Fair Employment Tribunal Northern Ireland Decisions

FAIR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

 

CASE REF: 77/16FET

1930/16

 

 

 

CLAIMANT: Patrick Breslin

 

 

RESPONDENT: Margaret Loughrey

 

 

DECISION

 

The Tribunal unanimously concludes that:

 

1.             The respondent discriminated against the claimant on the ground of sex;

 

2.             The respondent discriminated against the claimant on the ground of religion;

 

3.             The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant the sum of £30,000 for injury to feelings.

 

 

 

Constitution of Tribunal:

 

Employment Judge: Employment Judge Browne

 

Members: Mrs J Foster

Mr I Carroll

 

 

Appearances:

 

The claimant was represented by Ms M Rodgers, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Babingtons Solicitors.

 

The respondent was represented by Mr R Smyth, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Oliver Roche and Company, Solicitors.

 

 

ISSUES AND EVIDENCE

 

1.             The issues for the Tribunal to determine were:

 

(i) Whether or not the claimant was unfairly dismissed by the respondent; and

(ii) Whether or not the respondent discriminated against the claimant on the ground of sex and/or religion.

 

2.             The claimant was employed by the respondent on a regular but not formal basis from March 2016 until 16 May 2016, on which latter date he signed a contract of employment. His employment ended on or about 24 June 2016, that is, some five weeks after his contract of employment was signed.

 

3.             The claimant therefore lacked the twelve months' continuous employment required under Article 140 of The Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 to qualify for protection under Article 126 of that Order from unfair dismissal.

 

4.             If however a dismissal is found by a tribunal to be on the ground of unlawful discrimination, such lack of twelve months' continuous employment does not prevent the Tribunal from making a finding that the dismissal can properly be viewed as constituting a detriment for the purposes of the relevant discrimination legislation.

 

5.             By the time of his employment, the claimant had already known the respondent for over three years through a mutual acquaintance, although the respondent in her evidence took some time to acknowledge this. She accepted that since first meeting him, she had been aware that he had had significant personal issues affecting his health and wellbeing.

 

6.             The claimant described the respondent's initial attitude towards him as being friendly and civil. In the time before his formal employment, he had carried out some general labouring work for her. The claimant accepted that, by later providing him with a job, the respondent was giving him a significant "leg up" after a long period of unemployment.

 

7.             He also accepted that she had provided an all expenses paid holiday to Egypt, although he stated that it only became clear to him when he arrived at the airport that he and she were the only people going. The Tribunal noted that both parties had not adduced any further evidence about its significance to this case beyond the fact that the respondent had paid for it.

 

8.             The claimant's job title was as "assistant"; on his evidence, this comprised attending meetings with her, general administrative functions and general labouring jobs. He previously had been unemployed, and was living in rented accommodation.

 

9.             At around the time he started working for the respondent, the respondent offered the claimant the tenancy of one of her properties. He accepted, and moved in on
6 June 2016, although he never received a formal tenancy agreement from the respondent, despite repeated requests by the claimant, so that he then could have rent allowance paid by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive.

 

10.          There was conflicting evidence about the long-term plans for the house. Whilst this had a bearing upon credibility, the Tribunal considered that the house in itself was not an issue for it to decide. There was in any event ample other evidence from which to determine witness credibility on the relevant issues.

 

11.          On the claimant's evidence, the respondent's attitude to him changed dramatically from the time he received his contract of employment on 16 May 2016. The day after, his evidence, denied by the respondent, was that he overheard her saying "I've got that bastard where I want him now" while she was on the 'phone to an unknown person. On his account in his contemporaneous diary, she ended the call and looked startled and embarrassed when she realised that he had heard her. The claimant's evidence was that she had said this in the living room of her house within his hearing, the day he signed off benefits. He presumed from its context that she was referring to him.

 

12.          By signing the contract of employment and by signing off from claiming benefits, meant that his only source of income became his wages from the respondent. In the absence of a formal tenancy agreement, he was also reliant upon her in having somewhere to live.

 

13.          The claimant is, and was known by the respondent to be, devoted to his Roman Catholic faith. As such, he attended mass every day, and he had a number of religious statues in the house. The respondent confirmed that she had bought one of the statues for him. She also gave evidence that she had been born into the Roman Catholic faith, but that she no longer practised it, and that she had in fact "divorced the Pope".

 

14.          Despite her own lack of religious belief, the respondent was adamant that she had no issue with anyone practising their religion.

 

15.          The day after starting work for the respondent, the claimant returned home from work to find that one of his religious statues had been moved, from where he had placed it, to the fireplace.

 

16.          He received a text message from the respondent, which stated: "Did you like where I left your silly person". The claimant expressed his shock that, not only had the respondent entered the house while he was at work, but also that she had moved the statue and then sent her mocking text.

 

17.          There followed a number of incidents over the next few weeks, confirmed by evidence of text messages and photographs, sent to the claimant, either by the respondent from her mobile 'phone, or, with her consent or at her direction, by a member of her staff from a company mobile 'phone. In most of these incidents, it appeared that the respondent was accompanied by the two females whom, in addition to the claimant, she also employed as assistants.

 

18.          These incidents included: a photograph of the statue of the Virgin Mary lying on the floor of the claimant's house, along with his personal documents removed from a drawer; a photograph of the Virgin Mary statue with a cigarette in its arms and a glass of whiskey in front of it; a photograph of a teddy bear lying on top of the Virgin Mary, accompanied by a text message, saying "the puppet you worship is no longer a virgin"; similarly, a photograph of a statue of Padre Pio (a Roman Catholic saint) lying on top of the Virgin Mary in a clearly sexual way.

 

19.          The claimant's evidence was that the respondent repeatedly let herself in to the house while he was at work, without his knowledge or consent. The respondent stated that she did so with the full consent of the claimant, on the basis that, because her own house was being renovated, she needed access to his house in order to use the washing machine.

 

20.          The claimant said that he on a daily basis was belittled at work by the respondent about his religious devotion, and, when he asked her not to enter the house again after the whiskey incident, she shouted at him, stating "I pay your fucking wages, not some make believe puppet".

 

21.          The claimant gave evidence that the respondent complained because he was "always running to mass", and that he would have to choose between her and God. The respondent in evidence put this down to "a bit of banter" between friends.

 

22.          The claimant also gave evidence that the respondent constantly berated him because he was male, saying that she bitterly disliked men, and that "all men are bastards". The respondent denied ever making any such comments.

 

23.          The claimant gave evidence, supported by text message evidence, that, on Friday 24th June 2016, he received a message from the respondent which stated: "you are fucked Paddy ... get back up to the old house, you will need to sign back on".

 

24.          When he replied, asking if he had been sacked, the respondent confirmed that he had been, but did not say why. When the claimant replied to say that he had done nothing wrong, the respondent replied "yes you did now go away".

 

25.          As a result, the claimant took it that he had been sacked from his job, and did not return to work on the following Monday. The respondent did not contact him to enquire as to why he was not at work, and the claimant had to contact her a week later to request his P45, so that he could claim benefits. The text message correspondence between the two on that issue showed the respondent to be sourly uncooperative.

 

26.          The respondent countered the claimant's evidence by stating that these incidents were harmless ("just three girls having a laugh"), and that the claimant had also laughed when he saw the text messages and photographs. On her version of events, he accepted that they were done in jest and "laughed at it as well as the three of us".

 

27.          The respondent in her evidence repeatedly stated that the claimant was "crafty and sneaky" and "a liar and a thief". She also said that his case to the Tribunal was lies, in order to extract "money, money, money" from her, at the same time repeatedly rubbing her thumb and two adjoining fingers together.

 

28.          As regards the "sacking" incident on 24 June 2016, the respondent in her oral evidence stated that this was due to the claimant not washing and returning the dishes after a meal they had had together at her house. She had taken exception to his failure to do so because she had done so much for him, in giving him a job and a home.

 

29.          That explanation ran contrary to her witness statement, prepared as her evidence, and signed and adopted after affirmation by her at the outset of her case to the Tribunal. In it, she stated that the claimant's employment had terminated because "there simply wasn't the work for him to do", that the claimant knew this, and "he simply didn't turn up for work".

 

30.          Under cross-examination, the respondent stated that the claimant knew that she was not serious about sacking him. In her view, the claimant, as "an employee and a friend" knew that she had said it "as a friend"; and that he therefore knew that he could have come back to work on the Monday.

 

31.          The claimant was clear in his evidence that he took it from the respondent's initial message, and from her later reply to his query, that she had dismissed him, without explanation.

 

LAW AND CONCLUSIONS

 

32.          Discrimination on both of the relevant grounds is virtually identical, and the case law applies equally to both.

 

33.          Discrimination on grounds of sex is rendered unlawful by virtue of Article 3 of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland Order) 1976 ("SDO"):

 

"In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Order, a person ("A") discriminates against another ("B") if, on the ground of sex, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat another person."

 

34.          Discrimination on grounds of religious belief and political opinion is similarly rendered unlawful, by virtue of the provisions of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, as amended ("FETO").

 

35.          The provisions on direct discrimination and victimisation are set out at Article 3.

 

36.          In each area of alleged discrimination, the burden is on the claimant to prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that a detrimental act on prohibited grounds has occurred. The burden then shifts to the respondent to provide an explanation for the acts which is untainted by unlawful discrimination.

 

37.          The burden is on the claimant to prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that they suffered such unwanted conduct on grounds of religion, which had the required purpose or effect. If the claimant proves such facts the burden shifts to the respondent to prove that the treatment was not related to religion or that it did not have the alleged purpose or effect.

 

38.          The burden of proof is dealt with at Article 38A of FETO and Article 63A of SDO, which provide identcally that:-

 

"Where on the hearing of a complaint ... the complainant proves facts from which the Tribunal could, apart from this Article, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent -

 

(a) has committed an act of unlawful discrimination or unlawful harassment against the complainant or

 

(b) is by virtue of Article 35 or 36 to be treated as having committed an act of discrimination or harassment against the complainant,

 

the Tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not commit or as the case may be treated as having committed that act" [Tribunal's emphasis]

 

39.          The Court of Appeal, in the case of Igen v Wong [2005] IRLR 258 considered provisions equivalent to Article 38A of FETO, in a sex discrimination case, and approved, with minor amendment, guidelines set out in the earlier decision of Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Limited [2003] IRLR 332.

 

The Barton guidance, as amended in Igen, provides, as follows:-

 

"(1) Pursuant to s.63A of the SDA, it is for the claimant who complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part II or which by s.41 or s.42 of the SDA is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as 'such facts'.

 

(2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail.

 

(3) It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that 'he or she would not have fitted in'.

 

(4) In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the Tribunal will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the Tribunal.

 

(5) It is important to note the word 'could' in s.63A(2). At this stage the Tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a Tribunal is looking at the primary facts before it to see what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them.

 

(6) In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the Tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts.

 

(7) These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, an inference that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with s.74(21) of the SDA from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any other questions that fall within s.74(2) of the SDA.

 

(8) Likewise, the Tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant Code of Practice is relevant and; if so, take it into account in determining, such facts pursuant to s.56A(10) of the SDA. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant Code of Practice.

 

(9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent.

 

(10) It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not commit, or as the case may be is not to be treated as having committed that act.

 

(11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex since 'no discrimination whatsoever' is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.

 

(12) That requires a Tribunal to assess not merely whether the respondent has proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that sex was not a ground for the treatment in question.

 

(13) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, the Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular, the Tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal with the questionnaire procedure and/or Code of Practice."

 

40.          In the case of Network Rail Infrastructure Limited v Griffiths-Henry [2006] IRLR 865, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that:-

 

"A Tribunal at the second stage is simply concerned with the reason why the employer acted as he did. The burden imposed on the employer will depend on the strength of the prima facie case ....

 

It would be inappropriate to find discrimination simply because an explanation given by the employer for the difference in treatment is not one which the Tribunal considers objectively to be justified or reasonable. Unfairness is not itself sufficient to establish discrimination."

 

41.          The Court of Appeal in the case of Nelson v Newry & Mourne District Council [2009] NICA - 3 April 2009 dealt with the proper approach for a Tribunal to take when assessing whether discrimination has occurred and in applying the provisions relating to the shifting of the burden of proof. The court stated:

 

"[22] ... The Court of Appeal in Igen v Wong [2005] 3 ALL ER 812 considered the equivalent English provision and pointed to the need for a tribunal to go through a two-stage decision-making process. The first stage requires the complainant to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent had committed the unlawful act of discrimination. Once the tribunal has so concluded, the respondent has to prove that he did not commit the unlawful act of discrimination. In an annex to its judgment, the Court of Appeal modified the guidance in Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd [2003] IRLR 333. It stated that in considering what inferences and conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts. Where the claimant proves facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex then the burden of proof moves to the respondent. To discharge that onus, the respondent must prove on the balance of probabilities that the treatment was in no sense whatever on the grounds of sex. Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to be adduced to discharge the burden of proof. In McDonagh v Royal Hotel Dungannon [2007] NICA 3 the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland commended adherence to the Igen guidance.

 

[23] In the post- Igen decision in Madarassy v Nomura International PLC [2007] IRLR 247 the Court of Appeal provided further clarification of the Tribunal's task in deciding whether the tribunal could properly conclude from the evidence that in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent had committed unlawful discrimination. While the Court of Appeal stated that it was simply applying the Igen approach, the Madarassy decision is in fact an important gloss on Igen. The court stated:-

 

'The burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply on the claimant establishing a difference in status (eg sex) and a difference in treatment. Those bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient matter from which a tribunal could conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination; 'could conclude' in Section 63A(2) must mean that 'a reasonable tribunal could properly conclude' from all the evidence before it. This would include evidence adduced by the claimant in support of the allegations of sex discrimination, such as evidence of a difference in status, difference in treatment and the reason for the differential treatment. It would also include evidence adduced by the respondent in contesting the complaint. Subject only to the statutory 'absence of an adequate explanation' at this stage, the tribunal needs to consider all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint such as evidence as to whether the act complained of occurred at all, evidence as to the actual comparators relied on by the claimant to prove less favourable treatment, evidence as to whether the comparisons being made by the complainant were of like with like as required by Section 5(3) and available evidence of all the reasons for the differential treatment.'

 

That decision makes clear that the words 'could conclude' is not be read as equivalent to 'might possibly conclude'. The facts must lead to an inference of discrimination. This approach bears out the wording of the Directive which refers to facts from which discrimination can be 'presumed'.

 

[24] This approach makes clear that the complainant's allegations of unlawful discrimination cannot be viewed in isolation from the whole relevant factual matrix out of which the complainant alleges unlawful discrimination. The whole context of the surrounding evidence must be considered in deciding whether the tribunal could properly conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination. In Curley v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2009] NICA 8, Coghlin LJ emphasised the need for a tribunal engaged in determining this type of case to keep in mind the fact that the claim put forward is an allegation of unlawful discrimination. The need for the tribunal to retain such a focus is particularly important when applying the provisions of Article 63A. The tribunal's approach must be informed by the need to stand back and focus on the issue of discrimination."

 

42.          In S Deman v Commission for Equality and Human Rights & Others [2010] EWCA Civ 1279, the Court of Appeal considered the shifting burden of proof in a discrimination case. It referred to Madarassy and the statement in that decision that a difference in status and a difference in treatment 'without more' was not sufficient to shift the burden of proof. At Paragraph 19, Lord Justice Sedley stated:-

 

"We agree with both counsel that the 'more' which is needed to create a claim requiring an answer need not be a great deal. In some instances it will be forwarded by a non-response, or an evasive or untruthful answer, to a statutory questionnaire. In other instances it may be furnished by the context in which the act has allegedly occurred."

 

43.          In Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] IRLR 748, the EAT stated at Paragraphs 71-76:-

 

"(71) There still seems to be much confusion created by the decision in Igen v Wong. What must be borne in mind by a Tribunal faced with a race claim is that ultimately the issue is whether or not the employer has committed an act of race discrimination. The shifting in the burden of proof simply recognises the fact that there are problems of proof facing an employee which it would be very difficult to overcome if the employee had at all stages to satisfy the Tribunal on the balance of probabilities that certain treatment had been by reason of race.

 

...

 

(73) No doubt in most cases it would be sensible for a Tribunal to formally analyse a case by reference to the two stages. But it is not obligatory on them formally to go through each step in each case. As I said in Network Road Infrastructure v Griffiths-Henry, it may be legitimate to infer he may have been discriminated against on grounds of race if he is equally qualified for a post which is given to a white person and there are only two candidates, but not necessarily legitimate to do so if there are many candidates and a substantial number of other white persons are also rejected. But at what stage does the inference of possible discrimination become justifiable? There is no single answer and Tribunals can waste much time and become embroiled in highly artificial distinctions if they always feel obliged to go through these two stages.

 

...

 

(75) The focus of the Tribunal's analysis must at all times be the question whether they can properly and fairly infer race discrimination. If they are satisfied that the reason given by an employer is a genuine one and does not disclose either conscious or unconscious racial discrimination, then that is an end of the matter. It is not improper for a Tribunal to say, in effect, 'there is a real question as to whether or not the burden has shifted, but we are satisfied here that even if it has, the employer has given a fully adequate explanation as to why he believed or he did and it has nothing to do with race'.

 

(76) Whilst, as we have emphasised, it will usually be desirable for a tribunal to go through the two stages suggested in Igen, it is not necessarily an error of law to fail to do so. There is no purpose in compelling tribunals in every case to go through each stage."

 

44.          The Tribunal considered that the evidence adduced by the claimant was much more credibly supportive of his complaints than that of the respondent, who did little to dispute that the incidents had occurred as described by the claimant.

 

45.          The Tribunal unanimously concluded that the individual acts regarding the religious statues were, in the absence of a credible explanation, unmistakably associated with the claimant's religious beliefs. The respondent's explanation that it was all done as a joke between friends, and with the willing participation of the claimant, did not bear close scrutiny.

 

46.          The Tribunal found the claimant to be a steady and reliable witness. His evidence was credible, consistent and straightforward, and was supported by the objective evidence of the photographs and text messages. The Tribunal also accepted that the journal entries were more likely than not to have been written by him at the relevant time, and not manufactured for the Tribunal case.

 

47.          The respondent was found by the Tribunal to be a very unsatisfactory witness. She presented as volatile and aggressive during the hearing, and she repeatedly contradicted herself, not only during her own oral evidence, but also as between her oral evidence and her written statement, prepared specifically for the hearing.

 

48.          The starkest example of that inconsistency was the purported reason cited in her witness statement for the claimant leaving her employment, and that advanced by her at the hearing.

 

49.          In stark contrast to the respondent's evidence, there was no evidence of any response from the claimant when the photographs were sent to him. If he had been amused, as the respondent claimed him to be, it would have been reasonable to expect even one reply from him to that effect. The Tribunal found from the evidence of communications between the two that the overwhelming tenor was that the claimant was offended, bewildered and upset.

 

50.          The Tribunal accepted the claimant's evidence that he was genuinely and deeply offended, and concluded that he was reasonable in being so. Not only had his privacy been breached, but his employer also openly mocked his religion, to him and to the colleagues she brought with her in to his home. She desecrated his religious statues, and, in her role as employer, instructed two of his colleagues to be actively complicit in it.

 

51.          In those circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that there was no need for a comparator, as the Tribunal was satisfied that the respondent's conduct as his employer towards the claimant was on the ground of the relevant protected characteristic, namely, the claimant's religion. Such conduct therefore was direct discrimination on the ground of religion.

 

52.          When considering the claimant's other complaint about discrimination on the grounds of sex, the Tribunal also accepted the claimant's evidence about the respondent's other conduct towards him. Whilst there was no independent evidence, and the respondent denied making any adverse comments about him being a man, the Tribunal accepted the claimant's much more credible evidence.

 

53.          As such, the Tribunal was satisfied that the conduct of the respondent in her role as his employer was on the ground of the protected characteristic, namely, his sex. During the Tribunal proceedings, the respondent repeatedly and publicly branded the claimant as a thief and a liar. The respondent expressed the belief that he was solely motivated by money in making his claim, and that he had in effect stockpiled otherwise innocent conduct on her part, to later use as a means of extracting money from her. It was notable however that there was no evidence that the claimant had ever asked for anything from the respondent. If money had been his motivation, he could simply have played the game as her employee and reaped the reward.

 

54.          The Tribunal was satisfied however that the claimant reasonably viewed the message of 24 June 2016 as the respondent dismissing him, confirmed by her when he sought clarification. Further, she made no attempt to rectify the position when the claimant did not return to work.

 

55.          Her account of what in effect was an assertion of redundancy was regarded by the Tribunal as being untrue, and was in any event flatly contradicted by the respondent in her oral evidence. The Tribunal regarded that late alternative explanation as somehow being a personal issue over unwashed dishes as also being untrue.

 

56.          This was the claimant's only source of income, and the roof over his head was also in jeopardy. His dismissal was not of his making and came out of the blue, which further undermined the respondent's case that he had somehow engineered the situation from the outset, in order that he could bring a tribunal case.

 

57.          The offer of the job, the provision of accommodation, the all expenses paid holiday, appeared from the evidence all to emanate from the respondent. Whilst this was advanced on her part as being evidence of her generosity, the true situation appeared to the Tribunal to be very different.

 

58.          The respondent's behaviour was entirely consistent with conduct bearing all the hallmarks of a campaign of control and denigration of the claimant, whom she already knew to be a vulnerable individual, embarked upon by the respondent from her position of power over his situation.

 

59.          The Tribunal is unanimously satisfied that the respondent directly discriminated against the claimant on the grounds of his religion and his sex. The Tribunal concludes that her treatment of him in dismissing him flowed from and was inextricably linked to both protected characteristics, and was simply an extension of her less favourable treatment of him. As such, his dismissal, whilst not unfair for the purposes of the 1996 Order, was a detriment for the purposes of the relevant discrimination legislation.

 

REMEDY

 

60.          The Tribunal has carefully considered the evidence in this most unusual case, and the guidelines in Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1871 .

 

61.          The Tribunal is of the clear view that this case properly falls at the upper end of the scale. It is difficult to conceive of a more blatant and corrosive campaign of conduct conducted by the respondent, who additionally involved other members of staff in the humiliation of the claimant, in his home and at work.

 

62.          The ultimate detriment was the late-night dismissal of the claimant, at the vindictive whim of the respondent. Her conduct before the dismissal had been sustained and deliberate, against someone whom she knew to be vulnerable, and whom she had deliberately put in a position of almost entire dependence on her for a job and for somewhere to live.

 

63.          Her conduct during the entirety of the Tribunal case was groundlessly to portray the claimant as a thief and a liar.

 

64.          The Tribunal therefore considers that the appropriate amount payable is £30,000 for injury to feelings, which amount the respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant.

 

65.          This is a relevant decision for the purposes of the Industrial Tribunals (Interest) Order (Northern Ireland) 1990.

 

 

 

 

Employment Judge:

 

 

Date and place of hearing: 18 December 2017, 30 April 2018, 14 August 2018 and 10 September 2018, Belfast.

 

 

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: