Appeal - Leave to Appeal - Decision.
Before : |
Sir Timothy Le Cocq, Bailiff, sitting alone |
Between |
Camilla de Bourbon des Deux Siciles |
Plaintiff |
And |
Zedra Jersey Trust Corporation Limited (formerly BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation Limited) |
Defendant |
Between |
Zedra Jersey Trust Corporation Limited (formerly BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation Limited |
Plaintiff |
And |
Camilla de Bourbon des Deux Siciles |
Defendant |
Advocate H. B. Mistry for the Plaintiff
Advocate W. A. F. Redgrave for the Defendant
judgment
DECISION ON LEAVE TO APPEAL
the bailiff:
1. This is a decision on the papers of the application of Camilla de Bourbon des Deux Siciles ("Camilla") for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Royal Court (the Bailiff sitting alone) of 12th October 2022 ("the Judgment").
2. The Judgment dismissed Camilla's application seeking a stay of certain orders of the Court dated 22nd December 2020 and ordered that Camilla be debarred from prosecuting the claims set out in her Order of Justice against Zedra Jersey Trust Corporation ("Zedra") until she has paid in full the balance of £2 million fine imposed upon her for contempt of Court. The Court also made an order that Camilla pay Zedra's costs of and incidental to its application on the indemnity basis.
3. The test for determining whether or not leave to appeal should be granted requires the prospective appellant to show that:
(i) The appeal has a real prospect of success;
(ii) A question of general principle falls to be decided for the first time; or
(iii) There is an important question of law upon which further argument and a decision of the Court of Appeal will be to the public advantage.
4. In the Judgment, the Court cited authority that had been placed before it and specifically the cases of Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567 and Bettinson v Bettinson [1965] Ch 465 and X Limited v Morgan Grampian Limited [1992] 2 All ER 1. The Court concluded that it had a discretion to exercise and was able as a matter of the exercise of that discretion to make the ruling debarring Camilla from continuing her proceedings should it be just to do so. For the reasons set out in the Judgment, the Court concluded that an order would be just and would be proportionate.
5. The Plaintiff argues that the import of Bettinson is to the effect that the 'rule' that a party could not move till he had cleared his contempt must be confined to proceedings in the same cause. It is furthermore suggested that the order of the Court was not proportionate and was 'exorbitant'. Lastly, it is argued that there is a point of general principle to be decided for the first time, namely whether or not a Hadkinson type order can apply to causes other than the cause where the civil contempt was found.
6. The Court, in the Judgment, identified that there was a discretion to exercise and there was a sufficient basis for exercising that discretion. It was not disproportionate to do so as Camilla can purge her contempt at any time and continue with her proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal would not, on the usual principles concerning the exercise of a discretion, have a real prospect of success.
7. However, there has not, as far as I am aware, been a previous decision in Jersey about whether or not a discretion to impose a Hadkinson type order can be exercised in a cause that is different from, though very closely related to, the cause in which the contempt arose.
8. That is a matter that might fall within 3(ii) and 3(iii) above and I accordingly grant leave to appeal on that ground only.
Authorities
Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567.
Bettinson v Bettinson [1965] Ch 465.
X Limited v Morgan Grampian Limited [1992] 2 All ER 1.