Before : |
A. R. Binnington Esq., Commissioner |
Between |
Z |
Plaintiff |
And |
(1) Hawksford Trust Company Jersey Limited (2) Hawksford Nominees Jersey Limited (3) Hawksford Fiduciaries Limited (4) Hawksford Secretaries Jersey Limited (5) Hawksford Jersey Limited (7) B Limited (8) C Limited (9) D Limited (10) E Limited (11) F Limited (12) G Limited (13) H Limited |
Defendants |
IN PRIVATE
Advocate E. B. Drummond for the Plaintiff.
Advocate J. C. Turnbull for the First to Fifth Defendants.
judgment
the commissioner:
1. This is an application brought by way of summons ("the Summons") by the First to Fifth Defendants ("the Hawksford Defendants") for a payment on account of costs and an order for the payment of the costs of the Summons and a payment on account of such costs. The Hawksford Defendants further request that Taxation of all the First to Fifth Defendants' costs be referred to the Assistant Judicial Greffier "for early determination".
2. On 16 June 2022, the Plaintiff ("Z") made an application by way of Order of Justice for Norwich Pharmacal orders in aid of potential claims that she might have in respect of a family wealth structure running to many hundreds of millions of dollars. As is standard practice for Plaintiffs in Norwich Pharmacal applications, Z gave an undertaking that she would pay the "reasonable costs" of the Defendants, who were all "innocent parties". It has been accepted in this Court that "reasonable costs" is equivalent to a costs order on the indemnity basis.
3. The Hawksford Defendants were but five of thirteen defendants in the Norwich Pharmacal claim. Save for making submissions in relation to the scope and timings for compliance with the orders sought, the Hawksford Defendants rested on the wisdom of the Court in respect of the claim. Orders were made in the Norwich Pharmacal proceedings on 28 July 2022 ("the Orders") which required the Hawksford Defendants to provide to Z documents and information in relation to seventy Jersey companies ("the Companies"). The Orders were more extensive than typical Norwich Pharmacal orders in that they required the Hawksford Defendants not only to provide copies of documents, but also to collate and provide information, including statements of current assets.
4. An example of the wide-ranging scope of certain provisions of the Orders was given by Mr Craig Macleod, an Associate employed in the Insolvency and Dispute Resolution Department of Walkers, acting for the Hawksford Defendants, in an affidavit sworn on 9 June 2023 in which, at paragraph 24, he stated:
"The disclosure exercise presented a significant challenge not only because of the volume of potentially responsive documentation identified, but because of the wide-ranging scope of certain provisions of the Orders, for example, the requirement to: "disclose full details of any transfers of assets into or out of the [redacted] (as a re-settlement or otherwise, of income, capital or any other assets) from the date of formation to date, stating to whom the transfers were made, when and in what format (e.g. cash or in specie)."
5. In an affidavit sworn on 9 June 2023 on behalf of the Hawksford Defendants by Mr Fleming David Carswell, a director of the First Defendant, Mr Carswell stated that in order to comply with the Orders some 70,000 documents had to be manually reviewed in order to identify relevant documents. Significant difficulties were identified in respect of the scope and scale of the discovery exercise, and it soon became apparent that more time would be required by the Hawksford Defendants to comply. Accordingly on 30 August 2022, they issued a summons seeking, inter alia, an extension of the deadlines contained in the Orders. Following a hearing before the Royal Court on 8 September 2022, the deadlines were extended by six weeks. Subsequently, Z and the Hawksford Defendants agreed a further extension of one week by consent.
6. Mr Carswell explained that the exercise involved collating documents from four data sources containing potentially relevant information, namely eDocs, Jobstream, hard copy files and Mimecast. A team drawn from the client team worked through the files with the assistance of further members of staff from support teams. In order to facilitate the review of those documents to determine which were disclosable and to identify those that were not themselves disclosable, but contained relevant information, hard copies were scanned in by junior members of staff so that they could be reviewed electronically. Mr Carswell stated that this was a very onerous task as some of the files that had to be reviewed dated back decades.
7. Mr Carswell went on to state that once the scale of the task became clear to the Hawksford Defendants, the team was supplemented by significant additional reviewer resources arranged by Walkers, including paralegals and junior barristers.
8. Pursuant to the September Order of the Royal Court and with the agreement of Z, the Hawksford Defendants instructed an eDiscovery provider, TransPerfect, to provide an electronic platform for the review of the documents, this being the provider selected by Z as her preferred choice of provider from the options provided by the Hawksford defendants.
9. TransPerfect collected the electronic documents held by the Hawksford Defendants, including scans of physical files and minute books. They were then processed, resulting in 94,670 processed documents which were "de-duplicated" globally on family level to 79,128 documents. Those documents were then uploaded to TransPerfect's eDiscovery platform, "Relativity". Once in Relativity, the documents were subject to e-mail threading, leaving a total of 68,788 documents. In addition to those documents, a Mimecast archive of 302,051 historic emails that were potentially relevant were identified by the Hawksford Defendants and these were extracted by TransPerfect and processed, resulting in 450,114 documents which were then de-duplicated to 424,196 documents and uploaded to Relativity.
10. The Mimecast data was subject to an agreed keyword search which reduced the number to 4,226. Some 73,014 documents were manually reviewed by Hawksford's review team.
11. The Hawksford Defendants' own costs up to 8 February 2023 totalled £256,925.31, not including legal or eDiscovery costs.
12. As is usual in applications for Norwich Pharmacal Orders, Z was required to give an undertaking to pay the "reasonable costs" of the Hawksford Defendants incurred as a result of the Order.
13. In In the Matter of the Brazilian Trust [2018] JRC 038, Clyde-Smith, Commissioner, held (at para. 20) that such costs should extend to all reasonable legal and administrative costs in complying. The Commissioner further held (at para. 21) that although the use of the expression "reasonable costs" predated the then current taxation regime under Part 12 of the Royal Court Rules 2004, it equated to indemnity costs as defined in Rule 12/5, namely "all costs except insofar as they are unreasonable in amount or have been unreasonably incurred with any doubt being resolved in favour of the receiving party".
14. In Marange Invs. (Pty.) Ltd v La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines SARL [2013] JRC 119A, Commissioner Clyde-Smith observed (at para. 53) that he understood that it was unusual for costs on the indemnity basis to be taxed down more than 10%.
15. In relation to the quantum of internal administrative costs that can be recovered, counsel for Z suggested that the relevant legal principles could be summarised as follows:
(i) Usually, parties who are legally represented have no entitlement to recover their own internal costs at all.
(ii) However, defendants to Norwich Pharmacal applications ordered to give disclosure of information (who are typically innocent third parties) with the benefit of an undertaking as to their reasonable costs are able to seek to recover the internal expense incurred in providing the information.
(iii) Such expenses must be necessarily and reasonably incurred in compliance with the disclosure orders made. The undertaking is not a licence to incur expenses with impunity with the right to recoup them from the Plaintiff.
(iv) The appropriate level of staff should be used. As compliance with such orders is part of the business of service providers in Jersey, they should have on staff an officer at the appropriate level to respond to such orders. It is not appropriate to use the most senior level of staff, particularly where lawyers are also retained to vet the final production.
(v) The costs which can be recovered are restricted to a reasonable sum for the actual and direct costs of the work undertaken and should not include any proportion of the Defendant's overheads or any profit element referable thereto.
16. The starting point for this analysis was the decision of the House of Lords in the case which gave its name to these orders, Norwich Pharmacal v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133, which referred to the disclosing party being "reimbursed" the "expense incurred" in providing the information.
17. In Cartier International v BT [2018] 1 WLR 3259, a UK Supreme Court decision involving a website blocking order, Lord Sumption reviewed the domestic English law position in relation to the costs of compliance with Norwich Pharmacal and similar orders (at paragraph 12 and 13) and at paragraph 31 stated:
"As a matter of English law, the ordinary principle is that unless there are good reasons for a different order an innocent intermediary is entitled to be indemnified by the rightholder against the costs of complying with a website blocking order. The position in relation to website blocking orders is no different in principle from the established position in domestic law in the case of Norwich Pharmacal orders, freezing orders and other injunctions granted to require an innocent party to assist the claimant in the assertion of its rights against a wrongdoer.....
.....
36....The indemnity must be limited to reasonable compliance costs....."
18. In a case decided by the Chief Justice of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, Hampshire Cosmetic Labs Ltd v Cayman National Bank [1999] CILR N-1, the court was considering a contested bill presented by a defendant bank which had been ordered to give Norwich Pharmacal disclosure. In that case, the bank had engaged lawyers but the President and Compliance Officer at the bank, a Mr Gunby, had also become personally involved on the basis that i) the order presented difficulties which required his involvement; and ii) there were logistical difficulties faced by the bank in having to comply with the order and a number of other orders for discovery. The Chief Justice said:
"As to the latter concerns, I need say no more than that the Plaintiff in a particular case cannot be expected to meet the costs of a bank in complying with an order where those costs are brought about because the bank's staff is overwhelmed with other work. Banking business in these islands is such that disclosure orders have to be complied with and the appropriate numbers and levels of staffing should be in place to do so.
As regards the former concerns other issues arise: there can be very little reason to engage the time of the bank's most senior officer in ensuring that the bank fulfils its legal obligations to all concerned in complying with an order where the bank also engages the services of lawyers who are to be highly paid for attending to just that matter."
19. The Chief Justice went on to say that:
"....the promise to repay expenses incurred in complying with the order is a promise to repay only such expenses as are necessarily and reasonably incurred. Otherwise, the promise could be taken as a licence to incur expenses with impunity with the right to recoup them from the plaintiff.
.... I think it is reasonable for the bank to expect to recover the actual costs of its officers involved in seeing to the observance of an order plus a little extra for the business disruption or inconvenience of having their time spent away from normal banking business."
20. The Chief Justice continued:
"However there are yet further considerations involved here: as already noted, the normal course of banking business in this jurisdiction does involve compliance with ex parte orders on a regular basis. A bank is therefore well advised to have on staff an officer at the appropriate level who can effectively respond to such orders. I do not believe the client public would consider it reasonable that the person should be at the most senior level of the bank. This would be all the less acceptable where lawyers are to be routinely involved in vetting the final production to ensure proper legal compliance from all points of view. In that scenario, one would expect the more mechanical function involving the bank simply identifying and retrieving the information for presentation to the lawyers. The orders themselves are usually clear enough for those purposes and that was indisputably so in this case as specific transactions and dates were provided. I therefore do not regard the entire expense of Mr Gunby himself being involved as reasonably incurred."
21. Counsel for Z suggested that there was a close analogy to the position in relation to corporate litigants who use their own in-house expert, rather than instructing an external expert to assist them in litigation. In Re Nossen's Patent [1969] 1 WLR 638 Lloyd-Jacob J, sitting in the English Chancery Division, held that the charges of such an in-house expert could be recovered but the amount must be restricted to a "reasonable sum for the actual and direct costs of the work undertaken", and could not include a proportion of the corporation's overheads or "any profit element referable thereto", no part of such expenditure having been occasioned by the litigation.
22. We were advised by counsel for Z that, consistent with these legal principles, it is the practice of the Assistant Judicial Greffier in Jersey on the taxation of internal administrative costs incurred by local service providers who have to review files to give Norwich Pharmacal disclosure, to allow only the actual and direct cost of the time spent by the relevant individuals involved but without any proportion of the overheads or any profit element.
23. The Court agrees with the broad principles articulated by the Chief Justice of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands in the Hampshire Cosmetic Labs case (supra). However much will turn on the facts of an individual case. Given the frequency of disclosure orders that are made, whether as ancillary to freezing orders or as Norwich Pharmacal relief, it may well be prudent for Jersey financial services providers to have on their staff an officer at the appropriate level who can co-ordinate and deal with the response to such orders. Where the information sought is relatively straightforward, such as account balances, copy statements and the like, and is in respect of a relatively limited period, then the number of staff required is likely to be minimal.
24. However, in the present case the Hawksford Defendants were required to review the files of some seventy Jersey entities, and, in some cases, the Orders referred to a time period starting from the date of incorporation of the entity. Of the seventy entities, nine were registered in the 1990s, eleven in the 2000s and thirty-seven between 2010 and 2015. Given the number of entities and the period of time covered by the disclosure orders, the scale of the exercise was significantly beyond the scale of the disclosure exercise contemplated by the Chief Justice in the Hampshire Cosmetic Labs decision. It is therefore unsurprising that the Hawksford Defendants found themselves having to draw upon their lawyers, Walkers, to provide additional reviewer resources including paralegals and junior barristers. Furthermore, given the strict time limits required by the Orders for the provision of information, it would be unrealistic to expect the Hawksford Defendants to have recruited additional temporary staff at such short notice. This appears to have been accepted by Z as, in Mr Carswell's Third Affidavit, sworn on 9 June 2023, Mr Carswell stated, at paragraph 21 that "I understand that Advocate Drummond [Z's counsel] indicated his client's expectation that paralegals and junior barristers be utilised for the review exercise at the 8 September hearing".
25. In relation to the Royal Court's jurisdiction to order a payment on account of costs, the relevant principles were set out in the Marange Investments (Proprietary) Ltd decision (supra) at paragraphs 42 to 44 as follows:
"42. The principle in relation to the payment of costs on account is set out in the judgment of Jacob J in Mars UK Limited v Techknowledge Ltd. [1999] 2 Costs LR 44 (cited in Centre Trustees):
"I now turn to the second issue, whether or not there should be an order for interim payment. The first thing to do is to consider what the general rule should be, interim payment or not. There is no guidance given in the Rules other than that the court may order a payment on account. There is no guidance in the Practice direction. So, I approach the matter as a question of principle. Where a party has won and has got an order for costs the only reason that he does not get the money straightaway is because of the need for a detailed assessment [taxation]. Nobody knows how much it should be. If the detailed assessment were carried out instantly he would get the order instantly. So, the successful party is entitled to the money. In principle he ought to get it as soon as possible. It does not seem to me to be a good reason for keeping him out of some of his costs that you need time to work out the total amount. A payment of some lesser amount which he will almost certainly collect is a closer approximation to justice. So I hold that where a party is successful the court should on a rough and ready basis also normally order an amount to be paid on account, the amount being a lesser sum than the likely full amount".
43. Lower on the same page, Jacob J said:
"Thus, I start from the proposition that there should be an interim payment in general. However, the court has a discretion. In exercising that discretion, the court must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case."
44. The court should not, therefore, seek to conduct a taxation or detailed view of the successful party's costs, but adopt "a rough and ready" approach, in order to arrive at a figure which the successful party "will almost certainly collect."
26. In relation to the amount of detail that the receiving party needs to provide in order to enable the court to make its "rough and ready" calculation, the Royal Court (MacRae, DB) held, in Representation of Shinhan Securities Co Ltd [2023] JRC 050, at paragraph 17, that:
"...it is clear that the receiving party is not obliged to provide a formal bill of costs such as that which would be required for taxation......
18. Shinhan accepted that the calculation for interim costs would be a rough and ready exercise but that the summary needed to be prepared so as to give the court adequate information to make an estimate of a reasonable sum and said, with some force, that some of the information supplied by the Fund in relation to its costs was inadequate."
27. The Deputy Bailiff went on to say at paragraph 33, that:
"Although a draft bill of costs need not be prepared, it is necessary for the court to be "adequately informed so as to be able to make an estimate of a reasonable sum" in respect of the costs of English counsel, the Hong Kong expert and the Hong Kong lawyers. It was insufficient, in my view, for the court to simply be presented with a figure or, in the case of the Hong Kong lawyers, more information but (in that case) figures arguably calculated on the wrong basis and without, in relation to all three claims, any supporting narrative. Even a few paragraphs describing the work done by each lawyer/set of lawyers the subject of the relevant disbursement might have been sufficient, and certainly it would have been helpful for the paying party to have received well before the hearing. In fact, a description of the work done by the respective lawyers was, to a large extent, only revealed in oral submission sur le champ during the hearing. When such significant sums are being sought such material (which does not need to be extensive) is required so that the paying party is in a position to make considered submissions and the court has material enabling it to adopt anything other than the most cautious of approaches."
28. In an affidavit sworn on 23 June 2023 on behalf of Z by Sonia Shah, a Senior Associate in the litigation department of Z's Jersey lawyers, Bedell Cristin, Ms Shah summarised Z's position in relation to the Hawksford fees. She stated that Z had fortified her undertaking to pay the reasonable costs of the Hawksford Defendants by way of a payment of £100,000 to her firm's client account and that Z was making arrangements to transfer a further £365,000 to her firm's client account to be held to the Court's order in respect of the Hawksford summons. She stated that on the basis of invoices provided to Z so far, the Hawksford Defendants had purportedly incurred £1,143,839.24 in costs between July 2022 and February 2023. Of that sum, Z had paid £125,375.42 to meet the full costs of junior counsel engaged by Walkers (acting for the Hawksford Defendants) to undertake the discovery exercise and i) had paid £33,184.79 and ii) was making arrangements to pay a further £28,734.72 to meet the full costs of TransPerfect (namely, £61,919.51) which supplied the e-disclosure platform and related services in respect of the "Hawksford Documents". She stated that Z had not paid Walkers' invoices amounting to £719,619, having made clear in correspondence concerns about the unreasonableness of the fees incurred and that she had made offers (which the Court understood to be £365,000 in full and final settlement) to settle those fees for what she considered to be a reasonable amount, which offers had not been accepted. She added that Z had not paid the Hawksford Defendants' own internal invoices amounting to £236,925.31 (which had apparently been calculated on the basis that the profit element had been removed) having concerns about the unreasonableness of the fees incurred and the rates applied by the Hawksford Defendants. She stated that the Plaintiff had requested further information regarding Hawksford's invoices, which was not provided. Ms Shah stated that the Hawksford Defendants had failed to file a costs schedule in the usual way or to even to propose an appropriate sum for a payment on account. They had not provided any information in respect of their costs of and incidental to the Summons. It should however be noted that a schedule of costs of and incidental to the hearing on 3 July 2023 was subsequently provided in the court bundle, amounting to £77,364.00 in respect of Walkers' fees and £23,864.16 in respect of Hawksford's costs. She stated that Z would satisfy any order the Royal Court (or the taxing officer) made as regards costs and reiterated that Z had paid £187,294.93 in respect of the Hawksford Defendants' costs to date. She further confirmed that her firm would be holding £465,000 pursuant to Z's undertaking and/or to the Court's order in respect of the summons.
29. The starting point is that as an "innocent party" the Hawksford Defendants are entitled to their reasonable costs, which is the equivalent of costs on the indemnity basis, from Z. Furthermore, where a party's entitlement to costs is not in dispute, in this case as the Plaintiff has given the Court an undertaking to pay them, then the receiving party is entitled to ask the Court to order an amount to be paid on account, the amount being a lesser sum than the likely full amount and calculated "on a rough and ready basis".
30. Whilst the principle of payment may be agreed between the parties, in this case, the quantum is most certainly not. The tenor of the correspondence between their respective lawyers suggests that the possibility of their reaching agreement is somewhat remote.
31. By way of example, in a letter dated 23 November 2022 from Advocate Drummond of Bedell Cristin to Advocate Turnbull of Walkers in relation to receipt of copies of Walkers' and counsels invoices for July, August, September and October 2022, Advocate Drummond stated, by way of general comment, "our client's overarching concern is that your firm seems to have adopted a "kitchen sink" approach to its bills, treating our client's undertaking as a blank cheque, without any consideration of the reasonableness of the fees charged. This is both unreasonable and inappropriate".
32. In response, by letter dated 13 December 2022, Advocate Turnbull stated, "the intemperate and professionally discourteous content of your letter betrays the cold reality that Z's "objections" are almost entirely fallacious and/or unjustified".
33. Advocate Drummond's response on 20 December 2022 stated, "once your letter is stripped of hyperbole, it is clear that the parties disagree on the issue of whether or not the fees incurred by your firm are unreasonable in amount or have been unreasonably incurred, and thus whether or not they are payable by our client under the terms of her undertaking".
34. There can be little doubt that the work required to be carried out, at short notice and within a tight timeframe, by the Hawksford Defendants in order to comply with the Orders was a significant exercise. The scale of the exercise was such that it would have been unlikely that there would be sufficient resources within their business to deal with it. In those circumstances it was reasonable for them to look for external resources to assist. They looked to their lawyers to provide those resources and one of the issues to be determined on taxation would be whether that resulted in employing individuals with a higher level of expertise than was required, and thus higher cost. Whilst it might be argued that it would have been preferable for the Hawksford Defendants to have sought to employ less qualified staff directly on a temporary basis, that was unlikely to have been a realistic option given the timeframe and, in any event, might well have resulted in more input being required from Walkers to check the results of the work. There may well therefore have been some advantages in making use of resources from a law firm as against employing temporary less-qualified staff. It should also be noted that Z's advisers were aware of this choice by the time of the 8 September 2022 hearing. However, whichever resources were used, it is clear that a significant degree of oversight would inevitably have been required from Walkers given the number of entities involved and the extent of the information required. The Court recognises that on taxation, where a far more detailed review is carried out, there is likely to be some argument as to whether the staff used were at an appropriate level and whether their charge-out rates were reasonable.
35. Effectively on the eve of the hearing of the Summons, the parties began to engage in relation to a payment on account of costs. The Hawksford Defendants offered to accept the sum of £465,000 as a payment on account of both the Hawksford Defendants' costs and Walkers' fees but this was rejected. A counter-offer of £365,000 was made by Z and when this was rejected the Hawksford Defendants' offer was increased to £415,000 which was also rejected.
36. Despite the provision of a breakdown of Walkers' fees and limited details of the costs of the Hawksford Defendants, it is not possible for this Court to do anything other than apply a very "rough and ready" approach, balancing the scale of the exercise that was required by the Orders against the very significant levels of fees and costs that were incurred by the Hawksford Defendants. It is clear that there are considerable differences of opinion between the parties as to the reasonableness of the amount of time spent and whether the individuals used were at an appropriate level. Those differences will have to be resolved by means of a detailed review on taxation. It would certainly assist the process if the parties were to address those issues in conjunction with the provision of the detailed breakdown.
37. In relation to the Hawksford Defendants' own costs of £236,925.31, Z has not made any payment and has maintained, inter alia, that she has not received satisfactory answers to her questions. Taking into account the fact that the costs have already been discounted to remove the profit element, but recognising that there remain significant issues between the parties in relation to these costs that are as yet unresolved, I order the Plaintiff to make a payment on account of 60% those costs, amounting to £142,155.18.
38. In relation to the unpaid Walkers' invoices amounting to £719,619, whilst it is acknowledged that Z made an offer to pay £365,000, that offer was on the basis that the sum would be in full and final settlement rather than by way of a payment on account. Recognising that there may be some significant areas of dispute on taxation of those costs, I order that Z makes a payment on account of 50% of those costs, being £359,809.50.
39. In relation to the costs of the Summons, the parties have set out their submissions in their skeleton arguments and in oral submissions. The Hawksford Defendants seek payment of both their own costs and the costs of Walkers in respect of the Summons on an indemnity basis. Z's counsel submits that the issue of a summons was not necessary for the costs to be submitted to taxation. Indeed, had the Hawksford Defendants commenced the taxation process at an earlier stage, they would have had to prepare detailed costs schedules which might have assisted the parties to reach agreement. Z's counsel also noted that the first request for a payment on account was made when the Summons was issued. They suggested that had a request been made earlier the matter could have been dealt with by agreement. In the light of the tenor of the correspondence between the parties that may be a somewhat optimistic assertion. There is however force in the suggestion that the claims should have been referred for taxation at an earlier stage, but it was equally open to both parties to have raised the possibility of a payment on account at an earlier stage. Had the Plaintiff been willing to make offers of a payment on account rather than in full and final settlement the dialogue between the parties might have been more productive. In relation to the Hawksford Defendants' request for "early determination" of the taxation of their costs the costs should be submitted to the Assistant Judicial Greffier in the usual manner.
40. Although the "innocent parties" to a Norwich Pharmacal application are able to recover their own costs of compliance with the orders in addition to their legal costs, it does not follow that this principle should be applied to the costs of the Summons. In the light of the above, the Court orders the Plaintiff to pay the legal costs of the Hawksford Defendants in relation to the Summons on the standard basis, not the indemnity basis, and makes no order in respect of the Hawksford Defendants' own costs, nor does the Court make an order for a payment on account of the costs of the Summons.
41. The order is therefore as follows:
(i) The Plaintiff shall make a payment on account in respect of all the First to Fifth Defendants' costs in the total sum of £501,964.68 within 28 days of the date of this judgment.
(ii) The legal costs of the First to Fifth Defendants' of and incidental to the Summons be paid by the Plaintiff on the standard basis, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.
(iii) Taxation of all of the First to Fifth Defendants' costs as aforesaid shall be referred to the Assistant Judicial Greffier.
Authorities
In the Matter of the Brazilian Trust [2018] JRC 038.
Marange Invs. (Pty.) Ltd v La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines SARL [2013] JRC 119A.
Norwich Pharmacal v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133.
Cartier International v BT [2018] 1 WLR 3259.
Hampshire Cosmetic Labs Ltd v Cayman National Bank [1999] CILR N-1.
Re Nossen's Patent [1969] 1 WLR 638.