Inferior Number Sentencing - motoring - failing to stop and report an accident - reasons
Before : |
Sir Timothy Le Cocq, Bailiff, and Jurats Christensen MBE and Opfermann |
The Attorney General
-v-
Pedro Nuno Rodrigues Caires
P. M. Lee Esq., Crown Advocate.
Advocate L. V. Marks for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
THE BAILIFF:
1. On 13 December 2024, we sentenced Pedro Nuno Rodrigues Caires ("the Defendant") for a number of motoring offences including drunkenly driving through St Helier at excessive speed during which he crashed into a stationary car, seriously injuring the driver. He subsequently ran from the scene and failed to stop and report what had occurred. (AG v Caires [2024] JRC 281)
2. We sentenced the Defendant as follows:
(i) Count 1 - driving a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit: 50 hours community service, the equivalent of 1 month imprisonment, with a disqualification from driving for 18 months and a requirement to re-take the driving test;
(ii) Count 2 - causing serious injury by dangerous driving: 312 hours community service, the equivalent of 2 years imprisonment, with a 2½ year disqualification from driving and a requirement to re-take the driving test;
(iii) Count 3 - failing to stop and report an accident: 100 hours community service, the equivalent of 4 months imprisonment.
3. All of the above were to run concurrently making a total of 312 hours community service and a period of 2½ years disqualification dating from 26 September 2024 with a requirement to re-take the test.
4. At the time we handed down sentence, we indicated that we would provide further reasons in due course. These, in brief, are those reasons.
5. It is not necessary for us to set out the precise details of the offending. These were fully referred to by the Crown in the statement of facts read out in court. Suffice it to say that on 9 July 2023, the Defendant had attended a private function at the Royal Yacht Hotel where he had consumed alcohol. He left shortly before 10.00 pm and drove his BMW through St Helier and then towards Queens Road. His speed has been assessed at being between 79 and 83 miles per hour whilst driving northerly up Queens Road and between 77 and 81 miles per hour when returning in a southerly direction. The speed limit over that stretch of road is 30 miles per hour.
6. The Defendant then collided at speed with a parked car between Lower Kings Cliff and Queens Avenue causing substantial damage. It cannot be said precisely at what speed he collided with the car but it was well in excess of the speed limit and caused substantial damage both to the car and to neighbouring properties. The occupant of the car was seriously injured, receiving a laceration to the right side of his head, a narrow subdural hematoma on the left frontoparietal region and small haemorrhage contusions to the left front region of the brain. We read the victim's personal statements which showed how his injuries had immediately affected him and revealed the continuing problems that he has with his back and pelvis and auditory issues. The Defendant fled from the scene and did not report the accident.
7. The Defendant was arrested subsequently in a neighbouring flat to his home address. In response to caution, he said that he had panicked and run away. During the procedure in which the Defendant's blood was taken at the hospital, he said that he was driving down the hill and a car pulled out in front of him. This patently was incorrect.
8. The analysis of the blood sample concluded, on the basis of a back-calculation, that at the time of the collision, the level of alcohol in the Defendant's blood would have been no less than 119 milligrams per 100 millilitres. The prescribed limit is 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres.
9. The Defendant provided no comment interviews with the police but other than that, it appears that he was co-operative, and we noted that the Defendant sent an email on 11 July to the police asking them to pass on his apologies to the person injured by his driving.
10. The Crown approached the matter by treating certain matters with which the Defendant had been charged as aggravating the main offence and moved accordingly for concurrent sentences. We agreed with this approach and agreed that driving at excessive speed in a state of alcoholic intoxication aggravated the most serious offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving.
11. The Crown moved for a sentence of imprisonment and we well understand the Crown taking that approach. In ordinary circumstances, a matter of this seriousness would have entirely merited a sentence of imprisonment. In terms of sentence, the Defendant was enormously fortunate that the injuries suffered by the person in the stationary vehicle that he struck were not more severe.
12. In mitigation, we noted that the Defendant pleaded guilty to all of the charges before him at the earliest opportunity and we accepted his letter of remorse and indeed the substantial level of remorse expressed through the Defendant's counsel to the Court as entirely genuine. We accepted that this behaviour was out of character and indeed the Defendant offered no explanation for it. The Defendant had no previous motoring convictions and his record was clear other than for two convictions dating from 2011 for unrelated offending.
13. The Defendant's counsel expressed the Defendant's attitude as being devastated, not only to be before the Court, but also at the impact of his actions. We noted that the Defendant was visibly distressed during the court appearance and we accepted that he has exhibited the same distress at meetings with counsel and on other occasions.
14. We noted that whereas the Defendant was above the limit, we would not characterise the level of intoxication as gross and we also accepted that only one of the injuries suffered by the occupant of the stationary vehicle could be described as serious.
15. The Defendant is married and has a young daughter and we were informed that were he to receive a sentence of imprisonment, then his family would need to re-locate and would lose their home. Normally, the approach of the Court is to take the view that it was for a Defendant to take into account the consequences of his actions on his family and not, save in exceptional circumstances, for the Court to be asked to do so.
16. We did, however, think that there were exceptional circumstances in this case. In addition to the mitigation that we set out above, we noted the quite extraordinary delay that had occurred before this matter was brought before us. The incident happened on 9 July 2023 and it appeared to us that all evidence should have been available within a relatively short period of time. The Defendant provided a blood sample, witness statements were, or could have been, taken and it was difficult for us to understand why this matter had taken so long to bring before the Court. Indeed, the Crown, whilst quite properly acknowledging the delay, was unable to offer any satisfactory explanation for it.
17. Be that as it may, the effect of that delay was that the Defendant has had this matter, with potential for imprisonment and the threat of homelessness, hanging over him and indeed his family, for much longer than it should have been. It seemed to us that this, coupled with the other extensive mitigation available to him (including co-operation, genuine remorse, guilty pleas and the benefit of good character), meant that we could take an exceptional course and were able to impose a non-custodial sentence.
18. For those reasons, we imposed the sentences set out in paragraph 2 above.
Authorities