1. As I have arrived at a different conclusion to my brethren I shall state my views shortly.

2. Article 4 (1) of the Dogs (Northern Ireland) Order 1983 (the Order) provides:

3. The Order provides also (Article 29(1)) that if a dog attacks any person the keeper of the dog and, if it is in the charge of a person other than its keeper, that person also shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £200. (Article 29(1)). By virtue of Article 53 a breach of a duty imposed under Article 29, so far as it causes damage, is actionable.

4. Jean Scott, the second defendant, as licensed owner of the dog that attacked and injured the appellant, Jonathan Canavan was sued by him and he obtained judgment in default against her.

5. He continued with his action against her brother Cecil as owner of the farm premises where his sister lives. It was in the farmyard that his sister’s dog attacked Jonathan Canavan and Cecil Scott is sued on the basis that he is deemed to be a keeper of the dog because Article 2 (7) of the Order states:

6. So it is said that Cecil and Jean Scott where each keepers of this dog, when Jonathan Canavan was attacked. Jean as licensed keeper of the dog and Cecil as the occupier of the farmyard with knowledge that his sister kept the dog, which it appears he had given to her as a present, at the farmhouse.

7. The purpose behind Article 2(7) is to prevent the occupier of land from escaping liability for a dog found on his land by claiming that the dog is neither owned by him nor in his possession. He is therefore deemed to be the person who keeps the dog unless he proves also that the dog was permitted to remain on his land without his knowledge

8. The question raised by this appeal is whether a dog can have more than one keeper by reason of the wide description of keeper in the interpretation component of the Order.

9. In the operative component of the Order it is made unlawful for a person to keep a dog of any description unless he holds a dog licence authorising him to keep a dog of that description. If Article 2(7) is given the meaning contended for by the appellant then Cecil Scott ought to have applied for a licence for the dog although a licence had been issued to his sister. Can it have been the intention of the legislature that, for example, a husband and wife should each hold licences for the family dog, one as the owner of the dog and its keeper, the other as a person deemed to be its keeper as an occupier of the house and garden where the dog lives?

10. I consider that the Court should look for a construction of the Order that will not produce such anomalous results as are reached by a literal construction of Article 2. The key is found in Article 4 if it is understood to mean that once a dog licence has been issued the person to whom it has been issued is the keeper of the dog. In Article 2 (3) and thereafter is be found those who may be the keeper of a dog and Article 2(7) only comes into effect when someone has to be deemed or considered to be the keeper because no one else has been established to be the keeper.

11. If the concept of a single keeper is adopted this has to be tested by reference to Articles 22 (3)( a)(i) and 24(1)( a)(i). Article 2 (3) makes provision for the keeper of a dog to be someone other than the owner. Article 22(3)( a)(i) states that a dog which is off land owned or occupied by the keeper and, if the keeper of the dog is a person other than its owner, off land owned or occupied by its owner also, shall be treated as a stray dog. I do not find this provision inconsistent with the concept of a dog having a single keeper under the terms of the Order. The same observation applies to Article 24(1)( a)(i).

12. I conclude that the Jean Scott was the sole keeper of the dog and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.