Before : |
Sir William Bailhache, President; |
Andrew Scott Page
-v-
His Majesty's Attorney General
The Appellant in person.
Advocate O. A. Blakeley, Amicus Curiae
Ms C. Hall, Crown Advocate.
JUDGMENT
FURNESS JA:
1. On 18 April 2024 Andrew Scott Page (-the Defendant-) was convicted before the Bailiff, sitting with a jury, of a grave and criminal assault which he had committed in December 2022 against a woman with whom he was having a relationship (-the Victim-). He was, on the same occasion, also convicted on a count of petty larceny, but that offence is not relevant to this appeal. The Defendant appeared for sentencing before the Bailiff, sitting with the Superior Number on 20 August 2024, when he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4½ years on the count of grave and criminal assault (Attorney General v Page [2024] JRC 172). By a notice of appeal dated 10 September 2024 the Defendant sought leave to appeal both his conviction and his sentence. His appeal against his conviction was dismissed by this Court in a judgment handed down on 2 April 2025 (Page v Attorney General [2025] JCA 091). His application for leave to appeal his sentence, and his substantive appeal if leave is granted, was adjourned to be heard after this Court had handed down its judgment in Attorney General v Tremarco [2025] JCA 093. The Court is now giving judgment on the sentencing appeal.
2. The Defendant is not represented on this appeal. The Court has been ably assisted by written and oral submissions from Advocate Olaf Blakeley, who appears as an amicus. At the hearing the Defendant stated that he relied on the submissions of the amicus, and that he did not wish to make any submissions of his own. The Attorney General is represented by Crown Advocate Christina Hall.
3. The following description is taken from the summary of the Victim's evidence set out in the Crown's Final Summary of Facts dated 14 August 2024, which was broadly adopted by the sentencing Court.
(i) On 20th December 2022, at approximately 4pm, the Defendant and the Victim collected the Defendant's prescription from the pharmacy. As the Defendant walked away, the Victim stated that he began to take approximately 10 clonazepam, which she said had caused her concern. The pair continued to the Co-op to buy some food and the Victim stated the Defendant began to act "differently", "slurring" and "not acting himself". An incident at the Co-op then occurred, whereby the Defendant was told to leave the shop by the security guard and shop workers.
(ii) The Defendant and the Victim then returned to the Victim's flat ("the Flat"). She stated the Defendant began drinking and was "completely smashed out of his head". As the Victim began putting away the shopping, the Defendant began goading the Victim, being "nasty" to her and she said she felt the Defendant was trying to start an argument.
(iii) The Defendant then began trying to cook a frozen lobster. He spilt sauce everywhere and began putting "literally anything in the cupboards he could find" in a blender. The Victim was concerned that the Defendant would give himself food poisoning and their interactions became heated. Eventually the Defendant threw the lobster in the bin whilst on the plate, blaming the Victim for the waste. The Defendant then started falsely accusing the Victim of cheating on him. He shouted at the Victim who tried to calm the Defendant as she was worried the noise would upset her neighbours.
(iv) The Victim then stated that the Defendant "started to go for [her]". He unsuccessfully tried to gouge her eyes. He grabbed her around the throat and was screaming in her face. At this point the Victim had her back to the kitchen drawers, and she stated she reached behind her for something to protect herself. She grabbed a knife from the drawer and held it by her side. In response the Defendant grabbed a kitchen knife from the kitchen sink and poked her in the stomach inviting the Victim to "plunge" her knife into him. The Victim dropped her knife and the Defendant then put his knife back on the draining rack.
(v) After he dropped the knife, the Victim tried to leave the kitchen area but the Defendant grabbed her from behind and pushed her into an armchair. The Victim recalled the Defendant placing all his weight on her and being unable to breathe. She recalled that at this time she thought the Defendant was going to kill her and described the feeling of "fighting for her life". He continued to shout at the Victim saying "horrendous things", and then threw her on to the floor and placed his weight on her again. The Victim recalled praying to God to look after her son.
(vi) The Defendant then threw the Victim to the floor and placed his arm around her neck from behind and applied pressure. The Victim managed to move to the bedroom where she tried to pack some of the Defendant's possessions, however the Defendant then threw her to the floor and grabbed her by the hair and hit her head against the doorframe between 2 to 4 times. Finally, the Victim recalled being kicked in the stomach and back.
(vii) In describing how the Defendant had strangled her, the Victim stated the Defendant had grabbed her around the throat. She stated his hands were around her windpipe and as he applied pressure the Victim explained how she couldn't breathe, and her legs "went". She described how she still feels a lump in her throat over a year later. Throughout the assault the Victim told the Defendant that she wanted him to leave. She stated that during the attack the Defendant had laughed and stated "he didn't hit women", a phrase he also used in his evidence. The Victim stated that the Defendant had also told her that if she called the police, she was a "grass".
(viii) When the Defendant finally left, the Victim told the Defendant there were cameras recording him outside of the Flat. The Defendant proceeded to punch himself in the face saying "look at these marks" and then left to go to his friend's house.
4. At trial the Defendant pleaded not guilty. He argued that he was acting in self-defence, and that the victim was the aggressor. The Victim was cross-examined (by an amicus) on this basis. Clearly the jury did not accept this version of events.
5. The sentencing Court had the benefit of a pre-sentence report, dated 8 August 2024, and a Victim Personal Statement made on 11 June 2024, which this Court has also read and taken into account. The pre-sentence report notes that the Defendant takes no responsibility for the offence, and maintains his self defence argument. It is also noted that the Defendant has 19 domestic incidents, of varying severity, recorded by the Police, although the present case is the only one which has resulted in him being charged and convicted. Only two of the previous incidents involved the Victim. The previous incidents appear to have related to domestic arguments which involved allegations and counter allegations. In none of them is the Defendant recorded as using, or threatening to use, a weapon.
6. The report also refers to the Defendant's -unenviable criminal record- of 46 convictions for 235 offences. It is clear from the report that the Defendant had a difficult childhood and was then, aged 10 subjected to a serious and traumatic assault which still affects his life. He remains on medication for the psychological impact. His offending began at an early age and has continued ever since. He is now aged 45. However, only two offences against the person feature among his convictions (two convictions for common assault committed in England in 2010, each attracting an 8 week prison sentence). His other convictions are mainly for theft and related offences, drugs and driving offences.
7. In his judgment on sentence the Bailiff said this about the offence:
-5 In our view the Crown has correctly characterised the nature of the grave and criminal assault against the criteria set out in Harrison v AG [2004] JLR 111. We accept it was not a premeditated assault but during the course of it you attempted unsuccessfully to gouge your Victim's eyes and as we have already indicated, the attack included grabbing her around the throat, applying pressure to the windpipe, holding a knife to her stomach and placing all of your weight on her causing her to struggle to breathe and hitting her head against a door frame and finally kicking her in the stomach and back. These actions cannot be described as other than intentional and deliberate. We also accept that the incident arose as a loss of temper and given your Victim's injuries it is clear the degree of force that was used. There was no apparent provocation.
6 You have a history of criminal activity including convictions for offences against the person and possession of offensive and prohibited weapons,
7 The Crown has suggested to us that the fact that the assault took place in the Victim's home, that you were under the influence of alcohol and prescribed medication, and that you brandished a knife as aggravating factors and we can only agree that they are such. There is no doubt there was an abuse of trust or power involved and you knew your Victim to be vulnerable because she has a history of mental illness of which you were aware. She had to leave her home and originally went to the Women's Refuge for safety.-
8. After noting that there was no guilty plea to the grave and serious assault charge, and no other evident mitigation available, the Bailiff said this:
-In mitigation your counsel has urged us to take into account your background and drawn our attention to particular sections of the relevant report. They disclose very serious matters [which we take to be a reference to the assault referred to above] and we do not in any sense minimise them but you have been on medication for a considerable period and it happened comparatively a long time ago and you could have sought help in the intervening period. Whereas we do not trivialise what happened to you, there must come a time when the relevance of that for sentencing purposes is significantly reduced and we have taken the view, that that time has been reached.-
9. The Court was referred to the decision in Coelho v AG [2020] JRC 140 on the approach to sentencing for offences involving domestic violence. The Bailiff concluded by stating that on the conviction for grave and criminal assault the Court adopted the Crown's proposed sentence of 4½ years imprisonment.
10. The amicus and the Crown are agreed on the principal authorities which set out the principles which should guide sentencing for this sort of offence. The starting point is the judgment of this Court in Harrison v Attorney General [2004] JLR 111, which sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account when sentencing for a grave and criminal assault. At paragraph 120 of the judgment the Court said this:
-In our judgment, in any case of grave and criminal assault the Crown, when drafting the statement of facts, and the Jurats, when addressing themselves to sentence, should make an assessment of the seriousness of the offence and should bear in mind the following factors, though the list is not intended to be exhaustive -
(a) the nature of the deliberation with which the assault was carried out;
(b) whether the blow was aimed or random;
(c) whether the incident arose as a result of a loss of temper or was committed in cold blood;
(d) what was the degree of force with which the blow must have been struck;
(e) the nature, extent, gravity and permanence of the injury occasioned;
(f) if a weapon was used, the nature of such weapon;
(g) whether the weapon was carried or seized on the instant;
(h) how many were concerned in the assault and the circumstances which gave rise to their involvement;
(i) the nature and extent of any provocation offered by the victim; and
(j) whether the offender has a record of committing the same or similar offences or constitutes a danger to himself of to the public.-
11. It will be apparent that some of the facts of the present case point to a more severe form of offending, but other potentially aggravating factors are absent.
12. The decision of the Royal Court in Coelho v Attorney General [2020] JRC 216 was important in that it emphasised the particular seriousness of a grave and criminal assault in a domestic context, and addressed that form of offending in the context of the Harrison criteria. The Court pointed out that domestic violence offences require the Court to address a range of aggravating factors which are not present in the general run of serious assault cases, and which are not fully reflected in the general guidelines for the sentencing of serious and criminal assaults to be found in Harrison. In paragraph 22 of the judgment the Court said this:
-Finally, although the Harrison factors are useful, are of general application and of particular assistance in cases such as street violence, they are not tailored to meet the context of domestic abuse. Here, the essential aggravating features of the offence were the use of the knife, the fact that the Complainant was assaulted in her own home (including in her own bedroom) and the assault was witnessed by her terrified six year old son, who tried to call 999 on his mother's mobile phone. It needs to be recognised that these sort of factors are at least as important as the "Harrison factors" in cases of domestic abuse and need to be given weight when assessing the gravity of the offence.-
13. There are a number of authorities on the significance for sentencing of the fact that the offender has used, or threatened to use a knife - see AG v Lawlor [2009] JRC 150, AG v Horn [2010] JRC 104 and AG v Moiro [2020] JRC 048. In Horn the Court observed, at paragraph 5:
"First of all the message is that knife crime will be dealt with severely even though no injury is caused, and secondly, domestic violence is similarly a crime which will be treated severely. A person's home, however big or small it is, is their refuge and if the person with whom the home is shared uses violence the victim suffers a double violation; a violation by a person that they have trusted and a violation in their own home. People who commit these offences can expect the Court to focus on the victims and not on their hardships and on their difficulties."
14. The most recent case concerning the sentencing of a grave and criminal assault in the domestic context is Attorney General v Tremarco [2025] JCA 093, a judgment which was not, of course, available to the sentencing Court in this case. Tremarco involved a sequence of 10 offences committed over a period of 6 years. The offender then left the Island and lived for 20 years in the UK, during which time he committed no further offences and appeared to have turned his life around. This Court nonetheless ruled that the seriousness of his offending demanded a custodial sentence (and not a community service order, which had been ordered by the Royal Court). A number of points emerge from the Court's judgment which are of relevance to the present appeal.
15. The first point is the Court's view of the aggravating factors which were present in that case. At paragraph 56 the Court identified these as:
(i) The fact that the assaults were committed on the Victim in the matrimonial home where she was entitled to feel safe, and in the context of a relationship in which the Victim was entitled to trust the Respondent not to engage in acts or threats of violence of any kind
(ii) The high level of violence on the part of the Respondent, including punching, kicking stamping grabbing by the throat and manual strangulation
(iii) The severity of physical injuries which the Respondent inflicted on the Victim, and the permanent scarring which they have left behind.
(iv) The repetition of the assaults, with the Respondent inflicting 10 assaults on the Victim over a period of some 6 years.
(v) The use of violent language by the Respondent in the course of the assaults, including the wish that the Victim should die.
(vi) The fact that the level of violence, combined with the Respondent's threats, left the Victim on more than one occasion in (quite reasonable) fear of her life.
(vii) The serious and long-lasting psychological damage inflicted on the Victim, which continues to blight her life to this day.
16. The second point is that the Court emphasised the seriousness, from a sentencing point of view, of non-fatal strangulation (at paragraphs 37 to 43). It cited an academic paper by Dr Jane Monckton Smith at the University of Gloucestershire, which concluded:
"[Non-fatal strangulation] is also associated with severe trauma in its victims and is in fact experienced as a real threat to life. Victims of it report not only that it is incredibly painful, it is an experience of potential death. Perpetrators of NFS very often have this as their motivation. It is a particularly traumatic, and because of this an effective, way to exert the ultimate control and leave the victim in no doubt that their life has been threatened. It would be a mistake to think that NFS is a spontaneous and angry assault, it is more likely to be a controlled and determined threat."
17. The third point is the Court's emphasis on the importance of the deterrent effect of sentencing, and the importance of maintaining public confidence in the prosecution and sentencing of domestic violence offences. At paragraph 58 the Court observed:
-Turning to the reasons which the Royal Court gave for its sentence, we do not agree with a view expressed in paragraph 12 of the sentencing judgment that this was not a case where deterrence was an important factor in sentencing. In recent years domestic violence has become recognised as a serious, and unhappily prevalent, crime. It is important that those with a propensity to commit crimes in this category are aware that their wrongdoing will be met with severe punishment. It is also highly important that those who may be victims of this form of crime can trust law enforcement authorities to take this form of offending seriously. It is important for the public to know that the vulnerable will be protected, if necessary, by the imposition of immediate prison sentences. To put the matter another way, it would send entirely the wrong signal to say that the perpetrator of a sequence of domestic assaults of this severity can escape prison, even though he may have reformed his life since the offences.-
18. As this Court ruled in AG v Gorvel [1973] JJ 2503, a sentence will only be overturned on appeal by a defendant if it is either manifestly excessive, in the circumstances of the case, or wrong in principle. This test was expanded somewhat by this Court in Harrison at paragraph 31, by reference to a passage from the 2003 edition of Archbold's Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice in the following terms:
"In broad terms, it is submitted that the court will interfere -
(a) where the sentence is not justified by law, in which case it will interfere not as a matter of discretion but of law;
(b) where sentence has been passed on the wrong factual basis;
(c) where some matter has been improperly taken into account or there is some fresh matter to be taken into account; or
(d) where the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive."
This approach has been followed subsequently, notably in the recent decision of this Court in Nunes v Attorney General [2024] JCA 160 at paragraph 13.
19. The Defendant's Notice of Appeal relates to both conviction and sentence. The grounds of appeal against sentence are grounds 1 and 4. Ground 1 is that the sentence it is manifestly excessive. Ground 4 reads as follows -
-Sentence was based on a summary of incorrect facts of the case ie
(1) statements like the defendant has previous convictions for offensive and prohibited weapons,
(2) describing linear scratches as bruises,
(3) no evidence provided at trial or sentence of allegations of drinking and being under the influence of prescription medication
(4) no evidence provided about alleged incident at Co-op shop
(5) no evidence at trial or sentence related to a knife being involved
(6) statement of FME [forensic medical examiner] misrepresented, for example under cross examination when asked by CROWN ADVOCATE -is that consistent with hands around the neck- she responds -I COULDN'T SAY THAT-. First sentence out of her mouth were asked the question by CROWN ADVOCATE,
(7) she continues -in HINDSIGHT I would have referred complaint to A&E. BUT THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME A YEAR BEFORE THIS comment she did not refer complaint to A&E and found nothing to concern her enough to do so -HINDSIGHT- should not be relied upon.
(8) I place a Placeholder on this so so I can address my full submissions before the appeal court in January 2025 as Miss Baker said.-
20. It is convenient first to consider Ground 4. The Crown accepts that there was an error in the Crown's Conclusions on sentencing which was before the sentencing Court. In paragraph 3(j) the following sentence appears:
-The Defendant has an extensive record which includes convictions for offences against the person, possession of offensive and prohibited weapons and public disorder offences. However, he has no convictions for domestic violence.-
The Crown accepts that the words -possession of offensive and prohibited weapons- should not have appeared in that sentence, because such offences do not form part of the Defendant's criminal record. It is submitted that this error had no material effect on the sentence passed; that the important fact (in the Defendant's favour) was that he had no prior convictions for domestic violence, and that that fact was stated in the Conclusions. However, the misstatement appears in the Crown's review of the Harrison factors and we note that the supposed fact that the Defendant had convictions for the possession of offensive and prohibited weapons was referred to in the sentencing judgment at paragraph 6. To this extent, therefore paragraph (1) of Ground 4 has been made out. We return to the significance of this below.
21. The Crown does not accept the criticisms made of its presentation to the sentencing Court which are made in paragraphs (2) to (7) of Ground 4.
22. As to paragraph (2), the medical evidence given at trial by Dr Zosia Bellamy referred to both -linear abrasions- (ie scratches) and bruises being present on the Victim's body, following the assault. It is not understood in what way it is said the scratches were described as bruises, or why this should have had any material effect on the sentence.
23. The Victim's own evidence is sufficient to justify the statements complained of in paragraphs (3) (4) and (5). Of course, while appealing his conviction the Defendant asserted that the Victim's evidence was unreliable and should have been rejected. But now that appeal has been dismissed, the position is that the jury must have been taken to accept the Victim's version of events over the Defendant's. It is therefore reasonable for the sentencing Court to proceed on the basis that the Victim's version of events is substantially correct.
24. Paragraphs (6) and (7) appear to be designed to discredit the medical evidence to the effect that the Victim had suffered strangulation. But the Victim's own testimony justifies the inclusion of strangulation as an element of the offence, and the medical evidence on any view is supportive of that testimony.
25. Overall, therefore, we do not consider that the criticisms made in Ground 4(2) to (7) are sufficient to show that the sentence was passed on an incorrect understanding of the facts, or was otherwise wrong in principle.
26. As we have noted above, the Defendant is correct in stating that the Crown's Conclusions on sentencing contained an error, in that they stated that the Defendant had past convictions for possession of offensive and prohibited weapons. That fact was expressly referred to in the sentencing judgment in paragraph 6. There must therefore, at the lowest, be a concern that this factor influenced the Jurats in reaching their decision on sentence. On the other hand, the Crown's Conclusions clearly stated that the Defendant had no convictions for domestic violence offences, and there was no suggestion that the Defendant had ever been convicted of an offence involving the use, as opposed to the possession, of an offensive weapon.
27. As Advocate Hall fairly admitted, it is uncertain what factors the Jurats actually took into account when reaching their sentence, because the sentencing judgment does not explain their detailed reasoning. But because the supposed convictions for possession of weapons were referred in the sentencing judgment, there has to be a risk that the Jurats were influenced to some degree by that misstatement. That possibility is rendered more plausible by the fact that the Defendant's offence involved the use of a knife, so previous offences related to offensive weapons might have been thought to be relevant. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the doubt over whether the misstatement had a material effect on the Jurats' decision has to be resolved in the Defendant's favour. We must therefore proceed on the basis that this is a case where sentence has been passed on the wrong factual basis, or is a case where some matter has been improperly taken into account, and thus falls within paragraphs (b) or (c) of the Archbold formulation quoted in paragraph 18 above.
28. Once this Court reaches the conclusion that a sentence is liable to be set aside, the Court must reconsider afresh the appropriate sentence for the offence. It is not appropriate, in a case such as the present to start with the Court's sentence and try and make an adjustment for the erroneous factor which we have assumed they took into account.
29. We return to the sentence we have decided to impose at the end of this judgment. We will first deal with the submissions on Ground 1 of the Appeal, namely whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. Although this Ground does not need to be ruled on in view of our finding on Ground 4, the submissions on Ground 1 are relevant to the question of the appropriate sentence. We will therefore consider the merits of Ground 1 on the assumption that the Jurats' decision was not vitiated by the mistake over the Defendant's past convictions.
30. We begin by evaluating the seriousness of the Defendant's offence by reference to the criteria we have extracted from the authorities. We start with the Harrison criteria, (set out in paragraph 10 above). We consider that although not premeditated, the attack was carried out with a degree of deliberation - it was not a momentary lashing out but a sustained series of assaults. The blows, and particularly the attempted eye gouging and the manual strangulation, were aimed rather than random. The medical evidence suggests that a degree of force was used, although no major physical injury was suffered. That said, the Victim still suffers some physical discomfort, and also has suffered mental trauma, leading to anxiety and flashbacks. A knife was used in the assault, albeit by way of threat. There was no provocation for the attack. On the other hand, in the Defendant's favour, the assault arose from temper, and not in cold blood, and the weapon was seized on the instant. The assault involved only the Defendant and the Victim. The Defendant does not have any history of convictions for domestic violence and only two minor convictions (15 years ago) for assault.
31. We have noted above the seriousness of the use of a knife, even if no injury was inflicted, particularly in a domestic context.
32. Turning to the aggravating factors noted in Tremarco (set out in paragraph 15 above), the assault occurred in the Victim's own home. It involved serious violence, including manual strangulation and (not present in Tremarco) attempted eye-gouging and the threat of the use of a knife. It is a measure of the seriousness of the violence that in the course of the assault, the Victim herself picked up a knife to defend herself, albeit she dropped it soon after. Although a single assault, and not part of a pattern of such behaviour, as seen in Tremarco, this was a serious assault with significant aggravating factors. It caused physical and mental injuries to the Victim, from which she is still suffering. It was clearly deserving of an immediate and significant sentence of imprisonment, and Advocate Blakely does not contend otherwise. The question for this court is whether the length of the term imposed was manifestly excessive.
33. Advocates Blakeley and Hall have properly eschewed any attempt to compare the facts and sentences in earlier cases with the facts of the present case. As the Court of Appeal said in Wood -v- AG [1994] JLR N-15a,(cited in Harrison paragraph 62) -
"It is necessary and important, however, to remember that reference to earlier cases is made in order to see the principles and guidelines which have been laid down there and to follow them. The purpose of referring to earlier cases is not to analyze the exact sentence which was then passed and the precise reasons why the court arrived at it. This would be an impossible undertaking since sentencing is a discretionary exercise in every case and the reports do not include every feature which influenced the court in exercising its discretion on earlier occasions."
34. Advocate Blakeley did however submit that the present sentence -jarred- with other sentences in domestic violence cases. He took the Court briefly to a series of cases involving domestic violence, namely Coelho, Attorney General v Crabtree [2017] JRC 143, Attorney General v Duffy [2017] JRC 131 Horn and Moiro. In each case he gave the Court a brief summary of the facts of the offence, and the sentence imposed. Some of those offences involved the use of a knife (Coelho Horn Moiro and Duffy), and some had aggravating factors not present in the present case (such as the presence of a child who witnessed the assault (Coelho and Horn), or a past record of convictions for domestic violence or violence against women (Coelho and Crabtree). All of the sentences imposed were more lenient than the sentence imposed by the Royal Court in this case, although in some cases there was significant mitigation present. Advocate Blakeley sought to avoid the suggestion that he was engaged in precisely the exercise which was deprecated in Wood, by characterising his submissions as a -high level review- of the sort of sentence typically handed down in cases of domestic violence, with a view to showing that the sentence in present case was significantly out of line with past sentencing practice.
35. Advocate Blakeley also sought to draw a comparison with the very recent sentence handed down by this Court in Tremarco. In Tremarco the actual sentence imposed was three years, but there was significant mitigation in that case, including a guilty plea. The Court was of the view that the -starting point- for the sentence was six years, which was then reduced to three years after taking account of mitigating factors. In the present case the sentencing Court made no deduction for mitigating circumstances. If one were to attempt a comparison one would have to compare the Defendant's sentence of 4½ years with the starting point of 6 years in Tremarco. The question raised by Advocate Blakeley is whether, granted that the cumulative effect of the offending in Tremarco was clearly greater than the single offence in the present case, the differential of 1½ years was sufficient to mark that difference. He points to the sustained and serious violence present over a number of years in Tremarco and the seriousness of the individual assaults. On the other hand, the Defendant in Tremarco never used a weapon, and never attempted to gouge his victim's eyes.
36. We do not find it a useful exercise to try and gauge the relative severity of the assaults in Tremarco, and in the earlier cases, when compared with the assault in this case. For the reasons given in Wood, we find it impossible to draw firm conclusions from the sentencing in these other cases (involving different facts and different aggravating and mitigating circumstances). What one can legitimately take from the earlier cases are the statements of principle and the Court's view of the aggravating factors present in those cases. The most important of these we have set out above.
37. Turning to the specifics of this offence, Advocate Blakeley rightly accepted that this was a serious assault. But he stressed the fact that the Defendant had no past convictions for domestic violence offences, and the fact that his offending was a one-off offence, and not part of a series of such assaults. Although the police had been called out to domestic incidents involving the Defendant on several occasions in the past, the Defendant had never been charged, let alone convicted, of any offence. He submitted, and we agree, that these incidents cannot be held against the Defendant.
38. In the end, the merits of this Ground turn on whether the Jurats in this case stepped outside the bounds of the reasonable range of sentences available to them. In Tremarco this Court considered the Jurats had made an error of principle in imposing a non-custodial sentence. But the Court was clear about the respect to be afforded to sentencing decisions of the Jurats, especially when sitting as the Superior Number (see paragraph 54 of the judgment). While the Courts have in the past referred to guidelines on sentencing issued by the Sentencing Council of England and Wales when considering assaults which constitute domestic violence (the Courts in both Coelho and Tremarco did so) the English system of sentencing tariffs has not been adopted in this jurisdiction, as appears from Nunes, and from the recent Royal Court decision in Attorney General v Roberts [2025] JRC 081. Instead, sentencing decisions are left to the good sense and judgment of the Jurats, who benefit from a close connection to, and knowledge of, the community which they serve. The Jersey system relies on their collective knowledge and experience to ensure consistency of approach in sentencing
39. On the present appeal, a case could certainly be made, and has been made, for a somewhat lower sentence than that imposed. It would have been open to the Jurats to have been more lenient had they been so minded. But that of course is not sufficient if the Defendant is to succeed on this Ground. He has to show that his sentence is not only excessive, but manifestly so. Weighing up all the factors in this case we are not satisfied that that hurdle has been overcome. The sentence imposed was towards the top end of the sentence one might have expected for this offence, but it was not manifestly excessive. We would not, had this ground of appeal been live, have given leave, or allowed the appeal, on this Ground.
40. We now turn to the sentence which we have determined to impose, in the light of the Defendant's success on Ground 4(1). Before us, Advocate Hall submitted that, notwithstanding the error over the Defendant's previous convictions, the Royal Court's sentence of 4½ years remained appropriate. Advocate Blakeley realistically accepted that a substantial term of imprisonment was inevitable, and proposed 3½ years.
41. We have already indicated that we consider the Royal Court's sentence was at the top end of the sentence which the present offence might reasonably attract. We have set out above the serious aggravating factors present in this case. But we do accept that this was a single offence committed by an individual with no relevant past convictions. We consider that this case should have a starting point of 4 years. We agree with the Royal Court that there is no real mitigation available to reduce that sentence. We therefore give leave to bring the appeal and we allow the appeal. We substitute a sentence of 4 years imprisonment for the sentence imposed by the Royal Court.
Authorities
Attorney General v Page [2024] JRC 172
Page v Attorney General [2025] JCA 091.
Attorney General v Tremarco [2025] JCA 093.
Harrison v Attorney General [2004] JLR 111.
Coelho v Attorney General [2020] JRC 216.
AG v Lawlor [2009] JRC 150.
AG v Moiro [2020] JRC 048.
Attorney General v Tremarco [2025] JCA 093.
Archbold's Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice.
Nunes v Attorney General [2024] JCA 160.
Wood -v- AG [1994] JLR N-15a.
Attorney General v Crabtree [2017] JRC 143.