. Mr Kevin Quinn and Mr Jim Quinn denied receiving any call on 20 April 2011. There is no independent evidence as to who made the call, the subject-matter of the call, who received the call or as to whether it had gone to voicemail.
19. The first thing that strikes the tribunal is that it is absolutely common for the completion of an application form to be required before a job interview is arranged. Mr Kevin Quinn and Mr Jim Quinn and indeed their female driver, Ms Conway, were adamant that this had been the universal situation in the respondent company. It was borne out by the practice adopted in the cases of Mr Nigel Skuce and Mr Hugh Donnelly. No evidence to the contrary was produced by the claimant in relation to the business practices of the respondent company. The claimant was unable to point to any instance where an employee had been interviewed without the completion of an application form. It does not seem to matter that an application form was completed on the same day as the interview; the important fact is that the application form appears to have always been completed. This practice appears to the tribunal to be common sense in any employment environment but particularly in a relatively regulated environment such as public transport.
20. The second thing is that the claimant has failed to produce, or to pursue by way of third party discovery, the Jobseeker’s log which she would have completed in relation to her claim for Jobseeker’s Allowance and which would shown, on a fortnightly basis, the applications for jobs allegedly made by the claimant and the interviews allegedly arranged for the claimant and, most importantly, the job offers made and accepted. In fact, the witness statement contained no evidence at all about the claimant’s job searches or about financial loss and indeed about any alleged mitigation of financial loss.
21. The third thing is that the telephone call recorded on 20 April 2011 in the mobile telephone records, on the claimant’s versions of events, indicates that a query about directions was made less than 45 minutes before the alleged interview on that date. The claimant lived in Omagh and the respondent company was in Ardboe. That timing seems somewhat unlikely. The evidence was that this involved a journey of between 50 minutes and one hour.
22. On the balance of probabilities, the tribunal does not accept the claimant’s version of events. It seems clear that a call was placed from her mobile to the respondents’ business mobile on both 19 and 20 April 2011. However, there is no independent evidence about the content of those calls and about who had received those calls. The difficulties that the tribunal expresses with the claimant’s general credibility does not the assist the tribunal in favouring her version of events.
Alleged interview on 27 April 2011
Claimant’s version
23. The claimant alleged that this interview had been arranged by Mr Kevin Quinn for 3.00 pm on 27 April 2011. She also alleged that documents, including her driving licence, had been asked for in the course of the interview with both the Quinn brothers and that they had been copied. She alleged that she had been offered a job starting in June 2011. She stated that she had earlier telephoned from Stewartstown and then from Ardboe to ask for directions to the respondent company. Her statement, no doubt prepared carefully for the purposes of this hearing, said she had arrived at the respondent company about 2.50 pm (ie that she had arrived early for the appointed time) and that she was asked to wait for both Mr Kevin Quinn and Mr Jim Quinn.
24. She alleged, on 27 April 2011, that Mr Jim Quinn first introduced himself and that they then walked from the office portacabin to the interview area which was in another building across the yard. This had been set up for an interview with three chairs. Mr Kevin Quinn had also attended the interview. She was then interviewed, asked about her qualifications, her employment history and was offered a job. Wages were discussed starting at £80.00 per day. Mr Jim Quinn said he would contact her for a start date ‘around June’.
Respondents’ version
25. Mr Kevin Quinn and Mr Jim Quinn denied that an interview had ever taken place. They said that the claimant had called into the respondent company unannounced and unarranged on 27 April 2011. There had been a brief chat with Mr Jim Quinn and she had been told that she could and should pick up an application form. Mr Jim Quinn had then gone outside for a smoke. The claimant had accompanied him. There was a further chat and Mr Kevin Quinn joined the two of them and they then moved over the yard to what was described as a canteen area. The Quinn brothers stated that it contained several chairs and not just three chairs set up for an interview as alleged by the claimant. They stated that this had been used for canteen purposes by the mechanic and by other persons working in the yard. Any job interviews would have been conducted in the office portacabin, after business hours or during lunchtimes. They had not asked the claimant to see her documents or her driving licence and they had not discussed wages. In fact, wages were approximately £70.00 per day for drivers. She had never been offered a job.
Decision
26. The claimant’s telephone record was again relied on by the claimant. This shows two calls on 27 April 2011 to the business telephone mobile number. These were at 15.08 and 15.24. If the claimant’s evidence was to be believed by the tribunal, she had, at those times, sought directions twice in these calls for an interview at 15.00 pm but had, according to her statement, arrived early for the interview at 14.50 pm.
27. That simply cannot have been the case. On her version of events, the second call was from Ardboe. So, again on her version of events, she was actually 30 minutes late, on arrival, for a pre-arranged job interview rather than 10 minutes early for that interview. In the collective experience of this tribunal, attending a job interview, firstly, 30 minutes late and, secondly, lost, is something that would not have slipped anyone’s mind. At the very least the claimant would have recorded such a significant event, perhaps recording that she had apologised for or had explained her lateness. She would have referred to her lateness in her witness statement. According to her evidence the first arranged interview (again denied by the respondents) was cancelled because Mr Jim Quinn did not attend. It seems obvious that, being late (if the telephone records and her oral evidence are accepted) she would have queried their availability at a later start time than that she alleged had been arranged and could have referred to that fact.
28. When challenged, the claimant stated, for the first time in evidence, that she had been blocked in traffic for an hour by a wedding in Pomeroy. This appears to the tribunal to be somewhat unlikely. Rural weddings do not necessitate the lockdown of entire villages and travel routes. If such an unlikely event had occurred, en route to a job interview, the tribunal would expected it to have been referred to and explained in the evidence-in-chief contained within the witness statement.
29. This was not, as it appears to the tribunal, an incident where everyone was relaxed about the timing of the alleged job interview. The claimant in her evidence had left home at 1.00 pm to allow two hours for the journey and had arrived (again if the telephone records and her oral evidence is accepted) some two and a half hours after setting out from home.
The claimant’s version of events seems highly unlikely.
30. The claimant said, at one point in her evidence, that the job offer was for a start in early June with the respondent company. In her first statement, she said:-
“around June”; and then
“in early June.”
No evidence has been provided by the claimant in relation to the contemporaneous Jobseeker’s Allowance log to support her allegation of an interview and a job offer. However it is perfectly clear that if such a job interview had been arranged, had taken place and had resulted in a job interview there would have been contemporaneous notes available in that log.
In her evidence, and in her statement, she waited for further details from the respondent company until 14 June 2011 before trying to make contact. It seems inherently unlikely that anyone would accept a job offer in such vague terms (ie ‘around June’ or ‘in early June’) and equally unlikely that anyone would leave it until 14 June 2011 before lifting the phone to check. That seems particularly the case where the claimant was, at the relevant times, relying on Jobseeker’s Allowance. Again, the claimant’s version of events seems highly unlikely.
31. The respondents had, on unchallenged evidence, offered a job as coach driver to Mr Skuce on 6 April 2011. That is something the claimant subsequently seeks to rely on to support a claim of sex discrimination. It seems highly unlikely that this occurred as alleged by the claimant. The tribunal has to ask itself why would anyone interview or offer a job to a woman, as the claimant has alleged, if they did not want women drivers? It also has to ask itself why would anyone subsequently decide they preferred Mr Skuce, when they had already interviewed him and offered him a job before, as the claimant alleged, interviewing her?
32. The version put forward by the respondents is more coherent and believable. An application form was required for any vacancy with the respondent company. No job interview had been arranged and no job had been offered. There were two calls on 27 April 2011 from the claimant’s mobile to the business’s mobile. These were at a time when, according to the claimant’s prepared statement, she was already at the respondent company. There is no independent evidence as to the content of those calls, who made those calls, or as to who, if anyone, received those calls. The calls would have been diverted to the office landline at the relevant times of day and anyone could have received them and those calls could have been about anything.
Again the claimant’s general lack of credibility has to be borne in mind.
Allegations of meeting between Ms Isobel Dunn and the claimant
Claimant’s version
33. The claimant alleged in her supplementary statement that she had been invited by Mrs Dunn, in 2007, to a meeting in Thyme Restaurant in Omagh and that the subject of her claim against Airporter had been raised by Mrs Dunn. She had recalled this meeting when Ms McKeever had put in a witness statement which referred to the claim of sex discrimination which she had brought against Airporter.
Respondents’ version
34. Mrs Dunn attended the tribunal on foot of a Witness Attendance Order and made it plain she was a reluctant witness. She also made it plain that she had been friendly with the claimant and regarded her, a former employee, as a good driver. She bore no animus to the claimant and can be regarded as an independent witness.
She denied that she had invited the claimant for a coffee on any occasion although she had bumped into her on occasions. She also denied that she had ever raised or discussed the Airporter claim at any pre-arranged meeting or at any other time, with the claimant.
Decision
35. The evidence of Mrs Dunn was clear and consistent. It was unshaken by the claimant’s cross-examination. The tribunal accepts that her evidence is truthful.
36. This is a case which hinges on credibility. The decision has already referred to matters which cast doubt on the claimant’s credibility. This instance is crucial. The claimant’s evidence is directly contradicted by the clear evidence of an independent witness. The claimant’s evidence is, on the balance of probabilities, untruthful and produced, by way of a supplementary statement, to bolster her claim of unlawful victimisation.
Allegation of a withdrawal of a job offer
Claimant’s version
37. The claimant alleges that in a telephone conversation in mid-June 2011 between her and Mr Kevin Quinn that the job offer was withdrawn by Mr Kevin Quinn explicitly because she was a woman or was withdrawn because she would therefore need stewards to assist her on late night runs. She also alleged, separately, that the job offer had been withdrawn because she had a prior history of making complaints of sex discrimination and lodging tribunal proceedings of sex discrimination, and that that had been known to the respondents.
Respondents’ version
38. Mr Kevin Quinn denied making or withdrawing a job offer in any terms. The respondents employ female drivers who worked in minibuses and other coaches, including full-sized coaches. All late night runs of full-sized or near full-sized coaches used a steward employed by the respondent company to help the driver. That occurred whether the driver was male or female. That evidence was supported explicitly by Ms Conway and was not rebutted by any evidence on behalf of the claimant. Ms Conway had initially worked only on minibuses and the claimant sought to make great play of that fact. However, in her cross-examination, Ms Conway made it plain that it had been own choice to first use minibuses. She had been employed by the respondent company as a returner after family responsibility. She initially lacked the necessary confidence to drive larger coaches and was limited to drive minibuses. She now drives larger and full-sized coaches as required.
Decision
39. The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that Mr Kevin Quinn did not withdraw a job offer in the alleged terms, or in any terms. The reasoning is dealt with more fully in the ‘Overall Decision’ below.
Overall Decision
40. The tribunal unanimously rejects the claimant’s allegation of unlawful victimisation.
41. Only the extremely rash would tell someone, who they knew or were supposed to have known as a previous and repeated sex discrimination complainant, that a job offer, which had previously been made, had been withdrawn effectively because the claimant was a woman. However, that is what the claimant expects us to believe had happened in the present case. That telephone call, which she alleged took place between her and Mr Kevin Quinn, could have been recorded by the claimant or could have been overheard by others. The tribunal has to ask itself whether anyone in their right mind would have made such an explicit telephone call, as alleged. The claimant, through her counsel, argues that Mr Kevin Quinn could have been caught unawares and could have ‘blurted out’ the explanation. That does not appear to have been reasonably possible. The claimant alleges that she had been hanging on for some time on the telephone to speak to Mr Kevin Quinn. There was no suggestion, on her allegation or on her evidence, that he had been caught unawares. Furthermore, her entire claim of victimisation is based on the premise that the respondents had become aware of a risk of sex discrimination litigation and had been determined that they would avoid it. It therefore seems highly unlikely that they would then openly and explicitly invite such a claim.
There is an imperfect reply from the respondents’ solicitor which refers to a meeting with Counsel on 17 November 2011 as the date on which the respondents became aware of the matters raised by Ms McKeever. Mr Jim Quinn in evidence suggested he would have learnt of earlier claims in September 2011 and had then notified his solicitors. The extent of the knowledge in September 2011, which was then clarified with Ms McKeever, is not the issue. The only evidence of knowledge prior to June 2011 is the alleged conversation with Mrs Dunn and that has been comprehensively rebutted.
Furthermore, the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses is clear, consistent and not rebutted. The respondents’ business employed female drivers and employed them for all types of runs. Stewards were engaged on larger coaches for late night runs and were engaged whether the driver was a male or a female.
42. In relation to the claim of victimisation, the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses is again consistent. The tribunal’s unanimous view is that the version put forward by Mr Jim Quinn and Mr Kevin Quinn is correct. Mr Kevin Quinn, Mr Jim Quinn, Ms Conway and Mrs Dunn were consistent. There was no evidence that details of the sex discrimination complaints or of the tribunal sex discrimination claims made by the complainant had been communicated or had otherwise been known of by the two Quinn brothers in June 2011. The claimant raises no more than the mere possibility of victimisation occurring in this case but there is absolutely no evidence in which an inference could properly be drawn, by a reasonable tribunal, of victimisation in the present case.
There is no proven evidence upon which a reasonable tribunal could properly draw an inference of unlawful victimisation.
43. In relation to the claim of unlawful sex discrimination, the tribunal prefers the respondents’ version of events. The claimant never completed an application form. That is accepted by the claimant. This is a wholly basic step in obtaining a job. She was never interviewed and never offered that job. Apart from the mobile telephone record, the claimant has produced no evidence other than her unsupported word to support these allegations. There is no independent evidence of the content of these calls or of who received them. The tribunal is faced with undisputed evidence of two other instances where the claimant made complaints of sex discrimination, one of which went to a tribunal, and both of which were settled. The tribunal has not heard any evidence relating to the merits or otherwise of those complaints and has decided to disregard them. Leaving those aside and in all of the circumstances of this case, there are no grounds upon which an inference of unlawful discrimination could properly be drawn in these cases. In particular, the respondent company clearly employed female drivers for all relevant occupations. Mrs Isobel Dunn flatly and convincingly contradicted the claimant’s version of events in her supplementary statement of the alleged meeting between her and Mrs Dunn and there are serious doubts, outlined above, about the claimant’s credibility.
Her evidence, unsupported as it is by any significant evidence, does not pass the first hurdle. The facts must be proved, disregarding any explanation made by the respondents on which a reasonable tribunal can draw an inference of unlawful behaviour. The test is not that sufficient unsupported allegations are made by the claimant. A reasonable tribunal cannot properly infer unlawful discrimination on the evidence proved before it in this case.
44. Both claims are therefore dismissed.
Vice President:
Date and place of hearing: 2 – 3 October; and
5 October 2012, Belfast
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: