1. In this application the applicant, a resident of the
Garvaghy Road area of Portadown, challenges the validity of the appointment by
the Secretary of State of the members of the Parades Commission for Northern
Ireland (the Commission) and seeks a declaration that their appointment was
unlawful, together with other remedies by way of mandamus, prohibition and an
injunction. The gravamen of her complaint is that as eventually constituted the
Commission contained no women members, which she claims is in breach of the
terms of the Public Processions (Northern
Ireland) Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) and is also invalid on a number of other
grounds. The case made by the Secretary of State, the respondent to the
application, is that in the circumstances of the case it became impracticable to
appoint a woman member, which had been his original intention, and that there
was no breach of the 1998 Act or any other obligation imposed upon him by the
law.
2. At the commencement of the hearing counsel instructed on
behalf of the Human Rights Commission for Northern Ireland applied for leave to
intervene and to present an argument in support of the applicant in the course
of the proceedings. Kerr J had earlier given the Human Rights Commission leave
to present a written submission but had not then given leave to intervene. I
respectfully agree that that was an advisable course to adopt. Where a judge at
the stage of giving leave to apply for judicial review or on review of the case
before the substantive hearing receives an application from a body such as the
Human Rights Commission for leave to intervene, it would, I suggest, be the most
appropriate course at that stage to restrict any leave which he may give to
furnishing a written submission. The judge who hears a subsequent application
for leave to intervene will then be able to read this and determine whether oral
argument from the body would be of sufficient assistance to justify adding an
extra party to the application.
3. I do not think that it would be profitable to attempt to
lay down categories of cases where it would be justified to give leave to an
intervener to present oral argument at the hearing of a substantive application,
but in my view leave should be very sparingly given, certainly at first
instance. Higher appellate tribunals may perhaps derive greater assistance from
an intervener in some cases, but I think that a judge at first instance should
give leave only when he considers that there is an issue of sufficient
consequence which cannot be adequately dealt with by counsel for one of the
parties to the application. In the present case I did not consider, having read
the written submission, that it was such a case, and accordingly I declined to
give leave to intervene.
4. The Commission was established by the 1998 Act, section 2
of which defined its functions:
5. Advance notice of a proposal to organise a public
procession has by section 6
to be given to the RUC, with details of date and time, route, numbers likely to
take part, bands and arrangements for control. Under section 8
the Commission is empowered to issue a determination in respect of a proposed
public procession, including conditions as to the route of the procession.
6. The composition of the Commission is laid down by
Schedule 1. It is to consist of a chairman and not more than six other members,
appointed for a term not exceeding three years by the Secretary of State, who
may by order vary the number of members. Paragraph 2(3) provides:
7. The term of office of the first chairman and members of
the Commission was due to expire on 18 February 2000. In October 1999 the
Secretary of State put in train the process of appointment of a fresh set of
members, to take up office on 19 February 2000 for a two-year term. The
appointment of the chairman was dealt with in a separate process. Advertisements
inviting applications for appointment were placed in the press in early October
1999, setting out the function of the Commission and the terms of appointment of
the members. The advertisement described the skills required for membership of
the Commission as follows:
9. In addition to the advertisements in the press for
applications, the Minister of State wrote to the leaders of all the political
parties and the main churches, asking them to encourage anyone whom they
considered appropriate to apply, and a similar request was made to the Irish
Government.
10. The Northern Ireland Office did not in the event
refuse to receive applications submitted after 5 November 1999, since it was
given to understand, in consequence of the requests to the political parties,
that some applications would be received after that date. Two such applications
were received on 8 and 16 November respectively, then another unexpected
application came in on 17 November. The NIO decided to accept all of these,
since it had taken no step to consider any of the applications submitted by 5
November.
11. A total of 82 persons applied for membership of the
Commission, of which 46, or 83%, were male and 14, or 17%, were female. The
annex to this judgment contains tables specifying the total number of
applicants, those shortlisted and interviewed, those who passed the merit test
and those proposed for membership. An interview panel was convened to consider
the applications and prepare a short list. It did so by assessing from the
application forms the extent to which each candidate possessed the skills and
qualities requisite for appointment which had been set out in the
advertisements. The candidates had been asked to give an account in their forms
of how they had demonstrated these skills and qualities. The number of
candidates shortlisted was 23, of whom three, or 13%, were female. The
interviewing panel then interviewed the candidates on the short list and
assessed in respect of each the level of his or her relevant skills and
qualities, the object being to ensure that each met the standard required for
appointment in respect of all the skills and qualities. Those who did not
satisfy this test were excluded, bringing the total down to 16, consisting of 13
Protestant males, one Catholic male, one Protestant female and one Catholic
female. These 16 persons were ranked in order of merit by the panel, which
recommended to the Secretary of State that he should appoint the first six.
Those six persons consisted of four Protestant males, one Catholic male and one
Catholic female. The reserve list, being the remainder of the 16 ranked persons,
then consisted of one Protestant female and 13 Protestant males.
12. The Secretary of State accepted the panel's advice and
the NIO approached the six persons selected. Initially all of them indicated
their willingness to accept appointment, and arrangements were made to announce
the composition of the new Commission on Monday 7 February 2000. On Friday 4
February the female appointee informed the NIO that she would not accept an
offer of appointment.
13. The Secretary of State was then faced with the
necessity to adopt one of several possible courses of action, none of which was
ideal. He considered and rejected the following as undesirable, for the reasons
set out against each:
14. It might perhaps have been possible to re-appoint the
existing Commission for a period, if its members could be persuaded to continue
in office until a suitable appointment could be made. Mr Watkins refers to this
possibility in his affidavit, but does not specify the reasons against it. I am
therefore not aware whether all the outgoing members could all have been
persuaded to remain in office and were all in a position to do so, but this
would have been a necessary precondition if balance were to be maintained. In
the event a different expedient was adopted by the Secretary of State, as Mr
Watkins sets out in paragraph 14 of his affidavit:
15. He then reported to the Commissioner for Public
Appointments what he proposed to do, explaining the circumstances to her. She
gave her approval to the method of appointment, stating that she was satisfied
that the NIO had made every effort to ensure both that the Commission was
representative of the community, as far as practicable, and had been appointed
on merit.
17. The main theme of Mr Macdonald's argument on behalf of
the applicant was that because of the absence of female members the membership
of the Commission could not be said to be representative of the community in
Northern Ireland. Mr Weatherup QC for the respondent accepted that the gender
imbalance made the membership unrepresentative, but argued that the Secretary of
State had done his best in the circumstances to secure mixed gender membership
and that it had been impracticable to do so. Mr Macdonald also disputed the
validity of the Secretary of State's view that it would have been unlawful for
him to become involved in acts of positive discrimination by appointing a woman
who was less qualified than a male candidate who was not appointed.
18. I am not altogether persuaded that the phrase
"representative of the community" in paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 1 to the 1998
Act was intended to mean that there should be gender balance, or at least some
representation of each gender in the make-up of the Commission. Counsel drew my
attention to the view expressed in paragraph 12.33 of the North Report, which
led to the enactment of the 1998 Act:
19. While it is obviously desirable that the Commission
should not be composed entirely of persons of one gender, the legislation does
not refer in terms to that factor. The phrase in paragraph 2(3) has to be taken
in its context and against the regular usage of the word "community". As Mr
Watkins observed in paragraph 17 of his affidavit,
20. The phrase in question does not refer to gender or to
the make-up of the population of the Province. It refers specifically to "the
community", which in the context of parades is constantly used to denote the
different sectarian blocks – see, for example, the reference in paragraphs 1.15
and 1.16 of the North Report to "another part of our community" and "the other
part of the community", which are plainly references to the sectarian divide. In
the context of the 1998 Act, therefore, it is in my view a tenable proposition,
notwithstanding Mr Weatherup's concession, that paragraph 2(3) imposes a
requirement only to ensure sectarian balance in the composition of the
Commission. I should, however, prefer to have further argument directed
specifically to this point before attempting to decide it finally, and in view
of my conclusions on the practicability issue it is not necessary to do so in
this judgment.
21. The Secretary of State is enjoined by paragraph 2(3)
of Schedule 1 to the 1998 Act to ensure that the membership of the Commission is
representative of the community "as far as practicable". This phrase appears
frequently in statute law and has been interpreted in many authorities, but it
is always necessary to bear in mind the context of the statutory provision in
which it appears. Some common threads run through the case law. "Practicable" is
a more stringent standard than "reasonably practicable": see, eg, Gregson v
Hick Hargreaves & Co Ltd [1955] 3 All ER 507 at 516, per Parker LJ. In
many contexts it means feasible, which is probably the nearest to a synonym for
the term. Perhaps the most apposite comment on the word is that of Boreham J in
Brooks v J & P Coats Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 702 at 719g, where he was
dealing with a factory occupier's statutory duty under section 4 of the
Factories Act 1961 to make effective and suitable provision to render harmless,
so far as practicable, all such fumes, dust etc as might be injurious to health.
He stated in the course of his judgment:
22. In the present context the obligation placed upon the
Secretary of State to ensure the representative nature of the membership of the
Commission is qualified by the provision that it is to be representative of the
community as far as is practicable. Certain practical limits are placed by the
small size of the Commission upon his ability to make the membership
representative. The need to observe the merit principle in appointments
constitutes another very important practical constraint. Limitations of this
type are no doubt what the legislature envisaged when requiring the Secretary of
State to ensure that the membership was representative of the community. The
phrase is in my opinion capable of encompassing practical difficulties such as
those encountered in the present case, when a prospective appointee pulled out
at the last minute, it was desirable to proceed without delay to make the
appointments to reconstitute the Commission, and the appointment of a candidate
from the reserve list would have made for religious imbalance, as would leaving
the vacancy unfilled for a period while another appointment was made. Because of
those practical difficulties and the need to appoint on merit and avoid
religious imbalance, the Secretary of State was unable to do what he had
originally intended to do, appoint at least one woman to the Commission. If the
all-male membership of the Commission means that it is not representative of the
community – a point on which I do not propose to rule – he took all practicable
steps open to him to make it so representative.
23. Mr Macdonald, implicitly acknowledging the force of
this argument, then relied on two contentions. He argued first that even if the
Secretary of State had been stymied by events from achieving the object of
making the membership properly representative, he had left himself in that
position by the inadequacy of his original trawl for candidates. I do not think
that this contention is well founded on the facts of the case. The process of
advertisement and trawl produced a field of 68 candidates, including 14 women of
mixed denominations. Although the number of appointable women was reduced to two
during the sifting processes, that is insufficient proof that the net was cast
insufficiently widely in the first place or that if any other method had been
chosen there would have been a wider selection of suitable female candidates.
Secondly, Mr Macdonald submitted that the Secretary of State was entitled to
appoint a Catholic woman to replace the candidate who dropped out,
notwithstanding the fact that such an appointee would have been less well
qualified for appointment than those on the reserve list. He argued in support
of this contention that positive discrimination of this kind would have been
lawful, notwithstanding the general anti-discrimination legislation, in order to
fulfil the requirements of the 1998 Act. The basis for this argument was Article
78 of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which
repealed and re-enacted with amendments the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland)
Acts 1976 and 1989. The material portion is Article 78(1)(a), which re-enacted
section 41 of the 1976 Act:
24. Mr Macdonald argued that since the 1998 Act was passed
before the 1998 Order Article 78(1)(a) applied to preserve the lawfulness of
acts done in pursuance of the requirement contained in paragraph 2(3) of
Schedule 1. Accordingly, he submitted, the Secretary of State was bound to make
the membership of the Commission representative of the community, and could with
impunity indulge in positive discrimination for that purpose.
25. This argument disregards the fact that the obligation
in paragraph 2(3) is not absolute, but is qualified by the provision that he is
to make the membership representative as far as is practicable. Moreover, the
same argument cannot be advanced in respect of sex discrimination, because of
the terms of Article 52 of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976,
which contains a provision similar to that of Article 78 of the Fair Employment
and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998. The 1998 Act is certainly not an
earlier enactment than the 1976 Order and therefore Article 52 of the latter
cannot operate to preserve the lawfulness of acts done to comply with any
requirement in the former. The discrimination which it is suggested that the
Secretary of State should have exercised was sex discrimination, not religious
discrimination, and it would, as the Secretary of State correctly apprehended,
have been unlawful for him to appoint a less qualified woman ahead of a better
qualified man. I accordingly do not consider that these contentions advanced by
Mr Macdonald are well founded.
26. Paragraph 3(ii) of the applicant's statement sets out
a number of matters which it is claimed the Secretary of State failed to take
into account in reaching his decision:
27. It is clear from the evidence which I have discussed
that the Secretary of State did have regard to the factors set out in (a), (b),
(c), (g), (h) and (i). The purport of sub-paragraphs (d) and (f) is that the
Secretary of State should have had regard to the appointing procedures contained
in the Guidance published by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. He
obviously did have regard to them, for he went so far as to consult the
Commissioner before appointing Mr Quinn. The applicant's complaint is a rather
different point, that he did not follow them to the letter. In the ordinary way
there is no legal obligation upon a minister to do so, and an appointment is not
invalidated if he fails to follow them. The applicant claims, however, that an
undertaking was given to the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition on 27 October
1999 by the Minister of State Mr Adam Ingram on behalf of the Government that
these procedures would be followed, and it was submitted on her behalf that this
gave rise to a legitimate expectation that this would be done. It is also
contended in paragraph 3(iii) of her statement that on this ground the manner in
which the Secretary of State arrived at his appointing decisions was
procedurally unfair.
28. I can deal with the last point first. Three
applications were received after the closing date specified in the press
advertisements, but were considered along with the others. It appears that one
at least of these applicants was eventually appointed. Mr Watkins states,
however, at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that no consideration had been given to
the other applications by the time the last of the late entries had been
received. All the applications were then considered together, and I cannot see
that any prejudice was thereby caused to any of those whose applications were
submitted by the stated closing date or that the process was unfair to them. It
has not been suggested that there are any other persons who would have applied,
and might have been successful, if they had known that late applications would
be received. When it came to the appointment of Mr Quinn, the Guidance was not
followed, because of the exigencies of the situation, but before he made the
appointment the Secretary of State consulted the Commissioner in order to obtain
her views on the propriety of proceeding as he proposed to do, and she approved
his course of action. I therefore do not consider that there was any procedural
unfairness.
29. It is suggested that Mr Ingram's assurance gave rise
to a legitimate expectation that the Commissioner's Guidance would be followed
in all details and that failure to do so in the respects to which I have
referred invalidates the procedure. I am unable to accept this. In the first
place, the evidence contained in paragraph 11 of the applicant's affidavit is
insufficiently precise or specific to ground a legitimate expectation, failure
to fulfil which would invalidate the procedure. Secondly, the Guidance was
followed in all matters of substance except the two particular respects,
departures for which there was in the circumstances good reason and which caused
no ascertainable prejudice to any person. Thirdly, the contention would have to
be founded on a "substantive" legitimate expectation, and it is by no means
clear that this, rather than a "procedural" legitimate expectation, represents
the law today. I do not propose, however, in this judgment to pursue or decide
this last point, as the matter is concluded against the applicant without it.
32. I assume for the purposes of considering this issue
that the word "discriminate" is to be construed as having the same meaning as in
the fair employment legislation, treating the persons concerned in a less
favourable manner than persons of a different political opinion would be
treated. I do not consider that the applicant has established that the Secretary
of State was guilty of any discrimination against any persons on the ground of
political opinion. He was scrupulous in his attempt to achieve a community
balance, which reflects broadly not only religious but political differences. Mr
Macdonald complained that there was a shortage of nationalists in the make-up of
the Commission membership. Mr Weatherup disputed the correctness of this
assertion, but it appears quite clear in any event that there is no evidence of
any discrimination against persons holding nationalist opinions. I therefore
reject this ground of complaint.
33. I have given consideration to the written submission
furnished by the Human Rights Commission for Northern Ireland. I have already
dealt with that part of the submission which relates to domestic law and need
not repeat my conclusions.
34. It goes on to set out the provisions of a number of
international conventions, suggesting that these may be material to the issues
in the present application. I do not find it necessary in this judgment to enter
into the question whether any person may have a legitimate expectation arising
out of the terms of such conventions to which the Government has adhered. I do
not consider that any of the provisions of the several conventions cited by the
Human Rights Commission adds anything of consequence to those of domestic law.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women each contain provisions for the elimination of discrimination. I
do not see any provision in any of them which might be said to impose any
obligation germane to the issues in the present case which is not already
imposed by domestic law. Nor do I consider that the provisions of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities assist the court in dealing
with those issues. To dilate further on these conventions would be an
unnecessary elaboration and lengthen this judgment unnecessarily, and I do not
propose to spend further time on them. I would express the hope that if outside
bodies wish in future to apply to intervene in litigation or present written
submissions, they will confine themselves strictly to relevant and apposite
matters which directly address the issues before the court.
35. For the reasons which I have given in detail in this
judgment I reached the conclusion which I announced after the conclusion of the
hearing, that the applicant has not made out any of the grounds on which she
relied in support of her case and the application must be dismissed.
|
Male |
Female |
Total |
Protestant |
46 |
6 |
52 |
Roman Catholic |
18 |
6 |
24 |
Other/Unspecified |
4 |
2 |
6 |
Total |
68 |
14 |
82 |
|
Male |
Female |
Total |
Protestant |
15 |
1 |
16 |
Roman Catholic |
5 |
2 |
7 |
Total |
20 |
3 |
23 |
|
Male |
Female |
Total |
Protestant |
13 |
1 |
14 |
Roman Catholic |
1 |
1 |
2 |
Total |
14 |
2 |
16 |
|
Male |
Female |
Total |
Protestant |
4 |
0 |
4 |
Roman Catholic |
1 |
1 |
2 |
Total |
5 |
1 |
6 |