CASE REF:3647/01
551/02
APPLICANT: Pauline Rankin
RESPONDENT: The Chief Constable Police Service of Northern Ireland
The unanimous decision of the tribunal is that the applicant has not proved in either of her applications that she was unlawfully discriminated against on grounds of her sex under the provisions of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 and her applications are dismissed.
Appearances:
The applicant was represented by Ms Wilson Barrister-at-Law instructed by Reid Black Solicitors.
The respondent was represented by Ms Murnaghan Barrister-at-Law instructed by the Crown Solicitor.
The reasons for this decision are given in extended form, being an issue under the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order.
7.00 am - 3.00 pm known as early shift
3.00 pm - 11.00 pm known as late shift
11.00 pm - 7.00 am known as night shift.
(a) Having to attend court and
(b) Extra hours of duty detailed to constables by the Operational Planning Unit (hereinafter called OPU).
This was usually worked as part of a 12 hour shift i.e., an extra 4 hours + 15 minutes briefing time involving either a continuation or earlier commencement of normal 8 hour shift.
An officer would check the computer regularly to see what his/her overtime duty was going to be. Overtime was mostly obligatory and only refused if another person was available.
(1) The terms "Recuperative and Restricted Duties" will replace the former terms "Temporary and Permanent Restrictions".
(2) "Recuperative Duties" are defined as "temporary rehabilitative duties or working conditions approved to assist an officer's ultimate return to full duty following illness or injury, by permitting return to or continued work in a less demanding capacity".
(3) It will be the expectation that any officer placed on such duties will return to the full range of operational duties at the earliest opportunity.
(4) Officers will be placed on "Recuperative Duties" if they are deemed to be incapable of carrying out the full range of duties, due to a medical condition. A recommendation will be made to the Chief Superintendent Personnel, via the officer's supervisor, by one of the medical advisers. This will be for a maximum of 3 months, with the possibility of an extension of a further 3 months, at the discretion of the Chief Superintendent Personnel, following advice from the medical adviser, and will be reviewable on a 3 monthly basis. During this time every effort will be made to facilitate the officer's return to the full range of duties. At the end of 3 or 6 months, an officer incapable of returning to the full range of duties will be placed in the "Restricted Duties" category.
(5) Overtime must not be worked by officers on "Recuperative Duties" unless this has the explicit approval of line management and the medical adviser.
(6) "Restricted Duties" are defined as "duties or conditions approved for other than recuperative purposes to any officer unable to perform one or more aspects of full operational duty for a specific reason, where there is little likelihood of a return to full operational duties".
(7) Officers will be placed on "Restricted Duties" if they are likely to be subject to a permanent medical restriction. This will apply when:
(a) The officer has been on Recuperative Duties for 6 months and is not yet fit to resume the full range of duties or
(b) In the opinion of the medical adviser the officer will not be fit for the full range of duties in the foreseeable future. Such officers will be subject to regular review by the medical adviser to monitor any change in circumstances.
Prior to this Order there was apparently no restriction as to the amount of overtime allocated to those on a medical restriction. Also "temporary restricted duties" were commonly described as "light duties".
She also spoke to Sgt Browne, Con Thompson's supervisor, who told her she did not have to do the overtime if she did not wish to do so. Sgt Browne recalled discussing "recuperative duties" with the applicant but was not sure whether or not she had referred to the Force Order. Applicant said she did not refer her to it.
(a) On 30 August 2000 after which Dr Crowther reported on 5 September 2000,
"She is currently on long term sick leave as a result of a neck problem which may well require surgery. She …… could probably return to duties without a significant risk of confrontation at the end of September if these were available. She would have no difficulty working the normal shift system. We are awaiting further scans and comments from the neurosurgeon but it likely she will have to remain on restricted duties until she recovers from her operation".
Received by personnel on 12 September 2000.
(b) On 12 April 2001 when Dr Watson reported on 13 April 2001,
"She has had her MRI scan however she is awaiting her neurosurgical appointment which I think is in June, therefore in view of the remarks dated 5 September 2000 from Dr Crowther, her duty should remain at present without confrontation. We would hope to review her after the neurosurgeons have commented on her possibility of having surgery".
Received by personnel on 23 April 2001.
Applicant was aware from June 2001 that neck surgery was not appropriate and without it her restriction was permanent. In her evidence she said she told her section sergeant and sergeant in OPU. She did not however go back to OHU or seek a referral.
(c) On 24 October 2001 after which Dr Crowther reported on 25 October 2001,
"Unfortunately the neurosurgeon feels that surgery would not be appropriate at the moment due to risks involved. Unfortunately Con Rankin will therefore have a vulnerable neck in situations of physical confrontation which would restrict her from duties involving this risk in the long term.
I note there has been a query with regards to her working overtime. From a medical point of view there would be no constraints to her working overtime if required. As previously stated she can work in the full shift system".
This latter report was apparently received by personnel on 2 November 2001.
(i) There was no indication in Dr Crowther's report of 5 September 2000 that restrictions should be placed on amount of overtime she could work.
(ii) That Force Order had not been properly applied to her in that she fell into 11(8)(b) as being an officer who in the opinion of the medical adviser will not be fit for the full range of duties in the foreseeable future.
(iii) Other officers on restricted duties had been regularly given more overtime than the applicant.
Chief Inspector Robinson sought the view of OHU whether the applicant was capable of working overtime and requested Inspector Weston to investigate the complaint and report. Inspector Weston confirmed that the applicant had been told by OPU that overtime availability would be unlikely for her due to the restriction in her working capacity. He also reported that no deliberate overtime constraints had been applied to officers on restricted duties but that it was normal to detail officers who could perform the full range of duties and that overtime worked by an officer on restricted duties was for a valid and necessary reason.
Following receipt of reports from OHU and Inspector Weston, Chief Inspector Robinson informed OPU that the applicant could be given overtime in capacity of SDO. In his response to Con White he said "Whilst Force Order Part 1, File Box B …. is silent on overtime for personnel on restricted duties, I nevertheless consider that it is always good practice to seek OHU opinion before such overtime is allocated. This I have done on this occasion. I can confirm that medical opinion does not prevent the member performing overtime. Operational Planning has been so informed".
There is confusion in the terminology used in this correspondence.
It is not clear from Chief Inspector Robinson's letter whether he is agreeing with Con White and the applicant that she was "restricted" or whether he is accepting that following receipt of the medical report on 25 October 2001 she is "restricted". The latter is more consistent with his evidence to the tribunal that he based his decision that applicant was "restricted" upon the report of 25 October 2001 but said he could understand the applicant's view prior to this that her restriction was permanent. He explained that he thought it was good practice to seek opinion from OHU to check persons on "restrictive" and for those on "recuperative" it was necessary. He accepted there was delay in getting medical evidence reviewing persons on "recuperative".
(i) Con Speers was given no overtime in March 2001. He sought an interview with OHU and was classified as fully fit.
(ii) Con Chalmers was similar to the applicant in that on 6 February 2001 OHU said he was fit for duties limited to station complex and this was likely to be the case for several months. He worked as SDO at Oldpark Station. In August 2001 he approached his line supervisor for overtime and was referred to OHU who said on 7 August 2001 he could do overtime as an SDO. No overtime as SDO was available to him. On 31 August he went off sick on grounds of stress.
Both Con Speers and Con Chalmers were referred to the Force Order in relation to their allocation of overtime.
(iii) Con McFettridge worked 9.00 am to 5.00 pm and did not wish to work overtime.
It was clear that manpower in Oldpark was down – to three persons per section, one as security at gate, one as SDO and one to cover either of these positions.
The tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence that Con White of Police Federation suggested to her that her transfer was significant coming so soon after she had lodged her claim of sex discrimination in relation to allocation of overtime and that it was probably on his advice she lodged her second claim. Unfortunately the tribunal did not have the benefit of his evidence on the matter.
(i) Less favourable treatment.
(ii) On grounds of her sex.
To show that the less favourable treatment was on ground of her sex, the applicant must show that another male in the same or not materially different circumstances was treated differently or that a hypothetical male in the same or not materially different circumstances would have been treated differently.
The House of Lords in the Shamoon case said that whilst the traditional 2 stage approach:
(i) Was there less favourable treatment and
(ii) If so, was it on grounds of sex.
May be appropriate in some cases, in other cases, less favourable treatment cannot be determined until it has been asked why the applicant was treated as she was.
The applicant was not referred to the Force Order when she raised the matter of her overtime with Con Thompson. It was however raised with her federation representative, Con Cahill, a few days later when he was making representations on her behalf. In comparison to the two male officers the only less favourable treatment was that the applicant was not referred to OHU in June when she raised the matter. There is nothing to suggest this was because she was female but rather that her federation representative did not do it or advise her to do it.
In the tribunal's view it was a very material difference. We could understand that the applicant used him to illustrate the amount of overtime available to SDO's and assistant SDO's, overtime she believed she could have done. The fact he was not subject to any medical limitation meant he was, if required, available for non-confrontational duties and he was not subject to Paragraph 11 of the Force Order. There was no evidence to show that a hypothetical male comparator would have been treated differently to the applicant had he been in the same circumstances or not materially different circumstances.
(i) Con Thompson's conversation with the applicant on 22 June 2001 – his failure to refer her to the Force Order and his abrupt tone. The tribunal did not find in the circumstances that it could draw such an inference.
(ii) In relation to the Force Order that the federation representatives were not familiar with it. There was no evidence to confirm this; that the applicant was not referred to it in June does not confirm this; the evidence of Sgt Browne was that she referred Con Cahill to it and he was fully aware of it and they discussed it.
(iii) No documentation between OPU and personnel re officers with duty restrictions. The explanation offered was that at the relevant time there was only a small number of officers with duty restrictions i.e., four. The tribunal could not draw any inference of sex discrimination.
(iv) Someone other than Con Thompson detailed overtime to applicant. The tribunal accepted his explanation that it was probably detailed by her section sergeant because of a need. Again the tribunal could not draw any inference.
Counsel also suggested that in Dr Crowther's report of 5 September 2000 the words that the applicant would have "no difficulty in working the normal shift system" meant she was fit to work overtime. Unfortunately it did not say so and the tribunal did not think it appropriate to make the assumption.
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1996 a tribunal has a discretion to make an Order for Costs where it is of the opinion that "a party has in bringing or conducting the proceedings acted scandalously, frivolously, vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably".
The respondent's application did not include "scandalously", "frivolously" or "disruptively" but relied on "vexatiously, abusively" or "otherwise unreasonably". There was no suggestion that the applicant acted from a spiteful or improper motive. The respondent's application relied on lack of substance in the applicant's claims and that they had no reasonable prospect of success.
In relation to the first case, the applicant believed she had been treated unfairly in respect of the allocation of overtime. Chief Inspector Robinson in his evidence said he understood the applicant's view that her restriction was permanent, also that there was some confusion with the introduction of the Force Order and delay in getting medical evidence. She was the only female in her section who was restricted in relation to duties. She believed that male officers like her were being treated differently. It is the view of the tribunal that she had a prima facie case and was entitled to bring her claim to the tribunal which did not reach its decision until it had heard all the evidence.
In relation to her second claim the applicant was given some 4-5 days notice she was being transferred to another station. It was suggested to her by her police federation representative that it might be significant following so soon after her lodging a sex discrimination claim. On 28 January 2002 the applicant wrote to Sgt Jardine of OPU seeking information about her transfer but did not receive any reply. Again there was a prima facie case.
The originating application in this claim filed almost a month later, and also in the first claim, were both signed by solicitors acting on behalf of the applicant but who at the hearing were no longer acting for her. Also at the hearing neither of the police federation representatives were available to give evidence. It was not therefore certain to us that the applicant "had the benefit of legal advice at all times prior to and during the presentation of these complaints".
Finally in neither case was any application brought by the respondent for a pre hearing review.
Having considered all the circumstances the tribunal refuses the respondent's application for costs against the applicant.
Chairman:
Date and place of hearing: 15, 16 October 2003 and 27 November 2003, Belfast.
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: