Jersey Unreported Judgments

Trust - application to bless a decision to distribute assets

[2024]JRC186

Royal Court

(Samedi)

15 September 2024

Before     :

A. R. Binnington, Esq., Commissioner, and Jurats Averty and Le Cornu

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE REPRESENTATION OF OCORIAN PRIVATE TRUSTEES (JERSEY) LIMITED AND OCORIAN LIMITED

AND IN THE MATTER OF Y TRUST, W TRUST, V TRUST AND U TRUST (TOGETHER THE T TRUSTS)

AND THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 47, 51 AND 53 OF THE TRUSTS (JERSEY) LAW 1984 (AS AMENDED)

IN PRIVATE

Advocate N. M. C. Santos Costa for the Representor.

The First Respondent in person (by video link).

Advocate H. Sharp for the Second Respondent.

Advocate H. B. Mistry for the Third Respondent.

Advocate S. C. Thomas for the Fourth Respondent.

Advocate M. P. Renouf for the Guardian ad litem (excused appearance).

judgment

the COMMISSIONER:

1.        On 16 July 2024, we sat to hear an application brought by way of Representation by Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited and Ocorian Limited (each a "Trustee" and together, "the Representors" or "the Trustees"), pursuant to Article 51 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 ("the 1984 Law") for the Court to "bless" a decision of the Representors to distribute the assets of certain family trusts.  At the conclusion of the hearing, we gave our blessing to the decision and made certain further orders. The following are our reasons for so doing.

2.        The Trustees sought judicial guidance and direction in relation to matters concerning the administration of certain family trusts. The Trustees submitted that where the Court is sitting administratively, or exercising a quasi-parental jurisdiction, to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of a trust, it is accepted that it should generally sit in private (see HSBC Trustee (CI) Limited v Kwong [2018] JRC 051A [K180-K202] at 22). The Trustees therefore sought an order that the proceedings continue to be heard in private and that any judgment given be anonymised.  In the absence of objection from the other parties, we acceded to that request.

The Trusts

3.        During his lifetime, the late F ("the Settlor") settled a series of trusts to benefit his family and employees.  Amongst those trusts are four Jersey law trusts known as:-

(i)        the Y Trust;

(ii)       the W Trust;

(iii)      the V Trust; and

(iv)     the U Trust (together, "the T Trusts").

4.        Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited is the current trustee of the W Trust which was established on 27 February 1974 (but registered on 12 March 1974 in Scotland prior to the trust's change in proper law to Jersey).  Ocorian Limited is the current trustee of the V Trust and the U Trust, those trusts having been established on 3 April 2002.  Ocorian Limited also act as the current trustee of the Y Trust, which was established on 2 October 2012.

5.        The Settlor established the T Trusts for the primary benefit of his four children, namely:-

(i)        B;

(ii)       C;

(iii)      D; and

(iv)     E (together, "the Settlor's Children").

6.        B, C and D are the Settlor's children from his first marriage.  E is the Settlor's son from his second marriage.  The Settlor died domiciled and resident in Country 1 on 17 December 2020 and at the time of his death, had divorced his second wife, G and was living as a bachelor.  None of the Settlor's Children have their own children or are married.

7.        Beneficiaries of the W Trust also included employees, past and present, and their dependents of a family business known as Company A and connected entities.

8.        Whilst the trust period of the Y Trust is indefinite, the trust funds for each of the W Trust, the V Trust and the U Trust (together, "the Vesting Trusts") were due to vest on 31 December 2022.  By Act of Court dated 9 December 2022, the Royal Court extended the vesting dates to 30 September 2023. By Act of Court dated 21 September 2023 the vesting dates were further extended to 3 December 2023, and at the conclusion of a hearing on 18 November 2023 the vesting dates were further extended to 30 September 2024.

9.        Under the terms of the T Trusts, the Representors have the power to appoint the trust funds to or for the benefit of any of the beneficiaries.  The Settlor was firm in his wish that all of the Settlor's Children benefit equally from the Family Trusts.  So as to give effect to this wish, the Representors considered it appropriate to appoint out the assets in the T Trusts and make outright distributions to each of the Settlor's Children ("the 2022 Equalisation").

10.     Following the Settlor's death in December 2020 and in anticipation of receiving certain assets from his estate, the Trustees began, in January 2021, an equalisation exercise, termed "the 2022 Equalisation", by which the benefits received by each of the Settlor's Children from the Family Trusts and from the Settlor himself were scrutinised and the assets of the Family Trusts allocated in such a way as to equalise the position as between them.  The effect of the 2022 Equalisation would be to distribute all of the assets of the T Trusts, resulting in their termination.

11.     The Representors considered the exercise of such powers to bring about the termination of the T Trusts to be a momentous decision in the life of the Family Trusts and to that end, sought the Royal Court's blessing of its decision, pursuant to Article 51 of the 1984 Law.

The previous applications

12.     On 2 June 2023, the Court (W J Bailhache, Commissioner) handed down an interim judgment (In the matter of the Representation of Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited and Ocorian Limited - Re: Y Trust [2023] JRC 087 (the "June 2023 Judgment") in respect of the application by the Representors for the Court's approval or blessing of what had then come to be described (as it turned out, erroneously) as the "final distribution plan" by which the assets of the T Trusts would be appointed out of those trusts among the Settlor's Children with an additional provision for G, who would be added to the Y Trust solely for the purpose of receiving a benefit of £200,000, and would thereafter be excluded.

13.     In the June 2023 Judgment, the Court refused to approve or bless the final distribution plan put before it, and the Trustees advised the Court that they would return to Court later in the year with a further distribution plan for the Court's consideration.  That further hearing took place on 17 and 18 November 2023 (W J Bailhache, Commissioner) ("the November hearing") and a detailed judgment was given on 18 January 2024 ("the January 2024 Judgment")(Representation of Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited and Ocorian Limited Re T Trust [2024] JRC 015).

14.     The Court noted in the January 2024 judgment that it had always been plain to Advocate Renouf as the Fifth Respondent that the employees and former employees of Company A and their dependants were unlikely ever to receive benefit from the T Trusts and, as he had taken the view on behalf of the minor and unborn beneficiaries of the Settlor's children that it was in their best interests that the assets within the Trusts be fully distributed, there was little that he could or should add to the contentions which the putative parents of those he represented might advance.  For the same reason, we were content that he should be excused from appearance before us.

15.     At the November Hearing, the Trustees had presented a revised distribution plan for consideration by the Court, and the Court noted in the January 2024 Judgment that whilst the distribution plan was not agreed by all the beneficiaries certain elements of it were, further noting that it was in some respects "a good deal clearer than the final distribution plan which came before the Court for consideration in May".

16.     Amongst the contentious issues before the court at the November Hearing were what was described as "the French write-off" and the "realisation of Property 1".

The French write-off

17.     The circumstances giving rise to the French write-off issue are described at paragraphs 19 to 23 of the June 2023 Judgment and relate to the allocation of loans made by the Trustees through a Jersey company, Company B which was one of the trust assets, to C and D to enable them to purchase and enhance a stud-farm in France ("the French Property") which was ultimately sold at a loss ("the Company B French Loans").

18.     At the November Hearing, the Trustees presented a Distribution Plan in which it was proposed that the Company B French Loans be allocated in accordance with the contractual position, which is to say, those loans taken out by C were allocated as a benefit to C and those loans taken out by D were allocated as a benefit to D.  Whilst the Distribution Plan was accepted by D, B and E, C had objected to the Trustees' proposed approach and had argued that 80% of C's Company B French Loans should be allocated as a benefit to D.  Having heard submissions and reviewed the evidence at the November Hearing, the Court disagreed with the Trustees' proposal to proceed by way of the contractual position and instead held that in its view, it was for the Trustees to look behind the loans and to examine how the money was spent.  Having expressly noted that it was not directing the Trustees, the Court expressed the view that the Trustees could not be criticised were they to allocate the Company B French Loans equally as between D and C.  As a result, at the November Hearing, the Court partially blessed the Distribution Plan save for the element which related to the Trustees' proposed treatment of the French Property.

19.     Following the November Hearing, the Trustees revisited all of the evidence and considered the submissions made at the November Hearing.  In light of the non-binding guidance given by the Court, the Trustees indicated that they found merit in dividing the Company B French Loans equally between C and D, noting that the French Property was a joint venture as between C and D, with C running the gîtes at the property and D the equestrian side of the property.  In particular, having considered the financial maturity of both C and D, the Trustees now considered that some of C's Company B French Loans would have been made to enable money to be spent on the French Property as a whole, for both the benefit of C and D.  For this reason, the Trustees now considered it reasonable to allocate the Company B French Loans 50/50 as between C and D.

20.     Given the hostility and fractured relationship between C and D in particular, and cognisant of the fact that it was clearly impossible to deal with the Company B French Loans in a manner which was accepted by both, the Trustees, at the hearing before us, sought the Court's blessing of their amended decision taken in relation to the Company B French Loans and therefore sought the Court's blessing to implement the 2022 Equalisation by way of what was termed "the Amended Distribution Plan" which reflected the Trustees' current intentions.  The Company B French Loans and treatment of the same were a significant part of the 2022 Equalisation.

Property 1

21.     The issue relating to Property 1 was described at paragraphs 37 to 45 of the January 2024 Judgment.  It was not however the subject of any application by the Trustees before us and was described as a "distraction" by Advocate Santos Costa on behalf of the Trustees.  Nevertheless, as it was the subject of some comment by the parties at the hearing and is a matter which is delaying the proposed distributions we shall make some mention of it.

22.     Property 1 is owned by the W Trust, and it was acquired for D's occupation once she had left the French Property.  She currently lives in Property 1 with her mother, who is also the mother of B and C.  D has occupied it rent free pursuant to a licence agreement, and in addition, the W Trust has met the costs of various utilities and, from time to time, paid for improvements to the property, as well as refunding to D money that she has spent on Property 1.  All these monies were treated by the Trustees as gifts made during the Settlor's lifetime.

23.     The Property 1 purchase price was funded by way of a loan from Company B.  The Trustees had agreed in principle to sell Property 1 to D for the sum of £2 million, having received a valuation in September 2022.  The result of such a sale would be that the Trustee of the W Trust would be unable to repay the entirety of the Company B loan.  The consequent Company B write-off would reduce the value of the V and the U Trusts as well as the Y Trust and adjustments had been made by the Trustees to compensate C, B and E for the resultant reduction in that value.

24.     The W Trust did however need to sell Property 1 even to contain the Company B loss at its current level.  Accordingly, if D did not proceed to buy it, the Trustees would need to evict her (and her mother) and sell the property on the open market to a third party.  The Trustees had been requesting D since February 2022 to provide proof of funds enabling her to purchase it, and they had taken the view that an urgent decision was needed.  As a result of the delay, D was served with a notice to vacate on 1 February 2022 and a second notice was served on 16 January 2023, without prejudice to the first.  Although D had claimed that the sale of Property 1 would leave her homeless the Trustees had disagreed given that she owned a property in Country 3 outright, having purchased that property using monies gifted to her by her father to enable her to purchase Property 1 from the Trustee in or about 2018.

25.     In the January 2024 Judgment, the Court noted that although D had been pressed since February 2022 to provide proof of funds for her acquisition of Property 1, she was not, even by April 2023, presenting any coherent intention to make progress with the sale of the Country 3 property which would facilitate that acquisition.

26.     The Court regarded the sale of Property 1 as an essential step in the winding up of the Family Trusts and distribution of assets to the four siblings following the equalisation programme, and expressed the view in the January 2024 Judgment that D's procrastination in making arrangements to complete the acquisition of Property 1 was acting as a block on any timely distribution, adding that if the Court were in the position of the Trustees, it would take the approach that if D was not able to complete the purchase of Property 1 by the end of February 2024, the eviction proceedings would be pursued and the property placed on the market forthwith. 

27.     However, recognising the principle of non-intervention, the Court did not direct the Trustees to take these steps but instead blessed the decision of the Trustees to give D until the end of February 2024 to come up with proof of funds for her purchase of Property 1, failing which eviction proceedings would be taken.  The Court added that it did not seem at all unreasonable, even if D did produce proof of funds by the end of February, for the Trustees to insist upon a completion of the sale of Property 1 to her within the following six weeks.  It was clear to the Court that D's activity or lack of it was holding up the process for each of her siblings.

28.     In the January 2024 Judgment, the Court further noted that the fact that the Trustees had placed the property on the open market did not mean that the Trustees could not still sell the property to D if, after that date, she was in a position to buy it.  The Court added that, on the face of it, if D's offer at £2 million was less than any offer received from a third party on the open market, the Trustees would be expected either to take the better offer unless all the adult beneficiaries agreed and would be prepared to back that agreement with an appropriate indemnity or to proceed with the sale to D and make a further adjustment to the amount of her benefit to reflect the difference between the sale price to her and the sale price foregone by not proceeding with the better offer.

29.     Notwithstanding the comments made by the Court in the January 2024 Judgment, Property 1 remains unsold.  In the absence of D providing the required proof of funds, eviction proceedings have been commenced in England ("the Eviction Proceedings").  The Trustees advised us that Property 1 has to be sold in order to enable them to repay some of the Company B Loan and write off the remainder and to contain the loss in the W Trust.  The lack of sale was a block to the implementation of the Distribution Plan and the Amended Distribution Plan.  However, D is now defending the Eviction Proceedings (at increased cost to the Family Trusts) and the Trustees find themselves unable to sell to a third party whilst those proceedings are ongoing, particularly as D appears to be claiming estoppel (although the Trustees are apparently advised that her claim is not properly pleaded and is without merit).

Application to adjourn

30.     At the beginning of the hearing before us on 16 July 2024, Advocate Mistry, on behalf of D, sought an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that the Court should not bless the Trustees' decision without final figures being available, the final figures being dependent on the result of an enquiry as to the quantum of the Trustees' legal and administration costs ordered by the Court in the January 2024 Judgment.  He argued that the provision of final figures was essential for D to be able to assess whether or not she could afford to purchase Property 1 and further suggested that the Court had indicated in the January 2024 Judgment that a blessing of the Trustees' decisions could not take place until the quantum of costs was determined.

31.     In relation to the latter submission Advocate Mistry referred us to paragraph 72 of the January 2024 Judgment in which Commissioner Bailhache said:

"This Court will not engage in a detailed review of quantum in the current proceedings and would generally approve the making of an order for the trustee to recover its internal administrative costs and its expenses pursuant to Article 26(2) of the Trusts Law and under the Court's own inherent jurisdiction. As set out in Alhamrani, there is a threshold before the Court will direct a more detailed enquiry into quantum. In our judgment, that threshold is clearly passed in this case and accordingly we do not consider that we would be in a position to bless without further enquiry the Distribution Plan, which appears to have taken account of fees and expenses charged, in the sense that the distributable funds have been reduced by the fees and expenses taken by the Trustees."

32.     Advocate Mistry suggested that the words "we do not consider that we would be in a position to bless without further enquiry the Distribution Plan" meant that the Distribution Plan could not be blessed until the quantum of the Trustees' costs was finally determined.  We do not read the judgment in that way.  The Court's concern, as expressed in that paragraph, was that as the figures set out in the Distribution Plan took into account deductions for the Trustees' costs it was arguable that a blessing of the Distribution Plan would amount to an approval by the Court of those costs.

33.     The Court went on to say, at paragraph 102:

"It was clear in the application before us that for the most part the Distribution Plan was accepted by the four siblings. The tinkering which is necessary is relatively minor. Accordingly, subject to the resolution of these outstanding items, the Distribution and steps Plans are approved, and the parties will not have to revisit them."

34.     In our view, having made the order that it did in January 2024 for there to be an enquiry as to the quantum of the Trustees' costs, the Court made clear that there was no question that a blessing of the Distribution Plan constituted an acceptance of the quantum of the Trustees' costs.  Furthermore, although the costs that were challenged were substantial the amount of any repayment that the Trustees may be ordered to make in respect of their costs is likely to be relatively modest when compared with the total amount being distributed.

35.     Advocate Thomas, for E, pointed out that any adjournment of the application would have a particular impact on his client given that he had received very little benefit to date from the Family Trusts when compared to the benefits received by his siblings.

36.     In the circumstances we rejected Advocate Mistry's application for an adjournment.

The law

37.     The test that has to be applied by the Court when deciding whether or not to bless a decision taken by trustees who have not surrendered their discretion to the Court is well-established, having been summarised by the Court of Appeal In Re Otto Poon Trust [2015] JCA 109:

"Where a trustee has made a momentous decision, that is a decision of real importance to the trust and seeks the court's approval for the decision, the legal test to be applied by the court is well-established in this jurisdiction. As explained in Re S Settlement [2001] JLR N37, the court must satisfy itself (i) first that the trustee's decision has been formed in good faith, (ii) second that the decision is one at which a reasonable trustee properly instructed could have reached; and (iii) third, that the decision has not been vitiated by any actual or potential conflict of interest."

Decision on the French write-off

38.     This matter was fully canvassed before the Court at the November Hearing and the parties had full opportunity to provide evidence in support of their contentions, which led to the Court refusing the application in the January 2024 Judgment.  As we have already stated, the Court, having expressly noted that it was not directing the Trustees, expressed the view in that judgment that the Trustees could not be criticised were they to allocate the Company B French Loans equally as between D and C.

39.     At the hearing before us, Advocate Mistry took us to further affidavit evidence filed by D subsequent to the January 2024 Judgment in which she sought to argue that there were additional benefits obtained by C in relation to the French Property which would justify a larger proportion of the Company B French Loans being allocated to C.  In our view, those submissions ignored the fact that the French Property was not itself a trust asset and did not justify adjustments to the 50/50 split in relation to the benefit of the Company B French Loans.

40.     Advocate Sharp, on behalf of C, pointed out that at the November Hearing D had argued that most of the benefit of the Company B French Loans should be attributed to C, and on that occasion she had ample opportunity to present the further evidence which she now suggested supported her contention.

41.     Having examined the further evidence, we do not regard it as supporting the view that the acquisition of the French Property was anything other than a joint venture between D and C. Looking at one of the main reasons why the property was purchased, which was described by a representative of the Trustees as being to "help D satisfy her riding ambition", we can well understand why, in its January 2024 Judgment, the Court said:

"We recognise that there might have been some mileage in C's claim that she should bear less than 50% of the loss, but she has sensibly accepted a 50/50 split in her submissions to us."

42.     The further evidence provided by D does not cause us to doubt  the conclusion that was reached by the Court in the January 2024 Judgment and, in our view, the Trustees' decision to allocate the Company B French Loans equally between D and C was formed in good faith, was one which a reasonable trustee properly instructed could have reached, and has not been vitiated by any actual or potential conflict of interest.  We accordingly blessed that decision.

Property 1

43.     As we have already noted, the Trustees did not seek any order from the Court in relation to Property 1, the Court having already provided its blessing to the Trustees' decision as to how to proceed in its January 2024 Judgment.  However, D, in her skeleton argument, sought an order that the Court refuse its blessing of the Trustees' decision that it be sold for £2 million either to D or a third party and sought further orders relating to its value and the apportionment of any difference between its sale price and its "current value".

44.     It is clear that the continued delay in the sale of Property 1 is a block to the implementation of the 2022 Equalisation.  The delay appears to be largely attributable to D's failure to engage with the Trustees in relation to her desire to purchase it.  In relation to her ability to purchase the property, it would appear that she has now sold her property in Country 3, and we note that at the hearing before us B indicated that she had offered D financial assistance to purchase it given her concern for her mother, who also lives in the property.  D's defence of the Eviction Proceedings appears to be yet a further attempt on her part to delay a decision as to whether or not to purchase it.  Further delay is likely to have a financial impact on her siblings.  As the Trustees have pointed out, D is not being forced to purchase the property: if she does not wish, or is unable, to purchase it she clearly has sufficient funds from the sale of her Country 3 property to purchase an alternative.

Orders on the Trustees' application

45.     For the above reasons we blessed the Trustees' decision to allocate the Company B French Loans 50/50 between C and D and implement the 2022 Equalisation by way of the Amended Distribution Plan.

The inquiry in relation to the Trustees' costs

46.     In its January 2024 Judgment, the Court had ordered that the internal administration costs of the Trustees and the fees and expenses paid to outside lawyers and other professional advisers since the date of the Settlor's death should be referred to the Judicial Greffier for taxation on the trustee basis, namely whether those internal costs and fees had been reasonably and properly incurred.

47.     Given the magnitude of the task, the Court had ordered that an external costs expert be appointed as a Greffier Substitute, if the Bailiff so agreed, at the cost of the Family Trusts, with a view to settling the appropriate figure for both administrative fees and expenses.  The Court had invited the parties to agree terms of reference for the Greffier Substitute, which were to be submitted to the Court for approval on the papers.  We were told by Advocate Santos Costa that draft terms of reference had been submitted to the parties by the Trustees and discussions have taken place.  Unfortunately, it had not as yet proved possible to agree the identity of the proposed Greffier Substitute.

48.     At the hearing before us, Advocate Mistry requested that the review of the Trustees' costs should be extended to include costs prior to January 2021.  In this connection he referred to paragraph 54 of the January 2024 Judgment, in which the Court said:

 "As we understand it, the Settlor approved the Trustees' fees until December 2020 when he died. There may be some contention as to whether he had capacity to approve those bills in the last years of his life. As we understand it, no beneficiary has approved the Trustees' fees and expenses since. The fact that the Settlor may have approved the bills to the date of death does not in our judgment prohibit any challenge to those fees by any of the beneficiaries subsequently, although it is not apparent that there is any appetite on their part to take that step, at least at the moment. In this judgment we concern ourselves only with the fees and expenses incurred since the date of the Settlor's death."

49.     In response Advocate Santos Costa submitted that the Trustees did not consider the Alhamrani threshold to have been met with regard to their historic costs.  He pointed out that were the Court to agree such an order, an application for a further extension of the Vesting Date would be required due to the need to repay any monies to the trusts from which they were taken.  He suggested that this would further delay the implementation of the 2022 Equalisation.  Further, in terms of the costs of any taxation, he submitted that these would need to be met from the Family Trusts.

50.     Advocate Mistry's application, which was only brought before the Court in his skeleton argument, was one which may involve different considerations from those applicable to the existing order for taxation.  For example, there may be provisions in the trust deeds or elsewhere that relate to the Settlor's approval, a possible enquiry as to the Settlor's mental capacity, and there may need to be an examination as to why a previous reallocation exercise, referred to as "the Macfarlanes Plan", was not carried out.  The finding that the Alhamrani threshold was met in relation to the costs incurred after the Settlor's death does not necessarily mean that it was met in respect of those incurred prior to his death.  The Court has previously noted that the existing taxation exercise is of some considerable magnitude and Advocate Mistry's application, if successful, would significantly increase the work and time required, the costs of which would be likely to be borne by the T Trusts and thus by the beneficiaries.  Furthermore, it may well require a further extension to the Vesting Dates.

51.     We therefore indicated to Advocate Mistry that should he wish to pursue the application it should be made by way of a formal application, supported by argument as to why it is appropriate, to which the other parties may respond in the usual way.

A further submission by D

52.     Advocate Mistry referred us to the costs orders against the Trustees in respect of the May 2023 Hearing set out at paragraph 5(a)(i) and (ii) of the January 2024 Act of Court, and in respect of the November 2023 Hearing set out at paragraph 5(c)(i) of the January 2024 Act of Court, noting that the Trustees had repaid the sum of £133,594.91 but had provided no explanation as to how that sum had been calculated, although Advocate Santos Costa directed the Court to an email which, on the face of it, appeared to explain the basis for the Trustees' calculations.  We directed Advocate Mistry to compile such questions as he may have in respect of that particular sum and/or any other sums that have been supplied (the "Clarification Requests"); and directed that the Trustees shall respond, within fourteen days of receipt, to any such Clarification Requests received.

Vesting Dates

53.     Given the continued delays in implementing the 2022 Equalisation, we acceded to the Trustees' application, which was not opposed, for the Vesting Dates of the Vesting Trusts to be extended to 31 March 2025, with liberty to apply for a further extension.

Costs of the July 2024 hearing

54.     We were not addressed in relation to the costs of the hearing.  We do not believe that any of the parties object to the costs, if any, of Advocate Renouf as Guardian being paid from the Y Trust on the indemnity basis.

55.     Our provisional view is that the Trustees should have their management costs and legal fees incurred of and incidental to the hearing payable out of the T Trusts on the Alhamrani basis and that the beneficiaries should bear their own costs.  Our reasoning in relation to the Trustees' costs is that the orders made in respect of the previous two hearings reflected the Court's criticism of the Trustees' conduct, and the Court has now found that the decision which the Trustees sought to have blessed at the July hearing was an appropriate one.

56.     In relation to the proposed order in respect of the beneficiaries, this avoids a sibling effectively having to pay any part of the costs of the other siblings and reflects the fact that they will in due course each be receiving a distribution which will in effect reimburse that expenditure.  It also reflects the fact that a significant part of the hearing was taken up by D's argument in relation to the 50/50 split, which did not succeed, and discussion of her procrastination in relation to the sale of Property 1.

57.     Should any of the parties wish to express an alternative view to that which we have provisionally expressed then they shall have fourteen days from delivery of the draft judgment to make written submissions.

Authorities

Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984. 

HSBC Trustee (CI) Limited v Kwong [2018] JRC 051A. 

In the matter of the Representation of Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited and Ocorian Limited - Re: Y Trust [2023] JRC 087. 

Representation of Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Limited and Ocorian Limited Re T Trust [2024] JRC 015. 

In Re Otto Poon Trust [2015] JCA 109.