Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland Decisions

"6. On the 31^st January 2001, just minutes prior to the commencement of the Preliminary Hearing counsel representing the Applicant was advised that the Coroner was going to adjourn the Preliminary Hearing. The reason advanced was the pending decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom.

7. At the outset of the Preliminary Hearing, without inviting or hearing argument from any of the parties represented, the Coroner stated that he had decided that he was going to adjourn the Preliminary Hearing and that he was making that decision because he had become aware for the first time the previous evening, at about 9.00pm, of the substance of the imminent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom.

8. When asked by Mr Treacy QC, representing the Applicant, whether he had made up his mind on this issue or whether he was willing to hear argument on whether the Preliminary Hearing should proceed the Coroner stated that he had already made the decision and the Preliminary Hearing would be adjourning for the reasons set out above."

(a) the Committee erred in law in deciding that the respondent did not have an arguable case for judicial review of the Coroner's decision to adjourn the preliminary hearing;

(b) the Committee failed to give reasons for its decision.

The judge held in the respondent's favour on both heads of argument.

"[14] In the present case the adjudicator and the Committee had been provided with the opinion of Ms Quinlivan that the failure of the coroner to give counsel the opportunity to make submissions on why the preliminary hearing should not be adjourned constituted a breach of the rules of natural justice. This was clear and unsurprising advice. Whatever the views of the coroner as to the likelihood of the judgment in the European Court influencing the conduct of the inquest, he was obviously obliged to allow counsel to make submissions as to whether the preliminary hearing should proceed. This was so as a matter of general principle. It was particularly required, however, in this case where the inquest had been long delayed. (As it happens when judgment was given in Jordan v United Kingdom ECtHR was critical of the inordinate delay in holding the inquest).

[15] In approaching the question whether legal aid should be granted for the application for leave to apply for judicial review, the adjudicator and the Committee ought also to have had in mind that the applicant needed only to establish an arguable case. In my opinion, there was no conclusion possible other than that the applicant had at least an arguable case that the coroner should have allowed argument against the adjournment.

[16] The Committee (and presumably the adjudicator) decided that it was reasonable for the coroner to conclude that the decision of ECtHR would be helpful in deciding how the inquest should proceed. This is undoubtedly correct but it does not meet the essential point made on behalf of the applicant in the opinion of counsel and the draft proceedings submitted to the legal aid department. This was that the coroner should have heard counsel for the applicant before reaching his decision. That failure inevitably rendered the coroner's decision susceptible to judicial review. The applicant was certain to succeed in such an application unless it could be shown that the coroner was bound to have rejected any argument advanced against an adjournment. Then the application for judicial review could have been refused as a matter of discretion. But there was no material before the adjudicator or the Committee that could justify the conclusion that the court would exercise its discretion to refuse judicial review, much less that it was inevitable that it would do so. In those circumstances, legal aid ought to have been granted. I consider that the refusal to grant it was unreasonable and cannot be sustained."

"I am satisfied that reasons for the decision of the adjudicator and the Committee ought to have been given in this case. I accept that the legal aid authorities are not under a duty to give reasons in every case and that it is open to them to adopt a policy of generally not giving reasons. In the present case, however, there was a strong and, as it proved, correct opinion from counsel in favour of the grant of legal aid. Both the adjudicator and the Committee failed to appreciate the significance and effect of that opinion. These factors removed this case into that exceptional category that required reasons to be given."

"The giving of reasons may among other things concentrate the decision-maker's mind on the right questions; demonstrate to the recipient that this is so; show that the issues have been conscientiously addressed and how the result that the issues have been conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached; or alternatively alert the recipient to a justiciable flaw in the process. On the other side of the argument, it may place an undue burden on decision-makers; demand an appearance of unanimity where there is diversity; call for the articulation of sometimes inexpressible value judgments; and offer an invitation to the captious to comb the reasons for previously unsuspected grounds of challenge. It is the relationship of these and other material considerations to the nature of the particular decision which will determine whether or not fairness demands reasons."

"In considering this issue I start from the position that the legislation governing legal aid in Northern Ireland does not require the Legal Aid Committee to given reasons for its decisions. That is not in my view conclusive, but it points towards a conclusion that in the ordinary way one would not expect it to be obligatory for the Committee to furnish reasons for its decisions. It seems to me that it will depend on the nature of the issues before the Committee whether reasons will ever be required. In the present case, to which I shall limit my ruling, the grounds on which the applicant relied in his appeal to the Committee appear with sufficient clarity from the documents which he submitted. When the Committee dismissed his appeal, it was rejecting his submission on each of those grounds. The applicant and the court are quite well able without receiving more details to examine each submission and to decide if the Committee has applied the law correctly or fallen into error in rejecting it.

In a case such as the present, accordingly, where the issues canvassed before the Committee are matters of law, and those have been identified through the applicant's written or oral representations, it does not seem to me to be necessary for the Committee to set out its reasons seriatim for holding against the applicant. Such a case is not one where the laconic refusal of an application or dismissal of an appeal presents an inscrutable mask behind which one cannot see. It is possible to look at each of the issues and see whether the Committee's conclusion on it can be justified. The same may no doubt be said in very many other cases where the issue is whether there is any prospect of success on the facts put before the Committee. One might suppose that cases could arise where an appellant was left in the dark about the Committee's reasons because it decided on a ground which had not been the subject of any submission or discussion, but such cases can be left for decision if they should arise, and I decline to lay down any general proposition."

Nicholson LJ. I agree.

Coghlin J. I agree.