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Fair Employment Tribunal Northern Ireland Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Fair Employment Tribunal Northern Ireland Decisions >> McGeady v North West Regional College [2010] NIFET 00196_08FET (23 February 2010)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIFET/2010/00196_08FET.html
Cite as: [2010] NIFET 196_8FET, [2010] NIFET 00196_08FET
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THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL
CASE REF: 196/08FET
CLAIMANT: Fiona McGeady
RESPONDENTS: 1. North West Regional College
2. Dorothy McElwee
3. Karen McLaughlin
DECISION
The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the claimant was not subjected to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of religious belief. The claimant’s claim is therefore dismissed.
The claimant’s claim that she has been subjected to a detriment on grounds related to trade union membership or activity will now be listed for hearing by an Industrial Tribunal.
Constitution of Tribunal:
Chairman: Ms Julie Knight
Members: Mr Alan Kerr
Mr Michael Roddy
Appearances:
The claimant was represented by Mr Matthew Corkey, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Stelfox Solicitors.
The respondent was represented by Mr Conor Hamill, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Worthingtons Solicitors.
1. ISSUES
The issues to be determined by the Fair Employment Tribunal were:
(1) Whether the claimant has complied with the statutory procedures specified by Article 19 of the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003;
(2) Whether the claimant has presented her originating claim to the Fair Employment Tribunal within the statutory time limits contained in Article 46(1) of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 and Regulation 15(1)(b) of the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2004;
(3) If not whether it is just and equitable to extend the statutory time limit for presenting the claim;
(4) If the Fair Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s complaint, whether she was subjected to less favourable treatment on the grounds of religious belief.
The Tribunal determined at the outset with the agreement of the parties’ Counsel that it was in the interests of justice that the Tribunal should not deal with the jurisdictional matters in isolation as preliminary points but should hear the entire evidence in the case before reaching its conclusions.
2. EVIDENCE
The Tribunal considered the witness statements and oral evidence of the claimant Mrs Fiona McGeady, and the respondents, Karen McLaughlin and Dorothy McElwee and witnesses for the respondents, Mr Seamus Murphy, Ms Kate Duffy and Mr Callum Morrison. The Tribunal took into consideration all documentary evidence in the agreed bundles to which its attention was drawn by the parties and their witnesses. Where there was a conflict the Tribunal found the evidence of the respondents’ witnesses to be more credible than that of the claimant.
3. FINDINGS OF FACT
The Tribunal found the following relevant facts to be proven on a balance of probabilities:
(1) The claimant, Mrs Fiona McGeady, a Catholic, has been an employee of the North West Regional College for approximately 15 years, initially as a lecturer in the Hospitality Section. With restructuring in 2003 the Hospitality Section became part of the Business Services Department (“the department”) and the claimant and Karen McLaughlin, a Catholic, were made full time Lecturers in Hospitality and Catering. Ms Luane Quigley, a Protestant, was made a full time Lecturer in Tourism. The Head of Department was the second named respondent, Mrs Dorothy McElwee, a Protestant. In 2004 Ms McLaughlin was made a Principal Lecturer (PL), teaching 10 hours a week in addition to carrying out her curriculum role which was the operational management of hospitality, tourism and sport. The claimant and Mrs McElwee are members of the college trade union. Neither Ms Quigley nor Ms McLaughlin are union members.
(2) The NWRC ran up a financial deficit of £2 million and received a seven year loan from the Department of Education. As part of a recovery plan a number of courses in the college were completely cut and there were reductions in teaching hours throughout the College. 2003/2004 was the second year of recovery. The religious background of employees in the NWRC as a whole and within the Business Services Department is predominantly Catholic.
(3) The claimant taught tourism programmes including the HND Travel and Tourism, AVCE Travel and Tourism and Btec National Travel and Tourism. She introduced the First Diploma of Travel and Tourism programme which she has coordinated since 2005. In addition she taught on the HND Leisure Programme and worked on the Supervisory Management Programme with Fruit of the Loom. She was required to teach 23 hours per week.
(4) In September 2003 the claimant suggested to Mrs McElwee that the department should run a new programme of a Single Award in Tourism, Business and Hospitality as an opportunity for students already enrolled on the AVCE Tourism, Hospitality and Business Programmes. The claimant told the Tribunal that she volunteered to coordinate the programme and that Mrs McElwee agreed to this. The claimant told the tribunal that she made an arrangement for the coordination hour and teaching hours for the new programme to be put on her timetable only to be informed a few days later by Ms Quigley that she had been asked by Mrs McElwee to coordinate the new programme. The claimant told the Tribunal that she felt annoyed and upset but that she decided not to complain as it was so early into her full time appointment and she wanted to build working relationships. Rather than complain the claimant told the Tribunal that she had decided to “take it on the chin”. The tribunal accepted that at this time there were no formal procedures in place for the allocation of coordination responsibilities. Mrs McElwee told the Tribunal that she had no recollection of how Ms Quigley was given the coordination role but did not think that she would agree to give the role to the claimant one day and then change her mind a few days later.
(5) In September 2003 Ms Quigley asked the claimant if she would teach the second year student units allocated to the Single Award in Tourism, which had originally been allocated to Ms Quigley. The claimant agreed to teach two units which were each allocated two hours and these were put on her timetable. A few days later, Ms McLaughlin told the claimant that the time allocated to these units was to be cut due to a drop in student numbers from sixteen to three. Mr Seamus Murphy, (a Catholic) the Director of the NWRC, issued an instruction due to the fall in student numbers that the course would only be permitted to continue if it was financially viable. Mrs McElwee therefore decided to reduce the number of hours to one per unit and asked Ms McLaughlin to communicate this to the claimant. The claimant objected to the proposed cut in hours as she considered, and was supported by her colleague Julie Herron and her trade union, that the proper number of hours was two per unit, irrespective of student numbers. Over the next few weeks, the claimant and Ms Herron had a number of meetings with Ms McLaughlin and Mrs McElwee to discuss this issue. During these meetings the claimant expressed the view that she had been “set up” by Ms Quigley who she believed, knew that student hours would be cut but had not put the claimant fully in the picture.
(6) The claimant met with Ms Kate Duffy, (a Catholic), the Assistant Director Human Resources on 16 October 2003 and complained about the proposed reduction in course hours. She said that she felt boxed into a corner by her line managers and complained that she felt railroaded and bullied. She contended that Karen McLaughlin had asked her if she was “on a crusade” and had threatened to timetable her classes on a Friday afternoon. She told Ms Duffy that she had never experienced any difficulty with either Mrs McElwee or Ms McLaughlin prior to this. She complained that Ms Quigley had her timetable filled from June. Ms Duffy made the claimant aware of the NWRC harassment policy. She indicated that she did not wish to make a complaint but she did ask Ms Duffy to note her concerns. On 7 November 2003 the claimant contacted Ms Duffy and asked her to arrange a meeting with Mrs McElwee, the claimant, Mr David Limb, the claimant’s union representative and herself. This took place on 14 November 2003 and it was agreed that the unit hours should not be changed. At the meeting the claimant indicated that she agreed that the issue was now history and that she would move on. The claimant told the Tribunal that she felt angry and upset that Mrs McElwee did not acknowledge that she had legitimate issues concerning Ms Quigley’s actions and the effects on the students in reducing student hours. The Tribunal noted that had the decision to cut the unit hours from two to one not been reversed, this would not have resulted in any change to the claimant’s contractual hours as she would have been allocated hours on other programmes.
(7) On 15 October 2004 the claimant met with Mr Murphy to talk to him about her concerns about her relationship with her line managers. She advised him that she considered that before Ms McLaughlin was appointed to the position of PL she had got on very well both with her and Mrs McElwee but that now she thought that Ms McLaughlin was being used as “a battering ram” against staff rather than supporting them. Mr Murphy formed his own view that the claimant was unhappy about the accountability culture that was being developed in NWRC.
(8) A number of budget cuts as part of the recovery plan led to a reduction in contact teaching hours to 15 in all courses in the NWRC. This led to a shortfall in hours for a number of lecturers. The timetable issued to the claimant on 23 September 2006 shows that at that time she had 13.5 teaching hours per week. Appendix 1 to the claimant’s contract of employment provides that the duties of a Full Time Lecturer may include curriculum development. Paragraph 8 of the contract specifies that a Full Time Lecturer is required to undertake duties as directed for up to 36 hours per week. The lecturer’s programme of duties is to be determined through discussion with the relevant line manager in accordance with Part 3 of Appendix 1.
(9) Mrs McElwee sent memos on 3 October 2006 to the claimant and Ms Herron, copied to Ms McLaughlin, regarding their timetable, advising that shortfall of 4 and 4.5 hours had arisen in their respective class contact hours. She advised that she had allocated the shortfall to curriculum development in the claimant’s case and identified a number of activities in both cases. She requested that the claimant and Ms Herron meet with Ms McLaughlin to agree an action plan. Mrs McElwee sent similar memos to the claimant’s colleagues who also had a shortfall in hours, namely, Liam McCaomhanaigh and E Cairns on 18 October 2006 and to Martin McGeady on 30 October 2006. Ms McLaughlin did subsequently meet with the claimant and Ms Herron to discuss how to implement Mrs McElwee’s memo. The Tribunal did not accept the claimant’s evidence that she and Ms Herron subsequently received another separate document from Mrs McElwee entitled “Action Plan”. The claimant told the Tribunal that she was annoyed at the time because she had asked “every member of staff that she came into contact with if they had received an action plan and they confirmed that they had not. She expressed surprise at the hearing when her attention was drawn to the memos sent to Mr McGeady and Mr McCaomhanaigh as she said that this was the first time that she had seen these documents and in light of what she said she had been told by them. The Tribunal did not find the claimant’s evidence credible in this regard and rejected her contention that as a result of the memo she was expected to produce additional work while maintaining a full teaching commitment.
(10) The claimant taught the National Diploma in Travel and Tourism. In order to achieve the qualification it was mandatory for students to attend and complete a residential unit. The claimant had an allocation of two hours on her timetable to deliver the unit which included planning, organising, attendance and delivery. The costs of flights and accommodation are met by the students themselves and the NWRC provides staff time and costs and assistance with travel to the airport. From 2006 the claimant and Ms Herron were unable to accompany the students on the trip due to their participation in industrial action. Ms Quigley who taught the Foundation Degree also organised residential trips for her students. The course content of the Foundation Degree is validated by the University of Ulster. Residential trips were not a mandatory part of the course and they were arranged by Ms Quigley outside of her timetabled hours. Ms Quigley, as a non union member, was not involved in industrial action and so was able to accompany students on the residentials.
(11) Mrs McElwee sent an email to the claimant and Ms Quigley on 10 October 2006 stating that it was imperative that a coordinated approach was taken to residentials and that no bookings or arrangements should be put in place until agreement was reached with her or Ms McLaughlin. On 16 October 2006 the claimant and Ms Herron confirmed their unavailability to Ms McLaughlin to accompany the trip due to industrial action. Ms McLaughlin asked the claimant to liaise with Ms Quigley so that the National Diploma and Foundation Degree residentials were organised for the same time and venue in order to minimise staff costs to the department. Ms McLaughlin confirmed this by email on 26 October 2006.
(12) Despite this instruction there was no liaison between the claimant and Ms Quigley. It appears from the documentation that on 20 November 2006 Ms Quigley booked return flights for herself and a colleague to Milan leaving on 28 March 2007 to return on 1 April 2007. She then submitted on 28 November 2006 an “Initial Approval Form” for a residential in Milan, which Mrs McElwee approved on the same date. Mrs McElwee told the Tribunal that this was because she assumed that there had been liaison between Ms Quigley and the claimant. The proposal was agreed by the Deputy Director of NWRC on 1 December 2006. Ms Quigley then submitted on 30 November 2006 an expenses claim form which included the flights to the Finance Office, which was authorised by Mrs McElwee on 12 December 2006.
(13) When the claimant submitted her proposal afterwards for the National Diploma students’ residential in Amsterdam, it was returned to her by Mrs McElwee stating that it was not “in compliance”. Mrs McElwee instructed Ms McLaughlin to inform the claimant that she must organise her trip to the same destination as the Foundation course as previously requested. The claimant alleges that there was an altercation between herself and Ms McLaughlin afterwards and that she was blamed unfairly for not liaising with Ms Quigley. She told the Tribunal that she considered that her line managers and Ms Quigley were working to their own agenda within the department to the detriment of the other tourism staff and that this was another example of favouritism towards Ms Quigley Neither the claimant nor Ms Quigley were disciplined for failing to follow the instruction to organise a joint residential. Due to the additional costs that would have been incurred by a late booking of flights to Milan, the National Diploma students were in fact permitted to have their residential in Amsterdam and were accompanied by Ms McLaughlin and part time lecturer Carolyn McKinley.
(14) The claimant was on sick leave from 16 April 2007 until 7 September 2007 due to work related stress which the claimant alleged was caused by her increased workload and deteriorating relationship with her line managers. Ms Duffy sent a standard referral letter to the claimant shortly after the commencement of her sick leave asking her to attend an appointment with Dr Linton, the NWRC’s Occupational Health adviser. Paragraph 7 of the Sickness Absence Management Policy and Procedure provides that if a sickness lasts or is expected to last for more than six weeks a referral may be made to the occupational health adviser and that if deemed necessary, a report will be sought from the employee’s GP or other appropriate agency with the consent of the employee. Paragraph 14.1 of the Policy provides that “an employee shall if required by the College at any time with reasonable justification submit to a medical examination by the College’s occupational health adviser subject to the provisions of the Medical Reports Act 1988 where applicable.” The Tribunal accepted Ms Duffy’s evidence that an immediate referral is made to the occupational health adviser in all cases of absence relating to work related stress. This is to enable NWRC to identify the stressors and take immediate action to support the member of staff concerned. The claimant was seen by Dr Linton initially on 25 April 2007 and reviewed by him on 29 May 2007. He wrote to Ms Duffy on 29 May 2007 that the claimant was not fit for work as she was suffering from an anxious depression, but hoped she might be fit to return in September 2007. He concluded, “You would need to speak to her about her perceived stressors at work as this may be a barrier to recovery”.
(15) Mrs McElwee wrote to the claimant on 6 June 2007 asking her to attend a meeting on 18 June to discuss the medical report. The claimant did not attend. Mrs McElwee wrote to the claimant again on 19 June suggesting a meeting on 2 July and further on 21 August requesting a meeting on 3 September. The claimant said that she did not receive the letters of 6 and 19 June, which she thought due to confusion on the part of the postal service, and so she did not attend the meetings or respond to the letters. When Mrs McElwee telephoned the claimant’s home, the claimant’s nephew informed her that the claimant did not live at that address. At the time the claimant was staying in Donegal.
(16) The claimant was reviewed by Dr Linton on 3 September and was certified as fit to return to work on 10 September 2007. A Return to Work meeting took place on 10 September between the claimant and Mrs McElwee. Dr Linton’s report was discussed and Mrs McElwee asked the claimant about her medication. The claimant considered this to be an intrusive question told the Tribunal that she was upset by it. The Tribunal accepted Mrs McElwee’s evidence that she was trying to establish whether the claimant might have any side effects from medication such as tiredness which might have to be taken into account to facilitate the claimant’s return to work. The claimant had furnished a document listing what she considered to be her stressors which was discussed at that meeting. Mrs McElwee also raised with the claimant the fact that she had not responded to her letters and the response to her telephone call. The claimant said that she felt uncomfortable and that she was being accused of deliberately trying to mislead Mrs McElwee. The Tribunal was satisfied that Mrs McElwee was seeking to ensure that the NWRC had the correct contact details for the claimant. The claimant told the Tribunal she believed that the letters and phone call from NWRC and Mrs McElwee were intended to harass her and she was not aware of any other member of staff being asked to attend meetings during illness.
(17) After the meeting Mrs McElwee sent an email to the claimant advising that she could carry over 10 days leave from the previous leave year which should be taken in June 2008. The claimant sent an email the same day to Ms Duffy enquiring about her entitlement to carry over her annual leave entitlement as she had been on sick leave during her holiday period. The holiday leave year runs from the 1 September until 31 August. Paragraph 5.3 of the contract provides that “All leave schedules are subject to approval by the Head of Department or equivalent...” and paragraph 5.9 of the contract of employment provides that “You cannot take leave entitlement (or any part thereof) for one leave year in a subsequent year without the prior approval of the Director/Principal and subject to a maximum of 10 days. If you fail to take any of your leave entitlement in the appropriate leave year you will forfeit any accrued leave not taken without any right to payment in lieu.”
(18) The claimant also met with Mr Murphy who referred her back to Mrs McElwee to make her request for leave through “proper procedures”. Ms Duffy subsequently sent an email to the claimant on 14 September 2007 advising that the Director had given approval and that she could carry forward 10 days leave and that she was required to arrange with her Head of Department/PL the most convenient time to take leave. The claimant wished to take one week’s leave prior to and one week’s leave after Christmas 2008. Her union representative made representations on her behalf and she was permitted to take these dates. It was the claimant’s case that Mrs McElwee had approved Ms Quigley’s leave application for the same dates requested by the claimant. In her written statement of evidence, the claimant alleged that she was aware that an unidentified colleague had been permitted to carry over her full entitlement of leave after a period of sickness. The Tribunal accepted Mr Murphy’s evidence that he has never approved the carry over of more than 10 days. Furthermore the claimant accepted at the hearing that she received her contractual entitlement to carry over leave and was permitted to take leave when she wanted it and that her complaint was that she was only permitted to take these dates after her union representative became involved.
(19) In October 2007 around the time of the planning of a residential trip to Prague, the claimant was asked to agree the mandatory residential unit from the National Diploma programme. The claimant was not able to accompany the trip due to the industrial action and students were to be accompanied by other members of staff. Furthermore there was delay in booking flights as some students failed to bring in their deposits on time resulting in a shortfall of funds against the planned budget. The claimant told the Tribunal that she felt “scapegoated” for the shortfall.
(20) The removal of the residential unit was opposed by members of staff in the department, including the claimant and students on the course. Mrs McElwee took a management decision at the beginning of April 2008 to remove the residential unit. Her stated reasons were budgetary constraints and operational issues and that the mandatory status of the unit placed a financial burden on students. The reasons for the decision were communicated to the claimant and Ms Herron by email dated 4 April 2008. Mrs McElwee considered that this was primarily an issue for them because Ms Herron coordinated the National Diploma course and the claimant taught it, therefore it was important to consult the claimant about the replacement unit. She asked them to nominate a replacement unit. Mrs McElwee was subsequently appointed to the position of Head of Higher Education and Training in NWRC on 1 May 2008 but did not take up post until the appointment of Head of School in June 2008.
(21) A meeting took place with the tourism team on 7 May 2008 at which staff indicated that they did not support the removal of the residential unit. However Mrs McElwee sent a further email on 12 May 2008 to the claimant and Ms Herron confirming her decision to replace the unit and requested that they inform Ms McLaughlin by 16 May 2008 as to what the replacement unit should be. She reiterated that this did not rule out non mandatory trips.
(22) The claimant and Ms Herron asked to meet with Mr Calum Morrison Assistant Director Curriculum, on 15 May 2008 to discuss the retention of the residential unit. As they did not consider that this meeting resolved matters they subsequently requested a meeting with Mr Murphy which took place on 20 May 2008. Mr Murphy said that they asked him to overrule the decisions of their line manager and Mr Morrison concerning the instruction to remove the residential unit. Mr Murphy advised them that the NWRC could not support the retention of the residential as a mandatory unit. He informed them that they should now take direction from Ms McLaughlin. During this meeting Mr Murphy discussed with the claimant and Ms Herron what activity was covered by industrial action and referred to a recent discussion he had had with a regional union official on this issue.
(23) Ms McLaughlin met with Ms Herron and the claimant on 9 June 2008 and set a deadline of 12 June for them to select one of three options so that the timetables could be planned for the new academic year. As she had not received a response Ms McLaughlin went to the claimant’s office. The claimant informed her that the unit must remain and that it was a decision for the whole team and not just for her. She said that she felt upset and harassed at being asked to come up with answers on the spot.
(24) The claimant and Ms Herron met with Ms Duffy on 27 June 2008 and raised a complaint of harassment against Mrs McElwee and Ms McLaughlin. The claimant complained that Mrs McElwee treated her less favourably than Luane Quigley and that she thought that this was on religious grounds because they were both Protestant. She believed that she was treated less favourably than Ms McLaughlin because of her trade union activity. Ms Duffy explained the Harassment policy and the claimant and Ms Herron indicated that they wished to make formal complaints. Ms Duffy advised the claimant that she would have to put her complaint in writing. Both the claimant and Ms Herron were concerned about complying with timescales for lodging a complaint with the industrial Tribunal. Ms Duffy reassured them that now the matter had been brought to her attention their complaint would not be out of time even if the formal investigation did not commence until September 2008. The claimant confirmed at the Hearing that she was concerned about time scales as the previous year a colleague had their complaint ruled out of time by a Tribunal as it was not lodged within three months of the matter complained of.
(25) The claimant subsequently lodged a written grievance on 7 July 2008, having read the NWRC Harassment policy. She complained that she had been victimised and harassed by Mrs McElwee and Ms McLaughlin and that she believed that they had operated a policy of unfair treatment towards her and her co worker Ms Herron while operating a policy of favouritism towards Ms Quigley. This document referred to the arrangements made for the 2008 trip to Prague and the decision to remove the residential unit from the National Diploma course. Specifically the claimant stated that she had received memos detailing additional duties in the form of an action plan; that Ms McLaughlin had several times undermined her in front of students; that she was made to feel incompetent in relation to the money issue during the residential; that she was the only member of staff to have her timetable scrutinised when teaching hours were cut in the department; that her work was compared to that of a non union member (Luane Quigley) and that the claimant was told to fall into line with her practices; that when she raised a previous residential with her line managers, the issue was brushed aside and led to further victimisation by her line managers; that there was “favouritism towards non union members of staff within the department and union members who are prepared to break the strike action” and “I firmly believe that this may be one of the reasons why I have been treated in an unfair manner by my line managers”.
(26) The claimant submitted a further document on 5 September 2009 in which she detailed further examples of favouritism as follows: Being instructed to change the arrangements for the 2007 residential to fall into line with dates booked by Ms Quigley; being accused of non compliance by Mrs McElwee; Ms Quigley removing applicants for the National Diploma course and placing them on the database for the Foundation Course; that Ms Quigley was given coordination responsibility for the Single Award in Tourism in her place; that the residential unit on the National Diploma should be offered in the same way as the Foundation degree.
(27) Mr Morrison was asked by Ms Duffy to carry out the investigation into the claimant’s and Julie Herron’s complaints under the Harassment policy. Although there was documentary evidence to suggest that he had received some training, Mr Morrison himself was unable to recall at the hearing whether he had received equal opportunities training. The Tribunal accepted Ms Duffy’s evidence that she did not advise him that the claimant had verbally informed her that she believed that Ms McElwee had discriminated against her on religious grounds. The claimant did not mention in either document that her grievance included a complaint of religious discrimination by Mrs McElwee.
(28) On 8 September 2008 Mr Morrison interviewed the claimant who was accompanied by Mr Pegg, her union representative. Ms Duffy was present in an advisory capacity. At the outset of the meeting Mr Morrison asked the claimant to take him through her complaints and as the meeting was drawing to a close, Mr Morrison asked the claimant whether she wished to add or say anything else. The claimant did not mention religious discrimination although she sought information about the timescale for completing the complaint and being able to pursue a complaint with the industrial Tribunal. After the meeting Mr Pegg queried whether Mr Morrison should conduct the investigation as the claimant had referred to him in the complaint in the context of the meeting with him on 15 May 2008. Ms Duffy indicated that this was not a problem the claimant had not made a complaint of harassment against him.
(29) Mr Morrison interviewed Ms Herron, Mrs McElwee, Ms McLaughlin, Ms Joan Casey, Ms Carolyn McKinney, Mr Tim Roberts, Mr Martin McGeady and Ms Berni Rutherford during his investigation. Following these meetings he concluded that there was no evidence to support the claimant’s allegations of harassment and victimisation against Mrs McElwee and Ms McLaughlin. Mr Morrison wrote to the claimant on 13 October 2008 advising her that her complaints were not upheld. His report contained his findings in relation to both the complaints of the claimant and Ms Herron. The claimant wrote to Ms Duffy on 16 October 2008 giving notice of her intention to appeal. Her grounds for appeal in her letter of 24 October were that “the investigating officer had tried to deflect from a legitimate complaint by counterclaiming that she manipulated students into making a complaint on her behalf; that the focus of the complaint has been watered down to one issue namely the removal of the residential unit from the National Diploma programme and that two separate claims were amalgamated into one in order to save effort for the investigating officer”. The claimant did not mention that there had been a failure to investigate a complaint of religious discrimination.
(30) The claimant’s appeal was conducted by Professor Fabian Monds, Governing Body Member of the NWRC. The appeal hearing was held on 19 November 2008. Professor Monds concluded that the investigation was conducted in a correct and thorough manner and that he decided that the claimant’s appeal did not affect the Investigation Report finding that there was no evidence to support the allegation that the claimant had been harassed and victimised by Mrs McElwee and Ms McLaughlin. Consequently the claimant’s appeal was not upheld. His view was that it would have been preferable for a separate report to have been provided for her complaint but that there had not been a serious breach of confidentiality. The claimant did not raise any complaint to the Tribunal concerning Professor Monds’ decision.
(31) The claimant lodged a complaint with the Fair Employment Tribunal on the 20 November 2008, naming Dorothy McElwee and Karen McLaughlin as respondents complaining she had been subjected to ongoing harassment and victimisation at work by her two line managers since 2003 and the restructuring of the college which she had initially attributed to her trade union membership. She complained she tried to address this problem with Human Resources in 2004 but that since then had been victimised by both Mrs McElwee and Ms McLaughlin who had shown favouritism towards Ms Quigley, a non union member; that management did not carry out a fair and independent investigation of the facts; and that a legal representative had suggested the initial complaint of favouritism may be on religious grounds as well as trade union membership. Subsequently the claimant in replies to the respondents’ request for additional information particularised her complaint and confirmed that her allegations of religious discrimination were against Mrs McElwee in relation to a number of incidents which had occurred between September 2003 and May 2008 and Mr Morrison concerning the manner in which he had investigated her complaint. The claimant’s complaint that she has been subjected to a detriment for reasons related to her trade union membership will be heard by an industrial tribunal in due course.
(32) The claimant told the tribunal that the suggestion that there may be religious dicrimination was in fact made to her by Mr Denis Pegg of the UCU but that she had had an underlying feeling since 2003 that Mrs McElwee’s treatment of her was connected with her religious belief. The claimant told the tribunal that her suspicion arose due to the fact that she is a Catholic and that Mrs McElwee and Ms Quigley are both Protestant. She alleged that she had a conversation with Mrs McElwee during which the latter denied that she treated the claimant less favourably than Ms Quigley for reasons related to the claimant’s trade union activity because she herself is a member of the union. The claimant told the Tribunal that in light of this reply she concluded that the only other possible reason for this treatment could be that Mrs McElwee is a Protestant and favoured Ms Quigley because she is also a Protestant. Mrs McElwee had no recollection of this conversation. The claimant’s evidence was that she did not directly raise the possibility of religious discrimination with Mrs McElwee as she found it difficult to talk about religious issues due to personal reasons.
(33) Similarly the claimant told the tribunal that she did not talk about her complaint of religious discrimination at the investigatory hearing with Mr Morrison because he is a Protestant and she told the Tribunal that she believed that Mr Morrison may have been biased towards Mrs McElwee because he is also a Protestant. During cross examination the claimant told the Tribunal that at a return to work interview, Mrs McElwee had a conversation in her presence with a union representative, Mr David Limb about football tops and that Mrs McElwee mentioned that Mr Morrison had Rangers’ tops and that there was “no need for those tops over here”. The Tribunal doubts the veracity of this aspect of the claimant’s evidence which was raised for the first time in cross examination. Mr Limb was not called to give evidence in relation to this matter. Furthermore although Mr Morrison is a Protestant and originates from Scotland, the Tribunal accepted his evidence that he does not share the sectarian loyalist outlook which is generally associated with Scottish and Northern Irish Loyalist/Protestantism.
Contentions of the Parties
(34) For the claimant it was contended that that Mrs McElwee “the (alleged) discriminator had subjected the claimant to a continuing act of less favourable treatment on grounds of religious belief from 2003 onwards and time for lodging a complaint with the Office of the Tribunals should run from the last incident, namely the decision was taken to remove the residential unit stated to be on 12 May 2008. Mr Corkey BL conceded in his submissions that the last act complained of by Mrs McElwee had occurred more than six months prior to the lodgment of the claimant’s originating complaint but he submitted that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion in favour of the claimant to extend the time limit on just and equitable grounds in the light of all the circumstances of the case. He submitted that the claimant had established facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that she had been deliberately less favourably treated than her chosen comparator, Luane Quigley, on grounds of religious belief.
(35) The respondent denied that the claimant was discriminated against on grounds of her religious belief. Mr Hamill BL argued that the claimant’s complaints concerned separate and discrete incidents, with the time for lodging a complaint running from the date of each incident. Therefore it was contended that with the exception of the allegation in relation to the handling of the first stage of the grievance procedure all of these complaints were lodged outside the statutory time limits prescribed by the 1998 Order, as extended by the Regulation 15 of the 2004 Regulations. Furthermore the claimant had failed to comply with the statutory grievance procedure in relation to a number of the complaints raised.
4. THE LAW
Religious Discrimination
Article 3 of the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (“the 1998 Order”) provides:
3. - (1) In this Order "discrimination" means –
(a) discrimination on the ground of religious belief or political opinion; or
(a) discrimination by way of victimisation; and "discriminate" shall be construed accordingly.
(2) A person discriminates against another person on the ground of religious belief or political opinion in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of this Order if –
(a) on either of those grounds he treats that other less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons;
Article 3(3) of the 1998 Order provides :
A comparison of the cases of persons of different
religious belief or political opinion under paragraph (2) must be such that
the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially
different, in the other.”
Article 19 (1) (b) provides that: It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person, in relation to employment in Northern Ireland, -
(b) where that person is employed by him –
(i) in the terms of employment which he affords him; or
(ii) in the way he affords him access to benefits or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford him access to them; or
(iii) by dismissing him or by subjecting him to any other detriment.
Article 38A of the 1998 Order provides that : “Where, on the hearing of a complaint under Article 38, the complainant proves facts from which the Tribunal could, apart from this Article, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent –
(a) has committed an act of unlawful discrimination or unlawful harassment against the complainant, or
(b) is by virtue of Article 35 or 36 to be treated as having committed such an act of discrimination or harassment against the complainant,
(b) the Tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not commit or, as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act."
Guidance on the application of this provision was given by the Court of Appeal in the cases of Igen Limited –v- Wong 2005 IRLR 258 in which the Court of Appeal ruled that the guidance issued by the EAT in Barton–v- Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Limited should be applied and amended as follows:
(1) Pursuant to (Section 63(a) of the 1975 Act) it is for the claimant who complains of (sex) discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities the facts from which the Tribunal could conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the employer has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of part two where which by the virtue of Section 41 or 42 of the 1975 Act, is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as “such facts”.
(2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail.
(3) It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to them. In such cases the discrimination will not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that “he or she would not have fitted in”.
(4) In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the Tribunal would therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts bound by the Tribunal.
(5) It is important to note the word “could” in section 63(a)2. At this stage the Tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a Tribunal is looking at the primary facts before it to see where inference of secondary fact could be drawn from the facts.
(6) In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the Tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts.
(7) These inferences can include in an appropriate case any inferences that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with Section 74(2)B of the 1975 Act from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any other questions that fall within Section74(2) of the 1975 Act.
(8) Likewise a Tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant code of practice is relevant and if so take it into account in determining such facts pursuant to Section 56(a)(1) of the 1975 Act. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant code of practice.
(9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the employer has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the employer.
(10) It is then for the employer to prove that he did not commit or as the case maybe, is not to be treated as having committed that act.
(11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the employer to prove on a balance of probabilities that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since “no discrimination whatsoever” is compatible with the burden of proof directive.
(12) That requires a Tribunal to assess not merely whether the employer has proved an explanation from the facts from such inference can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that sex is not a ground for the treatment in question.
(13) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, the Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden to proof. In particular the Tribunal will need to examine carefully examinations for failure to deal with the questionnaire procedure and/or Code of Practice.
Period within which proceedings must be brought
Article 46 of the 1998 Order provides that: (1) Subject to paragraph (5), the Tribunal
shall not consider a complaint under Article 38 unless it is brought before
whichever is the earlier of –
(a) the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which the complainant first had knowledge, or might reasonably be expected first to have had knowledge, of the act complained of; or
(b) the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the act was done.
(6) For the purpose of this Article -
(b) any act extending over a period shall be treated as done at the end of that period; and
(a) a deliberate omission shall be treated as done when the person in question does an act inconsistent with doing the omitted act or, if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires within which he might reasonably have been expected to do the omitted act if it were to be done.
The statutory grievance procedure.
Article 19 of the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 states that:
19 (1) This Article applies to the jurisdictions listed in Schedule 3.
(2) An employee shall not present a complaint to an Industrial Tribunal under a jurisdiction to which this article applies if –
(a) it concerns a matter in relation to which the requirement in paragraph 6 or 9 of Schedule 1 applies, and
(b) the requirement has not been complied with.
(3) An employee shall not present complaint to an industrial Tribunal under a jurisdiction to which this article applies if–
(a) it concerns a matter in relation to which the requirement in paragraph 6 or 9 of schedule 1 has been complied with, and
(b) less than 28 days have passed since the day on which the requirement was complied with.
Schedule 1 Part 2 Chapter 1 of the 2003 Order sets out the standard procedure for grievance procedures.
Extension of time limits under the Statutory Dispute Resolution Provisions
Regulation 15 of the Employment (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (Dispute
Resolution) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2004 (the 2004
Dispute Resolution Regulations”).
15. - (1) Where a complaint is presented to a Tribunal under a jurisdiction listed in Schedule 2 or 3 or, as the case may be, under Article 38 of the Order
Of 1998, and –
(b) either of the grievance procedures is the applicable statutory procedure and the circumstances specified in paragraph (3) apply;
the normal time limit for presenting the complaint is extended for a period of three months beginning with the day after the day on which it would otherwise have expired.
(3) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are that the employee
presents a complaint to the Tribunal –
(a) within the normal time limit for presenting the complaint but in circumstances in which Article 19(2) or (3) or Article 20(1) or (2) of the Order of 2003 does not permit him to do so; or
(b) after the expiry of the normal time limit for presenting the complaint, having complied with paragraph 6 or 9 of Schedule 1 in relation to his grievance within that normal time limit.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) the following acts shall be treated, in a case to which the specified regulation applies, as constituting compliance with paragraph 6 or 9 of Schedule 1 –
(b) in a case to which regulation 7(1) applies, compliance by the employee with the requirement in regulation 7(2);
(b) in a case to which regulation 9(1) applies, compliance by the appropriate representative with the requirement in sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of that regulation, whichever is the later;
(c) in a case to which regulation 10 applies, the raising of his grievance by the employee in accordance with the procedure referred to in that regulation.
(5) In this regulation "the normal time limit" means –
(a) subject to sub-paragraph (b), the period within which a complaint under the relevant jurisdiction must be presented if there is to be no need for the Tribunal, in order to be entitled to consider it to –
(i) exercise any discretion; or
(ii) make any determination as to whether it is required to consider the complaint, that the Tribunal would have to exercise or make in order to consider a complaint presented outside that period;
Extension of the Time Limit on “Just and Equitable” Grounds.
Article 46(5) of the 1998 Order provides that the Tribunal may nevertheless consider any such complaint, claim or application which is out of time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so.
The Tribunal considered the following legal authorities:
British Coal Corpn v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336
Suffolk Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust v Hurst and Others [2009] IRLR12;
London Borough of Islington v Ladele and Liberty (EAT) [2009] IRLR 154;
Igen Limited and Others v Wong;
Chamberlin Solicitors and Another v Emokpae;
Brunel University v Webster [2005] IRLR 258;
Zafar v Glasgow City Council [1997] IRLR 229;
Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 172;
Stephen William Nelson v Newry and Mourne District Council [2009] NICA 24;
Law Society v Bahl [2003] IRLR 640;
Shamoon v the Chief Constable of the RUC [2003] UKHL11 [2003] IRLR 285 2003; and
Madarassey v Nomura International PLC [2007] EWCA CIV 33.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Statutory Dispute Resolution Procedures apply to the claimant’s complaint of religious discrimination. These require an employee to set out the grievance in writing and send it to the employer and to wait twenty eight days thereafter before lodging a complaint with the Office of the Tribunals. The purpose of the statutory dispute resolution procedures is to give the parties to the dispute an opportunity of resolving the dispute before proceedings are lodged with the Tribunal. The complaints and the type of claim must be sufficiently identified to enable an employer to investigate the grievance. The claimant did not specify in her written grievance that she was complaining of religious discrimination. However Mr Hamill BL conceded that for the purposes determining whether the claimant had complied with the statutory grievance procedure, the claimant’s written complaint should be construed in the context of her verbal complaint to Ms Duffy that Mrs McElwee had subjected her to religious discrimination. Having carefully considered the contents of the claimant’s written grievance in the context of her oral complaint to Ms Duffy, the Tribunal determined that the claimant’s written grievance referred to the allocation of coordination duties to Ms Quigley in September 2003; an alleged cut to teaching hours in September 2003; the issuing of an action plan in September 2006; the arrangements in November/December 2006 for the Amsterdam/Milan residential; and the decision to remove the residential trip as a mandatory unit from the National diploma. However the claimant’s written grievance did not include her complaints that Mrs McElwee had repeatedly contacted the claimant during her sick leave in 2007 or the alleged refusal to permit the claimant to carry over her sick leave. The tribunal determined that the claimant had not raised a written grievance about the manner in which Mr Morrison had conducted the investigation of her grievance. Therefore the tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with those matters which had not been raised by the claimant in her written grievance and which the respondents did not have the opportunity of addressing through the statutory grievance process.
(2) The claimant’s case was that from September 2003 she had been subjected to a deliberate and continuing campaign of religious discrimination by Mrs McElwee, culminating in the confirmation of her decision to remove the residential unit as a mandatory component of the National Diploma on 12 May 2008. The claimant did not lodge her originating claim with the Office of the Tribunals until 20 November 2008. All of the alleged acts of discrimination by Mrs McElwee were therefore lodged outside the time limit specified in the 1998 Order as extended by the 2004 Regulations. The onus was on the claimant to prove on a balance of probabilities “either by direct evidence or by inference from primary facts, that the numerous alleged incidents of discrimination were linked together and that they are evidence of a continuing discriminatory state of affairs covered by the concept of an ‘act extending over a period’.” (Per Mummery LJ in Hendricks v The Metropolitan Police Commission 2003 1 ALL ER 654 paragraph 48).
(3) It is the case that all of the complaints made by the claimant against Mrs McElwee were presented outside the statutory time limit contained in the 1998 Order as extended by the 2004 Dispute Resolution Regulations. The tribunal therefore had to consider in any event, whether, in all the circumstances of the case, it is just and equitable to extend the original time for the presentation of the claim. In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to extend the statutory time limit the tribunal is required to consider the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of granting or refusing an extension, and to have regard to all the other circumstances, in particular: (a) the length of and reasons for the delay; (b) the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; (c) the extent to which the party sued had co-operated with any requests for information; (d) the promptness with which the claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and (e) the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action (British Coal Corpn v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336, at para 8). However, although, in the context of the 'just and equitable' formula, these factors will frequently serve as a useful checklist, there is no legal requirement on a tribunal to go through such a list in every case.
(4) The tribunal did not consider in all the circumstances of the case that the claimant had established that the incidents were linked together so as to constitute an act extending over a period. By the time the claimant raised her grievance orally with Mrs Duffy on all of the incidents with the exception of the removal of the residential unit were already significantly outside the statutory time limits. The tribunal concluded that the trigger for the claimant’s grievance was in fact the removal of the residential unit and Ms McLaughlin’s insistence that the claimant nominate a substitute unit. The tribunal is satisfied that this was the focus of the claimant’s grievance and that the previous incidents which were referred to by the claimant in her written grievance were cited as examples of previous incidents of alleged favouritism/more favourable treatment towards Ms Quigley by Mrs McElwee (and Ms McLaughlin) by way of supporting her current grievance.
(5) The tribunal took into account the length of time which elapsed between each the alleged incidents and the fact that the claimant had decided after each incident not to pursue a formal grievance, even though according to her own evidence she had a suspicion that the underlying reason for the alleged treatment by Mrs McElwee was related to her religious belief. She decided instead, to use her own words, “to take it on the chin”. The claimant did not make any complaint at all at the time or raise any concern about the allocation of the coordination duties to Ms Quigley and Mrs McElwee was unable to recall the circumstances due to the lapse of time. Other issues, including the proposal to reduce teaching hours in 2003 and the carryover of annual leave, were to all appearances resolved at the time to the claimant’s satisfaction in that she did not raise a formal grievance or pursue these matters further. The tribunal noted that although the claimant initially referred to cuts having been made to her teaching hours and not being permitted to take her annual leave entitlement, she conceded that this was not in fact the case. The claimant was aware of the limitation periods for lodging proceedings from at least 2006 and the tribunal was satisfied that she had the benefit of obtaining advice from her trade union representative. The tribunal did not consider that the incidents were either homogenous or that the facts found could either directly or by inference lead it to conclude that the acts of Mrs McElwee were linked together by an intention on her part to treat the claimant less favourably than Ms Quigley. In these circumstances, the tribunal, in weighing the prejudice to the parties did not consider that it was just and equitable to extend the time limits in relation to the incidents which occurred prior to April 2008. The tribunal was satisfied that the fact that the claimant did not raise a grievance about these matters at the time of their occurrence made it more difficult for the respondents’ witnesses to recollect events.
(6) However in considering the exercise of its discretion the tribunal considered that the removal of the residential unit, although it too was presented outside the time limit, was in a different category to the other incidents. The claimant had lodged a written grievance in accordance with the time limits contained within the statutory grievance procedures and her originating complaint was lodged a relatively short period after the expiry of the extended statutory time limit. The tribunal did not consider that prejudice would be caused to the respondent by reason of this delay in view of the proximity of the grievance process. The tribunal therefore considers that it is just and equitable to extend the time limit for presenting the claimant’s claim in relation to the allegation of religious discrimination relating to the removal of the residential unit. Although the Tribunal concludes that the incidents which occurred prior to that date are not justiciable matters, it considers it is entitled, where relevant, to take them into account as evidence to support its conclusions in relation to the substantive complaint.
(7) Therefore, applying the guidance in Igen v Wong, the tribunal had to consider at the first stage whether the claimant had established facts from which it could conclude that Mrs McElwee, in deciding to remove the residential as a mandatory unit from the National Diploma course, had deliberately discriminated against the claimant on grounds of her religious belief. The tribunal was mindful that following the reasoning of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the Madarassy case, the burden of proof does not shift to the respondent simply by the claimant showing a difference in status and a difference in treatment in the treatment of her. The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate the possibility of discrimination and without more, are insufficient material from which the tribunal could conclude that on the balance of probabilities the respondent had committed an act of discrimination. The tribunal is required at the first stage to consider the evidence of both the claimant and the respondent.
(8) The Tribunal did not consider that Ms Quigley was the correct statutory comparator for the purposes of the claimant’s complaint. This was because the residential unit was not a mandatory component of the Foundation course delivered by Ms Quigley and she organised the trips for her students outside of the curriculum. The contents and mode of delivery were determined by the University of Ulster rather than NWRC. Mrs McElwee indicated to the claimant that she would be still be able to organise residentials but that they would not be mandatory. The Tribunal noted that in fact the claimant’s complaint in this instance, is that she was being required to deliver residentials on the same basis as Ms Quigley. The view of the Tribunal is that this cannot then amount to less favourable treatment. The tribunal considers that the correct comparator is a hypothetical Protestant comparator teaching a course with a mandatory residential unit sharing the same characteristics of the claimant. The tribunal was unable to infer from the evidence before it that Mrs McElwee would have treated the hypothetical comparator more favourably than she did the claimant. The tribunal accepted that Mrs McElwee’s decision to remove the residential unit was motivated by “historical” difficulties associated with the arrangements and funding of the unit, which included staffing and budgeting issues and the conduct of students. The tribunal concluded that the reasons for her decision as stated in memo of 4 April 2008 were both genuine and had a basis in fact. The decision to remove the residential unit was a management decision to change the curriculum taken by Mrs McElwee for reasons which the Tribunal did not consider were related in any way to the claimant’s religious belief.
(9) The tribunal carefully considered whether there were any facts from which it could conclude that the claimant had been treated less favourably on the grounds of her religious belief. The tribunal took into account that the claimant accepted that up until the restructuring of the NWRC in 2003 she had experienced no difficulty from either Mrs McElwee or Ms McLaughlin. The claimant accepted that Mrs McElwee had not made any overtly discriminatory remarks towards her and the tribunal did not accept the claimant’s evidence that the conversations took place with Mrs McElwee concerning the reason for her treatment of the claimant or concerning Mr Morrison having Rangers’ shirts. The Tribunal considers that the claimant’s complaints relating to the proposed cuts in teaching hours and the delivery of “action plans” coincide with budgetary restraint across the college. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant has established that she was treated less favourably than the hypothetical comparator in these instances. The claimant was not the only employee who was affected by management decision to implement budgetary restraint. A number of courses were cut altogether and Mrs McElwee sent memos to all members of staff who had a short fall in teaching hours. The Tribunal has found as a fact that Mrs McElwee did not send the claimant a separate Action Plan and did not find her evidence credible in that regard. The Tribunal was satisfied that Mrs McElwee wrote to the claimant when she was on sick leave to set up a meeting to discuss Dr Linton’s report in accordance with the sickness absence policy. The Tribunal considered that as the claimant’s line manager, Mrs McElwee was entitled to enquire into the information given to her by the claimant’s nephew and the reasons why the claimant had not responded to her letters. The Tribunal was satisfied that she did so in order to establish the correct contact details for the claimant. The tribunal accepted Mrs McElwee’s evidence that at the time of approving Ms Quigley’s proposal, she acted under an assumption that the claimant and Ms Quigley had followed her instruction to liaise together about the arrangements for the 2007 residential trips. Neither the claimant nor Ms Quigley were formally disciplined arising from their failure to follow this instruction. The tribunal accepted that the claimant was reprimanded by Ms McLaughlin but it is not the claimant’s case that Ms McLaughlin treated her in this way because of her religious belief.
(10) For these reasons the tribunal was unable to conclude that the claimant’s has established facts from which it could conclude that the claimant was subjected to less favourable treatment on grounds of religious belief and her complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Chairman:
Date and place of hearing: 30 November – 4 December 2009 and
11 December 2009, Belfast
Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: