CASE REF: 1476/07
CLAIMANT: Kieran Harris
RESPONDENT: The Multiple Sclerosis Society of Great Britain & Northern Ireland
The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the claimant was not unfairly dismissed. The claimant's claim is dismissed in its entirety.
Constitution of Tribunal:
Chairman: Ms J Knight
Members: Mr F Dodds
Mr N Wilkinson
Appearances:
The claimant was represented by Mr Gerry Grainger, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Rosemary Connolly Solicitors.
The respondent was represented by Mr Kevin Jaquiss of Cobbetts Solicitors.
Issues
Evidence
Findings of Fact
(1) For the respondent it was contended that the claimant was dismissed for reasons relating to his conduct and that Mr Gillespie was entitled to reach the conclusions that he reached in finding the claimant guilty of misconduct in view of the documentary evidence before him combined with the contradictory statements of the claimant at the disciplinary meeting and during the investigation. Mr Gillespie was entitled to conclude that the claimant had sought to mislead him as to his role in the matters which lead to his dismissal. Procedurally the dismissal was fair in that an independent investigation was carried out by Louise Simpson. Mr Gillespie was a proper person to conduct the investigation given that the complaint against him was made at a governance level and he had not been involved in the investigations of the Chairman's Committee. In relation to the appeal there was no evidence that the involvement of Ms Fagg prejudiced the process. The appeal panel was entitled to reach the finding that it did especially in view of the fact that the claimant did not attend. In any event Ms Rantzen's evidence was that the same decision would have been reached in her view had Ms Fagg not been involved. Furthermore dismissal was a reasonable sanction to impose based on the conclusions reached by Mr Gillespie.
(2) It was contended for the claimant that the disagreement about governance issues leading to the withdrawal of the delegated powers, was inextricably linked with the allegations of misconduct against the claimant and that once that decision was made, the claimant's employment was in jeopardy. There was an artificially constructed case by the respondent against the claimant to justify his dismissal. At no time had the respondent specified the allegations of bullying and harassment made against the claimant. There was no basis for the assertion that the claimant had committed MSSNI to a separate path as at all times he had carried out the decisions of the Council and Executive Committee. At the time of the alleged misconduct the claimant was employed by MSSNI and not the respondent so if there was a conflict with the national society he was bound to carry out the instructions of his employer. The claimant acted in these matters at all times with the authority of the Executive Committee. It was contended that the respondent had acted unreasonably in treating these matters as a reason for dismissing the claimant and Mr Gillespie had failed to take into account mitigating factors, such as his successes and length of service. The process followed was unfair in that Mr Gillespie should not have been involved in the disciplinary investigation because of his own involvement in events prior to the withdrawal of the delegated powers; and further that he had failed to carry out a full and proper investigation, for example he did not interview the Treasurer about allegations of financial misconduct and that the appeal process was flawed due to the involvement of Ms Fagg. It was suggested that the respondent could not in any event discipline the claimant for conduct which had arisen before the withdrawal of the delegated powers.
The Law
(a) the reasons (or if more than one the principal reasons) for the dismissal, and
(b) that it is either a reason falling within paragraph 2 or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.
(2) A reason falls within this paragraph if it –
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee,……
Article 130 (4) provides: Where the employee has fulfilled the requirement for paragraph one, the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair, having regard to the reason shown by the employer-
depends on whether the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employers undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee,
and
shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.
Article 130A (2) inserted into the 1996 Order by Article 23(2) of the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (the 2003 Order), provides that:
"Subject to paragraph(1), failure by an employer to follow a procedure in relation to the dismissal of an employee shall not be regarded for the purpose of Article 130(4)(a) as by itself making the employer's action unreasonable if he shows that he would have decided to dismiss the employee if he had followed the procedure".
The statutory dispute resolution procedures prescribed by the 2003 Order and set out in Schedule 1, part 1 of the 2003 Order apply in this case. Where an employer fails to comply with the 3 step statutory dismissal procedure, a dismissal is rendered automatically unfair.
The tribunal considered the following case law: Foley v Post Office; HSBC Bank Plc (formerly Midland Bank Plc) -v- Madden 2000 IRLR 827 CA; Iceland Frozen Foods -v- Jones 1983 ICR17; British Homes Stores -v- Burchell 1978 IRLR 379 EAT; W Weddel and Company Limited -v- Tepper 1980 IRLR96; Sainsbury's Supermarkets v Hitt 2003 IRLR 23; Polkey -v- A E Dayton Services Limited 1987 IRLR 503; Ulsterbus Limited v Henderson 1989 IRLR 251 NICA; Trusthouse Forte (Catering) Limited v Adonis 1984 IRLR 382; LJ Sewell and J Francis v Ford Motor Co 1973 IRLR 25; W Devis & Sons Ltd v RA Atkins 1977 IRLR 314; CEX Limited v Mark Lewis 2007 UKEAT/0013/07; Software 2000 Ltd v Andrews 2007 IRLR 568 EAT.
In the Burchill case, the EAT set out the following principles:-
"What the tribunal have to decide every time is, broadly expressed, whether the employer who discharged the employee on the ground of the misconduct in question ………..entertained a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief in the guilt of the employee of that misconduct at that time. ……………First of all, there must be established by the employer the fact of that belief……… Secondly, that the employer had …reasonable grounds for that belief. And thirdly……….that the employer………had carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in the circumstances of the case".
The leading case on the application of Article 130(4) of the 1996 Order is Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones 1982 IRLR 439 EAT in which Browne-Wilkinson J stated that "the correct approach for the industrial tribunal to adopt in answering the question posed by [article 130(4) of the Order] is as follows:-
i.the starting point should always be the words of [article 130 (4)] themselves
in applying the section an industrial tribunal must consider the reasonableness
of the employer's conduct, not simply whether they consider the dismissal to be
fair;
in judging the reasonableness of the employer's conduct an industrial tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer;
in many, though not all cases where there is a band of reasonable responses to the employee's conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another employer might quite reasonably take another;
(iv) the function of the industrial tribunal, as an industrial jury, is to determine whether in the particular circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band, the dismissal is fair; if the dismissal falls outside the band, it is unfair."
In the case of Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt 2003 IRLR 23, the Court of Appeal stated that it was not for the tribunal to substitute its own view for that of the employer. The Court of Appeal stated as follows:-
"The range of reasonable responses test (or, to put it another way, the need to apply the objective standards of the reasonable employer) applies as much to the question whether the investigation into the suspected misconduct was reasonable in all the circumstances as it does to the reasonableness of the decision to dismiss for the conduct reason".
Conclusions
Chairman:
Dates and place of hearing: 14-25 April 2008; 1-2 May 2008; 6 May 2008; 28-30 May 2008;
4-5 June 2008 at Belfast.
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: