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Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions >> Halligan v Armagh City and District Counc... [2010] NIIT 01608_10IT (07 March 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIIT/2011/01608_10IT.html
Cite as: [2010] NIIT 01608_10IT, [2010] NIIT 1608_10IT
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THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REF: 1608/10
CLAIMANT: Catherine (Cathy) Halligan
RESPONDENT: Armagh City and District Council
DECISION
The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant was not unfairly dismissed by the respondent. The claimant's claim of unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed by the tribunal. In regard to the matter of costs, the tribunal orders the claimant to pay to the respondent the total sum of £2,658.42 in costs.
Constitution of Tribunal:
Chairman: Mr James V Leonard
Members: Mr James Kerr
Mr Patrick Archer
Appearances:
The claimant appeared and represented herself at hearing.
Mr Conor Hamill, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Jones Cassidy Jones, Solicitors, appeared on behalf of the respondent.
Reasons
1. By claim made to the tribunal dated 17 June 2010, received 18 June 2010 by the Office of Tribunals, the claimant claimed unfair dismissal. There was an additional complaint contained in a claim form of “bullying and unethical behaviour” which was not accepted by the Secretary under the applicable procedure. Accordingly, the claim for unfair dismissal alone proceeded. By response dated 4 August 2010 the respondent confirmed that the claimant was an employee of the respondent and that the claimant had been dismissed in consequence of an internal disciplinary procedure, the outcome of which was not appealed by the claimant. It was also stated that the claimant had been dismissed with nine weeks’ notice pay. The reason stated by the respondent for the dismissal was “gross misconduct”. It was stated that this misconduct related to serious, persistent and determined insubordination. In all respects the claimant’s contention that she had been unfairly dismissed was denied by the respondent, with particulars provided, and the respondent submitted that the claimant was acting unreasonably in pursuing the claim and put the claimant on notice that costs would be pursued against her in the event that her claim failed.
2. The tribunal heard oral evidence on the respondent's behalf from Carol Corvan and Jill McEneaney, and the claimant gave oral evidence on her own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the tribunal received oral submissions on behalf of the respondent and the tribunal also heard from the claimant.
3. The tribunal would wish to record the observation that this was a particularly challenging case at hearing. The tribunal took very considerable care in case management at hearing with this unrepresented claimant carefully to explain the order of proceedings, to explain the customary sequencing of evidence and to give proper guidance and assistance to the claimant within the terms prescribed by the overriding objective in order to enable the claimant to present her case in the manner in which she desired. The tribunal took care to ascertain that the claimant fully comprehended these explanations. The tribunal returned to the issue on a number of occasions throughout the hearing in order that it could be certain that the claimant would not be placed at any particular disadvantage when faced with a respondent who was represented by Solicitor and Counsel. On a number of occasions the tribunal requested express confirmation from the claimant that the claimant was in a proper position and fit to proceed with the matter. On each such occasion the claimant expressly confirmed to the tribunal, in response to such enquiries, that she was indeed quite fit and capable of proceeding with the hearing and properly dealing with and presenting her case in the manner chosen by her, after appropriate guidance and accommodation had been afforded to her by the tribunal.
The Issue
4. As the respondent conceded that the claimant was an employee who had been dismissed for reasons relating to conduct, the tribunal had to determine the claimant’s claim and, if that the claim were to be determined well-founded, the matter of appropriate remedy. Further, at the conclusion of the hearing the respondent’s representative made an application for costs. The matter of costs also had to be considered and determined by the tribunal.
The Tribunal’s Findings of Fact
5. In consequence of the oral and documentary evidence adduced before it, the tribunal on the balance of probabilities determined the following material facts:-
5.1. The claimant was employed by the respondent. This employment commenced on 12 February 2001. The employment came to an end on 23 March 2010. At the material time, the claimant was employed as Principal Internal Auditor.
5.2 The claimant's employment was governed by written contractual terms. These terms included a disciplinary policy and procedures. Within these procedures were set forth in writing examples of misconduct and corresponding disciplinary penalties available to the employer, including verbal warning, written warning, final written warning and dismissal or other sanction. There was a section entitled “ Gross Misconduct”, which defined this as misconduct of such a nature that it fundamentally breached the contractual relationship between the employee and employer and justified management in no longer accepting the continued presence of the employee at the place of work. Included amongst examples of “gross misconduct” in this section was “serious insubordination”. These formal procedures further set forth in this documentation particulars for carrying forward any disciplinary process.
5.3 In a document provided to the tribunal by the respondent, there was set forth a chronology of events. The sequence of these events was confirmed in the evidence of the respondent's witnesses. The detail of this chronology of events was not contraverted by the claimant. The tribunal received oral evidence from the respondent's witnesses concerning particular events which commenced in January 2009 and which continued for a period of time thereafter, eventually culminating in specific events which occurred on 9 March 2010. Whilst the tribunal was provided with a considerable amount of detail in respect of these events, it is sufficient to provide details of these in fairly summary form. In brief, concerns were raised by the respondent’s management in respect of the claimant’s work performance in her post and, in addition, concerning the claimant's willingness to adhere to managerial instruction and the manner in which she dealt with certain fellow employees of the respondent.
5.4 The tribunal
is unaware of any difficulties between the claimant and her management prior to
the early part of 2009. On 13 January 2009 there were some
discussions between Carol Corvan, the claimant’s Line Manager and the
claimant concerning the claimant being required to relocate office
accommodation. It seems that the claimant was resistant to the idea of moving
office. The claimant also seems to have been resistant to engaging in meetings
designed to discuss various
work-related matters. This particularly emerged as an issue in July 2009.
5.5 In July 2009 meetings took place between the claimant and management both in respect of the issue of sharing and relocating office accommodation and also in respect of a particular allegation levelled against her that the claimant had spoken inappropriately to another member of staff. There then followed further meetings at which concerns were raised by Carol Corvan regarding a request on the claimant's part to work from home (which request management declined). In the mid part of 2009 Management had concerns about the claimant attending to her workload and her engagement both with work colleagues and also with her line manager. In September 2009 a meeting was arranged with an external consultancy agency with a view to securing one-to-one coaching of the claimant by an external consultant, Anne McMurray, designed to assist the claimant in respect of her job tasks and functions. It seems that the claimant did not engage with the coaching and mentoring services offered by the consultant which related to leadership development and career coaching. The consultant reported this to the respondent's management in October 2009 and the coaching and mentoring programme did not proceed. The consultant reported to the respondent that the claimant had stated that the claimant could not identify any areas of her performance and style which she thought she needed to develop. The consultant further reported that the claimant had said that she had no motivation to work on these issues. Thus the programme was discontinued.
5.6 In September 2009 an incident occurred whereby another employee alleged that he had been belittled and humiliated by the claimant. Management obtained details from the employee making these allegations and then meetings took place with the claimant in order to address issues emerging from these allegations. At the meetings the respondent's management found that the claimant did not engage and appeared to be aloof and found it was observed that the claimant seemed to find these meetings amusing.
5.7 In November 2009 the claimant was issued with an informal warning in respect of a failure on her part to carry out a work instruction. She did not appeal this. On 21 December 2009 Carol Corvan held a meeting with the claimant. After this meeting it was confirmed to the claimant by an e-mail of that date that management would have to give consideration to a formal disciplinary process unless the claimant’s attitude towards fellow employees and her attitude towards professionalism of her work functions was addressed. The offer of communications training was stated still to be available if the claimant wished to avail of it. The claimant did not take up that renewed offer.
5.8 In January 2010 concerns were raised about the claimant not using the electronic work attendance recording (‘clocking’) system; the claimant’s manually recorded attendances did not appear to management to coincide with their observations of the claimant's actual attendance at work. In February 2010 the claimant was issued with a verbal warning. This related to lack of professionalism and respect for her colleagues. This verbal warning was issued following a succession of meetings which had taken place between the claimant and management over the previous seven months, culminating with a meeting which took place on 3 February 2010 between the claimant, Fionnuala Loughran, the respondent’s Human Resources Manager, and Carol Corvan. It was recorded in a letter dated 3 February 2010 from Carol Corvan to the claimant, notifying the claimant about the verbal warning, that the claimant had been offered mentoring support which had been declined by her. The claimant was warned in writing that if she did not take steps to improve her attitude and communication with colleagues her employment might be at risk.
5.9 Further concerns were then expressed by management regarding the claimant’s work output. These concerns related to management's perception that the claimant was not progressing audit tasks; concerns were also expressed regarding the quality of the claimant's reports. The respondent's management were also concerned with the claimant’s communication with colleagues, it being perceived that the claimant’s communication with colleagues was not clear. A further concern was that when asked to clarify things by management the claimant had declined to do so.
5.10 In early March 2010 Carol Corvan observed the claimant at her work desk but not appearing, from Carol Corvan’s observation, to be conducting any proper work. The topic of not ‘clocking’ in and out was raised again with the claimant by Carol Corvan at the time and it was made clear that the claimant was expected to use the electronic ‘clocking’ system. In an e-mail received on 9 March 2010 from the claimant by Carol Corvan, the claimant stated that she would be working from home for the rest of the week. Carol Corvan forthwith replied to this by e-mail, stating that the claimant was not authorised to work from home and requiring the claimant to attend a meeting. Carol Corvan then telephoned the claimant a short time afterwards and the claimant stated to Carol Corvan that she would not be at a meeting which had been arranged for the following Friday, 12 March 2010; the claimant then put the telephone down on Carol Corvan abruptly and terminated the telephone conversation. A further telephone conversation took place that day, 9 March 2010, between the claimant and Carol Corvan and the claimant stated that she would be leaving work that day at 12.00 noon. Carol Corvan, in response, indicated that the claimant did not have permission to leave work at that time and she asked the claimant why the claimant had put the telephone down on her. The claimant then, once again, put the telephone down and terminated the conversation. Carol Corvan then e-mailed the claimant that same day, 9 March 2010, to inform the claimant that this conduct was to be regarded as insubordination; a meeting was to take place arranged for the following Friday, the purpose of which was to review the claimant’s performance and other issues. The claimant was informed that she was entitled to be accompanied to the meeting by a Trade Union representative or fellow employee. In preparation for the meeting the claimant was asked to prepare a summary of time spent on audits, detailing any delays.
5.11 On Friday, 12 March 2010, a meeting took place. This meeting was attended by the claimant, together with Carol Corvan and also Fionnuala Loughran. Throughout the course of this meeting the claimant’s general attitude to things was what would be described as defiant and obstructive and the claimant was of a mind not to accept any fault on her part or blame. The claimant insisted that she would be working from home and that she had made a decision in that regard. It was made clear by management at the meeting that the claimant had no authority to work from home. The respondent's refusal to authorise the claimant working from home was confirmed to the claimant in a letter dated 18 March 2010 sent to her by Carol Corvan.
5.12 A disciplinary hearing was held on 22 March 2010. At the meeting the claimant was represented by Dennis Halligan, a work colleague. Jill McEneaney chaired the disciplinary panel, with Fidelma McQuade, the respondent’s Human Resources Officer, and also present was Paul Hanna, the respondent’s Leisure Services Officer. A number of misconduct allegations were made against the claimant at the disciplinary meeting. These were, firstly, fraud in respect of ‘clocking’ and time recording irregularities, secondly, insubordination, thirdly, abuse of authority and fourthly, poor performance in post. The grounds supporting these various allegations were put to the claimant in the course of the disciplinary meeting and the claimant was afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations. There was quite a lengthy discussion regarding the issues raised by management. The meeting commenced at 11.15 am and concluded at 12.55 pm. On the following day, 23 March 2010, the disciplinary panel reconvened with the same persons in attendance and the conclusions of the disciplinary panel in respect of the various allegations were announced to the claimant at the meeting.
5.13 In respect of the allegation of fraud, the respondent's disciplinary panel considered that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation of fraud. However, the panel did consider the claimant's conduct to constitute an abuse of the ‘flexi' system which amounted to major misconduct.
5.14 In respect of the allegation of insubordination, the disciplinary panel upheld that allegation. It was determined by the panel that on numerous occasions the claimant had refused to carry out reasonable requests from her Line Manager. This conduct included the claimant refusing requests on numerous occasions to record time worked on each audit, ignoring instruction to arrange meetings, refusing to provide clarification in respect of information sought from officers by e-mail on 25 February 2010, failure to attend a meeting with Carol Corvan on 8 March 2010 and leaving the work premises at 12.00 noon without ‘clocking’ out. It was recorded that there was also a period of five days’ absence without leave on the claimant's part in respect of which the claimant claimed to have been working from home, but without any managerial authorisation. The finding in respect of this allegation was of serious insubordination, amounting to gross misconduct.
5.15 In respect of the allegation of abuse of authority, the disciplinary panel found that the claimant’s conduct towards fellow officers amounted to oppressive and abusive behaviour. This was categorised as being unacceptable. This alleged misconduct related to specific incidents involving two named individuals; a lack of respect was found to have been shown by the claimant towards work colleagues. The finding of the disciplinary panel was that the claimant had abused her authority and that this amounted to major misconduct.
5.16 In respect of the allegation of poor work performance and failure to complete audits within the agreed timeframe or to the required standard, and an allegation that the claimant had spent twelve hours working from home (unauthorised) reviewing a file, the disciplinary panel determined that this amounted to unacceptable working. It was recorded that at the mentoring meeting arranged with the external consultant the claimant had stated that she could not identify any areas of her performance necessitating development. The finding of the disciplinary panel was that the claimant had refused to accept the need to improve her behaviour and to engage with leadership coaching specifically designed to assist her in improving her performance and dealing with colleagues. The disciplinary panel determined that this amounted to major misconduct.
5.17 It was also further mentioned by the respondent's management that the disciplinary panel had considered the claimant’s explanations relating to a particular issue which had emerged regarding the claimant's resistance to relocating her office, but that the panel had found that the claimant was unable to explain satisfactorily why the offered accommodation was not suitable. There was also a finding that the claimant had not provided satisfactory evidence concerning her raising this issue with her Line Manager. It was noted that the claimant had received an informal warning on 11 November 2009 and had received a verbal warning on 2 February 2010 in respect of conduct relating to time recording, insubordinate behaviour and attitude to colleagues. It was believed that the claimant had made no attempt to improve her behaviour or performance. The disciplinary panel had found the claimant’s attitude to be unhelpful, arrogant and at times antagonistic. In view of all of the forgoing matters, the respondent's decision was to dismiss the claimant.
5.18 The claimant was duly dismissed and the respondent afforded her pay in lieu of notice. In a letter to the claimant dated 25 March 2010, the reasons for the dismissal were set forth. Therein it was confirmed that the claimant would receive nine weeks’ pay in lieu of notice, together with two days’ outstanding leave pay, with some deductions being made from these wages in respect of a professional course which the claimant had agreed to be partially reimbursed by her to the respondent. The claimant was advised of her entitlement to appeal the decision within five working days of receipt of the letter confirming the dismissal to the respondent's Clerk and Chief Executive. The claimant did not appeal the dismissal. The tribunal does not need to recite any further material findings of fact for the purposes of reaching a determination in this case.
The Applicable Law
6. In this case the claimant has claimed unfair dismissal. The Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1996 Order”) provides at Article 126 of the 1996 Order that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer. Article 130 of the 1996 Order provides for the test of fairness concerning the dismissal by an employer. It is for the employer under the provisions of Article 130 (1) (a) to show the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and, under Article 130 (1) (b), that it is either a specified reason as set out in Article 130 (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal. The specified (potentially fair) reasons for dismissal that are set out in Article 130 (2) include, amongst others, the conduct of the employee (invariably referred to as “misconduct”). The guidance bearing upon the application of these statutory provisions is derived from a number of leading cases. In these matters of dismissal for alleged misconduct, the leading authority remains the case of Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1982] IRLR 439 in respect of which guidance has been given and approval confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in the case of Rogan v South Eastern Health and Social Care Trust [2009] NICA 47, following similar guidance and approval having been given by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Dobbin v Citybus Ltd [2008] NICA 42. The tribunal in the exercise of its function is therefore very clearly guided by Iceland. Therein the guidance (as given by Browne-Wilkinson J and bearing in mind that the statutory provisions referred to are the equivalent to Article 130 of the 1996 Order in Northern Ireland and that there is now “neutral” burden of proof) is stated as follows:-
‘(1) The starting point should always be the words [of section 57(3)] themselves;
(2) in applying the section an industrial tribunal must consider the reasonableness of the employer's conduct, not simply whether they (the members of the industrial tribunal) consider the dismissal to be fair;
(3) in judging the reasonableness of the employer's conduct an industrial tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer;
(4) in many, though not all, cases there is a band of reasonable responses to the employee's conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take another.’
7. In misconduct cases the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in Rogan has also endorsed again the approach in British Homes Stores v Burchell [1980] ICR 303. This approach involves the tribunal addressing three primary questions:
· The first question is – has it been established by the respondent, as employer, the fact of that belief in the misconduct alleged?
· The second question is – had the respondent, as employer, in its mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief?
· The third question is – had the respondent, as employer, at the relevant time or at least at the final stage at which it formed that belief on those grounds carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case?
The Tribunal’s Determination
8. In this case, the claimant has alleged unfair dismissal. The tribunal has carefully noted the evidence and the submissions in the matter. The law in respect of unfair dismissal in Northern Ireland follows the Court of Appeal Decision in the case of Rogan. In misconduct cases the tribunal also considers the approach taken in British Homes Stores v Burchell.
9. In this case, looking at matters objectively, there has been a proper, fair and reasonable investigation on the respondent’s part. The respondent has taken some care to conduct proceedings in a fair and proper manner. The disciplinary charges levelled against the claimant were clearly explained to the claimant. The claimant was afforded an entitlement to be accompanied to the disciplinary hearing. The claimant was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to address and to endeavour to counter any allegations put to her. If any employee in an internal disciplinary process, or any claimant in the tribunal process, declines properly to engage in the formal processes available, whether at the workplace disciplinary process or at tribunal, in the absence of anything else giving rise to procedural or substantive unfairness or mishap, that is a matter entirely for any such employee or any such claimant.
10. In this case, at hearing, the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses was given in a forthright, clear and compelling manner. Such evidence was not contraverted nor challenged by the claimant. As has been mentioned, the tribunal took some considerable care to ensure that the claimant was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity fully to participate in the proceedings. In doing so, the tribunal bore in mind both the general principles of natural justice and also the statutory provisions in this regard which are contained in the overriding objective under which the tribunal is to conduct its proceedings. With this accommodation afforded to her, the claimant did not endeavour to challenge or contradict any evidence adduced by the respondent nor did she challenge any submissions on the part of the respondent or provide the tribunal with the benefit of her own submissions concerning the factual and legal issues connecting that to her claim. How any claimant, whether represented or not, exercises the choice freely to be taken in respect of any evidence to be adduced or any argument advanced, is a matter for such claimant. The tribunal’s task is to ensure fairness and equity of approach and to make certain that any party is fully facilitated and enabled properly to participate in proceedings. In this case the claimant was afforded an opportunity by the tribunal to confirm, on a number of occasions, that she was properly fit and able fully to participate and to engage with the proceedings. The claimant expressly confirmed in response that there was nothing preventing her in so doing and in fully participating.
11. In this case, looking at the merits and applying the law as is mentioned above to the essential matters of fact determined by the tribunal, the tribunal is entirely satisfied that the claimant was fairly and properly dismissed by the respondent following a fair and proper investigation, which was in compliance with the principles in Burchell, and a fair and proper disciplinary process. There was nothing unfair or unjust about either the procedure engaged in by the respondent to effect the dismissal nor in the substantive fairness of the decision to dismiss. In the tribunal's unanimous determination, the respondent's decision to dismiss the claimant, in every respect, falls fairly and properly within the band of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer, applying the test in Iceland. Accordingly, the dismissal was fair and the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal is dismissed by the tribunal.
12. This determination thus leads the tribunal to the issue of costs. It must be said that it is somewhat unusual for the tribunal to encounter a hearing to determine a claim of unfair dismissal where the claimant brings the case before the tribunal but seemingly does not fully engage with the process of hearing. There is a presumption of capacity and fitness. That presumption is rebuttable if proper evidence were to be adduced to effect a rebuttal; there was none in this case. The tribunal must therefore assume that the claimant in this matter took a conscious decision to pursue this claim before the tribunal in the manner in which it has been conducted.
13. On the strength of the evidence and the facts determined, this claim for unfair dismissal is entirely without merit. In proceeding in this manner, the claimant has acted in a way which is unreasonable. The tribunal’s power to award costs is conferred by Rules 38 to 41 of the Industrial Tribunals Rules of Procedure contained in Schedule 1 to the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2005 (‘the Rules’). Rule 40 of the Rules provides that a tribunal shall consider making a costs order against a paying party were, in the opinion of the tribunal, the paying party has in bringing the proceedings, or he has in conducting the proceedings, acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably, or the bringing or conducting of the proceedings by the paying party has been misconceived. Rule 41 of the Rules provides that the amount of a costs order against the paying party may be determined by the tribunal specifying the sum which the paying party must pay to the receiving party. Rule 41 of the Rules further provides that the tribunal may have regard to the paying party's ability to pay when considering whether it shall make a costs order or how much that order should be.
14. Upon conclusion of the hearing, it was agreed that the respondent's representatives would provide details of the legal costs sought in writing to the tribunal. By letter dated 7 December 2010, the respondent’s representatives wrote to the tribunal in relation to legal costs arising from the attendance at the tribunal on 2 & 3 December 2010. A fees invoice dated 7 December 2010, signed, was attached to that letter detailing attendances at the tribunal for the dates in question and costs charged in regard thereto, together with VAT, and also Counsel’s fee. The amounts in question were, Solicitor’s professional costs totalling £962.49 (on a time-charged basis), VAT of £168.43 and Counsel’s fees of £1,527.50. The total costs were thus £2,658.42.
15. Upon receipt of this letter and invoice, the tribunal by letter dated 14 December 2010 wrote to the claimant, copying the letter and invoice, indicating that the Chairman of the tribunal had directed that the claimant provide such written submissions which she might wish to make in respect of: (1) the possible award of costs by the tribunal; and (2) the amount of costs claimed; and (3) the claimant's ability to pay any award of costs such as the costs claimed. That claimant was requested to provide any submissions she might wish to make within 10 days of the date of the tribunal’s letter. Nothing was received by the tribunal in response to this request from the tribunal.
16. The tribunal thus further considered the costs issue. In conducting proceedings as she has done, the claimant has caused the respondent to incur considerable difficulty, inconvenience and financial cost. The claimant has been afforded an opportunity to revert to the tribunal with her own submissions in respect of costs, having had the amount of costs sought made clear to her. She has declined to take up this opportunity. The tribunal has received nothing from the claimant in opposition to the respondent's submissions concerning the costs issue and also the amount of such costs claimed and her ability to pay. In determination of this issue, the tribunal has given careful consideration to the respondent's submissions and all the circumstances of the case.
17. The tribunal notes that in the case of Lodwick v London Borough of Southwark [2004] IRLR 554 the Court of Appeal in England confirmed that costs awards in employment tribunals were exceptional; the aim was compensation of the party which has incurred expense in winning the case, not punishment of the losing party. No specific unreasonable conduct which caused costs to be incurred is required to be proved. It is sufficient that the tribunal has regard to the nature, gravity and effect of the unreasonable conduct as factors relevant to the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion (see McPherson v BNP Paribas [2004] ICR 1398).
18. In this case, the tribunal's determination is that the claimant has in bringing and in conducting these proceedings acted unreasonably. The tribunal had perceived no merit in the claimant's case. It is proper under these circumstances that the claimant, as paying party, bears the costs of the proceedings as indicated by the respondent’s representatives, the aim being compensation of the party which has incurred expense in the matter. In the absence of any information (which indeed was requested from the claimant but not provided) concerning the claimant’s ability to pay any award of costs such as the costs claimed, the tribunal does not see any reason to award part only of such costs as have been claimed. That being the case, the tribunal orders the claimant to pay to the respondent the total sum of £2,658.42 in costs.
Chairman:
Date and place of hearing: 2 & 3 December 2010, Belfast.
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: